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

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THE PRODUCTIVITY OF PEASANT FARMING ACCORDING TO BUDGET STATISTICS.

By Prof. S. N. Prokopovitch.*)

Paper read before the Association on February 1st, 1923.

The main point in the study of the productivity of peasant farming is that of establishing the degree to which its gross yield is influenced, on the one hand, by the various factors of production and, on the other — by the market.

For the purpose of establishing the degree of such influence, I have used budget statistics of peasant households. The methods of analysis will be explained later. Up to the present I have been able to complete the investigation concerning two districts of Russia, widely different as to conditions of farming, viz. one in the North (Vologda) and one on the black soil of the province of Kharkoff (Starobielsk). The analysis of the material obtained for the prov. of Tambov is not yet completed.

We will start our investigation from a brief characteristic of the sizes of the holdings, of the number of hands available and of the stock and implements at the disposal of the peasant farms to which the budget data now being analyzed refer.

According to the size of holdings the farms with which we are dealing, are grouped as follows:

Sizes of holdings	Districts			Sizes of holdings	Districts		
	Vologda	Tambov	Starobielsk		Vologda	Tambov	Starobielsk
Up to 3 des.	4.	2.	—	15.1-20 des	15.	3.	14.
3.1-6 des.	26.	30.	14.	20.1-30 »	16.	1.	12.
6.1- 9 »	19.	27.	17.	Over 30 d.	14	2.	6.
9.1-12 »	25.	9.	15.				
12.1-15 »	17.	11.	13.	Total ...	136.	85.	91.

We cannot be sure that this grouping is strictly representative of the actual distribution of peasant holdings in the districts to which the budget data apply. Accordingly, we are not going to dwell on this aspect of the problem. We are concerned in another question: viz. — what are the mutual relations between the separate factors of production in peasant farming? In order to make these relations clear, in the first instance we must study the absolute figures, in which these several factors are expressed.

*) It is with the greatest pleasure that we are giving to our readers this paper by Prof. S. N. Prokopovitch. Apart from the purely theoretical interest in the new method applied, which enables us to grasp the complex mutual relations between the productivity of peasant farming and a whole series of economic factors, this paper presents much purely practical interest. In the first instance, it enables one to do away with some very harmful illusions concerning the Russian agrarian problem. Then, it fixes the attention on a very simple truth, which, however, has not yet been fully realised by all, viz. that a speedy reconstruction of Russian farming requires the investment in Russian agriculture of capital from abroad. A speedy infusion of such capital is alone able quickly to raise the productivity of Russian farming and to lay a solid foundation to the re-establishment of Russian national economy, while, at the same time, helping to fill up the gap in the world's economic organisation, due to the absence from it of Russia. (*Edit.*)

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With regard to the number of workers per family the grouping obtained is as follows:

No of workers	Districts			No of workers	Districts		
	Vologda	Tambov	Staro-bielsk		Vologda	Tambov	Staro-bielsk
Up to 1.	2.	—	1.	4.1-5	15.	14.	13.
1.1-2	42.	10.	21.	5.1-6	9.	13.	5.
2.1-3	37.	14.	19	6.1-7	3.	4.	8.
3.1-4	28.	26.	19.	Over 7	—	4.	5.
				Total ...	136.	85.	91

Finally, the grouping according to the amount of farming capital, i. e. the value of live stock, implements and buildings, is given in the following table:

Amount of farming capital	Districts		
	Vologda	Tambov	Starobielsk
Up to 250 roubles	19.	3.	9.
250.1- 500 »	38.	11.	19.
500.1- 750 »	37.	20.	10.
750.1- 1.000 »	16.	20.	14.
1.000.1- 1.500 »	19.	20.	18.
1.500.1- 2.000 »	4.	8.	11.
Over 2.000 »	3.	3.	10.
Total.....	136.	85.	91.

These tables tend to show that, as far as the sizes of holdings, the amounts of farming capital and the number of workers per family are concerned, peasant farms are far from homogeneous or approaching to a single type. It is a long established fact that with the rise in one of the factors in a peasant farm, e. g. of the size of holding, the other two factors, i. e. the number of workers and the amount of farming capital, tend also to rise. We cannot, however, rest content with the establishment of the bare direction of the development of the factors of production, and must try to measure the closeness of the connection existing between them.

Had we to deal with simple phenomena, in which the causes influencing them are clearly separated, in order to establish the functional dependence between the factors of production with which we are concerned, it would do to find the coefficients of regression of each of them on the others. But peasant farming is a phenomenon of complex structure, and is influenced by a number of causes exercising joint action; this is why, instead of resting content with individual observations of this phenomenon, we have recourse to statistical methods. Here, however,we will make an attempt to approach the study of the relations in which we are concerned by means of the method applied to the sphere of physical phenomena, mainly of simple nature, and will examine the results thus obtained.

We have three essential elements or factors of production, every one of which exercises its influence on the other two and, in its turn, is influenced by them. In the case of simple phenomena, when we have a functional dependence between two quantities x and y, the curve $y=f(x)$ will be complementary

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to that of $x = f(y)$; hence, the relation between the coefficients of increase of x and y will be represented by the simple formula $b_x = \frac{1}{b_y}$. The case of complex phenomena is different. Here, the curve $x = f(y)$ will never coincide with that of $y = f(x)$; accordingly, the relations between the coefficients b_x and b_y will never assume the simple form characteristical of the functional relation between simple phenomena. In this case, we will have to do not with 3, but with 6 coefficients of increase, which are given in the following table:

Y	X	Regressions		
		Vologda	Tambov	Starobielsk
Farming capital.	Number of workers	104.3	130.0	250.1
Number of workers	Farming capital	0.0011	0.0009	0.0015
Farming capital	Size of holding	21.7	57.4	71.6
Size of holding	Farming capital	0.02	0.0045	0.0088
Size of holding	Number of workers	3.47	1.25	2.57
Number of workers	Size of holding	0.026	0.07	0.1325

The only conclusion we are enabled to draw from this table is that, the greater is the regression of the one factor on the other, the smaller is that of the later on the former.

This is very simple to explain. Is is due to the relation of the units in which the separate factors are expressed. Thus, land holdings are measured in dessiatins, while the value of farming capital is expressed in roubles; accordingly, the economic weight of a dessiatin of land being very much greater than that of a rouble of capital, the regression of farming capital on land gives a high coefficient, while that of land on capital — a low one, and the lower, the higher is the coefficient of regression of capital on land. The relation between the units of measurement, in this case, does evidently blur the actual economic influence of the two factors, studied by us. This influence, hindering the progress of our study, can easily be eliminated. In order to achieve this, we must make a transition from coefficients of regression to coefficients of correlation, the latter being equal to the geometric means between the respective pairs of coefficients of regression, i. e. $b_x : r = r : b_y$.

The coefficients of regression are obtained by means of the formula $b_y = \frac{Sxy}{Sx^2}$; hence, $r = \sqrt{\frac{Sxy \cdot Sxy}{Sx^2 \cdot Sy^2}}$.

In other words, in both the numerator and the denominator we have an equal number of x's and y's; consequently, the units in which x and y are expressed have no influence on the value of r, i. e. of the coefficient of correlation.

The following table gives the values of the coefficients of correlation between the variables dealt with in our investigation:

	Vologda	Tambov	Starobielsk
Size of holding and farming capital	0.66	0.51	0.79
Farming capital and number of workers	0.34	0.35	0.61
Size of holding and number of workers	0.30	0.30	0.58

The coefficients of correlation thus obtained establish the degree of connection between the factors of production in peasant farming. It appears

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that this connection varies within a wide range. The connection between the size of holding and the amount of farming capital appears to be much closer than that between these two material factors and the number of workers in a peasant family. Then, in the case of various districts,the degree of correlation between the same factors fluctuates within a very wide range, which fact points to the existence of marked differences in the structure of peasant farming in these districts. This problem calls for close and careful investigation.

On the conclusion of this brief analysis of the essential factors of peasant farming, we can proceed to the study of its productivity. In the first instance, we shall start from the examination of the amount of gross income derived by peasants from farming in various provinces. Grouping the separate farms according to the amount of gross income derived from agriculture, we arrive at the following distribution:

Amount of gross income	Districts	
	Vologda	Starobielsk
Up to 200 roubles	68	8
200.1 — 400 »	52	16
400.1 — 600 »	12	16
600.1 — 800 »	3	13
800.1 — 1.000 »	1	7
1.000.1 — 1.500 »	—	19
1.500.1 — 2.000 »	—	6
Over 2.000 »	—	6
Total	136	91

Evidently, the peasantry of the black-soil belt is considerably better off than that of the Northern provinces.

But, if we adopt a grouping according not to the gross income, but to the area under cultivation, we arrive at the following figures representing the increase in the income as dependent on the growth of the area sown:

Area sown	Districts	
	Vologda	Starobielsk
Up to 1.0 dessiatin	98.0	183.6
1.1 — 2.0 »	183.8	192.7
2.1 — 3.0 »	233.5	261.7
3.1 — 4.0 »	302.4	384.5
4.1 — 6.0 »	406.6	442.7
6.1 — 10.0 »	612.9	634.0
10.1 — 20.0 »	771.6	1.103.6
Over 20.0 dessiatins	—	1.959.7
Total average	236.3	868.6

Thus, it appears that the cause of the income being higher in the case of Southern peasant farming does not so much lie in the better quality of soil in the black-soil area of the South, as compared with the poor soil of the North, as in the fact that the land belonging to Southern peasants is more fully cultivated and that the areas sown per farm are larger in the South.

The problem of the causes, on which the yearly yield of peasant farming

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depends, require most careful investigation, and in analysing it we cannot rest content with the grouping according to areas sown, given above. The problem should be examined in all its aspects. Let us try, therefore, to study the influence on the yield of all those economic factors, whose influence may be suspected *a priori* or which have been referred to in the literature of the subject.

Evidently, we must start from those factors of peasant farming, on which the economic strength of a peasant farm directly depends, such as the size of holding, method of exploitation, area sown, number of workers, amount of farming capital, number of live stock, etc. Then, we must take into account the factors influencing the consumption, such as the number of persons depending on the produce obtained for their personal maintenance in the farmer's household, and the ratio of this number to that of the actual workers. The last factor has first been pointed to by Prince A. I. Vasiltchikoff,*) and, of late, was strongly emphasized by A. V. Tchaianoff.

The degrees of correlation between the gross income of a peasant farm and each of these factors are expressed in the following series of coefficients.

	Vologda	Starobielsk
Size of holding	0.71	0.78
Method of exploitation	0.72	0.98
Area sown	0.77	0.93
Area of medows	0.62	0.47
Farming capital	0.68	0.82
Value of buildings	0.53	0.64
» of implements	0.66	0.84
Value of live stock	0.73	0.84
Total number of live stock	0.75	0.83
Number of cows	0.77	0.59
Number of animals of draught	0.46	0.76
» of workers	0.42	0.64
» » » in farming	0.55	—
Membership of family and dependants	0.41	0.61
Ratio of family membership to workers	0.03	0.02

In the first instance this table tends to show that the amount of gross income is much more influenced by factors bearing on production than by those representing consumption,such as the total number of persons depending on the produce for their livelihood and the ratio of the latter to the number of actual workers. In the latter case the coefficient of correlation is so small that it tends rather to prove the absence of any connection of this factor with the amount of gross income. Evidently, one is bound to expect a certain degree of correlation or, rather, even a considerable one, between the gross income and the number of persons depending on it for their maintenance; if the number of consumers in a family does not directly influence the amount of gross income, it is, to a considerable extent, dependent on that amount, because the gross income of farming determines the net income, which forms the basis of the household budget of a peasant family and is closely correlated with the size of the family, i. e. with the number of consumers in it.

Of the factors of production the greatest influence is exerted by the system of exploitation of land and by the area sown; the influence of the sizes of hold-

*) «The life of the Russian countryside and Agriculture in Russia», 1881, p. p. 37-39. (Russian).

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ings is less marked, particularly in the district of Starobielsk, with its extensive practice of leases; still less marked is the influence of the area of meadows.

Next to the influence of land in its importance comes that of farming capital, of which, again, the more active part, composed of live stock and implements, yields higher coefficients of correlation with the income than the passive element represented by buildings. The value of buildings is characteristic rather of the past than of the present economic position of the peasant farm. Whether the value of the stock or its number, reduced to units of black cattle, are taken, has no influence on the sizes of coefficients of correlation, which points to the fact that the standards adopted for such reduction are correct. In the district of Vologda, with its extensive dairy-farming, cows yield a higher coefficient of correlation with income than horses, while in the district of Starobielsk, one half of which is steppes, and where dairy-farming is but little developed, the contrary is the case, and animals of draught yield a higher coefficient of correlation. Finally, the lowest degree of correlation of all is that between the gross income of the farmer and the number of workers in his family. This is partly due to the fact that a considerable part of such workers is employed outside the farm, in some industrial or other work. But, even if, instead of the total number of workers in the family, we take only those who are actually employed in farming (together with outsiders hired to help in the work), as this is done in the case of the district of Vologda, we still obtain a lower degree of correlation than in the case of the system of exploitation and in that of farming capital.

Our table tends to show that the grouping according to the system of exploitation, the area sown and the numbers of live stock, so widely used in the statistical investigations of the Zemstvos, is the most suitable to the nature of the subject. Less suitable is the method of grouping according to the numbers of workers, the sizes of holdings and the numbers of animals of draught in provinces outside the black-soil area. Accordingly, we are bound to reject the conclusion arrived at by A. A. Tschuproff, concerning the advantages of grouping according to sizes of holdings, as compared with that based on the areas sown,*) and to introduce certain modifications in the very widely accepted contention of N. N. Tchernenkoff that «the most convenient method of grouping in the case of peasant farms, in so far as they are really living on agriculture, is, apparently, that of classification according to the numbers of animals of draught and to the areas sown: both these elements tend to represent with the greatest accuracy and completeness the volume and the actual position of agricultural production of all individual peasant farms, in so far as other conditions are sufficiently similar».**) N. N. Tchernenkoff has exaggerated the importance of the number of animals of draught, especially in the case of provinces outside the black-soil belt. Still less satisfactory is the method of grouping according to the number of consumers, while that based on the ratio of the number of consumers to that of actual workers is unable to yield any results whatever.

Thus, the degree of correlation between the amount of gross income and the various factors of production tends to establish a certain gradation of the degrees of influence exercised by them, which places them in the following

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*) «Memoirs of the Polytechnical Institute of St. Petersburg», 1904, vol. I, № № 1-2, p. 100. (Russian).

**) «Characteristics of peasant farming», vol. I, 2nd edit., 1918, p. 112. (Russian).

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order: the first place is held by the system of exploitation of land; next comes farming capital and, finally — the number of workers.

We are, however, unable to confine ourselves to these results of our analysis. In the case of statistical data we have always to do with the joint influence of a number of causes; consequently, in adopting a method of grouping according to a certain attribute, say — to the system of exploitation of land, we have an amount of gross income resulting not only from the attribute named in the table, but from other causes affecting it, whose action is not disclosed by the classification, such as farming capital and the number of workers. If, in the case of simple phenomena, in which the causes are distinct, the relation between cause and effect can be represented by the formula

$$f(x) = a,$$

when there is a complexity of causes, with which statistics are called upon to deal, the same relation assumes the form

$$f\,x\,(y,z\ldots) = a,$$

of which the x is specified in the table, while the action of y, z etc. remains concealed. It is possible that the influence of the x is stronger than that of the hidden y, z, etc. In this case, the value of a will mainly depend on that of x, and the empirically established correlation will more or less closely correspond to the facts. But equally possible is the contrary case, in which the influence of x will be smaller than that of y, z, etc. In such case the correlation of the two quantities x and a, empirically established by us, will prove entirely misleading.

Evidently, in order to find the real measure of the influence of x on a, we must eliminate the interferring influence of the hidden causes y, z, etc. This we can achieve by the use of combined tables, which enable us to equalise in our groupings the influence of the factors which we want to eliminate, thus removing any interference with the factor in which we are interested and which serves as basis for the final grouping.

Combined tables have first been introduced in the Zemstvos' statistical practice in the 80ies by the statistician of the province of Tchernigov, A. P. Shlikevitch. Their construction, which has remained unchanged ever since, suffers from three shortcomings. First, the selection of attributes on which such tables are based, is more or less arbitrary. As a result of studying the grouping of his material, the statistician comes to the conclusion that the strongest influence on the phenomenon in which he is concerned is exercised by certain causes. It is on these factors or causes that his combined table is based. Above we have already had the occasion to point to the inadequacy of ordinary grouping in classes, and to the adverse influence exerted by the differences in the units of measurement adopted. It appears evident that coefficients of correlation alone are able to supply a solid basis for the selection of attributes in constructing combined tables.*) Then, as far as I am aware, no attempt has ever been made exactly to measure the degree of connection between the variables, entering a combined table. Statisticians appear to have been deterred from it by the fact that every secondary group has a coefficient of regression of its own. As a result, they confined themselves to a rough estimate of such regressions. Meanwhile, it is possible to find the coefficient of regression for the aggregate of all elements entering the table as well. The most convenient formula for this purpose is

*) This problem has been discussed by the present writer in a special paper at the Congress of Statisticians, organised by the A. I. Tchuproff's Society in 1913.

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$$b = \frac{Sn\,(x-x_m)\,(y-y_m)}{Sn(x-x_m)^2},$$

because, in using it, one has to take account only of the differences $(x-x_m)$ and $(y-y_m)$, instead of the absolute values of these quantities. This permits us directly to proceed to the summation of the respective differences of all secondary groups of the combined table and, by dividing one sum by the other, to obtain the coefficient of regression.

Finally, if, in the case of combined tables, no attempt was made to find the coefficients of regression, no one has, naturally, attempted to calculate the coefficients of correlation. This, certainly, it would be impossible to expect from A. P. Shlikevitch, S. A. Kharizomenoff, and other statisticians of the 80ies of the last century, seeing that the existence of correlation, alongside with functional dependence, was first discovered by Sir F. Galton in 1889.*)

Even now, however, no one has thought of establishing the degree of correlation between the elements of a combined table. Meanwhile, if a combination table permits the calculation of the coefficients of regression of *a* on *x*, one is also enabled to calculate the regression of *x* on *a* and, then, from these two coefficients of regression, to find the coefficient of correlation.

Thus, it is possible to eliminate these defects of the combined table. The only difficulty in our case is that the budget data at our disposal are far too few in number, to allow the application to them of the method of analysis by means of combined tables. As a result, we have been compelled to adopt too wide class intervals for the grouping of the data,**) at the expense of the adequate balancing of the influence of the causes eliminated, and even after having done so, in most secondary groups we have got only 2, 3, or 4 observations. Beside, in many secondary groups the frequency was represented by 1, which made it impossible to calculate the differences by use of the formula $(x-x_m)$, and forced us to leave all such cases entirely out of account.***) Accordingly, the results obtained are subject to a certain amount of error. Nevertheless, they are worthy of serious attention.

On having isolated the effects of the separate factors by means of combined tabulation, we arrive at the following coefficients of correlation of the amounts of gross income with the various elements of production:

	Vologda	Staro-bielsk.****)
Sizes of holdings	0.36	0.25
Number of workers	0.19	0.22
Amount of farming capital	0.39	0.69

*) Natural Inheritance, 1889.

**) The areas of holdings were divided into the following groups: up to 3.0 des., 3.01 — 6.0; 6.01 — 9.0; 9.01 — 12.0; 12.01 — 15.0; 15.01 — 20.0; 20.01 — 30.0; 30.01 — 40.0 and over 40.0 dessiatins. The amount of farming capital: up to 250 roubles; 250.1 — 500; 500.1 — 750; 750.1 — 1.000; 1.000.1 — 1500; 1500.1 — 2.000; 2000.1 — 3000, and over 3.000 roubles. The number of workers: up to 1.0; 1.1 — 2.0; 2.1 — 3.0; 3.1 — 4.0; 4.1 — 5.0; 5.1 — 6.0; 6.1 — 7.0 and over 7.0.

***) The numbers of farms thus left out of account were: in the district of Vologda, out of a total of 136—4,8 and 12; in that of Starobielsk, out of a total of 91—12, 13 and 14.

****) The insufficient number of budget data for the purpose of analysis by means of combined tabulation, in the case of the district of Starobielsk has had the effect of making the sum of the coefficients of correlation of income with the separate elements of peasant farming equal to 1.16, i- e. greater than 1, which is in contradiction with theoretical principles.

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A comparison of these coefficients of correlation, obtained analytically, with the empirical coefficients given before, tends to show, in the first instance, that, when the causes are acting in the same direction, their empirical coefficients are higher than their analytical coefficients; only in the case if the causes are acting in opposite directions, i. e. if the sign of one factor is positive and of the other—negative, the empirical coefficient of correlation can be lower than the analytical. Then, the relative sizes of empirical coefficients cannot form a basis for judgment as to the sizes of the respective analytical coefficients. Thus, according to empirical coefficients, in the case of the district of Vologda, the influence of the sizes of holdings is greater than that of the amount of farming capital, while if we take analytical coefficients, the relation appears to be inverted.

Accordingly, it follows that the strongst influence on the amount of gross income is exercised by the value of farming capital and the smallest — by the numbers of workers in the farmer's household.

My collaborators at the Economic Bureau at Berlin are now proceeding with the analysis, by the application of the methods explained above, of budget data for other regions of Russia, widely differing in the conditions of farming, (distr. of Velsk and prov. of Tambov, Novgorod and Voronej). There are on grounds to suppose that the results of the closer investigation of these districts would be in contradiction with the results already obtained for the two districts analysed. And the greater will be the number of districts to which the conclusions already reached will be found to apply, the greater should be the degree of attention these conclusions would merit in considering various plans for the reconstruction of the Russian national economy.

Although peasant farming essentially depends on the farmer's own labour, its productivity is influenced to a much greater extent by the area of land and the amount of farming capital at its disposal than by the number of workers in the peasant's family. It appears evident that the decisive factor is not the amount of labour at the disposal of the farmer, but the possibility of making productive use of the hands available, which depends on the size of holding and the amount of farming capital, i. e. on live stock and implements. Here we find a certain analogy with the law governing the fertility of soil, by which the latter is determined by the nutritive element of which it contains the smallest amount of all. The only difference is that the mutual relation of the various elements in the domain of economics is more elastic than the effective combination of various nutritive stuffs in the soil.

In considering the practical problems of Russian agricultural economy, the following may be said. As a result of the revolution, in various parts of Russia various average sizes of holdings have, apparently, been established. These sizes, as far as the nearest future, at least, is concerned, can be, more or less safely, looked upon as constants in any problem dealing with the increase of the gross yield of farming in Russia. This is so, because to alter these sizes will be beyond our power, while the changes to which they will be subject independently of our will (on account, say, of the growth of agricultural population or of its decrease, as a result of an exodus to the towns), will be relatively slow, and may as well be neglected. Accordingly, the only variable in the problem will be the amount of farming capital. This, to a certain extent, can be deliberately influenced; thus, it may, under favourable conditions, be increased by the investment in it of capital obtained from abroad. It is only by having recourse to this last expedient that we can really achieve a speedy restoration of our national income and a re-establishing of the purchasing

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capacity of the agricultural population, with all the consequences involved, such as the resumption of the demand for manufactured goods, the restoration of Russia's credit, etc.

Here, however, we must make certain reservations. In certain exceptional circumstances the amount of labour at the disposal of a peasant's family can exercise a greater influence on the productivity of farming than the material means of production. As an example of such exceptional circumstances, may be taken the farming of Siberian peasant-colonists. According to A. A. Kaufmann, in their farming, as time goes on, the influence of the amount of labour at the disposal of the peasant's family tends gradually to outweigh that of the other factor of paramount importance, i. e. of the amount of capital in the colonist's possession. In studying the conditions of new settlers we see that, in their case, money appears to be of considerably greater importance, than the amount of labour at their disposal. In the case of older settlers, having been there for 4 years and more and, consequently, having already completed the original equipment of their farms, combined tabulation according to the two factors muntioned, i. e. to labour and to the amounts of money, presents the case in a different light.

Amounts of money invested by farmers:	One worker per family		Several workers p. fam.	
	Average per farm:			
	Horses	Des. sown.	Horses	Dess. sown
Nothing	1.6	2.9	3.5	7.7
up to 25 roubles	1.8	3.0	3.7	7.5
25 to 50 »	2.0	3.6	4.3	10.0
50 — 100 »	2.4	4.8	5.0	12.4
100 — 200 »	2.8	5.8	5.4	13.1
over 200 »	2.6	5.4	5.6	14.9

«We see, says A. A. Kaufmann, that colonists who have brought nothing or only a few roubles with them, but are strong on account of the number of hands at their disposal, in the course of a few years are decisively outstripping those, who, although having invested a comparatively large amount of money, are not in possession of considerable resources of labour».*)

The exceptional conditions with which we have got to do in this particular case are due to the fact that, in the process of the development of new farms by the settlers, the use of the whole of the labour available in the family is meeting with no obstacles in the sizes of holdings, because there is more land available for exploitation than the colonist can reasonably be expected to be able to cultivate; nor are there any limits imposed in the case of the provision of the necessary supply of other requisites of production, the cost of all the necessary stock, except the horse, being extremely low.

Now, let us study the influence of market conditions. The greater part of what is produced in a peasant farms, is usually consumed or otherwise used within the farmer's own household. A considerable amount, however, of the produce, is disposed of in exchange, and thus finds an expression in terms of money. The extent to which such pecuniary elements have penetrated in the peasant-farmer's household budget, can be seen from the table below, in which the

*) A. A. Kaufmann. Economic and statistical problems of peasant farming, 1918, p. p. 19-20. (Russian).

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households investigated are grouped according to the percentage of pecuniary elements in the amount of gross income derived by them from farming:

P. c. of pecuniary elements	Districts:		P. c. of pecuniary elements	Districts:	
	Vologda	Starob.		Vologda	Starob.
Up to 10 p.c.	1	3	50.1-60.0 p. c.	24	13
10.1-20.0 »	9	5	60.1-70.0 »	5	5
20.1-30.0 »	14	24	70.1-80.0 »	7	3
30.1-40.0 »	37	19	over 80.0 p.c.	1	2
40.1-50.0 »	38	17	Total	136	91

Still more characteristical, perhaps, is the grouping according to the areas sown, given in the following table, in which the first column for each district contains the amount of pecuniary income in roubles per farming household, and the second — the percentage of pecuniary elements in that income.

Area sown, in dessiatins	Vologda		Starobielsk		Area sown in dessiatins	Vologda		Starobielsk	
	Rs.	P.c.	Rs.	P.c.		Rs.	P.c.	Rs.	P. c.
Up to 1.0 des.	43.4	44.2	115.2	62.7	6.1-10.0 des.	322.4	52.6	259.7	41.0
1.1-2.0 »	87.0	47.3	71.4	37.1	10.1-20.0 »	350.4	45.4	435.5	39.5
2.1-3.0 »	96.5	41.3	88.7	33.9	over 20.0 des.	—	—	830.8	42.4
3.1-4.0 »	125.5	41.5	189.3	49.2					
4.1-6.0 »	199.0	48.9	145.1	32.8	Average	105.7	44.7	353.1	40.7

The irregular character of the series of percentages of pecuniary elements in the income tends to show that the development of these elements in peasant farming is proceeding under a strong influence of outside factors, which stand in no relation whatever to the areas sown, viz. of the proximity of the farm to the market or to railway lines. On the whole, this table tends to point to the fact that the process of transition of Russian peasant farming from the stage of primitive natural economy to that of production for the market has made great strides in the early part of the XXth century, and that this progress has been somewhat more marked in the provinces outside the black-soil belt, with their higher degree of industrialisation, than in those of the black-soil area. The peasant has escaped from the grip of the natural economy, which held him in bondage for centuries, and has become, even if with little consciounsess of the change, an active participant in the world economy.

This transformation of Russian peasant farming has been pointed to by Schultze-Gävernitz as early as in the middle of the 90ies of the last century. According to him, «the replacement of the traditional forms of natural economy by farming engaged in production for the market, which improves the balance of trade and buyes manufactured goods — such is the main feature of Russia's economic evolution in the second half of the present century. This forms the real basis of those successes in the sphere of industry and finance which, although they strike the eye of the observer at first sight, are really secondary facts in the chain of cause and effect».*)

The growth of pecuniary elements in peasant farming since the emancipation of the serfs was mainly due to the development of the railway net and of the towns. The market, by its widespread tentacles, was energetically drawing peasant farming in that direction. Not all peasants, however, responded

*) G. Schultze-Gävernitz. Essays on the social economy and the economic policy of Russia. 1901, p. p. 254-255.

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to its appeal. In order to find, which particular elements of peasant farming are the most responsive to these outside influences, we shall see what are the degrees of correlation existing between the percentages of the pecuniary components of the gross income and these various elements.

The respective coefficients of correlation are as follows:

Elements	Coeffi cients		Elements	Coeffi cients	
	Vologda	Starob.		Vologda	Starob.
Gross income	0.34	0.14	Number of anim. of draught	—0.18	—0.05
Size of holding	0.16	0.03	farming capit.		
System of exploitation	0.16	0.04	Ratio ———	—0.03	0.08
Area sown	0.04	0.03	size of holding		
Number of workers	—0.21	—0.09	Number of consumers	—0.17	—0.09
size of holding			size of holding		
Ratio ———	0.26	0.12	Ratio ———	0.23	0.13
number of work			numb. of cons.		
Farming capital	0.53	0.06	Area of lease-land	0.02	0.03
Total number of live stock	0.07	—0.04	Outside earnings	—0.26	—

This table leads to the following conclusions. The pecuniary element is the most pronounced in the case of the farms possessing a large amount of farming capital and a large gross income; evidently, the pecuniary component of the income stands in direct connection with the productivity of peasant farming. With outside earnings the percentage of pecuniary elements is in evident antagonism. Families, in which the numbers of workers are large, show a preference for outside earnings, and the pecuniary constituents of their incomes are smaller. A similar restrictive influence is exercised by the numbers of persons in the household, i. e. of consumers. The larger is the area of land per consumer, the greater is the development of production for the market. The most important point for us is that of the connection existing between the proportion of the pecuniary elements in the income and the productivity of peasant farming. What is the degree of productivity of peasant farming can be judged from the amount of gross income obtained per dessiatin of land under exploitation.

According to the amount of gross income the farms investigated are grouped as follows:

Amounts of income per dessiat.	Dist ricts		Amounts of incomes per dessiat.	Dist ricts	
	Vologda	Starob.		Vologda	Starob.
Up to 10 roubles	25	1	50.1-60.0 roubles	1	16
10.1-20.0 »	74	2	60.1-70.0 »	—	8
20.1-30.0 »	25	10	70.1-80.0 »	—	7
30.1-40.0 »	8	32	Over 80.0 »	1	2
40.1-50.0 »	2	13			
			Total	136	91

This table clearly shows how great are the differences in the productivity of Russian peasant farming. In the first instance, one is struck by the enormous difference in the yield per dessiatin of the black soil of the South and the poor soils of the Northern region. But even within the same province or district the productivity varies within a very wide range. Evidently it is not the fertility of the soil alone that is the decisive factor. In order to solve the problem, we will find the coefficients of correlation between the gross income per des-

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siatin under exploitation with those factors, which can be expected to exercise an influence on the income. The coefficients are given in the following table.

Factors correlated	Coeffi cients		Factors correlated	Coeffi cients	
	Vologda	Starob.		Vologda	Starob.
Gr. income from farm.	0.02	0.10	farm. capital	0.52	0.22
P. c. of pecun. elem...	0.11	0.19	Ratio ———————		
Size of holding.....	—0.40	—0.23	size of holding		
System of exploitat.	—0.40	—0.28	Numb. of consumers.	—0.02	—0.19
Number of workers...	0.02	—0.07	numb. of cons.		
size of holding			Ratio ———————	—0.01	—0.05
Ratio ———————	—0.46	—0.16	num. of work.		
numb. of work			Area of lease-land..	0.05	—0.20
Farming capital	—0.09	0.02	Outside carniegs....	0.24	—

Evidently, the greatest influence on the amount of gross income per dessiatin of land under exploitation is exercised by the degree to which the peasant farm is provided with farming capital and labour per dessiatin of the area cultivated. All other correlations are of derived nature, with the exception of that of the percentage of pecuniary elements in the income, whose growth exercises an influence on that of the income per dessiatin in a positive derection. Let us try, on the basis of the budget data available, to establish the degree to which the productivity of peasant farming is influenced by the number of live stock, the supply of agricultural implements, the amount of labour available and the percentage of pecuniary elements. Here, in the first instance, we have to do with the influence of the proportion of land under actual cultivation: in the black-soil area this proportion is considerably greater than in the North, with its poor qualities of soil. The higher is the income per dessiatin of land under exploitation, the greater, as a rule, is the proportion of land actually cultivated in a given farm, as shown by the following table.

Income per dessiatin	P.c. of land under cultivation		Income per dessiatin	P.c. of land under cultivation	
	Vologda	Starob.		Vologda	Starob.
Up to 10.0 roubles...	9.5	11.5	40.1-50.0 roubles...	24.0	57.1
10.1-20.0 »	15.2	25.3	50.1-60.0 »	31.6	58.5
20.1-30.0 »	24.8	39.3	60.1-70.0 »	—	60.3
30.1-40.0 »	32.6	52.1	Over 70.0 »	26.2	58.7
			Average.....	14.9	52.5

The kind of plants cultivated is also very important. In this respect, particularly worthy of attention are those crops which require the greatest amount of labour in their cultivation, as flax, potatoes, sunflower, various kinds of vegetables, etc. The percentages of the areas sown occupied by such crops were as follows:

Income per dessiatin	Vologda	Starob.	Income per dessiatin	Vologda	Starob.
Up to 10.0 roubles...	6.0	3.8	50.1-60.0 roubles ..	6.5	8.6
10.1-20.0 »	8.3	22.8	60.1-70.0 »	—	13.7
20.1-30.0 »	8.3	5.8	Over 70.0 » ...	0.0	7.6
30.1-40.0 »	10.8	7.1			
40.1-50.0 »	21.8	4.8	Average.....	8.1	7.2

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Then, the yield is influenced by the number of live stock per dessiatin of land under cultivation, in the first instance in the shape of the income derived from the produce of cattle-breeding, and, than, by increasing the supply of manure in those districts where the fields must be manured.

The numbers of live stock per dessiatin of land under cultivation, reduced to units of black cattle, were as follows:

Income per dessiatin	Vologda	Starob.	Income per dessiatin	Vologda	Starob.
Up to 10.0 roubles . . .	0.13	0.22	50.1-60.0 »	0.56	0.33
10.1-20.0 »	0.23	0.07	60.1-70.0 »	—	0.38
20.1-30.0 »	0.32	0.25	Over 70.0 » . . .	0.53	0.36
30.1-40.0 »	0.48	0.31			
40.1-50.0 »	0.56	0.34	Average	0.22	0.31

The yield of crops is also greatly influenced by the degree of thoroughness with which and the time at which the work of cultivation is done. These elements, however, do not lend themselves to quantitative expression. Accordingly, our budget data contain no information on the subject: we must try to find them in the results of peasant household censuses and in the current data of Zemstvo statistics.

The very wide range of variations in both the technical execution of the work and in the time at which it is being done by peasants, according to the degree of their wellbeing, has already attracted attention in the literature of the subject.*) As to the yield of crops, budget statistics have unfortunately paid little attention to it. Finally, the last of the principal factors affecting the income obtained in peasant farming, is that of prices at which the produce is sold: well-to-do farmers, who are not compelled to sell their produce at once, obtain higher prices. Information as to this point is also missing in budget statistics.

Thus, the amount of gross income per dessiatin of land under cultivation depends on three factors: farming capital, labour and the development of the pecuniary elements in the income. Having isolated, by means of combined tabulation, the influence of the percentage of pecuniary elements from the other factors, we obtain the following coefficients of correlation between the income per dessiatin and the percentage of pecuniary elements:

District of Vologda — 0.39
» » Starobielsk — 0.17

These figures show the extent to which the productivity of peasant farming is influenced by the market.

This influence deserves particular attention. Apparently, in the course of the first few decades after the reform of 1861, peasant farming was in a condition of stagnation. Only from the middle of the 80ies, owing partly to the direct influence of the demands of the market and of the construction of railway lines, and partly to the appearance, at the head of the farming business, of a new generation, free from the demoralising influence of serfdom on its psychology, peasant farming begins energetically to develop new branches, such as grass-sowing, flax, potatoes and beet growing, dairy farming etc.

If, at first, the effect of the market was only to deprive the peasant of a part of his produce, thus reducing his own consumption of grain, milk, flax

*) See, V. Postnikoff. «South-Russian peasant forming», p. p. 276-9, 317. A. Kaufmann, op. cit., p. p. 165-166.

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and wool, while giving him nothing in exchange for these goods, as the proceeds were mainly used by the peasant for the payment of taxes and of redemption money, by the end of the XIXth century the demand of the market began to stimulate the productivity of peasant farming. The very constitution of the latter has undergone great changes: the development of production for the market tended to increase the income of the peasant, thus creating a real basis for the development of the national industries, of railways and of towns.

In the early 70ies, A. N. Engelhardt was justified in his doubts as to the influence of the development of dairy «artels» on peasant farming, because the latter tended to introduce trading elements in it. But the contention of Nikolai - on that the development of exchange «tends to lower the yield of agricultural production» and leads to conditions in which «the work of the peasant yields disproportionately low and ever declining returns»*) is an evident anachronism in the case of the 90ies.

Nikolai - on has failed to notice the development of the productive forces of peasant farming, which has started since the middle of the 80ies and assumed the form of an increase in the branches, whose production is intended for the market. The whole of the progress achieved by the agronomic organisations of the Zemstvos and by agricultural co-operatives is confined to these «market» branches of peasant farming, while the branches entirely intended for the peasants' own consumption or the «natural» branches, show no signs of development, and their technique remains on its old traditional level.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN AGRICULTURE AND ITS PRESENT CONDITION.

Abstract from a paper read before the Association on January 4th, 1923.

By A. S. Orloff.

CH. I. AGRICULTURE AS THE FOUNDATION OF THE RUSSIAN NATIONAL ECONOMY.

There is no doubt that the fate of Russia in the course of the next few decades to come will depend on the progress of her farming which, at present, has almost completely passed into the hands of the peasantry.

Russian industries, foreign trade, towns and Budget can develop and grow only up to the point to which such development is permitted by the foundation on which the whole of Russia's prosperity rests, viz. — by the amount of produce her farming will be able to provide for export and for the internal market.

A striking confirmation of this view has been given by the events of the last year. In the winter and spring of 1922 Russia was severely affected by a sudden «crisis of overproduction»: the countryside, although in dire need of everything, has become unable to buy the most essential manufactured goods, and the latter found no market, in spite of the fact that their output did not

*) Essays on our social economy after the Reforms, 1893, p. p. 74, 188. (Russian).

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exceed one-tenth of the pre-war figures and that imports from abroad were practically negligible.

Not only to increase her agricultural production to its pre-war level, but to raise it considerably above the latter — such is the most urgent problem of absolutely paramount importance with which Russia is now faced.

When, before the war, the poverty of Russia was being discussed, not only the socialist parties, but all the liberal groups of Russian society used to be unanimous as to the causes of this evil. They used to see them in the political régime which jealously guarded the interests of the landowning nobility and was affraid to create an enlightened, prosperous and free peasantry and which, therefore, deliberately kept the peasant in a condition of dependence and ignorance, doing very little to help him and placing obstacles on the way of any attempt towards the raising of peasant farming up to modern standards. It seemed that, were this régime to fall, the capable and hard-working peoples inhabiting Russia, would make speedy and certain progress towards material prosperity and moral culture.

Then came the Great War, followed by the Great Revolutions. Russia's internal life was overhauled to its very foundations. Old chains, as it seemed, were broken for ever.

What is the result? Is Russia now on its way to economic prosperity? Are famine, poverty and all the horrors, now devastating Russia, only the inevitable consequences of the war and the revolution, a transient stage in Russia's life, after which she is bound not only to recever her pre-war level of well-being, but gradually to catch up her more prosperous neighbours? Or, are the new chains, imposed on the great majority of the Russian people, as heavy and as strong as the old? Or perhaps, the destruction is so great and the means of restoration so uncertain and inaccessible, that even the return to pre-war standards of prosperity should be looked upon as a dream and relegated to a remote future?

These questions are essentially questions of what is the direction in and the rate at which Russian peasant farming is developing at present and can be expected to develop in future, and of what was the influence exercised on it by nearly ten years of wars and revolutionary upheavals. To answer these questions, we need to study, on the one hand, the present condition of agriculture in Russia and, on the other, the lessons taught to us by the examples of progressive farming in other countries.

In dwelling briefly on the facts and the views which, in my opinion, are of paramount importance, I will pay particular attention to the views of the representatives of Russian agricultural science and practical experience, especially in so far as these views have found collective expression.*)

CH. II. RUSSIAN FARMING AT THE CLOSE OF THE FIFTH YEAR OF THE REVOLUTION.

The distribution of land and the types of holdings created by the revolution. By the beginning of 1922, when the process of revolutionary re-organi-

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*) The data and the views quoted in this article are taken from a great number of various works and articles published in Soviet Russia, from papers, resolutions and discussions of Russian agricultural congresses, as well as from a number of well known foreign works on the subject. To avoid overburdening the article with foot-notes, references are generally omitted, except in a few particular cases.

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sation of land-ownership has been completed, the general character of the changes, as far as the actual exploitation of land is concerned, as compared with the conditions existing in 1917, is clearly shown by the following table, giving percentages of land under cultivation belonging to various groups:

	32 provinc. of Sov. Rus		The Ukraine	
	1922	1917	1922	1917
Belonging to:				
Peasants	96.3	76.3	96.0	55.4
Private owners and State	—	23.7	—	44.6
Collective farms	0.5	—	0.8	—
Soviet farms	2.7	—	3.2	—

In other words, except for 3.2 p. cent. in Soviet Russia and 4 p. c. in the Ukraine (a total area of about 3.5 million dessiatins) the whole of the land under cultivation has passed into the hands of the peasants.

Statistical data of the Soviet Government concerning the total area of land available for farming, of the numbers of agricultural population and of farms are unreliable, especially after the famine on the Volga and the migration of the starving population from that region. As a rough approximation it may be assumed that the total area of land available for agricultural exploitation (exclusive of woodland) in European Russia amounts to about 140 million dessiatins, while the agricultural population numbers about 90 million with 15 million farms and 6 persons per farm on the average. The average area of land per person living on its produce, is about 1.5 dessiatin. The average size of a peasant farm is about 9 dessiatins, of which about 7 dessiatins are arable land and 2 dessiatins grazing land and meadows. Here we leave out of account all wooded areas, which also have a great importance to the neighbouring farms, for which they use to provide grazing and hay.

In fact, however, the actual peasant farms exhibit a very wide range of deviations from this average, not only in various regions of Russia but even in the same locality. The re-distribution of land and the changes in the sizes of the areas cultivated by separate farms that took place during the revolution, have had comparatively little effect in mitigating these inequalities. The actual transfer of the big estates to the peasants assumed the form of the seizure of these estates by one or several neighbouring villages, which carried out the partition of the land thus seized only between themselves, without, as a rule, permitting any outsider to take part in it. The partition was usually carried in accordance with the Soviet Government's instruction, on the basis of the numbers of persons in the household («iedoki» — «eaters» is the actual Russian term for these). In this scheme, a man is treated as 1; a woman — as 0.8; a lad — 0.75; a girl — 0.6 and a child — 0.5. The process of re-distribution of the landowners, estates, in the case of many provinces involved also the lands privately owned by peasants, enclosed farms and individual holdings and, in many places, even a general re-distribution of peasants' allotments, thus having led to the resuscitation of the village commune even in those villages in which it seemed to have entirely disappeared for decades. The total area involved in such re-distribution in the course of the revolution was not recorded, but it is, undoubtedly, very large.

This process of re-distribution has naturally brought about a most thorough levelling of holdings within separate communes, the sizes of holdings having, in most cases, been brought into close correspondence with the membership of

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peasant families. At the same time, however, the great disparity in the sizes of holdings, which existed before the revolution, was entirely preserved not only in the case of various regions of Russia, but even within the narrow limits of any given canton («volost»).

On the basis of data concerning 24 provinces of Soviet Russia, which lend themselves to comparison, the Central Statistical Office gives the following characteristic of the changes:

Years	Total number of peasant farms	Out of which (p. cent.):			
		Not sowing at all	Sowing		
			Up to 4 des.	4-8 des.	Over 8 des.
1916	6.034.114	11.4	59.1	21.6	7.9
1919	6.119.616	6.5	74.0	16.4	3.1

In various regions, however, these groups of farms have a different relative importance, as can be seen from the following table in which the grouping of farms according to areas sown is given for a number of provinces of Soviet Russia (1919):

Provinces	Percentages of farms with area sown:			
	1.1-2 dess.	2.1-4 des.	4.1-6 des.	6.1-8 des.
Tula	14.9	39.0	24.9	10.0
Orenburg	11.2	21.6	19.3	12.9
Viatka	12.8	36.0	24.8	11.9
Vitebsk	49.2	31.3	4.7	0.8
Yaroslavl	27.8	26.2	5.6	1.2
Vologda	43.3	27.5	3.4	0.5
Petrograd	24.4	14.7	2.2	0.2
Penza	15.9	35.2	21.4	9.5

Alongside with the levelling of holdings, there was a similar levelling in live stock and farming implements. The percentages of peasants having no horses and cows at all, on the one hand, and of those possessing three or more have greatly fallen, while there was a corresponding increase in the groups with one or two horses and cows.

The type of farming described above has all the characteristics of small or average-sized peasant farming. All that is left in Russia of anything like farming on a large scale amounts to no more than the 3.5 million dessiatins, of which the peasants have not got hold. By the end of 1921, the Soviet Government has used this area to organise 4.316 so-called «Soviet farms» and 15.121 «collective farms». Below we give a few data, which may give some idea of these two types of farming.

According to the census of Soviet farms carried out in 1921, and involving 2.289 such farms, their average size in the Northern region was 210 dessiatins, in the Viatsko-Permsky — 315 des., in the Central Industrial — 233; in the Petrograd region — 243; in the West — 364; to the East of the Volga — 2314; in the Volga region — 454; in the Central Agricultural — 245; in the South East — 1784. The average size of Soviet farms for the whole of Russia amounted to 389 dessiatins. Of the total area of Soviet farms 48.2 p. cent. were suitable for ploughing. The area under crops in 1921 reached 221.567 dessiatins.

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The collective farms in the whole of Russia in 1921 are characterised by the following figures:

Types of farms	Numbers of farms	Areas	Numbers of people maintained on them
Communes	2.242	342.300 des.	138.420
Artels	11.440	896.932 »	729.888
Cultivation in common	1.439	54.994 » .	63.295
Total	15.121	1.133.326	931.404

Thus, the average area of land per commune was 152.6 dessiatins; per artel — 65.3 dessiatins. Per worker, the communes had 3.7 des. and per artel — 2.1 dessiatine.

It appears clear that farming on anything like a large scale in Russia has entirely ceased to exist. Soviet and collective farms, with the 3 p. cent. of land in their possession and with 1.5 p. cent. of farming population depending on them, are able in future to play the rôle of experimental farms for carrying out any kind of large-scale experiments, but would be absolutely unable to assume any importance in the economic life of the country.

Russia has definitely become a country of small and average-sized farming, and her future depends on the improvement and development of these types of farms.

Village communes and individual holdings. It is a matter of great importance in modern farming, whether the land belonging to the farm lies in a single plot or it is scattered in many strips mixed up with other people's holdings. Up to 1905, the latter was almost generally the case in Russia, not only in villages which held their land in common, but even in those in which the peasants held their allotments in perpetuity. Since 1905, the argarian policy of the old régime was steadily directed towards the development in Russia of individual enclosed holdings, and all means of pressure, compulsion, as well as the granting of financial facilities and of various privileges, were used in order to speed up the creation of enclosed or unenclosed individual farms on all descriptions of land, including the original peasants' allotments.

Whatever one might say of the measures applied by the Government to achieve its purpose, one is bound to admit that the results actually achieved were very important: in the course of the decade from 1907 to 1916, 1.612.690 individual enclosed holdings of the « houtor » and « otroub » types were formed, with a total area of 16.020.197 dessiatins. These figures, together with the numerous evidence obtained from the agronomic personnel of the Zemstvos as to the peasants' views and desires before the revolution, tend, certainly, to prove that the idea of individual holdings was very far from being entirely a product of the Government's policy, but that it was finding considerable support in the desire of certain groups among the peasantry, which wanted this change.

What was the attitude of the peasantry, as a whole, to these new forms of holdings during there volution, when it was able to find free manifestation? Unfortunately, this most interesting and important question cannot be answered as it should be, with statistics in hand, showing the numbers of individual enclosed farms which have been destroyed or have survived in various parts of Russia. The general attitude, however, appears to have been sufficiently ma-

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nifested. Prof. N. Pershin, who has made an investigation of this problem, has come to the conclusion that the attitude of the peasantry to individual farms was entirely different in the regions outside the black-soil area, in the North and North-East, on the one hand, and in the black-soil belt, the South and South-West, on the other. In the case of the former, the population, with very few exceptions, not only did not attack individual farms, but, on the contrary, has done its best to save them from any attempts on the part of the Soviet Government, which was then striving to replace all individual farming by collective farms, as a higher technical and social form of cultivation of land. On the other hand, in the South, South East and in the black-soil area the peasants, attitude towards individual peasant farming was the same as towards landlords, and individual farms were almost entirely destroyed. The explanation offered by the author is that, in the latter case, individual holdings were formed almost exclusively by means of enclosures from the common land, and resulted from the desire of their owners to preserve some advantages enjoyed by them, which they incurred the risk to lose, had they remained in the village communes, or belonged to rich peasants who were on the way of becoming large landowners. From the point of view of technique, these individual holdings were not better than those of the peasants in the commune, and were, therefore, unable to justify their existence in the eyes of the peasantry. At the same time, in the North, the North-East and the Centre of Russia there were numerous individual farms which were far more progressive in their technique and more prosperous than the average peasant farms in their districts, while they possessed no more land than the latter. This tended, naturally, to impress the local peasantry and to inspire confidence in the new forms of farming, and the peasant could not raise his hand to attack them. Moreover, precisely in these parts of Russia there exists at present a very marked tendency towards transition to individual holdings: many instances have been recorded of whole villages dividing up their land to form enclosed farms. The initiative, awakened by the revolution, is apparently seeking to find an outlet in this form.

Land settlement. In the foregoing we have been dealing with the actual changes which have taken place during the five years of the Soviet régime. There is no need to explain or to prove that in the case of all the changes brought about by the revolution, and particularly in that of the new agrarian conditions created by it, it is of the utmost importance that the situation now established *de facto* should be consolidated *de jure*, so as to make the beneficiary certain as to the nature and the limits of the rights acquired by him and of the security of his possession. In the case of land, whether owned or held on some other title, the laws and regulations of the authority which happens for some time to be in control of a given territory are matters of relatively small importance. The Russian revolution has already had sufficient experience of such laws, which were intended to remain «for ever immutable» and, in some cases, were dealing with land, but which were very soon repealed or annulled. Far more important than laws is their actual application, which tends to create a strong bulwark of vested interests and makes the repeal of the existing laws impossible without encountering stubborn resistance on the part of those whose interests are at stake.

In the sphere of agrarian relations this application of the laws means the completion of the work of land settlement, i. e. an exact survey of the land of every holder, the preparation of survey maps and the actual carrying out of delimitations on the spot. This requires a good deal of serious work, but, once it is done in agreement with the majority of the groups of population

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concerned in it, it becomes a very strong foundation of the new relations, and the strength of the whole building becomes so great that its destruction is impossible, unless by another revolution.

The work of land settlement was started in 1919, in the course of which year only 321.000 dessiatins were actually surveyed and their boundaries marked. Since then, the work was making greater progress: in 1920 the area surveyed amounted to 3.034.000 dessiatins; in 1921 — to 8.456.000 dessiatins, while in 1922 it will probably reach about 10.000.000 dessiatins. The figures quoted represent the area of which the survey was entirely completed, including the carrying out of the survey and the marking of the boundaries of the lands of every canton and village concerned, i. e. of the principal types of land settlement done by the State. At its present rate of progress, this work would require about five or six years more for its final completion. The main obtacles to the speeding up of the work are the financial position of the Soviet Government and the lack of the necessary technical personnel, whose number at present does not exceed 4.500. It would be difficult to say how far the Soviet Government could be able to cope with these obstacles, even if it were earnestly willing to complete the survey within a short period of time. Thus, we see that the work now being done by the State in the sphere of land settlement, if it is not proceeding fast enough, is still going on in a satisfactory manner and is having a considerable effect.

Altogether different is the position with regard to internal settlement, establishing the rights to land within the villages. The available technical personnel is entirely engaged in the work of land settlement as between the villages, carried out by the State, and is almost absolutely unable to pay any attention to these internal problems of village life. Accordingly, there is not only no special propaganda of various forms and measures of land settlement, which are of great importance for the development of progressive agriculture, among the population, but even the demands already existing in the villages cannot be met on an adequate scale.

To the domain of land settlement, finally, belongs also the problem of the carrying out of a general *cadastre* or of an exhaustive register of all agricultural lands, which would give a more or less accurate account of their areas and their qualities. In spite of the exceptional importance of a *cadastre* for a reasonable organisation of the food tax, the voices of those, who insist on the necessity of carrying it out, are not listened to. Apparently, it is clear to the Soviet autorities concerned, that it is entirely beyond them to undertake this work with any hope of success in the near future, partly owing to technical reasons, but mainly on account of financial difficulties.

Cattle-breeding. The losses in the live stock of Russia since the beginning of the war were enormous. Kriastchova gives the following figures of the numbers of live stock in Soviet Russia and the Ukraine in 1916 and 1921, while drawing attention to the fact that the figures for 1916 are already much lower than those of pre-war days («Selskokhos. Jizn», №№ 1-2, 1922):

	Horses	Oxen	Cows	Sheep	Pigs
	(in thousands)				
1916	21.221	3.445	22.280	79.726	19.456
1921	18.916	2.637	20.611	41.623	14.300

The terrible famine of 1921 has further reduced the numbers of live stock.

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P. Miesiatzev («E. J.» № 252) estimates the number of horses in 1921 at 18.283000. and for 1922 at 14.031.500.

The prospects for the nearest future are gloomier still: the condition of breeding stock and of young cattle is such that, instead of an increase in the numbers of cattle in the course of the next few years to come, one is bound to see a further depletion of the herds. Even before the famine, Khriastchova estimated the losses in the number of breeding bulls at 56 p. cent. of their total stock in 1916. The future of horse-breeding is represented by Witte («E. J.» 2,22) in the gloomiest light, because, while the total number of horses has fallen by 40 p. cent., Russia has lost 85-90 p. cent. of her stock of breeding stalions at the breeding stations and 99 p. cent. of the stock of her horse-breeding farms. At present, the total number of stalions at breeding stations is about 1.500, instead of the former 9.267, plus private and Zemstvo stalions; at the breeding farms there are now 1.000 stalions and 3.000 brood mares instead of 25.000 and 300.000 respectively before the war.

The decrease in the numbers of live stock is, beyond doubt, one of the principal causes of the present catastrophical condition of peasant farming.

Agricultural Implements. The value of implements yearly consumed by the Russian agriculture used to amount to about 100 million roubles. About one-half of the total was imported from abroad (59.447.000 roubles' worth in 1912 and 40.919.000 roubles' worth in 1914), the other half having been manufactured in Russia (52.695.000 roubles' worth in 1912 and 54.917.000 r.' worth in 1914). The war has entirely stopped the imports from abroad and has led to a great decrease in home production. By 1920 the revolution has completely disorganised home production, and all efforts to re-start ithave ended in failure. Even in the manufacture of the simplest kinds of implements the output of Soviet factories is far below the pre-war standards: thus, the number of scithes manufactured in 1921 amounted only to 776.000, as compared with 1.135.000 in 1913 (68.4 p. cent.); that of reaping hooks — 697.000 instead of 2.531.000; that of ploughs — 99.000, as compared with 739.000 (13.4 p. cent.). The position with more complicated machines was even worse than that: the number of threshing machines manufactured in 1921 was 1.600, or 1.5 p. cent. of the output of 1913; that of winnowing machines — 2.800 or 3.4 p. cent., while the number of harvesting machines produced amounted to 10, or 9 p. cent. of the pre-war figure.

The importation of agricultural implements from abroad since the resumption of trade relations with the outer world, was also unable to assume anything like large proportions, owing to the deficiency of funds for payment. Thus, in 1920, the value of agricultural implements imported amounted to about one million gold roubles; in 1921 and 1922 the imports were somewhat larger, but their exact values are unknown. As a result, the present shortage is put by Soviet authorities at 90 million poods of various implements, to the value of 540 million gold roubles, while the most urgent minimum requirements are now estimated at 50 million gold roubles (A. Steklitzky, «E. J.»№274).

The area sown and the yield of crops. The changes mentioned above have resulted in a heavy reduction in the area under crops and in the productivity of the fields, with the consequent fall in the yield of cereals. Of the extent to which agricultural production has suffered we can obtain an idea from the figures given by P. Miesiatzev, a prominent advocate and promoter of the Soviet policy with regard to farming. According to him, the area under crops has fallen from 85.24 million dessiatins on the average for 1911-1915, to 43.81 million dessiatins in 1922, or by 45.4 p. cent. The average yield of crops has

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fallen from 43.6 poods per dessiatin in 1911-1913 to 30 poods in 1920 and 23.7 poods in the famine year 1921.

CH. III. THE PROBLEMS OF RUSSIAN FARMING.

After having completed our brief survey of the present precarious condition of Russian farming, let us now proceed to its possible future prospects. We will make an attempt to deal with the principal purposes to the achievement of which all efforts should be directed, being careful to dwell only on purely practical propositions, without allowing ourselves to be carried away by utopian dreams of what might have happened, had Russia succeeded in showing to the whole world an unprecedented example of a socially and technically ideal organization of farming, with electrification, ideal sizes of holdings, etc. etc.

We must always bear in mind that the transition from the lower to the highest forms of farming possible at the present stage of science and technique, makes slow progress even in the most advanced agricultural countries, while Russia is a country of small peasant farming which is only beginning to adopt modern improvements.

The principal problem of Russia's political and social reconstruction is that of raising this particular type of farming to the highest possible level of efficiency. This process of gradual improvement is bound to take place on the now existing background of economic relations throughout the world, and will depend on these relations; the progress must take account of the given standards of farming technique and the methods of its propaganda and adoption.

In order to trace at least an outline of Russia's real possibilities in this respect, we shall make a short survey of the experience of other countries, and of the essential points distinguishing their farming from the Russian, and see what useful conclusions we are able to draw from this comparison.

In the first instance, we shall give a few figures to illustrate the general conditions of agriculture in some advanced countries, as they existed before the influence of the war has made itself felt. The figures are taken from the «Annuaire International de Statistique Agricole», 1915-16.

Countries	Average yield of crops per hectar for 1907-1916 (in poods)					Average numbers of lives tock per 1.000 hectars of land available for agriculture			
	Wheat	Rye	Barley	Oats	Potat.	Horses	Black cattle	Sheep	Pigs
Russia Europ.	43	48	52	49	419	89	133	152	46
» Asiat.	40	40	40	43	343	—	—	—	—
France	82	64	84	79	539	45	247	217	24
Germany	126	105	121	116	847	65	397	99	338
Un. Kingdom	131	113	115	113	877	73	449	919	119
Belgium	153	150	169	146	1098	103	715	72	546
Danemark	187	98	135	112	857	140	623	69	540
Holland	151	107	159	96	881	114	714	287	460
Canada	79	71	194	83	636	67	133	44	63
U. S. A.	60	62	82	65	391	59	179	136	190
Japan	83	-	99	97	601	53	46	1	11
Argentine	39	42	49	51	832	43	142	374	15

This table tends clearly to exhibit the degree to which Russian farming is lagging behind the respective types of farming in Western Europe Even. the countries of the American continent, with their extensive methods of agriculture, have overtaken Russia, except in the case of the Argentine which is still lagging behind us.

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Can these great differences between the various countries be completely accounted for by mainly natural causes, such as climate or the qualities of the soil? The most cursory glance at the history of agriculture in these countries would do to convince us that this is not the case. Natural causes have long receded to the background, as compared with factors depending on human will and effort. The economic conditions of the development of agriculture in its relation to the world market, the standards of general education and of agricultural training and the density of agricultural population — such are the principal causes which, in a variety of combinations, tend to create these differences between various countries. As far as the differences existing between European countries are concerned, the principal factor is the general level of culture and, next to it, stand various peculiarities of historical origin.

In the XV and XVI centuries the average yield of wheat in England, just as that of Russia at present, did not exceed 35 to 45 poods per dessiatin, as compared with the 150 poods to which it now amounts. In the beginning of the XIXth century German farming was lagging far behind the French, while the level of English farming was much higher than that of France. At the beginning of the XXth century Germany succeeded to take the first place among these three countries, having left France far behind and, during the later decades, having outstripped England as well.

Below we give a few figures showing the progress of farming in Germany and England during the last few decades:

Average yearly yield per acre (1 acre = 0,37 dessiatin; 1 bushel = 1,38 Russian miera; 1 cwt = 3.1 poods).

Description of crops	England		Germany	
	1885-89	1909-1913	1883-87	1909-1913
Wheat (bushels)	29.5	31.2	19.8	31.6
Barley »	32.4	32.7	22.7	36.7
Oats »	38.8	39.0	25.7	44.6
Potatoes (poods)	365.8	384.4	210.8	334.8
Hay (cwt)	26.1	23.1	22.5	33.7

Thus, in the course of 30 years Germany succeeded in increasing the yield of her crops by about 50 to 100 p. cent., while England's progress in this respect was practically nil. The author of this comparison (Middleton) illustrates the difference in productivity between German and English farming by saying that on every 100 acres of land under cultivation the English farmer is able to support only 40 to 50 people, as against 70 to 75 people supported on the same area in Germany. He produces 15 tons of cereals instead of the German 33 tons; 11 tons of potatoes instead of 55 tons; 4 tons of meat instead of the German 4½ tons; 17 tons of milk instead of 28 tons; a practically negligible amount of sugar instead of the 2¾ tons produced in Germany.

French figures, as already referred to, are much lower than those for England, while Russia is far behind France.

In turning to the literature on agriculture for an explanation of these facts, we obtain in practically every case essentially the same answer to our question: the system of agricultural training and the general standards of agricultural education in the country, the level of farming technique, the efficient organisation of experimental farms, the selection of seeds, the improvement of live stock and its rational feeding, the use of artificial fertilizers, the adequate organisation of credit facilities for the farmer — such are the real foundations of modern progressive agriculture.

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In the first instance, we should try to find an answer to the question, whether our farming in future should follow the examples set by the German or Belgian agriculture based on intensive cultivation. Should it not rather be carried on extensive lines, as that of North and South America? We have seen that the figures of yield of these latter countries are far below those of Western Europe. Meanwhile, it is clear that the general level of culture of the American farmer is, certainly, nearer to that of the Belgian or the German, than to that of the Russian peasant. There evidently exist certain causes which do not allow American farming to be raised to the standards of intensification existing in Germany or Belgium? Such causes do, naturally, exist. If we take some of the countries to which reference was made in our table, and calculate in each case the ratio of the population engaged in farming to the area under cultivation and to meadows, we will arrive at the following characteristical series of figures. The numbers of workers per 100 acres of land are: in the U.S.A. — 2.7; in England — 4.5; in Danemark — 7; in France — 10; in Germany — 13; in Belgium — 16 and in Russia — 10. In analysing these figures, we come to the conclusion that, in order to be able to intensify the exploitation of land, a country must possess a sufficiently dense agricultural population. If the number of hands available for agriculture, for any reason whatever, happens to be relatively small, the direct result is that, either, a large percentage of lands must remain uncultivated and be converted into meadows, while intensive cultivation must be restricted to a comparatively small area, or the cultivation must be carried on extensive lines and, although the shortage of hands can be made good by the use of machinery, the technical level of cultivation is bound to suffer, as this is the case in American countries. The flow of labour to agriculture is determined by the whole set of economic conditions prevailing in the country. If, for instance, industries and towns, offering better prospects of remuneration to labour, tend to develop in a country, there is bound to be a migration from the countryside to the towns until the latter are saturated with labour or until the conditions of employment in agriculture are raised to a level at which competition for hands with the industries and the towns is made possible. The flourishing industries and towns of England and of the United States tend always to reduce the supply of labour available for farming. This is why, in England, out of a total of 26 million acres of good land available for cultivation, in 1921 only 10 million acres were actually under crops. Beside, before the war, the area under crops was gradually decreasing, and since 1918 this decrease has set in again, in spite of the efforts made by the Government to check this process.

Russia is in possession of sufficient labour to ensure a very high degree of intensification of her farming. Her future lies in intensive farming on West-European lines. One should give up, as an Utopia, all idea of achieving an improvement in the conditions of the countryside by reducing the density of Russia's village population through such measures as industrialisation, colonisation of outlying territories, etc.

There is no doubt that all these measures are necessary and that they are able to improve the conditions in the most overpopulated districts. But they are absolutely unable to improve the standards of life and the cultural level of the Russian countryside to a degree at which they would approach those enjoyed by the American farmer. As applied to the whole of the country, their importance cannot be great. The utmost these measures would ever be able to give Russia, would be to absorb the excess of the natural growth of her population.

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Are we able now to assign the limits to which the intensification of farming in Russia can be expected to go? Being, on the one hand, a technical problem, the degree of possible intensification depends, on the other, to a greater extent still, on economic conditions. By making use of all the modern achievements of agricultural science, by using the most suitable seeds, natural and artificial fertilizers etc, we would, certainly, be able to raise the yield of crops by no less than three times practically throughout Russia, while in some districts in which the technical level of cultivation is particularly low, we might obtain a four or even five-fold increase. Economic conditions, however, can set much lower limits to the degree of intensification. These limits are determined by the current level of prices of farming produce, of implements, fertilizers, labour and other essential elements of production, by the distance from the nearest market, as well as by the efficient organisation and the cost of transport within the country. The variety of combinations in which these factors are met in various parts of Russia is bound to make the limits of possible intensification very different in every separate part of the country. The general rule is that a farmer is able to intensify his cultivation as long as the costs of improvements are lawer than the increase in the return obtained by him.

No one would be able now to foresee for any considerable time to come, what will be the combination of these various factors in future, on which will depend the possible degree of intensification. At present, the utmost we can do is to speak of the probable tendencies in the development of these factors. If the increase in the yield of Russian agriculture proceeds very fast, and the balance available for export abroad exceeds the demand of the growing population of consuming countries, it is probable or, rather, even certain, that there will be a fall in the prices of agricultural produce, which will exert an adverse influence on the progress of intensification. Simultaneously with this, one should, however, expect a fall in the prices of farming implements and fertilizers, by which the progress of farming technique would be helped. In our competition in the world market, we are much handicapped by our distances and our inadequate system of communications, which tend greatly to increase overhead charges on farming produce or implements, either sold or bought. A great hindrance in our case is also the necessity to buy agricultural machinery and fertilizers abroad, owing to which we have to pay more for them than our competitors do. On the other hand, we enjoy the great advantage of cheapness of everything within the country, which, combined with the low standards of life of the peasant population, makes our farming costs very much lower than they are in the countries of the West. As an illustration of these higher costs, we may point to England, where meadows cannot be converted into cereal fields, because it is impossible to find sufficient labour for this purpose at a wage of 20 shillings per week, although for very nearly two years the number of unemployed in the country amounts to about 2 millions.

In dwelling on what appear to be the probable limits of intensification in Russia, we feel entirely justified in saying that these limits are somewhere very far. It appears absolutely certain that the world market would never allow the production of cereals in Russia to be increased to anything over twice its pre-war figures, without a catastrophic fall in the level of prices. In the case of animal products the possible limits of expansion appear to be very much wider.

Thus, the aim which Russian farming should strive to achieve may be briefly formulated, as that of raising its productivity to the maximum to which it is allowed to rise by the present level of agricultural technique and the conditions of the world market.

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CH. IV. THE MEANS TO DEVELOP RUSSIAN FARMING.

These means can be divided in two main groups: a) Legislative measures or the establishment of legal norms, dealing with various aspects of agriculture; and b) Various economic measures of the Government and of public bodies, intended, within the framework of the given legal organisation, to assist the development of farming.

In the case of Soviet Russia we have got also to take into account a third set of consideration—viz. the methods by which the Government is carrying its ideas into effect. These methods are playing so important a part in to-day's Russian realities, and are tending to establish such extraordinary kinds of relations between the compulsory measures of the State and the efforts of self-help on the part of the community, that any one who does not clearly understand them is bound to be entirely in the dark as to Russian life in general and the conditions of Russian agriculture, in particular.

A. AGRARIAN LEGISLATION.

The agrarian legislation of the Soviet Government, which was gradually growing in the course of the last five years,as a result of the piling up of separate decrees, was ultimately codified some time ago, having been brought together in a general Agrarian Code, in which some of the internal contradictions of the former enactments have been removed. The Code, whose full title is «Agrarian Code of the R. S. F. S. R.» was approved by the C. E. C. on October 22nd, 1922. The Soviet legislative acts bearing on forests were not included in this Code and are to be codified separately in the «Forest Code» which is now being compiled.

I do not intend to dwell here on a detailed analysis of the «Agrarian Code», in which important provisions are mixed up with much unimportant detail. It is my purpose to establish and to defend those essential propositions which, in my opinion, tend to form the legal basis of the real interests of the great majority of the population of Russia and to guarantee the maximum of conditions favourable to the development of our farming. Then, it is my intention briefly to show, to what extent these propositions are embodied in the Agrarian Code.

Four propositions must be accepted as absolutely necessary to enable Russian farming to emerge from its present critical condition and to develop in future. These propositions are as follows:

1) The revolution has done away for ever with all rights of former owners to land, buildings, live stock, implements, etc., previously owned by them, as well as to any compensation for their losses:

2) The rights of small farmers, who are personally working on their holdings, must be made legally secure up to the extent to which they enjoy them at present.

3) The present area of Soviet and collective farms, in so far as the latter are not properly peasant farms, must be carefully preserved in the hands of the State and safeguarded against any attempts to lay hands on it by former owners or present cultivators, and must form the basis of an extensive organisation of experimental farming, seed farming and cattle breeding, whose development will be one of the most vital problems of Russian agriculture. The balance of land on the satisfaction of these requirements must be diverted to the purposes of internal colonization.

4) The forests and empty areas in all parts of Russia must remain in the

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hands of the State for the purpose, both, of providing land for the farmine population in future and of the organisation on them of systematic colonization on a large scale.

The acceptance of the first of these propositions puts an end to a wrong created by centuries, whose further existence could be justified by no other reasonable motive than that the doing away with it would cost the whole nation too much, as this proved to be the case in reality.

The second proposition involves the sanctioning of another wrong of historical origin—viz. of the fact of the comparative poverty of the peasantry, with regard to land, in some parts of Russia, alongside with relative wealth in other parts. The sanctioning of this wrong is made necessary by the consideration that it is beyond the power of any Government to transfer millions of landless peasants to the lands of their wealthier brethren, and to compel the latter thus to part with some of their land for their sake . Such an attempt would inevitably involve the country in a new civil war, more terrible still than the one from which it has just emerged, and equally fruitless.

As far as the third and fourth of these propositions, i. e. the development of experimental work and the building-up of a reserve of land, are concerned, they will be dealt with at a later stage.

Collective, communal and individual farming. Is it possible now categorically to decide in favour of any one of these three forms of farming, and should the Government by legislation and administrative pressure assist the development of any of them at the expense of the two others?

Five years' practical experience of collective farming has resulted in heavy disappointment even for its strongest advocates and supporters. Such farms were speedily heading to ruin, their downward movement having even outstripped that of average peasant farming. The failure was due to the fact that, 1) the farms, instead of real peasants, have got into the hands of people willing to work on land, but absolutely ignorant in all matters of agriculture and cattle-rearing: factory workers, intellectuals, etc.; 2) the present-day man, generally speaking, is still, probably, unfit for such forms of farming. In spite of the fact that the relatively large farms are nearer to the «optimal» size,*) than the average small peasant family holdings, and are, therefore, theoretically able to offer greater prospects of success, in practice they have proved an utter failure.

The difficulty of bringing into accord personal initiative and collective opinion; the various degrees of agricultural knowledge, training, and working capacity; the impossibility, owing to the low degree of mechanisation and the difficulty of properly assessing the individual efforts and the productivity of the separate members and, accordingly, of working out the principles of a fair distribution of the yield; the desire of some to spare no effort in order to obtain the highest possible prosperity of the collective farm, while others tend to work as little as possible and to enjoy leisure — all these and innumerable other distinctions in individual psychology tend in an agricultural collective to exercise more influence than in any other kind of collective work, and tend, apparently, to make the prospects of development of such organisations extremely remote, relegating them to some very distant future, when men will become incomparably more cultured, tolerant and well-meaning

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*) See, A.V. Tchaianoff and others: «The optimal sizes of farming enterprises» (Russian), 1922.

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to each other and when, perhaps, owing to further progress of science and technique, the daily toil of the farmer will cease to be as heavy as it is now.

As long as people have practically nothing better to do, collective farms will, naturally, exist. But as soon as opportunities of real work and of fair remuneration present themselves to the Russian intellectual and manual worker, the majority of these farms are bound to collapse. Accordingly, it is my opinion that those now working in the collictive farms cannot be considered as having the same right to the land they now cultivate, as the genuine peasant has to retain his allotment. For the time being, collective farms must be looked upon as forming part of the reserve of land at the disposal of the State

This, naturally, does not imply that, in a few particular cases, when collective farms are cultivated by genuine peasant farmers, really able to carry their farming with a reasonable measure of success, either individually or in common, they should not be considered as entitled to priority with regard to the eventual allocation of holdings out of the area now being farmed by them, up to the norms fixed for the given district.

If, on the one hand, collective farming is a form, to adopt which the present generation is not yet fit, communal farming, on the other, is a primitive form, which the Russian peasantry has already outgrown. «Communal landownership was the main obstacle on the way of the development of the productivity of peasant farming», said prof. Brutzkus at the Agronomic Congress, while, by the way, in his argumentation, he indicted the commune with such crimes, of which it scarcely could ever have been guilty.

The whole history of agriculture in Western Europe tends to confirm this view. A well known historian of English agriculture, Curtler, for instance, says that, in the whole agrarian history of the nations of Central Europe, no other fact has had more influence on the progress of farming than the disappearance of the rural commune and the development of the mutual independence of the farmers. This opinion, with very few exceptions, is shared by most of the best known authorities on the subject (Prothero, Golz, etc.). In their view the disappearance of the commune means the doing away with the three field system, the introduction of the rotation of crops, of grass sowing and new kinds of crops, the increase in the numbers of live stock, its rational feeding, etc.

The argument against the commune was everywhere the same, as that now rightly advanced in Russia: however progressive a separate farmer can be, however advanced may be his views as to the methods of cultivation etc., once he is a member of a commune he has got to adapt his pace to the progress of the latter. Independent individual farming alone allows free play to the initiative of the farmer which, in Russian conditions, is still capable of really miraculous achievements and which is bound, by its example, to lead the backward elements of the countryside along the path of progress.

Historical and theoretical considerations of this kind, however, do not appear to be equally convincing to all. It is a matter of common knowledge that the Russian «narodniki» («populists») have for many years staunchly supported the commune and opposed the development of individual holdings. The relative success of the Stolypin land reforms has greatly shattered their views on this point. Though the official attitude of the party on this point has not been altered, individual members have often expressed themselves in favour of its revision.

Of what has been said here of the advantages of individual holdings and against the commune I do not draw the direct conclusion that it is necessary

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by a single decree to divide the whole of Russia's land into individual holdings. In order to effect a wholesale transition to higher forms of farming, the population must first get ripe for it. It is a known fact that the drastic Prussian reform of the early XIXth, by which what remained of the commune was destroyed by decree, as well as English enclosures which were also carried out by the exercise of strong pressure on the commune, had very painful consequences for a large section of the population, although ultimately, after several generations, they proved to be beneficial.

One need neither combat the commune, nor artificially foster collective or individual holdings.What is really needed, is rightly emphasised in the resolution of the Agronomic Congress, which points to the necessity of «permitting the farming population freely to chose any forms of land holding, while adequately providing for the needs of the majority and for the agricultural initiative of the minority in the villages». Indeed, while rightly emphasising the existing tendency, this resolution does not make the demarcation line between the «interests of the majority» and the «initiative of the minority» sufficiently clear.

Is, for instance, the right of one-fifth of the peasants in a commune in which land re-distributions are in abeyance at any time to claim the enclosure of their allotments, introduced under Stolypin and preserved by the Bolsheviks, a form of reasonable outlet for personal initiative, or is it to be interpreted as a measure intended artificially to destroy the commune in favour of the minority? Why is that minority fixed at 1 /5, and not at 1 /4 or 1 /3? Any decision on such points is naturally bound to be purely arbitrary, while the expediency of any such norms can be tested only by their practical application.

Thus, no privileges to the communes, to collective farms or to individual holdings, and reasonable facilities for the unhindered development of any of these forms — such is the difficult task with which the Russian legislation is confronted to-day.

The right of property to land an other forms of tenure. Socialisation and nationalisation of land. What should be the legal title of the peasant to his land? Should it be owned by him, should he have its possession for use or should he lease it? Under what particular conditions should the legal provisions concerning land be described as establishing nationalisation, socialisation or private ownership to it or, rather, what is the real meaning of these terms?

We know how high is the degree of importance attached by some of our public men to the fact that land should be given to the peasants on terms of private ownership with all that is involved in it, i. e. with the unrestricted rights of bying, selling, mortgaging and accepting it in mortgage.

Many people are inclined to see in this the only condition capable of staying the present destruction of farming and of achieving its restoration. It is curious that, in so far as the absolute right of free disposal of land is concerned, some socialists of various shades of opinion are in agreement with the fiercest opponents of socialism. Accordingly, the reasons advanced in favour of this principle, as well as the ideas as to the way in which it can be carried into effect, are very different in the case of these two groups. The official Russian Social-Democratic Party, maintaining that it is the real guardian of orthodox Marxian principles, is in favour of free disposal, as being essential for the eventual creation of large farming enterprises, which alone are able to raise the productivity of agriculture to a maximum and are a necessary intermediate stage on the road to socialism. The same is aimed at by the staunchest enemies

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of socialism, but on different grounds: they aim at the establishment of absolute property to land, whatever be the sizes of holdings, because individual interest has always been and is bound always to remain the only motive power of economic progress. Large and highly productive model farms can be created and maintained only when they are controlled by «masters», whose energy and will are alone able to develop them. Between these two extreme views there is a large number of intermediate positions, imposing certain limitations on the freedom of disposal for various reasons. Among them are men of «populist» tendencies, as M. Osorgin, maintaining that the principle of ownership to land «is the only guarantee against outside interference which, at present, is always threatening to destroy the fruits of long strenuous efforts and deprive the peasant of the produce of his labour». Marxian Socialists belonging to the «revisionist» school, are led to the defence of free mobilisation of land on the ground that petty peasant farming is unable to survive and that it is necessary to afford certain facilities for the creation of privately owned farms of the most suitable («optimal») size. Such will be average-sized and moderately large farms, employing hired labour and being able to mortgage their land for the purpose of obtaining the necessary credit. According to this view, to prohibit the sale of land means artificially to keep on the land petty farmers, doomed to misery and unproductivity, owing to the impossibility of obtaining credit and of starting sound farming on their small allotments. This tends to reduce the gross income from farming, results in the countryside becoming overpopulated and hinders the migration of labour to the industry.

Next come various shades of opinion, purporting to represent the peasants' views, and declaring that the peasant wants to own his land and that only on such condition he will invest his labour, energy and knowledge in its cultivation.

As to myself. I maintain that legislation, prohibiting free disposal of land, is certainly more suited to Russian conditions, as they are to day and are bound to remain in the immediate future, and better able to meet Russia's requirements than any legislation based on opposite principles. Let us pass under review the main reasons advanced in favour of the right of private ownership of land.

The assertion that large estates ensure greater productivity in farming and that, as a result, they are superior and are bound to be superior to small farming, is contradicted by the results yielded by every new investigation. It is true that extremely small farms are often so overburdened with unproductive charges, so short of capital and so unproductive, that they are driven out of existence. But average-sized family farms with holdings of 2 to 10 or, rather, of 10 to 20 hectars, in France, England, Germany, Belgium, etc., have so far proved their vitality and their adaptability with regard to intensification, cultural progress and productivity, especially when, owing to co-operation, they begin to enjoy many advantages of large farms, that they can fairly be put on a level with the latter or even higher and considered as being the real foundation of countries with prosperous farming. It is precisely to this type that belongs the majority of Russian peasant farms, with average holdings of about 9 dessiatins.

One may be inclined to ask: why, if the type of farming, prevailing among the Russian peasantry, possesses so much internal vitality, should it be protected by artificial measures? This is because, in the immediate future, and — who could say? — perhaps for a rather considerable period, as the trials of Russia are not yet at their end, the farmers, holding quite sufficient land to

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start a prosperous farm, may still die from starvation owing to the lack of live stock, implements and seed. The starving peasants of the Volga region, for instance, gave a horse in exchange for a pood of grain. The right of free disposal of land would attract to the countryside a swarm of international sharks, who, perhaps under Russian labels, would buy up land wholesale for practically nothing. They would, once again, form large estates, owned individually, if the right of property to land were to be unrestricted, or by proxies, if individual property on land were to be limited to small holdings; they would be able to do the same under the form of mortgages, in the case of the establishment of a definite family norm, and of the right of sale and mortgage being limited to such normal allotments. This is clear, because Russian land is bound to be a better investment for money than any gold mines, as this is now with real property in Germany. Can we be certain that the Russian peasant's love for land will see him safely through all these trials, and that he will not be tempted to give up his land and, with it, the future of his children, for the lentil porridge offered to him now? Even had the process assumed a different form, resulting in the buying up by the wealthier peasants of the land of the poorer ones, having no horses, cows or land under actual cultivation, would one be able to say, that this would be beneficial? In my opinion, this would not be so: neither the industry, nor the towns or agricultural employment would be able to provide livelihood for the thus proletarised peasants and, instead of a life, miserable as it is, on a poor ration of bread and potatoes, they would be doomed to starvation. Until peasant farming recovers, free disposal of land in Russia is impossible. But what, when it will ultimately recover? Now, to give such right would be injurious; then, it would not be needed. Along with the progress of town life and of industry, which will offer the petty peasant farmer better prospects of livelyhood, than their farms, they will give up the latter and migrate to the towns. The amalgamation of petty holdings into strong average-sized farms will proceed as well in the form of leases, as it would in that of private property to land.

Then, private property to land is advocated on the ground that it is alone able to provide the necessary security for credit. Credit is, indeed, essential for the speedy reconstruction of Russian farming. But, at the same time, it is my considered opinion that the credit of which Russian agriculture is in need, viz. long term loans in very large amounts, will either be obtained in the form of Government loans or will not be obtained at all. As far as short term credit is concerned, it is based on a certain economic stability of the borrower (live stock, implements, etc.). Under normal conditions, a regular system of credit co-operatives would be able to attract much capital to peasant farming, without having recourse to land as security. The partisans of private property to land point to the fact that, whenever it is not recognised, «the personal initiative and interest of the farmer are killed, because some alien will is able at any time to destroy the fruits of his many years' labours and deprive him of his produce» (M. Osorgin). It appears to me that this contention is based on a confusion of ownership and security and completeness of the right to use the land. Energy and initiative are destroyed in Russia not on account of the impossibility to sell or to buy land, but by the absence of security as to the fruits of one's labours. No better expression can be found of this principal evil affecting the peasants, than the complaints addressed by them to Communist leaders at one of the congresses on the eve of the New Economic Policy: «The land is now ours, indeed, but the grain is yours; the meadows are ours, but the hay is yours; the forests are ours, but the timber is yours».

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The right to land is thus formulated in the Soviet «Agrarian Code» (art.11): «The right to land alloted for personal exploitation, is perpetual and cannot be revoked, unless on grounds indicated in the law». Then follow these grounds (art. 18), guaranteeing the rights of a peasant family to its land so long as any of its members is personally engaged in its cultivation. It appears to me that this is precisely what is essential for the peasant, while anything else, including the right freely to dispose of the land, is unimportant to him.

In fact, up to the very recent past, the peasants have never enjoyed full property rights over most of their land: peasant allotments could neither be sold, nor mortgaged. Only the Stolypin legislation, having permitted the peasants to enclose their allotments, has, at the same time, permitted also their sale, but only to persons belonging to the «peasant class».

I think that the actual formulation of the opinions on the problem, whether land should be made the peasants' private property, or whether it should be given him in secure and permanent use, is rendered difficult by the fact that the meaning of the terms «socialisation» and «nationalisation» is not sufficienty clear. «Permanent and complete use of land» should properly be designated by the word «nationalisation», while in the current Russian conception the latter appears as a form of socialism. Non-socialist elements among the Russian public, in their desire to do away with anything that reminds of socialist legislation, cannot even imagine a situation in which land would belong to the State. On the other hand, there are socialists of «populist» views who begin to believe that the peasant really wants to own his land and that, perhaps, it is necessary to adopt this principle as a watchword. They are, however, restrained by the fear lest they should break away from «socialist principles» without having noticed it themselves. To both one should definitely reply that their fears are absolutely unfounded, because nationalisation of land has nothing to do with socialism. In England and America, among the membership of associations, whose object it is to achieve the nationalisation of land, one can see the most extreme conservatives, bitterest enemies of socialism, as well as socialists.

A good deal of responsibility for the confusion belongs to the «populists» («narodniki»), who have introduced the unfortunate term «socialisation of land». This term, beside its unimportant declarative meaning, implying that the lands belong not to the State, but to the people as a whole, also implies two essential conditions: equality in the distribution of land and the preservation of the commune. I have already had the occasion to dwell on the inadequacy of both. As far as the term itself is concerned, one cannot fail to find it rather unfortunate: in fact, the carrying out of all that the term implies would leave us as far from socialism, as would nationalisation; accordingly, the word, being directly derived from «socialism», leads only to confusion and misunderstanding.

In considering the problem of private ownership of land or of its permanent use, I did my best to be perfectly impartial and unswayed by prejudice. I have shown myself to be emphatically in favour of permanent use. This is my considered opinion, which I am ready to defend, being deeply convinced that it meets best the peasants' requirements. Not only in this case, but throughout the examination of the main principles of Soviet agrarian legislation, I have deliberately avoided any reference to the peasants' present views and desires. Every observer in this field comes to his own conclusions, just because, up to the present, the peasant has been unable to give any objective expression of his views. When, ultimately, the peasants will be able to express their will,

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one shall have to accept it: should this prove to be against our convictions, we may try to convert them by persuasion, but not by struggling against their decision.

The Agrarian Code of October 30th, 1922, it is true, is not sufficiently complete as to details; its provisions are often badly formulated, and it leaves many important practical problems either entirely unsolved, or refers for their solution to instructions and regulations to be issued by the People's Commissariat of Agriculture. Apart, however, from these shortcomings, the main problems of legislation, such as the rights to land, the lease of land by actual cultivators, hired labour, communal, individual or collective exploitation of land, re-distributions and enclosures and measures to prevent too great a parcellation of holdings, appear to be adequately dealt with.

The least satisfactory sections of the Code are those dealing with the actual management of the holdings. On the lower stages, the Soviet legislation practically reduces to nothing the rôle of the head of the family farm; his place in it is taken by all the available members of the household, male and female, over 18 years of age. They are all entitled to claim separation, to take part in the village assembly («skhod»), deciding on problems of land holding, and to participate in all the affairs of the commune, etc. This provision is, apparently, due to the desire of the Soviet Government to increase the influence of the younger peasants, whom it regards to be more inclined to innovations, than the older generation. If, on these lower stages of administration, everyone is allowed and even invited to take part in the management of affairs, in the organisations of higher order the Soviet Government, on the contrary, appears to be extremely exclusive. Thus, the Chairmen of the Land Commissions in the cantons and the districts are directly appointed, while the election of their members is subject to approval by higher authorities. Beside, whenever a second election, in case of the cancellation of the first, yields unsuitable candidates, the whole of the members to the Commissions are appointed by the authorities. Briefly, in the administration of land, as well as in every other branch of administration, the Government makes an attempt to use demagogy at the bottom of the ladder, while insuring itself, in case of failure, against any disagreable incidents, by allowing no self-government at the top of it, in the higher administrative organisations.

Whatever its shortcomings, one may say that in the Code the requirements of life have proved stronger than theoretical schemes. The Code is based on certain sound «populist» principles, while rejecting some of their Utopian ideas, which found expression in the law, passed by the Constituent Assembly. It has been made more practical and complete, owing to advices given by practical agronomers, land-settlement workers and peasants and, on the whole, in my opinion, it represents the foundation on which future Russia, whatever be her external form of organisation, is bound to be built.

We are, however, bound to admit that, at present, at least, the Agrarian Code, as far as its main provisions are concerned, is only a piece of bureaucratic legislation, which did not yet find any real application in actual life: the peasants do not comply with its clauses, settling local matters in accordance with old and newly established customs.

B. ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL MEASURES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FARMING.

Economic and cultural measures for the purpose of assisting the development of farming are usually being undertaken and carried into effect

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by voluntary organisations of agriculturists, local self-government or the State. They aim at the better cultivation of land, selection and improvement of plants and live stock, improved methods of manuring soil and feeding of cattle and the most expedient organisation of farming as a whole. The means to this end are the acquisition of necessary knowledge and its spread among the population, the provision of the necessary capital for farming and the creation and development of organisations, through which cultural measures are actually carried into effect.

The cultivation of land. One may be perfectly safe in saying that the percentage of peasant farmers acquainted with sowing drills or realising the importance of early ploughing of fallow fields and practising it, is extremely small. A few such elementary principles of rational farming, had they been taught to the whole of the Russian peasantry, would be able, at negligible costs and with very little additional labour, to increase the yield of peasant farming by many per cent.

Having investigated, for instance, the combined effects of the early ploughing of fallow fields (end of April to early May) and of the use of the sowing drill in the Dmitrovsky district, V. Alexeieff contends that in those villages, in which at the beginning of the second decade of the present century these innovations were adopted, «a return of 14 times the amount of seed used is not at all an exception, but should be considered an average yield». The average gross yield of grain in these villages amounts to 120 poods per dessiatin, exceeding the average for the canton by 40 to 50 p. cent. In one case, the amount of seed grain expended per dessiatin being 7 poods, the yield reached 180 poods. Highly instructive are the general conclusions arrived at by this author: «The shortage of manure is made good by the methods of cultivation. By ploughing his fallow in good time, the farmer, being short of manure, obtains the same results as those obtained, with late ploughing of fallow, when the amount of dung put is twice as large. By the adoption of early fallow ploughing and the use of the sowing drill, one is enabled to obtain an yield equal to that of our best farms». («Vestn. S. Khos.», № 3, 1920). The author's assertions may appear to be a little too bold, based on observations inadequate as to number, area, time and accuracy. Here, however, we may quote the authoritative opinion of prof. Doyarenko, based on data obtained at the experimental farm of the Petrovsky Agricultural Academy and in the province of Moscow. «In comparing the various methods of fallow ploughing, we have come to the conclusion that, on the whole, early ploughing increases the yield by 50 p. cent. Thus, at our experimental farm the average yield of late fallow amounts to 112 poods per dessiatin, while that of the early fallow reaches 168 poods, or exactly 50 p. cent. more. This year the yield of our early fallow fields reached 247 poods». («Selsko-Khos. Jizn», № 2).

These are only a few occasional striking examples of the influence on the yield of the time of ploughing. They could be greatly increased in number, by studying the effects of autumn ploughing in the South, of the ploughing of harvested fields in the North, of the methods of preservation of moisture in the soil, etc.

Improved seed and cattle. Still less attention, perhaps, has been paid in Russia by the peasants, the Zemstvos and the Government, to the selection of seed grain and of live stock, to suit the conditions and requirements of farming in a given locality. Indeed, in the course of the last decade before the War these tasks appeared to have attracted increased attention; yet, the scale of the measures taken was very far from adequate. Meanwhile, the importance of

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research in this field is really enormous. Referring, for instance, to the work of American authors, Mssrs Babcock and Clausen («Genetics in relation to agriculture»), we may see, how great is the importance attached by them to this problem, as a fundamental one in modern farming.

Russia, with her great variety of climates and soils, with the poor quality of her working, dairy and slaughter cattle, more than any other country, should spare no efforts for the creation of special breeds of cattle and special selection of seed, to meet her requirements.

Manuring of fields and rational feeding of live stock. Rational methods of manuring the soil are as much the basis of modern intensive agriculture, as rational feeding of live stock is the basis of modern cattle-breeding. But how little is the Russian peasant acquainted with these first essentials of modern farming! Meanwhile, what would happen to German highly developed farming, had it been deprived of artificial fertilizers and feeding stuffs? When, owing to the war, in 1918 the amount of artificial fertilizers available in Germany has been reduced, in the case of nitrates, from 273 to 153 thousand tons, and in that of phosphorites from 782 to 220.000 tons, the yield of German crops has suffered an extremely heavy fall, reaching, on the average, about 40 p. cent. No less striking was the change in the quality of cattle; thus, the average weight of slaughtered cattle, in 1918, as compared with pre-war figures, has fallen for black cattle from 250 to 133 kg, for calves — from 40 to 31 kg; for sheep from 32 to 16 kg and for pigs from 85 to 59 kg. These figures speak for themselves and tend to explain why is it that the poor soil of Germany yields crops three times larger than ours. These facts appear particularly characteristic, because, as far as potash was concerned, Germany made more use of it in the course of the war, than she used to do before (550.000 instead of 536.000 tons). Meanwhile, the importance of potash under certain conditions may be proved by the following results obtained at a French experimental farm: the yield of wheat per hectar, with 15 kg of potash, was 820 kg; with 30 — 930 kg; with 50 — 1030 kg; with 174 — 1480 kg and with 190 — 1900 kg; in other words, by increasing the amount of potash used, the yield was made 2½ times higher.

Some of our agricultural experts, even among the best known, without denying the importance of artificial fertilizers, are yet often rather sceptical about their too ardent partisans.

Here, however, are the results obtained at the Rothamstead Experimental Farm in England, one of the best in the world, for a number of decades. A study was made of the yield of wheat, sown on the same field for 61 consecutive year, various combinations of fertilizers have been tested as to their results. We will take only three groups: absolutely unmanured land, land manured with the whole quantity of dung required (14 tons of dung per acre or 2.300 poods per dessiatin), and land on which exclusively mineral fertilizers, up to the full amount required, were used:

	Average for 61 year	Average for periods						
		1844-51	1852-61	1862-71	1872-81	1882-91	892-901	902-911
Unmanured	12.6	17.2	15.9	14.5	10.4	12.6	12.3	10.9
Dung	35.2	28.0	34.2	37.5	28.7	38.2	39.2	35.1
Min. fertilisers...	36.6	—	36.1	40.5	31.2	38.4	38.5	37.2

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This does not, certainly, imply that the importance of dung manure should be underrated and that of artificial fertilizers exaggerated. Dung, in the first instance, is the cheapest manure available at one's own farm, and had it been available in unlimited quantities, artificial fertilizers would not be needed at all. But, even when, before the war, the numbers of five stock in Russia were much larger than now, the amount of dung used in peasant farming per dessiatin of fields, seldom exceeded 1000 poods, while in many regions it was not above 500 poods. Now, with the heavy fall in the numbers of live stock and its deterioration, the amount of dung available for manure is very much smaller. Meanwhile, we know of no cultured country, even having more cattle per unit of area cultivated, which would be in a position entirely to dispense with artificial fertilizers. To combine both artificial fertilizers and natural manure in proportions varying according to the amount of dung available — such is the actual tendency at present prevailing. On account of the shortage of live stock in Russia it is essential, for the purpose of improving our farming, to develop and to cheapen the production of artificial fertilziers at home, as well as to learn their effective use.

It is not necessary to dwell here on the importance of rational cattle-feeding and on the rôle of concentrated feeding stuffs or on the necessity of using oil-cake and other by-products of farming at home, instead of exporting them abroad. All this is sufficiently clear and commonly recognised.

General organisation of farming. The rational organisarion of small farming was the subject of considerable discussion, but even theoretically the study of this problem has not advanced very far. In practice, the position is, naturally, worse still. The rotation of crops, the areas of grazing-land and fallow, the distribution of the area among various crops, the cultivation of technical plants — all this is not so much a matter of theoretical calculations, as of historical development. At present, when one-half of the fields are left entirely uncultivated, it is, perhaps, more important than ever to prepare well-thought-out plans, which would help in the rational organisation of the ploughing of these fields and in the development of the most suitable kinds of cultivation in every separate region. Beside, we should study the problems of the organisation of the most important among the secondary branches of farming (poultry-keeping, bee-keeping, rabbit-breeding, etc.) as well as the further use of agricultural produce (butter and cheese-making, drying of vegetables, etc.).

The importance of these branches, which often allow even petty farms to be prosperous, is well known.

Agricultural education and the diffusion of agricultural knowledge. Agricultural work is still infinitely far from that stage of mechanisation, at which it may be confined to the simple processes of attending the mechanisms, by which it is actually performed. Accordingly, any country aiming at agricultural progress must spare no effort to educate her farmers. The task is no easy one, as witnessed by the complaints that one reads in the agricultural literature of all countries. French writers on agriculture usually attribute the slow progress of farming in France to the ignorance and the backwardness of the French peasantry. The check suffered by the progress of English farming is attributed by an English writer, Wolf, to the ignorance of the farmer and the labourer. The same complaint is raised in America. Only at Germany all these countries are looking with jealous admiration, because, as this is generally acknowledged, in the course of a few decades she has succeeded to do more in the education of her peasants than any other country has done. To this is due her speedy progress, which has gained her a place among the countries with the most advanced agriculture.

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What have we to say about Russia in this respect? Before the war, agricultural education in Russia was extremely poor: she had only 10 higher agricultural colleges and 130 secondary and lower agricultural schools; now, the Soviet Government has almost entirely destroyed even these. In giving account of the state of agricultural schools at the All-Russian Agronomic Congress, the representative of the Department of Professional Education, Bushinsky, has depicted the condition of these schools in such colours, that the following speakers described it as «terrible» and «frightful». Professors of higher agricultural colleges gave no less gloomy a picture of the gradual decay of the higher educational institutions, accompanied, as one of them has said, by innumerable material, personal and moral losses. This was not entirely due to the lack of funds; the schools were ruined by transfers from one department to another and by the carrying out of various reforms by men entirely unconnected with their work. It was stated at the Congress, as a matter of common knowledge, that «agricultural schools were broken down by their new statutes», which «handed over their entire control to others than the people actually responsible for their administration». Provincial representatives expressed their satisfaction at the fact that they are far away from the «governing and reforming spheres», because, as a rule, all reforms reach the provinces only «when they are already in the course of revision or cancellation».

In its resolutions, the Congress was compelled to recognise the «absolutely catastrophical condition of agricultural schools» and to propose a series of measures for their salvation, the majority of which the Soviet Government has been, however, either unable or unwilling to carry into effect.

The main agency of the diffusion of agricultural knowledge among the population in Russia, as everyone knows, were the local district agronomers. Under the existing conditions in that country their work is particularly difficult and responsible. The Agronomic Congress, after long discussion, has passed a resolution, supported by the great majority of its members, to the effect that «the institute of district agronomers, owing to its direct contact with the local population and farming, has come victorious out of all its trials and has proved the vitality of this form of agronomic assistance». Accordingly, it has decided that «the institute of district agronomers should be recognised as being the fundamental form of all future local agronomic work».

At the same time, A. Minin and A. Levitzky have pointed to the shortcomings of the institute of district agronomers, viz. 1) to the universal character of knowledge district agronomers are required to possess, of which an average person is uncapable; 2) to the complaints on the part of the population that the agronomers are well equipped with theoretical knowledge, but cannot teach much in the way of practical applications, etc. Their proposal was to organise agronomic assistance on a regional basis, with the substitution of a series of specialists to the universal district agronomers.

We see that in the sphere of agricultural education and in the diffusion of useful agricultural knowledge among the population the work to be done in Russia is bound to assume tremendous proportions.

Scientific and experimental work. The improvement of farming methods requires, as a necessary condition, a widespread net of scientific institutions, carrying out experimental work on a large scale. The scale on which such work is being carried in advanced countries may be judged by the fact that, e.g. in the United States, where the work cannot be said to be up to the highest standards attainable, there existed, in 1914, 64 experimental farms, on which the expenditure amounted to 5.164.000 dollars.

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In Russia, experimental work, even before the revolution, was not up to the necessary standards. The Soviet Government has converted a number of landlords' estates, with their buildings and equipment, into experimental farms. According to the «Econ. Jizn» (19.11.22) the total number of regional stations and experimental institutions in Russia, on Oct. 10th, 1922, amounted to 154. Of these, 108 were working on the selection of seed; 23 — on cattle - breeding and 23—on the improvement of plants. Their personnel included 3.447 scientific workers, 1.000 employees and 6.000 labourers. Their aggregate area amounted to 36.600 dessiatins.

What we know of the general conditions of the work of Soviet institutions in 1922 warrants the conclusion that, with rare exceptions, no scientific work could be carried at all these stations and farms. They were not in possession of the necessary means and were, probably, overburdened with various practical tasks or simply engaged in obtaining the wherewithall to feed their personnel.

But the more defficult it is to carry out essential experimental work at present, the greater will be the part it will have to play in Russia in future.

Co-operation. — One of the principal conditions of the development of small peasant farming is the organisation of a widespread network of agricultural co-operative unions of small farmers. The importance of agricultural co-operative organisations is so great that it would not be too much to say that it is owing to them that average-sized and small farming has achived its successes and has become a prominent factor of agricultural progress. Co-operation puts at the disposal of the small farmer a large stock of agricultural implements, otherwise unavailable for him, and enables him to start rational butter- and cheese-making and other .branches of production directly connected with farming. Co-operation is a most powerful agency in the diffusion of agricultural knowledge and is always the channel through which this useful knowledge reaches the countryside. It helps the peasant to obtain better terms in selling and reduces his expenditure on what he buyes, thus being one of the principal factors in the intensification of farming. Finally, co-operation is the principal, if not the only, means of attracting capital to peasant farming, of distributing it and of supervision over its actual use. The importance of co-operation is too well known to have to be proved by figures or facts; it is sufficient to say that it is owing to the particularly great development of co-operation that the Belgian, Dutch and Danish farmers were able to raise the yield of their farming and cattle-breeding up to the highest standards. Average, sized farming in Ireland, France and Germany also owes its development and stability, in the first instance, to co-operation. Even among the comparatively large farmers of the United States and Canada, the co-operative movement, of late, is making great progress. In his speeches to the farmers, President Harding emphatically, points to co-operation as a means to overcome the difficulties with which they are now confronted. As prof. Ryan, one of the known authorities on American economics, puts it, the changes brought about by the co-operative movement in the life of many European countries are little short of a revolution, while H.W. Wolf, the distinguished author of a number of works on agricultural economics and on co-operation, in his recent work on the future of farming, summing up the results of his 60 years' labours in that domain, assumes co-operation to be the principal organising power in the farming of every country and points, as one of the main causes of the decline in English agriculture, to the fact that too little attention is being paid to co-operation and to agricultural education.

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In Russia, since the beginning of the co-operative movement, the peasants have made speedy progress in all those branches in which co-operation has succeeded in gaining a strong foothold. The Soviet Government which, in the course of the first years of its administration, did not allow any traces of self-help among the population to continue, by the beginning of 1921 has succeeded in entirely destroying co-operation and, by having done so, has greatly helped the destruction of farming. Since 1921, the Government, however, has been compelled to change its attitude, with the result that co-operation has once again been enabled to develop and that, early in 1922, I was able to describe the position as «the revival of the co-operative movement in Russia». This, however, was only a small beginning of development, and to proceed farther co-operation in Russia is still unable up to the present day. In 1922 a series of new restrictions were imposed on it by the Soviet Government. The very small degree of independence, enjoyed by it at the beginning of that year, has practically been reduced to zero before the year's close.

The State and economic and cultural measures. The whole of the measures enumerated above, at present, depends on the Government and on its financial position. Even in the sphere of independent activities of the population, i. e. in that of co-operation, the State, beside abstaining from interference and restrictions, is called upon to help the movement by means of credits and other direct assistance through its organisations. On the other hand, agricultural education, scientific research, experimental work and the whole system of establishments serving the purpose of agricultural development, entirely devolve on the State. As an example of this, we may point to the United States, where the idea was long maintained that, farming being a matter of local interest, its control must be entrusted to the separate States, and not to the Federal Government. In 1862, however, this view was given up, and a federal Department of Agriculture was formed which has ultimately assumed entire control of all the agricultural work in all the separate States. Before the outbreak of the war, it has become a powerful organisation with a yearly budget of 25 million dollars and a staff of 14.468; by 1907, its budget has increased to 37 million dollars and in 1922 it reached 120 million dollars.

If we measure the efforts made by various States for the development of agriculture by the average amounts of their Budget expenditure per 1.000 hectars of land available for cultivation, we find that the respective amounts are as follows (in gold roubles): U.S.A. — 700; U.K. — 1070; France — 600; Russia (before the war) — 300; Soviet Russia — 120 (Budget estimates for 1922). The last two figures tend clearly to show, how little could be done for the development of farming by the Government under the Tzars, and how much less still can be done now, under the Soviet régime. Beside, we should bear in mind that the last represents only the Budget estimate for 1922, and that the actual expenditure, beyond any doubt, was very much lower.

Capital. — Not only the intensification of farming, but even its restoration to its pre-war standards depends on the possibility of obtaining capital from abroad for investment in it. The sooner this is obtained, the speedier will be the restoration of farming, and the greater its future productivity. From the foregoing we have seen that the productivity of farming in Russia can be raised to a very considerable extent. Accordingly, the problem of obtaining capital for agriculture is one of the most important problems, on the solution of which depends the development of Russia's farming.

In this article I do not intend to dwell on the methods by which Russian agriculture can be financed. This is a distinct problem which must be dealt

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with separately. My only intention is to give here an approximate estimate of the amount of capital required.

In England, it is estimated that, on the average, the provision of live stock and implements needed for the equipment of a small farm, requires 10 to 11 pounds sterling per acre; the current working expenditure (exclusive of wages) — 2-3 pounds sterling a year per acre. Taking these figures as a basis of calculations, we would have to spend 270-290 roubles in fixed capital and 20 to 30 roubles in working capital per dessiatin, or, in the case of an average farm with 9 dessiatins of land, about 2.500 roubles and over 200 roubles respectively. Whatever reductions in these figures we might make, on account of the lower level of prices in Russia, we would still find that to equip our average farm up to English standards, we would require a capital outlay of no less than 2000 roubles or, on the average, 220 roubles per dessiatin. It is evident that the farming capital of our peasant has never been near anything even approaching these amounts and that now, on account of the loss of live stock and of the wear of implements, its real value is practically negligible.

C. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND THE COUNTRYSIDE.

The All-Russian Agronomic Congress in March, 1922, has passed two resolutions to the effect that: 1) «Peasant farming being directed by the will and the understanding of the farmer, with his ideas of its requirements and its technique, can be influenced only through the population, by developing its will and its understanding and by helping it to arrive at certain decisions not by compulsion, but by logical reasoning and persuasion, based on close co-operatio with its own free will and its independent activities in farming», and 2) «Peasant farming is subject to evolution, depending on internal and external conditions of historical origin, and, accordingly, it is not easily amenable to outside pressure, if the latter does not agree with the natural trend of its evolution». Most of the Soviet Government's economic and cultural measures have always been and still are in entire contradiction to these principles. The ideal of the Soviet Government in both political and economic matters is «enlightened oligarchy»: over the «ignorant» peasantry — the dictatorship of a relatively «enlightened» proletariat; over the latter — that of its «advance guard» —the Communist Party; over the Communist Party — of a small group of its most «advanced» leaders. With regard to the peasantry, this meant the making of it of an obedient tool in the hands of the town proletarian class, while, at the same time, obtaining from it sufficient means to enable the latter to give to the world an unprecedented example of flourishing industry and a prosperous proletariat. Thus, this meant the speedy introduction in the countryside, by means of Government orders, of the latest achievements of farming technique and organisation — viz., collective farms, electrification, the most efficient methods of cultivation, etc., so as to enable the peasantry more easily to carry the burden of maintaining its «enlightened dictators», and to make it actually grateful to them for having opened to the countryside the road to progress and prosperity. Hence the methods applied. There can be no peasants self-government in any more or less important domains of village life. Within the villages the peasants are still allowed a certain degree of self-government, but already all organisations dealing with larger units, such as cantons («volost») (Cantonal Executive Committees, Cantonal Land Commissions, Co-operative Unions of the second order) are put under direct Communist supervision. Beginning from all

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district organisations, the reins are firmly held by Communists, and the more important the organisation, the stronger must be the hand in control of it.*)

Hence the absolutely unreal character of self-government in all these peasants' Soviets, All-Russian Co-operative Unions, in all the institutions dealing with agriculture and land, etc. The voice of the countryside is only listened to by the Soviet Government in those cases in which discontent among the peasantry assumes threatening propositions. Then, the Government makes forced concessions to the people, and its measures, in some cases at least, as in that of the land legislation, mentioned above, acquire a more or less constructive character. In all other cases, these measures result in wanton destruction, which is bound to be felt for many years to come. As an example, we may point to co-operation, agricultural education, the provision of capital and other branches connected with peasant farming.

It is only natural that one should ask, what can be the fate of Russian agriculture under the Soviet régime.

Experience tends to show that, by all its measures, the Soviet Government is absolutely unable not only to improve agriculture, but even to prevent its further decline. The reasons are clear: it can find no substitute for co-operation; neither can it restore peasant self-government, nor re-establish relations with capitalist countries, which would enable the peasants to obtain the necessary credit abroad. Communists are unable to do this, without having ceased to be what they are.

Accordingly, until her system of Government is radically changed, Russia is doomed to economic stagnation, local famines and the actual dying out of the population of whole regions, and to terrible misery. It appears more than doubtful that the peasants should be «thoroughly satisfied» with the present régime, as asserted by Lenin in one of his recent speeches. This does not actually mean that, as a result of disaffection among the peasants, Bolshevism is bound, in the near future, to be overthrown by force, or drastically to alter its methods, although either may happen. Equally possible it is that Russia will continue for a long time to remain in approximately the same condition in which she is now. The Communist Government, having the Army at its disposal, is still able to extort tributes from the population in the form of grain or meat, furs and honey, as this was done by old time conquerors in a vanquished country. These tributes would not only be sufficient for the maintenance of the bureaucratic apparatus and of the Army, but would also allow, from time to time, to present the world with surprises, such as the erection of «Workers' Palaces» or the electrification of separate districts. Hundred million peasants, whom the Communists have turned into slaves, however poor and miserable they might be, and however high might be their death rate from famine and epidemics, would still represent an enormous working force, able to provide for the luxurious life of their masters and, at their command, while dying themselves, to erect magnificent monuments, which would remind future generations of their slavery.

Considered from the historical point of view, such a régime, in our days and conditions, cannot, naturally, be stable. It can last for some time but, ultimately, sooner or later, it is bound to collapse.

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*) One should not be mislead by the fact that, in some cases, at the very top one can see real peasants, e.g. Yakovenko and Chekunoff, who are easily accessible to all peasant representatives. I would not mention Kalinin, whose actuall connection with the village appears to be doubtful. In fact, no one of them enjoys any real authority. They are kept in their positions by the Soviet Government only with the purpose of showing the peasants that the government is really composed of «their» men.

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CH. V. CONCLUSIONS.

The foregoing permits certain approximate conclusions to be drawn, concerning the influence on the revolution of Russian farming and the future prospects of the development of the latter.

The peasants have taken possession of former landlords' lands to the value of at least 5.000 million gold roubles, and of the stock of private estates, valued at about 500 millions. The former arrangement of fields, which held the peasants in bondage to the landlords, was done away with. Land settlement work, done by the State, certainly results in a much better and more convenient configuration of the areas held by communes and individual farmers. These are the advantages of the change. But these advantages have not been obtained by the peasants for nothing. For an addition of a little over one dessiatin per farm, obtained by the peasants, the latter have paid with 1/3 of their live stock, with the deterioration of their farming equipment and with such a weakening of the whole of their resources that, for the time being, not only does the additional land lie actually idle, but they are even unable to cultivate the whole of their original allotments. Beside, to this should be added the loss of hundreds of thousands peasants of all ages at various fronts of civil war and as a result of famine; the ruin of schools and, as a result, the threatening increase in illiteracy; the general disorganisation of all branches of Governmental or public work in the interest of the peasants; finally, the heavy trubutes the peasants are forced to pay for the maintenance of the Government and of its apparatus. To the assets side of the peasants' profits and losses should, indeed, be added another gain which is one of really enormous importance not only for them, but for the whole of Russia. Before the revolution, the peasantry formed socially the lowest class of Russia's population, whose rights were considerably restricted, as compared with the rights and privileges enjoyed by other classes, incomparably less numerous than the peasantry. This inequality resulted in a constantly growing social discontent on the part of the peasantry and to century-long, tacit but stubborn struggle of the peasants for equal rights with others. Let us remind the reader of the prophetic words of Prof. Hertzenstein: «Terrible will be the time when the discontent of the peasantry, accumulated in the course of long years, will finally burst out. The waves of popular rising will not stop to distinguish the right and the wrong: they will destroy everything they meet on their way, and there will be no means to stay them, once they will overflow the banks in which they have been held before. If we choose to wait until we are roused from our slumber by the formidable cry of the turbulent peasant masses, all our landlords' farming, as well as the landlords themselves, will be doomed to destruction».

As a result of the revolution the inequality is done away with. The peasantry has obtained equal rights and equal economic opportunities with all others in Russia. The slavery, in which it now lives, and which is the lot of all non-communist elements in Russia, is the last passing phase in the agony of the dying historical inequality. One cannot now imagine a future régime, under which the peasant would not be placed on a footing of absolute equality with all other citizens of Russia. In the peasant-citizen Russia has a pledge of the reconstruction of farming and of the re-establishment of the whole Russian national economy.

The time draws near of peaceful constructive work in Russia. This work would be greatly hindered by the settling of old acounts. Still alive are the endless controversies about old agrarian programmes and past agrarian relations. The painful experience of the last few years has created sufficient inflammable material to kindle the fire of hatred among various parties and groups.

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The past is over. We have got to erase its traces and to leave to impartial historians the task of searching in its blood-stained pages. Those now living have got to keep to realities and to look forward into the future. In devising programmes and plans for the future one need not fear to come in collision with the views expressed in the past. Russian life has undergone a drastic change. How could we adjust it to old programmes? The future is unknown, and it is no easy task to trace a definite line of future activities even for men of similar views. Sharp conflicts of opinions and a struggle of views between various groups of the public are unavoidable. But this struggle must be directed to the achievement of a brighter future, and not to the settling of past quarrels. The reconstruction and progress of Russian farming are only possible along the liees indicated above, as a whole, because all the measures mentioned before are closely connected with each other. Whenever one of the essential requirements is not fulfilled, the whole progress is checked. «Economic progress is subject to the law of the minimum, i.e. every group of economic units has certain most urgent requirements, which have to be met in the first turn (the minimum), and it is only by meeting these needs that we can help the progress of our farming,»— such is one of the resolutions of the Agronomic Congress.

These factors,available in the minimum in Russian peasant farming, are so varied locally and even individually, that it is rather difficult to speak of them in general terms; but some of them may be generally recorded.

There are three of these factors in Russia that are forming the decisive minimum. They are: capital, co-operation and education. The greatest scarcity is felt in capital, and an increase in this element would speedily raise the level of farming: in some cases this increase would take the form of a horse; in others — that of a plough, a reaper or a drill; in certain localities (as the famine-stricken regions of the Volga), capital is needed for the carrying out of a whole series of works. The amount of capital required to meet the most pressing needs of Russian agriculture and to restore it to its pre-war standards, may be put at about 5 to 6.000 million gold roubles.

Needless to say that the accumulation of capital by the peasants themselves through savings, even had it been possible in the existing conditions, is bound to make very slow progress; several decades would be needed for it to restore Russian farming to its pre-war level. The process can be accelerated only by the attraction of considerable amounts of capital from abroad. Would this be practicable? In so far as we leave out of account the present political régime in Russia, and base our judgment on her possibilities, we can emphatically say yes. A country of such immense natural resources, of which the whole world is in need, as producer and, perhaps, to a greater extent still, as consumer, sooner or later is bound to obtain the credits required by it. But, naturally, capital will not flow to Russia at once: at first, the work of improving agriculture in Russia will depend on a few scores of millions given by the most daring investors. Progress, however, as well as disorganisation, usually develops at a growing rate. The first successes af investment will be bound to increase the flow of capital, until it will involve hundreds and thousands of millions.

This will happen when Russia will finally enter the path on which alone her progress is possible, viz. on the path of the building up of political and social life of the country through the free will and the mental effort of her whole population. Along this path the Russian peasant will advance as a citizen. And the sooner this comes, the easier it will be for Russia to put an end to internal disorganisation, to assume her place of honour among the great Powers of the world and to achieve speedy progress and development.

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DISCUSSION.

G. A. Pavlovsky.—I feel it to be an agreable duty to express our thanks to Mr Orloff for his highly instructive paper. On my part, I would like to make a few remarks on some particular points.

I think that, of the two aspects of the problem — the technical and the economic — much stress is laid by the author on the former, while the latter does not appear to be sufficiently appreciated.

In speaking of the speedy progress of farming in Germany, Mr Orloff pointed to the high degree of perfection of agricultural technique in that country, as to its cause, while in fact, it was primarily due to the vigorous growth of Germany's economic activities in all their branches. If, in the course of the period, to which the author refers, German farming has actually defeated its English and French competitors, this was not primarily because the technical standards of German agriculture were higher, but rather because the German national economy, as a whole, in its speedy development, was leaving France and, to some extent, even England, behind. This growth was giving a powerful impetus to the intensification of farming. The improvement of agricultural technique, involving increased costs per unit produced, entirely depends on the development of the effective demand of the market; it is the latter that sets the limits to intensification in a country of commercial farming. In the case of Russia these limits primarily depend on the internal demand for agricultural produce. As a striking example, we may point to Siberia, where the limits set to intensification by the inadequacy of internal demand have clearly shown their importance, practically during the life-time of the present generation.

In the course of the last two decades these limits of possible intensification, imposed by purely economic conditions, were very keenly felt by large farming in Russia and have greatly contributed to the process of liquidation of large estates. As a rule, the intensification of farming in the landlords' estates did not pay, and high technical standards of cultivation were achieved and maintained at the expense of other sources of income from land, belonging to the category of rent (meadows, forests, lease of land to peasants, etc). Intensive farming in large landowners' estates was rather an expensive hobby than a source of profit. Strict limits were set to intensification by market conditions. On this, and not so much on the ignorance of the farmer, depends the prevalence in the more remote regions of the East and South-East of European Russia of the most primitive methods of cultivation. There, as well as in some other districts in the South of Russia, and in Siberia, we see primitive methods of extensive cultivation combined with modern means of mechanical harvesting and threshing. In this respect, Russian farming conditions are akin to those prevailing in the British Dominions and in America.

In comparing intensive peasant farming with similar farming on a large scale, we find that the former certainly enjoys important advantages, the limits of possible intensification in its case being much wider than those with which a large farmer has got to reckon. But, in discussing the prospects of Russia's future agricultural progress in its broader national aspect, i.e. having in view not the principle that, whatever the consequences, Russia *must* be in future a country of exclusively small farms, but her general economic prosperity, we are bound to take into account the fact that, compared with extensive large farming, using modern methods of mechanical ploughing, harvesting, etc., small peasant farming in Russia may prove at a distinct disadvantage. Accordingly, without in any way trespassing in the legitimate interests of the pea-

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santry, on which depends the future prosperity of our country, we should not *a priori* assume a negative attitude towards the eventual development of modern extensive farming on a large scale on the lines, on which it is carried in the new countries overseas. Otherwise, in rigidly adhering to an abstract principle, we would do much harm to our national cause and, ultimately, to the peasants themselves, as the bulk of Russia's population.

Provided that we intend to export grain abroad on the same scale as we did before the war or even on a larger scale, the progress of our agriculture and of its technique is bound very much to depend on the conditions of the world market. In speaking of this, however, a reservation should be made. Our position, with regard to the limits set by the conditions of the world market, can, to a certain extent, be improved by a reduction in the costs of internal transportation, an efficient organisation of grain storage, viz. the developement of a widespread system of elevators, by improvements in our railway and harbour facilities, etc. But, on the other hand, we have to bear in mind that, since the war, our position in the grain markets of the world has changed very much to our disadvantage, and the re-conquest of our former markets will be a very difficult task indeed.

The war has brought about a great extension of the areas under cereal crops in the whole of the American continent, as well as in Australia. Apart from the increased volume of grain produced, its quality is bound to militate against us in the market. Russia's agricultural production has been both quantitatively and qualitatively affected by the events of the last few years, with the result that, for a certain period at least, the grain to be exported by us will be of poorer quality than that we did formerly put on the world market. Accordingly, both the increased competition and the quality of our produce will make for lower prices.

We will be faced with the problem: Shall Russia be in position, small peasant farming being her only form of agricultural production, and large farming being entirely barred, so to increase her grain output as to be able, on the satisfaction of her home demand, to export abroad a sufficient amount of grain of sufficiently high quality to meet oversea competition.

From the point of view of export, large farming, carried on extensive lines, as explained above, will, certainly, be both needed and possible in Russia, if we regard her future economic organisation as a practical proposition and not as the carrying into effect of certain abstract principles, notwithstanding the consequences. In many places, where the peasant population is dense, one will, naturally, be unable, to allocate land for large farming, on account of both political and economic reasons. But it would be a great mistake in those localities where there are areas of land lying idle, as, apparently, this is the case in some districts of the South, the Volga and the Don, to allocate them to the reserve, for the sake of future peasants to be born a century hence, instead of using them, on any terms found convenient, for the development of large farming, thus helping the whole country to tide over the most difficult period of her reconstruction by enabling her to increase and to improve her trade. This is not a matter of principle: this is the way of really hard facts and constructive economics. And it is high time we should pay more attention to these realities. In saying this, I am certainly very far from advocating a return to the former landlordsm: I simply mean large farming on capitalistic lines, carried by whomever it may be — a peasant, a former — nobleman landlord or any one who can put it on really sound business lines. Similarly, land could be allocated in the more remote regions of Russia, say — in Siberia — for

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cattle—breeding on a large scale, as this was started on the eve of the war. This would help Russia to tide over her present terrible shortage of live stock.

Now, a few words about nationalisation. I entirely agree with Mr Orloff that the nationalisation of land, provided it does not interfere with the complete independence of farming, has nothing to do with socialism. Its first advocate, Henry George, was, as far as his other economic conceptions are concerned, a typical «bourgeois». Beside, we always speak of nationalisation, as something entirely new to us, which is a great misconception. Of all countries, Russia has had the greatest practical experience of it, from the days of State peasants, living on State-owned lands, and of the nobility's «pomiestia», granted for service for the life time of the holder, and up to the present day in Siberia, where all lands, except for a couple of million dessiatins, were owned by the State and held by the peasants in perpetuity. The system, however, was dying from natural causes, because, while it failed to prevent the mobilisation of land, as we know from Siberian practice, allotments changing hands no worse than if they were private property, it interfered with the effective organisation of long-term credit, of which every farmer, if he wants to go on and to improve, is in need. This being so, nationalisation does not guarantee the peasant from loss of his land, if he wants to dispose of it, while it stands as a serious obstacle on the way of the progressive farmer, whom it deprives of the security he can offer for the credits he needs. Accordingly, had nationalisation been adopted, the peasant would have entirely to depend on credits from the State, which, as things are, would put him in a very precarious position indeed.

Finally, I really cannot follow the reasoning of those, who, like Mr Orloff, on the one hand, want to see in Russia a democratic State, in which the peasants would have their full share of responsibility for the Government of the country — while, on the other, they think that the peasant is not sufficiently ripe to assume responsibility for his own allotment. You cannot have it both ways: if the peasant is a grown up citizen, you should not treat him as a child, unable to mind his own affairs; if he is a child, you cannot entrust him with the duties of a citizen, and Russia is not yet ripe for democratic government.

A. M. Onou. — I do not intend to criticise; it is rather some doubtful points that I would like to make clear. Is Russia, on account of her natural conditions, really a country so well fitted for agriculture, as we usually imagine her to be? It appears to me that the prevalence of droughts, etc. tends to contradict this established view. Beyond doubt, Russia will always produce sufficient grain to meet the needs of her own population and to have a certain balance for export, but it is a matter of serious doubt for me, whether she can ever become the granary of the world. My second point of doubt is, whether it is large or small farming that possesses greater vitality in Russia. Here, I am rather inclined to accept Mr Orloff than Mr Pavlovsky's views: The process of transition to small holdings was steadily going on in Russia for many decades. The old landlord's estates were utterly ruined before the revolution and were falling to pieces. In my opinion, in the course of the last few decades we had large landownership in Russia rather than large farming. The general conditions in this respect, *mutatis mutandis*, remind us of those which prevailed in France on the eve of the Great Revolution. There also there existed large landownership, but not large farming. The further evolution brought about the parcellation of large estates.

M. V. Braikevitch. — In my opinion, Mr Orloff has given us a most valuable paper. One can see the great amount of strenuons work the author has put in it; there are many interesting comparisons; one sees that Mr Orloff both knows

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and loves farming, and that he is highly impartial in the way in which he approaches the most contentious problems.

I have, however, some objections to make with regard to certain points.

In the first instance, concerning the choice between *ownership* on land or *perpetaul use* of it. As to myself, I am sure that any future agrarian relations will be based on the principle of «ownership», as distinguished from «use» or «possession». Nationalisation, under which land belongs to the State, gives the latter too much power over the individual. I clearly realise that such nationalisation, adopted by the «Agrarian Code», is essential for the Communist State. Once the Communist régime deprives the peasants of any political rights and, what is particularly important, of the Budget rights, it is bound to have recourse to any measures to camouflage the resulting social anomalies. This anomaly is that the Communists, without and even against the will of the people, impose on the farmer an extremely heavy burden of taxes, on the proceeds of which they maintain the machinery of their government. This means that, in fact, their government is entirely maintained at the expense of the only group of the population, the peasantry, — which still produces anything at all. Briefly, the position may be summarised as follows: the parasitic Government of the Communists, as well as the equally parasitic nationalised industry, in other words — the «towns», live by the exercise of political dictatorship over the «village» at the latter's expense. The Communists, accordingly, want to camouflage the real nature of the extremely high tributes raised by them on the peasants. «State ownership of land» helps them in camouflaging these realities. Once land is nationalised, the food-tax is not only a form of taxation, but a rent for the lease of State-owned land as well. This helps to mitigate disaffection caused by the extremely heavy burden of taxation, and to make the struggle for Budget rights by the peasants, as a means of improving their position, less acute. Under any future democratic régime such methods of influencing the psychology of the citizens will be simply unnecessary.

It is high time to liberate the farmer from the interference of the Government official, whose extreme conceit and assurance are usually combined with absolute ignorance in agricultural matters. Throughout the history of Russian agrarian relations we see a stubborn struggle of those, to whom State-owned land was granted for use, for its appropriation on the title of private property. In the old days, the serving nobility was striving to become owners of the lands, granted to them conditionally, under the obligation of service to the State (*pomestie*). Ultimately, they have become absolute owners of their lands. Later, the peasants wanted to hold their land «as landlords», i.e. to enjoy the right of absolute ownership over it, either by purchasing land or by enclosing their allotments.

This struggle interests me in so far as it affects the most vital problem of to-days Russia, i.e. with regard to the influence its outcome may have on the increase of the productivity of Russian farming as a whole. The character of this influence seems evident. In the old days, private ownership on land has given the country more grain than did the old conditional holding. More recently, the enclosed *houtor* has proved to yield more than a peasant allotment in the commune. I am inclined to think that no development of democracy and of political liberty will prove possible and stable in Russia until economic freedom from Government interference is strongly established there, and this, in the first instance, in the case of the farmer and of his land, of which he must be absolute owner. This economic sovereignty or economic act of *habeas corpus* of the peasantry in Russia is absolutely essential for the very existence of the Russian State.

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Not only in Russia, but in every country, the technical and economic level of farming in the case of land owned by the farmer is higher than that on land held on lease. As an illustration of this, I would point to prof. J. Boyle's comparisons of «owner's» and «tenant's» farming.

I do not intend to continue my argument in favour of ownership on land for that very reason that I am convinced that, apart from any arguments, it will ultimately come to be established. Mr Orloff has himself been careful to eliminate all possible sources of conflict over this particular point by emphasising that the problem of «ownership» or «use» of land will have to be solved by the free will of the peasants themselves, when it will have an opportunity of free expression. By that future decision Mr Orloff invites us all to abide. On this viewpoint I am entirely ready to acquiesce.

Any revolution results in the extension of rights of the social groups by which it is made. The nationalisation of landowners estates and their transfer to the peasants for use does, certainly, improve the position of the latter, as compared with that in which they were before. But we should not forget that, while nationalising the landlords estates, the revolution has brought about the nationalisation of a far larger area of peasants, land, including their original allotments. The latter have been practically fully paid for in «redemption payments» and are the indisputable property of the peasants, under the title of either individual or communal ownership, which is unimportant. Is it probable that the peasant will give up this land he has acquired by paying for it at the expense of his personal consumption for a long series of years, and will hand it over to the State, while himself remaining only a tenant?

The security for credits necessary for the re-establishment of farming is easier to provide, when land is the property of its holders. If the latter enjoy only the use of land, capital for farming can be obtained from abroad only by means of Government loans. We are perfectly safe in assuming that the flow of capital to farming in such conditions is bound to be very small and extremely slow. In this case we are bound to take into account the psychology of the possible investor, which always inclines him rather to invest his money in industrial concern than in farming, i.e. in shares as against mortgage bonds, and in private loans of individuals or corporations than in Government loans. Meanwhile, it is precisely on the early investment of new capital in agriculture that depends the solution of the pressing problem of increasing Russia's national income and of her political and economic reconstruction. In order that the farmer might be in a position to raise his production to a level, corresponding to his own and the country's requirements, he wants not only land, but also capital for his equipment, for improvements, etc. Land alone does not solve the problem.

Guarantees against the effects of mobilisation and concentration of land. Mr Orloff is in favour of nationalisation of land on the ground that he fears that the peasantry in Russia and, particularly, in the famine-stricken districts, is, economically, extremely weakened. As a result, as proved by many examples of the recent past, it can be induced to part with its land for practically nothing and become proletarised. This would lead to social instability and to the outbreak of a new revolution, and so on. With this I entirely agree. In fact, the extreme impoverishment of the peasantry and its reduced capacity of resistance could result in a great development of bank speculation on land. This would cause land to become not the property of more or less large farmer-owners, but a pawn in the hands of speculators. It will pass in the hands of tenants or of nominal owners overburdened with mortgages etc, without any prospect of improvement in their position and, consequently, devoid of initiative and energy, until the whole speculation breaks down.

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There exist many practical means to prevent or, at least, to restrict such unhealthy speculation. They are found in the restrictions to which absolute ownership of land can be made subject. Thus, mortgage could be permitted only for the direct purpose of improvements and for the purchase of farming implements, live stock, etc. Sale of land could be restricted to the peasants of a given village or to members of a given farming or co-operative association and through the intermediary of the respective organisations, etc. This would have definite psychological, economic and political consequences, which, on the whole, in my opinion, would be more beneficial than the solution involving the acceptance of the principle of «use» as against «ownership». In accepting this solution, the peasant farmer being owner of his land and, accordingly, enjoying «economic sovereignty» and being fully conscious of his political and Budget rights, would impose certain restrictions upon his own right of freely disposing of his land in favour of the State, as a whole. The State, instead of being a feodal overlord, would assume a more modest rôle of modern managing director. This would limit the State's aspirations to dictatorship and make it less subject to the influence of its bureaucratic fancies.

The assignment of definite areas of land to cantons and villages and the compensation of former landowners. I entirely agree with Mr Orloff that no really fair distribution of the land seized by the peasants in the course of the revolution is practicable. Equality can be achieved within a separate village or canton, but never can it be carried beyond these limits throughout all the separate cantons and districts. At present, as a result of historical tradition, boundaries can be fixed with sufficient accuracy. These areas being very different in the case of separate villages, the actual average size of holding per head cannot be even approximately the same even in the case of two neighbouring villages. The boundaries of the lands belonging to separate villages, however, have come to be commonly recognised and respected. This is very important, because the «struggle for the re-distribution of land» is thus restricted to individual villages, instead of involving the whole of the country, as it did before. The struggle has thus become localised, being restricted to a comparatively small number of individuals, peasants of the same village, having a limited object in view, which is the fair distribution of holdings within the area at the disposal of the given village. This, what is particularly important for the whole of Russia's national economy, permits a settlement to be more quickly arrived at. Now this struggle is nearing its end. The limits of individual holdings within every village are already being definitely fixed in accordance with certain principles of justice and expediency and are bound in the nearest future to become really stable. The process of distribution is nearing completion, and it becomes possible to divert the energies to the vital problem of production. Any Government in Russia, in order not to delay the process of reconstruction, is bound to abstain from any interference with the actual distribution of holdings within the villages; with regard to it the only possible principle of future policy is *nolli me tangere*. Any Government measures intended to regulate the distribution of land should have been taken *before*, when the Government possessed real authority and the means to put its decisions into effect. Had these measures been taken in time, the revolution would, probably, never happen. Now, it is an accomplished fact. The re-distribution of land is being made by the people, without the State's participation in it. Moreover, both State and government will become realities only when this re-distribution is completed and sanctioned by the supreme authority. You see that, in agreeing with Mr Orloff, I do so in view of a definite principle, to which I

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attach particular importance, as a decisive factor in the whole Russian situation. This principle is—to start agricultural production in Russia on a normal scale, as soon, as possible.

But on this principle alone it would be mistaken to acquiesce. To it should be added a second principle: Russia's agricultural production must, as far as possible, be increased. Particular attention should be paid to this second principle during the earlier years of our reconstruction, because then any increase in production will cost very great efforts.

The intensification of peasant farming, to which Mr Orloff justly attaches so much importance, will also begin to yield its beneficial results only in 5-10 years after the beginning of agricultural reconstruction.

On account of this second principle, I am unable to agree with Mr Orloff in his views with regard to Soviet forms and to the allied problem of the compensation of former landowners. My attitude to both these problems is entirely governed by the second principle emphasised above, i.e. the necessity to increase agricultural production. Then, I am approaching them from a purely practical point of view, with an eye to future Russia's economic and political realities.

Russia, ruined as she is, with her production very much reduced and her credit facilities impaired, will, naturally, be unable to compensate former landowners in cash or in bonds. The time when the State was able to pay for lands expropriated from their owners on the basis of «just valuation» is gone. The peasantry also is utterly ruined.

I do not think that a situation can be expected to arise in Russia which would permit even an attempt to made to obtain such compensation. This would become possible in the case of a restoration of the former ruling class of noblemen-landowners to its privileged position, which possibility, in my opinion, is absolutely excluded. In the first instance, such restoration appears to be impracticable, but, even if it had ever happened to take place, any attempt at such compensation would be frustrated by the economic impossibility of carrying it out. Briefly, I think that the position of the former landowner, as a *rentier* living on rent from his estate, who would seek compensation for his losses, is an absolutely hopeless one, on account of political and economic considerations. Some at least, if not all, of the former owners would, however, be in a position to assume a different attitude. This is due to the fact that many of them are experienced farmers, used to farming on progressive lines. By assuming this attitude, they would be able not only to satisfy their personal egoistic desire for gain, but would also play a useful rôle in the national economy of the country by helping to increase the national income. In this rôle they will, naturally, become economically important elements in the country, with whom democracy as a whole will have to reckon, because it will be the democracy that will play the decisive part in the country and will be responsible for its future progress. The Russian democracy which, just as the first Russian Tzars, will be short of money and will need to satisfy the requirements of the population to make the new political régime stable, will, probably, be willing to give idle lands on the outskirts of the country, to former landowners who have lost their lands in the Centre of Russia and are willing and able to organise a sound farming entreprise on these new lands. Thus, the traditional Russian process of colonisation of the outlying districts of the country would be continued. Only the social and economic composition of the contingent of colonists would be changed. Formerly, Siberia and Turkestan used to be colonised by small peasant farmers. Now, it would be colonised by large farmers. Beside, there were precedents of such emigration of large farmers in Russia's past history. It was by large farmers that New Russia was colonised.

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From the purely economic point of view, the prospects of this new form of colonisation in Russia are even brighter than those of peasant emigration, because future colonists will be better equipped with capital and knowledge than were the farmer peasant-colonists.

I do not, however, think, that all the former landowners will be necessarily compelled to emigrate from European Russia. Here I am approaching the point of my disagreement with Mr Orloff, concerning the future of Soviet farms. My idea is briefly as follows. The Government should select from the land now held by Soviet farms the area needed for the organisation of experimental fields. This would not involve a very large area, and on this the State should limit its claims to these lands. Then, every Soviet farm would form part of the respetive «village land reserve», with regard to which the policy of the Government should be determined by the principle *nolli me tangere*, as suggested before. If the former owners of these lands would really prove to be efficient farmers and economically useful elements, and if the local peasantry would agree to their return, the parties would be able to arrive at some kind of compromise. The former owner would thus be enabled to getb ack if not the whole, at least a part of his former estate. If eventually he becomes something like a leader among the local farmers, by organising progressive farming or by starting some industrial entreprise connected with agriculture, his return will prove a direct benefit to his neighbours. Such cases are alrealy being recorded in some parts of Russia.

The rôle of the State is not to lay its hand on Soviet farms, but to be a mediator helping to achieve a compromise among the elements struggling for the distribution of the land available at the disposal of separate villages. Life itself will ultimately settle these quarrels about land. I think that this agrarian policy is bound to yield the best results, in so far as the growth of the volume and the improvement of the quality of agricultural production is concerned.

Intensification. The foreign and the home market for agricultural products. Finally, I have one more general remark to make. Does the intensification of farming ultimately depend on the conditions of the internal or of the foreign market, and on which of the two should we base our plans for the future? In dealing with the problem of intensification, Mr Orloff appears to take as a basis the level of world prices of agricultural products, thus assuming that Russia will always be compelled to export grain on a large scale, in order to meet the adverse balance of her imports of industrial products. Our development, however, may be as well expected to proceed in future along different lines, allowing a wider margin for intensification and containing a promise of brighter future for Russia. I mean the development of the home market through an energetie industrialisation of Russia. Beside the savings it yields in the costs of transport of grain and industrial products in either direction, the development of Russia's national industry extends the limits of the possible intensification of farming on account of other reasons as well. A characteristic feature of the present stage of industrial development is the energetic growth of standardised mass production, which greatly reduces the costs of manufacture. To make full use of the great benefits of mass production, however, Russia would be able only on the condition that the given branch of industry has achieved a high degree of development within the country.

The process of industrial development assuming such forms, farming implements, fertilisers etc. produced at home, would exhibit a stronger tendency to come down in prices than if Russia continued to depend for them on imports

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from abroad. On the other hand, in such conditions the farmer would sooner come to the realisation of the benefits derived by him from production for the market. His economic consciousness would be sooner developed in this internal exchange between town and country. At the same time, by taking part in the discussion of the country's Budget, including railway tariffs, taxation, etc., the farmer would be in a position to influence the conditions of exchange in his favour, naturally provided that he does not go beyond the limits, which allow the further progressive development of industrial production.

The progress of intensification in farming ultimately depends on the intensification of industrial production in the country, and *vice versa*. Any progress can be achieved only by a simultaneous harmonious development of all branches. Farming tends to pull on industrial production, while the latter, in its progress, is helping farming to advance. It is precisely on this harmonious development that the vigorous growth of the national income of the United States is based.

Beside, when the attention is focussed on the development of the home demand for agricultural products, the dependence of Russia's farming progress on the growth of population in the industrial countries importing grain, to which Mr Orloff refers, is practically eliminated.

By all this I do not mean to say that we would immediately be in a position to meet the whole of our requirements out of home production. To achieve this, we would, probably, need several decades. Still less it was my intention to say that our exports of grain should ultimately be reduced to zero. This is made impossible by that fact alone that we shall have to pay large amounts abroad, on account of our old debts and of the future loans Russia will have to raise for the purpose of her economic reconstruction. But, at least until equality is achieved in the world rate of remuneration of the work of individuals engaged and industrial and agricultural production, we must do our best to achieve a harmonious development of our exports in both their branches, i e. in those of farming produce and manuf actured goods. Thus, the influence of the world market on the intensification of Russia 's farming cannot, naturally, be entirely eliminated, but it can be greatly reduced. Our whole attention has, accordingly, to be focussed on the development of the home market for our grain. To this we are bound to approach with the increase in Russia's economic prosperity.

W. Braithwaite.—On the whole, I agree with the views of Mr Orloff. In my opinion, however, it is doubtful whether their actual fulfilment in the future economic, political and psychological conditions of Russia would prove possible. I am particulary in favour of Mr Orloff's suggestion with regard to the financing of Russia's agricultural reconstruction and improvements by means of Government credits and co-operation. Now, as to particular remarks on details, I do not fully share Mr Braikevitch's fears with regard to the possibility of excessive speculation in land in case of its extensive mobilisation. I agree with Mr Pavlovsky in his remark that it would be a great mistake to base all economic calculations on the prevalence and greater importance of either of the two principal branches of the country's economic activities. Success can be achieved only by the simultaneous development of both farming and industrial production in Russia. Industry is stimulated by farming and *vice versa*.

With Mr Pavlovsky's other contention, viz. that our position in the world market is seriously impaired, I emphatically refuse to agree. №9 of Keynes' Economic Reconstruction of Europe points to the deliberate reduction in the

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areas under crops, as compared with war-time. This is explained by the fear of Russia's reappearance on the world grain market as an exporter.

Our great mistake in the past was that we have always based our calculations on the place in the world market which was alloted to us, without making any attempts to increase the scope of our activities on our own initiative.

Now, about the possible future forms of land holding in Russia.

Will private ownership or possession for use prevail in Russia? Judging from the latest information about the attitude of the peasantry with regard to this highly controversial point, on which I have recently heard the opinion of a very well informed co-operative worker, fully qualified to speak on this subject, owing to his close connection and constant contact with the peasantry, who, beside, has quite recently come from Russia, ownership, in the accepted sense of the word, pure and unmitigated, has every chance of being established throughout the greater part of Russia.

As far as large farming is concerned, as late as a year or eighteen months ago, as a result of my own observation of peasant psychology, I was perfectly sure that the peasants would never allow the landlords to come back. Now, I am not at all sure of this. In some cases, as a matter of fact, landlords have been allowed to return. By the way, a few days ago I have had news from the R. district about an interesting case. When I was working in that district as co-operative instructor, I knew there a landowner, who owned a small estate. Formerly, he used to be a self-taught land-surveyor. Out of savings, accumulated by long years of self-denial, he bought a small area of waste land in that district. At that time he made himself and his newly acquired property a matter of endless fun among his neighbours. But, by strenuous work, he succeeded in converting the waste into a model farm. Then came the revolution. He was driven from his land, and the latter was converted into a collective farm. Finally, as a result of long efforts on his part, he was permitted to become a member of the collective. Then, the situation has gradually changed. He worked in the collective as a horse and, by his untiring work, without any protection from Moskow or any central organisations, he has ultimately succeeded in driving all the others out of the farm. Now, I am informed, he remains in undisturbed possession of his former land and finds wholehearted support on the part of the local peasants. To sum up the above, I will add, that it will be no surprise to me if the future Russian Constituant Assembly decides in favour of private landownership.

In conclusion I would like to point that, in my opinion, the most valuable part of Mr Orloff's paper is that dealing with farming technique and containing a wealth of numerical data.

S. O. Latkin.—I would very much welcome the decision of the future Constituent Assembly if it were to follow the lines suggested by Mr Braithwaite. All my past experience of practical agronomer has led me to the belief that the farmer-owner is always an important factor of agricultural progress. It is, indeed, probable, that no single solution of the problem of «ownership» or «use», applying to whole of Russia, will be arrived at. In the North, in Siberia and in the region of the Steppes the view still prevails among the population that land is «God's property». But I think that small farming, based on private ownership of land, will possess greater adaptability and vitality. Although I do not deny certain successes achieved by collective forms of land holding, I do not think them to be really important. In my personal experience, at least, I have never met with examples which could change my views on this subject. As a practical agronomer, I can say that it was always better to have

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to do with individual holders than with communes. The results achieved in the former case were always better than those achieved in the latter. Peasants who separated from the commune and settled on enclosed individual holdings, converted them into real paradises in the course of a couple of years. The fault of the former Land Settlement Commissions was that they did not always carry out the policy of separation from the commune and of the formation of individual holdings with sufficient skill. The doing away with scattered holdings and the bringing together of strips into single plots enabled improvements to be carried out. These successes were quickly destroying the traditional attachment of the peasants to the commune. Now, a few examples of my experience with co-operative organisations. In this case, I have had to work with both peasant - owners and communes. The former willingly joined so-called «Agricultural Associations», as well as co-operatives keeping stocks of machinery and implements for hire, grain-sorting stations, consumers' associations, etc.. In the province of Perm it was even possible to organise a co-operative steam flour - mill. The first to start this work were individual holders, and only later they succeeded in persuading those in the communes to join them. The psychology of the two groups is absolutely different.

Another example. In the district of Verkhoturie one village was very badly off, much of its land being occupied by marshes. Only the meadows were good. Ultimately, they gave up the commune and formed individual holdings. As a result, the land was improved, and the conditions of life became different altogether.

A few words about the fear of speculation in land by banks, which can deprive the peasants of their holdings. These fears I am unable to share. The peasants' grip on the land is much too strong to allow this to happen, and they will never let anyone to lay hand on it. Even the village *intelligentzia* which has tried to settle on land during the earlier years of the revolution, has failed in this. The peasants did not allow it. Beside, in a great many cases, large farming is unable to compete with small peasant farms. Both these considerations are bound very much to discourage speculation in land. Accordingly, I think that no harm will be done by a legislation permitting the peasants freely to dispose of their land. Ultimately, it will be held by those who know better how to put it to the best uses.

V. L. Bogdanovitch expressed the view that he cannot see why the «use», as distinguished from «ownership», provided the former is secured by firm guarantees, as suggested by Mr Orloff, would interfere with the efficient exploitation of land. The prevalence of leases in England, as we know, does not prevent expensive buildings frombeing erected.

A. S. Orloff.—In my concluding remarks I shall try to deal with some of the criticisms that have been made. Mr Pavlovsky, I think, is wrong in saying that I did not pay sufficient attention to economics. I have dealt with the problem of credits for farming, viz. of Government credits and with co-operation, as the channel through which these credits will reach the farmers. Then, I have dwelt on the conditions of the world grain market and of the limits which it imposes on the intensification of farming. I have not dealt with these conditions in greater detail, because this would involve me in too much guesswork. All these problems cannot be solved at present, because they contain too many unknown quantities. In this connection, I could refer to the work of Prof. Tschuproff on the influence of crops on grain prices and to prof. Tchaianoff's attempt to calculate the changes in world grain prices, resulting from the extension of the area under crops in Russia.

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As to our position in the world market, I think that we should not fear that our grain will be of poor quality. The quality of Russian grain was always good, while with regard to the admixture to grain of foreign matter, and to its cleanness, there was a great change for the better in the course of the last years. The sorting of grain in Russia has very much improved. If the network of grain elevators, which has already been considerably extended, will be further increased, the position will be better still.

Now, I return to the accusation of having neglected economic considerations. It is true that I have paid particular attention to the technique, and I did so deliberately, because, before, it did not attract the attention it deserves. This was our mistake. It was usual that, with all those in Russia who were concerned with agriculture, economic considerations tended to prevail over problems of technique and of intensification. What was the character of the average agronomer's activities in the province of Moscow before the revolution? It was mainly of economic, rather than of technical nature. He was mainly engaged in finding a way out of the poverty in which the peasantry lived and out of the low productivity of peasant farming, and found it mainly in co-operation. Meanwhile, the latest results of Russian practical experience tend to show that by early ploughing of the fallow alone the yield of crops can be raised by 50 p. cent. There is no doubt that the results of a given improvement are bound to be different in various regions of Russia. But equally certain it is that for every locality it is possible to find suitable improvements, which will meet the needs of local conditions. On the whole, we are bound to admit that the technique of Russian farming has never been sufficienty studied. There are very few problems in it which are not a matter of controversy even among the experts. As an example, I may point to the scepticism displayed by Minin at the last Agronomic Congress with regard to artificial fertilisers. All this is due to old prejudice. The Russian agricultural science has not yet clearly traced even the main lines of future intensification of farming. Meanwhile, one should think of the really miraculous results, recorded, for instance, by prof. Doyarenko (village Kourovo).

Thus, it would be possible, perhaps, even to make the problem of credit lose something of its present urgency and importance.

Now, about large farming. The whole problem, practically, depends on the area of land available for its development. In my opinion, the area available does not exceed 3 million dessiatins in Soviet farms and some 2 to 3 million dessiatins of lands now lying idle, or a total of about 6 million dessiatins. This would clearly be unsufficient for the development of large farming. Mr Pavlovsky thinks that there is plenty of land available on the Volga, the Don and in the South of Russia; I think, he is wrong. If he can prove that it is possible to find in Russia, say, 30 million dessiatins of idle land for this purpose. I do not object to the organisation on that land of large farms, which would be, so to say, factories of grain.

Our main point of disagreement with Mr Braikevitch is that of «ownership» or «use». The crux of the problem is the extent to which free disposal of land can be permitted. I think that, had my «guaranteed use» and Mr Braikevitch's «limited ownership» been put to practical test, they would differ very little from each other.

Personally, I do not think that the only security to the future investor can be afforded by private ownership of land. In my opinion the principal condition of the reestablishment of Russian credit abroad is the restoration of stable Government and of law and order in Russia. Assume that the Bolche-

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viks would now introduce private property on purely *bourgeois* lines. Credit abroad would not be available, owing to the uncertainty as to the stability of the régime. Let, on the other hand, a representative government be established, and let the country gradually settle down, and credit will become available even if, instead of being «owned», land is «held for use».

As to Mr Latkin, he appears to have mixed up two different problems: 1) individual or communal holdings and, 2) «ownership» and «use» of land. I have already had the occasion to point that I am very much in favour of separation from the commune and of the formation of enclosed individual holdings. But such a holding must not necessarily be owned by the farmer. By being held by the farmer for permanent use it will not lose the advantages referred to by Mr Latkin.

To reply to Mr Braithwaite I will say that, toin basing our own programmes on the expected future intentions and desires of the peasants, we would be weakening our own positions, which we regard as the right ones and which we should do our best to defend. Beside, it is absolutely impossible to foresee, what shape the peasants, ideas of land legislation will finally assume. The peasant is silent, cunning and practical. I do not think that at present his own views have already become crystallised. But theyare already in course of assuming a definite shape. Experience helps the peasants in the formation of their ideas.

EXPERIMENTS WITH MILLING CUTTERL

By N. N. Savvin.*)

Paper read before the Techn. Section of the Association on March, 8-th, 1923.

For the purpose of working out an instruction on milling operations, a series of experiments was made with new types of milling cutters. The work was done on a vertical milling machine «Milwaukee» Cincinatti № 2-½ B and on a horizontal longitudinal milling machine J. E. Reinecker, Chemnitz-Gablenz № 3. The former was driven by a 6 HP electric motor, and the latter by one of 13 HP. Both machines were in excellent working order. The material worked was plain forged steel, used for the manufacture of the driving parts of the mechanism in locomotives, with a tensile strength of 50 to 55 kg. per square millimeter. The characteristic features of the first type of cutters were: a comparatively small number of teeth, ranging from 7 to 12 for a diameter of 25 to 85 m/m; a cutting angle of 80° and a 20° angle of the spiral. The second type tested was a characteristical rough-modelling cutter with 5 teeth, a diameter of 136 m/m and a 52° angle of the spiral. The measurements of energy spent were taken by a registering wattmeter. Throughout the operation, the neatness of the surface worked was carefully watched and noted, while the shavings were collected, in order, by inspecting them, to judge of the degree to which the cutters have been blunted.

The efficiency of milling being to a very great extent dependent on the thickness of the shavings and on the number of teeth working simultaneously, it was imperative, in carrying out the operations on experimental material, to

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carefully take into account these two factors. For this purpose, it was necessary exactly to establish the connection between the diameter of the milling cutter, the number of teeth on it, the angle of the spiral, the number of revolutions of the cutter per minute, the forward movement per minute and the width and depth of the layer of material milled.

Fig. 1 shows a milling cutter of the first type tested, with an outside diameter of 50 m/m and 9 teeth, a cutting angle of 80° and a 20° angle of the spiral. The figure also shows the paths described by three consecutive teeth at an exaggerated rate of forward movement and a considerable depth of milling. Fig. 2 gives another projection of the same cutter, while fig. 3 shows its teeth in a plane.

Below, we will adopt the following notation:

D_{mm} — outside diameter of the milling cutter.
z — number of teeth on it;
n — number of revolutions per minute;
g — angle of elevation of the spiral teeth of the cutter;
h_{mm} — depth of the layer of material milled off;
b_{mm} — width » » » » » »
p_{mm} — forward movement per minute;
$p_{1\,mm}$ — forward movement per revolution of the cutter;
$p_{z\,mm}$ — forward movement per tooth of the cutter;
S_{mm} — maximum thickness of shavings;
k — number of teeth working simultaneously.

We have:

$$p_1 = \frac{p}{n} \quad \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots \quad (1).$$

$$p_z = \frac{p_1}{z} = \frac{p}{nz} \quad \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots \quad (2)$$

From fig. 1st it follows that

$$S = p_z \sin\alpha = \frac{p.\sin\alpha}{nz}$$

But $\cos\alpha = 1 - \frac{2h}{D}$;

hence $$S = \frac{p}{nz}\sqrt{1-\left(1-\frac{2h}{D}\right)^2} = \frac{2p}{nz}\sqrt{\frac{h}{D}\left(1-\frac{h}{D}\right)} \ldots \quad (3)$$

As to the value of k, this depends, on the one hand, on the angle α and on the number of teeth on the cutter z and, on the other, on the width b of the layer milled off and on the angle of elevation of the spiral teeth γ.

From fig. 1 it follows that, in the case of a cutter with straight teeth

$$k = \alpha : \frac{360}{z} = \frac{\alpha.z}{360}$$

The fig. 2 and 3 show that, in the case of cutters with spiral teeth, this figure should be increased by the ratio of the width b of the layer milled off to the distance BC between the teeth, measured in the direction of the axis.

But $BC = AB\operatorname{ctg}\gamma = \frac{\pi.D.}{z} . \operatorname{ctg}\gamma.$

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Fig. 1



Fig. 2



Fig. 3



Fig. 5



Fig. 4



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Hence, in the case of cutters with spiral teeth,

$$k = \frac{\alpha . z}{360} + \frac{b.z}{\pi . D . \text{ctg}\,\varphi}$$

Or, giving a more detailed formula,

$$k = z \left[\frac{\text{arc cos}\left(1 - \frac{2h}{D}\right)}{360} + \frac{b}{\pi . D . \text{ctg}\,\varphi} \right] \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots \quad (4)$$

In order to avoid interruption in the work of the teeth, we must have $k > 1$. Experience shows that the work proceeds quite smoothly, when $k = 2$. In this case for the cutter shown in fig. 1-3 we have:

$$\frac{\text{arc cos}\left(1 - \frac{2h}{50}\right)}{360} + \frac{b}{\pi . 50 . \text{ctg}\,20^0} > \frac{2}{9}$$

For various dephts of milling *h* we obtain, in this case, the following corresponding minimum widths *b*:

h_{mm}	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	12	14	16	18	20
b_{mm}	78	70	60	57,5	52,7	49	44	40,4	36,7	33	25,5	19,6	13,5	7,3	2,5

Fig. 4 and 5 show a cutter of the second type, with an outside diameter of 136 m.m, 5 teeth and a 52° angle of elevation of the spiral. In the case of this type of cutter, assuming $k = 1$, we obtain the following simultaneous values for *h* and *b*;

h_{mm}	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	10	12	14	16	20	24	30
b_{mm}	58	54	51	48	46	44.4	42.5	41	38	35	32.4	29.6	25	20	15



6 Fig. Толщина стружки Thickness of shavings

a-a Φ 85, v = 18.7 met/min, ω = 28×12 mm²
b-b Φ 45, v = 15.8 " ω = 40×6 "
c-c Φ 40, v = 8.8 " ω = 30×10 "
d-d Φ 130, v = 33,1 " ω = 118×3 "
e-e Φ 45 v = 15,8 " ω = 20×4 + 16×10 "

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Fig. 6 graphically shows the dependence of the volume of the shavings milled off in cub. cm. per 1 kw/min. net expenditure of energy, on the thickness of the shavings, when using cutters of the first type (fig. 1-3), made of high speed steel mark «Polldi maximum» containing 17-18 p. c. Wo and 3-5 p. c. Cr. The graph shows that, at speeds of cutting ranging from 8.8 to 33.1 met/min. and thicknesses of shavings from 0.02 to 0.24 mm, the efficiency of milling rises with the increase in the thickness of the shavings. This is in entire conformity with plain commonsense reasoning, as the more thinly the material is being broken, the greater is the waste of energy in the work.

As a rule, one can say that, in working with cutters of the first type on vertical milling machines, it is always better to strive after thin shavings, because this prevents vibration in the lathe and contributes to the smoothness of the surface obtained. In increasing the rate of forward movement per minute, it is always necessary simultaneously to increase the number of revolutions of the cutter, raising the tangential velocity of the latter up to 30 met./min. As a rule, one should avoid the tinging of shavings, which often takes place in the case of turning or planing; if this cannot be achieved by means of cooling, the speed of cutting should be reduced.

With regard to the number of teeth and to the character of the work done by them, the cutters of the first type described hold an intermediate position between the old rabbet milling cutter with small teeth and the new type of rough milling cutters with a small number of teeth. The cutters of this type are able successfully to cope with the tasks of so-called «universal milling», because they can be used for both the rough milling and the finishing work. It is reasonable to use them with machines that are not quite new.

In particular, on the ground of extensive experiments with milling cutters of the first type, the following practical hints can be given:

1) The work proceeds more smoothly when the depth h of the layer milled off amounts to 4-5 mm, while its width is 8 to 10 times as great.

2) In the case of vertical milling machines, when working on forged steel with tensile strength about 50 kg, it is necessary to keep to tangential velocities of about 20-30 met./min. The reduction in velocity to 10 met./min., when the machine is working under full load, causes dangerous vibrations in the lathe.

3) The rate of forward movement, if the conditions of the two preceding points are complied with, should normally amount to 60-100 mm. per minute.

4) The so-called old «American» way of forward movement, i.e. that in which the cutter moves in the direction of its rotation, can be advised in the case of the backward finishing drive of the cutter; this should be done at the same speed as the original forward drive, but at a small depth of milling, e. g. from 0 to 0.5 m/m. This will yield a very smooth and neat surface and will remove the traces of the deformations of the cutter, which occurred during the first rough-milling drive.

5) The normal time of a cutter's work without re-sharpening should be put at 4 hours. It is advisable, from the point of view of economy, that the whole of this time should be worked under full load.

6) The coefficients of efficiency of milling machines are as follows:

for a machine working under half-load — 0.50-0.65
» » » » » full- » — 0.70-0.85

7) Other conditions being equal, the face-and-side cutter, in a unit of time, removes from 40 to 50 p. cmt. more metal than does the common end-milling cutter.

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TABLE A.

Kind of cutter	Kind of work done	Layer milled off.		Material worked upon								
				Cast iron			Machine steel			Brass and Bronze		
		Width in m/m	Depth in m/m	Tangential velocity met/min	Forward movement P met/min	Volume of shavings in cub. cm to 1 HP per min	Tangential velocity met/min	Forward movement P met/min	Volume of shavings in cub. cm. to 1 HP per min	Tangential velocity met/min	Forward movement P met/min	Volume of shavings in cub. cm. to 1 HP per min
End-milling cutter.	Rough milling	up to 100	3-8	16-18	30-100	5-7.5	20-30	30-100	5-7.5	35-50	60-200	10-15
	Finishing ...	—	0-1	18-20	40-120	—	25-40	40-120	—	40-60	80-240	—
Cylindrical cutter with straight groves.	Rough milling	up to 120	4-12	16-18	30-120	6-9	20-30	30-120	6-9	35-50	60-200	12-18
	Finishing ...	—	0-1	18-20	40-120	—	25-40	40-120	—	40-60	80-240	—
Face-and-side cutter.	Rough milling	up to 200	3-6	20-25	60-120	8-13	25-30	50-100	7-12	40-50	100-240	15-24
	Finishing	—	0-1	25-30	70-120	—	30-40	60-120	—	40-60	120-250	—

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In table A is shown the work done by cutters of the first type.

In order to make the figures of this table readily available for use in the workshop, a nomogram was constructed, whose practical use is as easy as that of the slide rule. Being granted a certain depth of milling, and knowing the width of the object to be worked upon, one finds in the nomogram the corresponding rate of forward movement in mm. per min. per 1 HP. of the power of the milling machine. For various metals different logarithmic scales are used. The nomogram is constructed with the view of making full use of the power of the milling machines, and experience has shown that it is perfectly satisfactory for both small and large machines.

In the case of the second type of cutters 3 series of experiments have been made.

Fig. 7.



Fig. 8.



Fig. 9.



In the first series, variations were made only in the depth of milling, this ranging from 1 to 10 mm, all other elements remaining constant, the cutter revolving at 28 r. p. m., i.e. having a tangential velocity of 12 met./min., the forward movement being 10 mm/min and the width of the layer milled being 70 mm.

In the case of the second series, variations were made only in the rate of forward movement, within the range of from 10 to 232 mm/min.

In the third series the variable element was the number of revolutions of the cutter, which varied within the range of from 11 to 56 per minute, corresponding to a tangential velocity of from 4.7 to 23.4 met./min.

Fig. 7 graphically represents the influence of the tangential velocity of the cutter on the efficiency of milling. As shown by the graph, when the velo-

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city is from 8 to 12 met./min, the volume of shavings per gross K. W. of energy spent, is by about 25 p. cmt. larger than that obtained at velocities ranging from 19 to 24 met./min.; in other words, the efficiency is greater when the tangential velocity is smaller and the shavings are thicker.

Fig. 8 shows the influence of the rate of forward movement. The most conspicious feature of it is the difference in the amount of shavings per gross K. W. obtained by changing the rate of forward movement from 10 to 130 mm/min. The efficiency is speedily growing with the increase in that rate. The further increase of the latter up to 230 mm/min. exerts practically no influence on the efficiency of milling.

Fig. 9 shows the influence of the depth of milling. When the depth is increased from 1 to 10 mm, the efficiency is continually raised. Thus, for instance, when the depth was 1 mm per 1 KW/min. gross energy, the volume of shavings obtained was 2.3 cub. cm.; at a depth of 3 mm it was 4.4 cub.cm.; at 5 mm it amounted to 6.3 cub.cm. and at 10 mm it reached 8.0 cub.cm.

As, ultimately, any alteration in the number of revolutions of the cutter, in the rate of forward movement or in the depth of the layer milled off tends to cause variations in the thickness of shavings, all the graphs given above are combined in fig. 10, in which they are reduced to the same parameter — the thickness of shavings obtained. As shown by the graph, all three curves have a definite tendency to rise with the increase in the thickness of shavings; in other words, they clearly confirm the old law, established in the case of turning tools, according to which the volume of shavings in a unit of time per unit of energy expended increases with the thickness of shavings. In the case of thin shavings, e.g. up to 0.3 mm thick, the variations in the efficiency of milling proceed faster than in the case of thicker shavings. Beyond 0.4 mm the efficiency of milling remains almost constant.



Толщина снятого слоя. Fig. 10. The thickness of shavings

As, throughout the whole of the experiments recorded in the diagrams there was no vibration in the machine, and as the cutter of the second type is designed for rough milling, it is clear that the best conditions of work are those, in which the shavings are removed with the least expenditure of energy. This condition is satisfied when the thickness of shavings does not fall below 0.3 m.m This is achieved when the tangential velocity is kept within the range from 7 to 12 met./min., the rate of forward movement between 100 and 200 mm/min, and the depth of milling is not below 6 mm. Thus we arrive at economical speeds (10-12 met/min) similar to those formerly established by Taylor for rough turning tools. Under the conditions of work just mentioned, the productivity of the cutter amounts to about 8.5 cub.cm. of shavings (usually

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of machine steel of a tensile strength of 50-55 kg. p. sq. mm) per 1 K. W. of gross energy spent, or to about 6.25 cub.cm. to 1 HP. The productivity is, thus, practically the same as that of the cutters of the first type. The work of the cutters of the second type does, generally, proceed smoothly.

It is interesting to mention that, during the tests carried with the Reinecker milling machine, the suitability of the nomogram constructed for cutters of the first type was repeatedly tested. It was found that this nomogram yields satisfactory results with rough milling cutters of the second type as well.

In conclusion it is necessary to emphasise that, when milling to a normal depth, e. g. to 5-8 m.m., in order to obtain a smooth surface, requiring no further finishing, and using a cutter of the second type, one must not take shavings thicker than 0.2 m.m.; it is even preferable not to go beyond 0.15 mm, which, naturally, has to be done at the expense of the productivity of work.

Owing to the great vertical effort, especially at the start of the work of the cutter of the second type, the article worked should be fast fixed on the table of the machine. The machine itself must be powerful. In the case of long milling arbors, in order to prevent vibration, it is advisable to reduce the number of revolutions of the cutter, simultaneously increasing the rate of forward movement up to the full capacity of the machine.

Thanks to large intervals between the teeth of the rough milling cutter of the second type and to the regular shape of spiral shavings, the latter are easily removed from the cutter without getting under its teeth. This is a most important consideration, because the blunting of the cutter is to a great extent due to the getting of shavings under the teeth, which also tends to damage the surface worked upon.

THE PRODUCTION OF RADIUM IN RUSSIA.

By S. S. Palashkovsky.*)

Paper read before the Association on March 8th, 1923.

Among the problems of the exploitation of Russia's natural resources, the one dealt with in the present article is important for other reasons than the value of the possible output of radium in Russia or of its by-products. This value is, naturally, bound to be small, as compared for, instance, with that of Russia's production of coal.

It should, however, be borne in mind that the deposits of radio-active ores in the world are very rare. On the knowledge we now possess, we can speak of no more than 5 or 6 such deposits in various parts of the world as having any commercial importance.

Among them are the Russian deposits. On the other hand, in medicine as well as in some branches of industry, even now, radium plays an important rôle and cannot be dispensed with, while its aggregate output up to the present day is measured in grammes.

The fact that radium is both so extremely rare and so highly important, tends to add interest to the problem of the volume of radium deposits in Russia and of the development already achieved there in the industrial treatment of Russian radio-active ores..

*) Director of the «Fergana Company for the Production of Rare Metals».

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The known deposit of radio-active ores is situated in the region of Fergana, near the station Fedchenko, of the Transcaspian railway, in the approaches to the Altai mountain ridge. The ore is found in lime stone and carbon rocks, containing mainly salts of iron, barium, silicium, copper, vanadium, uranium and radium. There are some indications that these ores have been primitively worked by the Chinese in times immemorial, probably for the purpose of obtaining copper. They approached the deposits through a neighbouring cave.

The «Fergana Company for the Production of Rare Metals», to which the deposit belongs, obtained the ore from a shaft, driven by it to a depth of 27 sajenes. The work was begun a few years before the outbreak of the war. The total weight of ore produced reached 60.000 poods, of which about 42.000 poods were sent to Petrograd to the Company's laboratories and experimental works, while about 18.000 poods remained at the mine.

Up to the present, it was not possible exactly to determine the reserve of ore available in the deposit. For this no numerical data are available, and the character of the deposit has not yet been sufficiently studied. An idea of the deposit, however, may be given by the following facts. The shaft, driven to a depth of 27 sajenes, has penetrated into the ore seams. It was then connected by a gallery with the cave in which there was an outcrop of ore to the surface and from which the ore used to be obtained by the Chinese.

Boring has proved the ore to be the same in both the shaft and the cave. The general character of the locality suggests that this deposit, which is found in volcanic rock along an anti-clynal fold, is only an outcrop of a main deposit. Other outcrops should be found in the same fold.

The 60.000 poods of ore mentioned were obtained from the bottom of the shaft and from the connecting gallery, when they were being excavated.

Boring has shown that the ore is always preceded by ferrous layers. This evidence is important, because in the neighbourhood of the deposit there are caves filled with ferrous salts. In shape they are like iron pots.

The main deposit should be sought for at a greater depth. The outcrop of the deposit actually worked is about 100 feet above the level of underground water. Accordingly, one is practically safe in assuming that all outcrops, as far as they are above the level of underground waters, contain ore analogous in composition to that already obtained. Only below 100 feet the ore can be different in quality and lose its carboxide properties.

A source of water power is available in the immediate neighbourhood of the deposit. It was, however, found expedient to have the ore treated in Petrograd, until the industrial process of its treatment is freed from mistakes unavoidable at the outset and is definitely established.

The consideration that greater facilities and more expert personnel were available at Petrograd, where it was possible not only to have a permanent staff of chemists at the works, but also, in case of particular complications, to consult the leading authorities in every separate branch of chemical production, which led to this decision having been taken, has been entirely justified by the facts in the actual carrying out of the plan.

The problem of finding the best method of treatment of ore was one of great importance. This is because, as a matter of fact, the ore found at Tuia-Muiun (as the locality in which the deposit is situated is called), as to its composition, was not similar to that of other ores containing radium, the process of whose treatment was already known. A new, peculiar method of treatment had to be devised, while the process presented considerable diffi-

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culties which were being gradually surmounted by the invention of a series of practical expedients.

The 42.000 poods of ore treated in Petrograd contained: radium, of which a more detailed account will be given later, reduced to bromic radium — 4 grammes; metallic vanadium — 4 p. cent; uranium oxide (U_3O_8) — 1 p. cent.; metallic copper — 5 p. cent.

Passing by the practical details of production, whose working out was a matter of considerable trouble, but which can be of interest only to the specialist, I will only give a general outline of the process.

The production was carried as follows.

1) The ore was dissolved in technical muriatic acid. The whole of the radium, silicium and most of the iron and barium, as well as calcium and some part of the other elements remained in the residue which muriatic acid did not dissolve. Vanadium, uranium, copper etc. were dissolved. The dissolution was carried by means of heating.

2) The solution obtained was strongly oxidised, this helping to bring about the separation of vanadium, which formed a precipitation of vanadium acid.

3) Chloric iron being introduced in the solution and, on the neutralisation of the latter, the precipitation of vanadium salts was obtained in the form of ferro-vanadatum.

4) The solution, containing uranium and copper, was treated with metallic iron, this resulting in the separation of metallic copper and of protoxide of uranium. Uranium was separated from copper by the action of soda; uranium was dissolved, while copper remained in the residue. Then, the precipitation of uranium was achieved by neutralising the solution.

Already these four principal reactions required much effort and ingenuity on the part of the works' experts, to adapt them for application on an industrial scale. Still more complicated and interesting and, at the same time, more difficult to find, was the method of separating radium. It was necessary to carry out a long series of laboratory experiments to find a way of separating, on industrial lines, radium from silicium, iron oxide and other elements, and dissolving it, in order to make possible its easy extraction by the methods used by Madame Curie, as well as by the works manufacturing radium preparations for medical purposes. The difficulty of separating radium from silicium and other elements was that it was necessary to find a method of extraction not only suitable for application on an industrial scale, but also economical. In this respect we have finally succeeded in finding the right method.

Thus, the problem of the production of Russian radium can be considered as practically solved. The Russian ore, hitherto unknown to the technical world, has been added to the available world stocks of radium. This was entirely due to the efforts of Russian chemical personnel; beside S. V. Terpugoff and myself, who have throughout been responsible for the work, and our immediate collaborators, whenever this was needed, expert advice was given to us by prof. A. A. Yakovkin and Academician V. I. Vernadsky.

The beginning of Russian radium production was also due to Russian engineers: Mining Engineer Antonovitch and Eng. of Ways and Communications S. E. Palashkovsky.

Now, let us return to the history of radium production. The industrial method of separating radium from silicium and iron and of its dissolution was found in 1917. To start production on an industrial scale, however, we

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had no time. Most of the radium remained in the residue which, as Petrograd was threatened with German invasion, was removed to the Kama. Later, the works has been nationalied. The staff has got dispersed. Under Communist management, the whole work was apparently confined to a laboratory scale.*)

Russian scientists have been very much interested in the method of separating bromic radium by means of muriatic acid from the residue obtained by us. About 20 poods of the residues obtained have been given by us to the Odessa Branch of the Russian Technical Society for the needs of the latter's Radiological Laboratory. As far as I am aware, they have been worked upon by the young scientist E. S. Bukster, who was in charge of the Laboratory. Owing to the events of the last few years, I do not know whether he was able to find some method of their treatment, different from the one used by us.

The attached diagram of treatment gives a sufficiently clear idea of the process.



that, intil an economical industrial method of treatment of ore was founde the Company incurred considerable risks. Laboratory experiments alon,

Now, a few words about the form in which we obtained our product and of the quantity produced.

The degree of finishing to which the process was carried depended on purely commercial considerations. For the purpose of the exploitation of radioactive ores a special company, viz. the above mentioned «Fergana Company for the Production of Rare Metals», was formed. It is perfectly clear

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*) The «Econ. Jizn» (24.3.21) contains an account of an interview with Prof. Khlopin. The latter stated that one of the works of the Bondiujsky Combine has been adapted for the production of radium. Prof. Khlopin is the expert adviser of that concern. The works are to be started as soon as the necessary credits are granted by the Commissariat of Finance. The working capital required amounts to 400.000 gold roubles a year. The concern is equipped for the production of 1.8 gramms of radium in the course of the first year and up to 3 grammes in the course of the second. The analyses made by the Petrovsky Radium Institute have shown Russian radium «to be particularly pure, which makes it equal to the most valuable Czecho-Slovakian radium». (*Editors.*)

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did not enable it to arrive at definite conclusions as to the actual production of radium, vanadium and other by-products on a sufficient scale and at commercially reasonable costs. Accordingly, for evident reasons, the shareholders were anxious to limit their risks, until a final decision would be arrived at as to the practicability of production on an industrial scale.

Bearing these considerations in mind, the whole work was so planned, as to meet all necessary laboratory expenditure or, at least, most of it, out of the value of the produce obtained in those branches, in which the methods of production were already firmly established. The products were not, as a rule, completely finished, if the finishing process necessitated additional outlay on equipment and if we were perfectly certain that, had the equipment required been available, it could easily have been finished. The finishing problem was thus relegated to the future. Thus, e. g., vanadium was sold in the form of vanadium acid or in that of ferrous salt of vanadium acid, instead of the alloy of ferrovanadate, commonly used in metallurgy. Uranium was sold in the form of natrium uranate, containing about 35 p. cent. U_3O_8. The total quantity of uranium sold, reduced to U_3O_8, reached 6090 kg, or 0.9 p. cent. of the 42.000 poods of ore treated. Vanadium, as we have said, was sold in the form of vanadium acid, containing 45 to 50 p. cent. of metallic vanadium, or in that of ferrous salts of vanadium acid, containing about 24 p. cent. of metallic vanadium.*) It would, naturally, have been better to sell vanadium in its finished form of the alloy FeVa, used in metallurgy, as this is being done by the American «Standard Alloys Co, Pittsburg, Pa, U. S. A.», which is the principal supplier of this metal, obtained from Peruvian ore, to the European market, controlling the prices on the latter. As a matter of fact, we have been in negotiations with the German firms «Mark» and «Goldschmidt», engaged in the production of vanadium alloys, but the latter has categorically refused to disclose its secret, while the former has asked 500.000 marks for its patent and instruction. As a result, we have decided to wait until our own production is sufficiently developed, which course it was reasonable to take, as vanadium was finding a ready market even in the form in which it was offered by us. The total quantity of vanadium sold by us, reduced to metallic vanadium, worked out at 21.200 kg, or about 3 p. cent. of the 42.000 poods of ore treated.

The amounts of vanadium and uranium by which the quantities obtained fell short of the normal contents indicated above (4 p. c. and 1 p. cent. respectively), remained in the ore whose treatment has not yet been completed.

As pointed above, radium, after the treatment of ore with muriatic acid, remained in the undissolved residue, together with silicium, iron and salts of the 2nd group (Ca, Ba). The amount of radium (reduced to bromic radium), contained in the residue, varied from 0.022 mgr to 0.077 mgr per kg of residue, this depending on the degree to which the dissolution was complete. On our request, the analysis has been verified by Dr Rudolfi, Schmidt, the Radiogen C°, Dr Bennewitz, Mme Curie, Ramsay, Banque du Radium and Armet de Lysle. According to the results of these analyses, the total amount of radium contained in the 42.000 poods of ore treated, when reduced to bromic radium, reached 4 grammes. The weight of residues obtained amounted to 6000 poods. Part of these residues was sold by us to Germany and France at comparatively low prices. We were not so much concerned with the prices, as we wanted to arouse the interest of French and German firms in the new ore, because we

*) Uranium and vanadium were almost exclusively sold in Germany, while copper was sold in Russia.

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thought that they would sooner work out proper and economical methods of its industrial treatment than we could do it ourselves. In doing so we have committed a mistake and, accordingly, have ceased to sell residues, in the hope of dealing with them as soon as we should find out some methods of our own.

I would also add that, along with the working out of the methods of treatment of ore, we have taken considerable interest in the problem of its concentration. We were successful in finding an effective method of concentration of ore, which was very economical, considering local conditions. In applying this method it would, probably, be possible at Tuia-Muiun to establish only the production and concentration of ore, while having it treated at works situated in some large industrial centre.

Such was the position with the production of Russian radium. I am perfectly sure that it is bound to develop as soon as conditions are again established in Russia, enabling industrial concerns to do their work.

INSTITUTE OF TRANSPORT AND PRACTICAL ECONOMICS.

By W. L. Bogdanovitch.*)

Paper read before the Association on January 18th, 1923.

In the modern economic system the personal factor becomes daily more important. The economic life is now developing on a very large scale. Individual enterprises of comparatively modest dimensions, on having developed into large companies, are further being amalgamated into huge commercial and industrial concerns — in trusts and vertical combinations, finally involving whole branches of the national economy. The size of modern concerns does not admit of improvisation or rule of thumb in either their directors or their staff; on the contrary, they require both considerable preliminary training and a steady hand for their management.

Hence, in modern civilisation an important place is given to the following two problems: 1) that of professional education and training in all their branches and 2) that of practical economics.

It may be safely assumed that, without a wide and practical knowledge of the economics of his work, in the aspects of both the national and the world economy, neither an engineer, nor any other, whatever qualifications he might possess in the technique of his calling, can be successful in his chosen line of business.

In the future reconstruction of Russia's economic life, one of the principal problems, for decades to come, will be that of the organisation of a cheap and efficient system of transport.

The enormous distances of Russia, unlinked as yet by an adequate network of transport facilities, leave the great natural resources to be found in the different parts of the country, such as Siberia, North of European Russia or Transcaspia, still waiting for exploitation. A well organised and developed

*) The paper is given here with the alterations made by the Author after it had been read and discussed by the Association.

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transport system is bound to become a source of great economic possibilities, and the indispensable condition of the exploitation of the country's natural resources during the coming period of Russia's national development.

The technical side of transport in Russia was up to a very high standard. As to its commercial side, however, from the point of view of the future development of Russia's economic life — it had only just commenced to follow the proper course. This accounts for the meager influx of capital into Russian transport concerns. The problems of main and local railways, terminal ports, river transport, as well as those of the mutual dependence of transport, trade and industry etc., from the point of view of economics, call for the utmost attention, and the study of conditions existing in Russia, as compared to those in the principal industrial countries, should be made easy for Russians.

This is the reason why my thoughts constantly return to the question of founding in Russia an Institute of Transport and Practical Economics, and why I have chosen to dwell on this particular subject in the present paper.

CHAPTER I.

Before coming to the basic lines of the suggested organisation of the Institute of Transport and Practical Economics, I would like briefly to outline the way in which the problem of professional, technical and economic education was dealt with in Russia and abroad.

Professional Education in England. England is the country of tradition and practical experience. Here, professional education is carried in either of the following two ways. The first, which is followed by the majority, is the way of practical training. People are starting their business carreer at an early age, either as ordinary factory hands or as office boys. Simultaneously with this they obtain their professional and general education in very numerous and varied evening and Sunday Schools.*) Doing practical work at a factory, in a drawing or business office, etc. and receiving, at the same time, a theoretical education in their respective callings at evening classes, in the course of a few years, depending on their individual interest and capacities, they obtain such an insight into the routine of their professions, that they are able to join one of the Societies, dealing with their speciality, which are commonly known as «Institutes».**)

These Institutes are purely professional associations, encouraging and helping their members to improve their professional qualifications, though not directly aiming at their systematic theoretical and professional education by school methods. They should, therefore, not be confused with purely educational institutions, also known under the name of «Institutes». These Institutes render great assistance to their members.

The entrants to these Institutes are generally subject to certain conditions as to age, years of practice and of responsible work, positions occupied in commercial and industrial concerns, etc.

Being in possession of the required qualifications, one can become either a Member or an Associate of these Institutes. Of late, certain Institutes have begun to admit participation in them in the capacity of «graduates» or

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*) In London alone there are more than 150 of such London County Council Schools.

**) E.g. Institute of Civil Engineers, Institute of Naval Architects, Institute of Bankers, Inst. of Chartered Accountants, Inst. of Chartered Shipbrokers, Inst. of Directors, Inst. of London Underwriters, Inst. of Industrial Administration, Inst. of Transport, Institution of Professional Civil Servants etc.

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«students». In all cases it is usual to demand recommendations or guaranties from members of the Association. In some cases, beside being in possession of practical training, it is necessary to pass an entrance examination. Sometimes, the Institutes issue diplomas to their members, which serve as certificates of special professional qualifications. Nearly all Institutes have their own libraries for the use of their members and arrange various lectures. In the life of these Institutes special lectures given by the members on various problems, arising out of their personal experience or observation and investigation, followed by questions and discussions, are exceedingly popular.

The second method of technical education is similar to the one generally adopted in Europe. In this case, it is obtained by following a course at one of the special educational institutions. As a rule, these schools do not provide for fixed programmes to be followed by all students, but a series of courses are arranged bearing on certain special subjects taught in a given school, and from this the students select and arrange individual programmes to suit themselves. The certificate obtained on the completion of the course does not carry with it any special privileges, which fact helps to explain why English technical and commercial personnel is mainly recruited from men with only practical training.

It is characteristic that until quite recently the school education in this country did not endeavour to extend the horizons of the students beyond the routine of their special line of knowledge. Now, however, general commercial and economic education begins to attract greater attention, because experience has shown that the complications of the modern economic process require practical training to be supported by wider theoretical and scientific knowledge.

The most sound and interesting system is the one adopted by the «London School of Economics and Political Science», incorporated in the University of London, which is now the main centre of higher economic and commercial education in England. Although that school was only founded in 1895, its achievements are already very important.

Professional Education in Europe and America. The historical and economic conditions of life in other European countries have developed in different and less favourable circumstances. In the life of those nations there were moments in which the immediate creation of the necessary personal factor in this or that branch of economic activities became a pressing national problem. The solution of such problems was sought for in a rational and practical system of school education.

For example, the period following on the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 in Germany brought forward a whole series of problems involved in the economic re-organisation of that country. We find that during that period a large number of conferences were held with a view to examining the problem of technical and general school education in the country. The technical education was taken under the control of the Governement and based on the principles worked out at those conferences. As to commercial education, the most important and active part was played by public organisations, local self-government and leaders of Industry and Commerce.

Systematic and stubborn work, aimed at the creation of the personal factor for the German technique and commerce, had its recompense, as it finally gave Germany the place she has gained among the nations of the world.

In France the national problem of the organisation of labour and of production arose immediately after the Revolution. The demand for practical knowledge on the part of the people has greatly increased. To meet this demand

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«The Central School of Public Works» («Ecole Centrale des Traveaux Publics») was founded in 1794, which, in the course of the following year, was re-named «The Politechnical School» (Ecole Politechnique) and exists as such to this day.

In other industrial countries of Europe the history of professional education was equally determined by the national problems of the industrial or general economic development or reconstruction of the respective countries.

It is noticeable that in every country the economic development was closely dependent on the degree of technical and economic education. The two have always been developing on parallel lines. While the problems of economic development call forth a demand for men with technical qualifications, facilities of special training tend to give a fresh impulse to the growth of the country.

An important rôle in the development of commercial education, in those countries, as well as in Germany, has been played by private initiative, by municipalities, local self-government and commercial and industrial interests.

The system of commercial education in all European Countries is, on the whole, of the same type, and does not essentially differ from the corresponding schools which existed in Russia before the Revolution.

On the whole, it can be said that commercial education in Europe is rather of an academical than of a practical, utilitarian type.

The peculiarity of America is, that special care has been taken to achieve the right balance of theoretical and practical training in the schools.

If, from the outset, America started its economic life on the personal factor created by European culture and school, as the country developed into an independent economic and political entity, the problem of the establishment of schools of peculiary American type and standards became one of national importance. There is now a large and highly developed system of various schools, both general and special, and in many cases American schools achieve better practical results than those of European countries.

We take a special interest in economic, commercial, financial and other schools and colleges, which have been recently organised at the principal Universities of America.*)

In connection with the problem of post-war reconstruction of economic relations, these schools are, to-day, the object of particular care and attention.

What is most striking in the American school is the cultivation in the student of a habit of brief, clear and precise expression in either speech or writing.

Commercial and Economic Education in Russia. In Russia, the class of professional merchants and industrialists, corresponding to that existing in Western Europe, was of comparatively recent formation. The idea of a special commercial schools in Russia, however, dates from a time when in Western Europe there did not exist a single school of that type. In 1772, P. A. Demidoff made a donation of 205.000 roubles for the foundation of a «School for Com-

*) The Warton School of Finance and Commerce at the Pensylvania University; School of Commerce and Finance at the St. Louis University; College of Business Administration of Syracuse University; School of Business at Columbia University; College of Business Administration at Boston University; School of Business and Public Administration at Missouri University; College of Business Administration and School of Railway Engineering and Administration at Illinois University; College of Commerce and Journalism at Ohio State University; Course of Instruction in Government, Social Ethics and Economics at Harwarp University; School of Commerce at the North-Western University; Chicago, Schoolof Commerce at Georgia University and many others.

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mercial Education» which was established in Moscow, being attached to the «Foundlings Home». In 1799, this school was transfered to Petersburg. In 1804, the merchants of Moscow founded two new Commercial Schools.

Until the recent events in Russia, the educated parts of the Russian merchant class in Moscow, Kieff, Odessa etc., like those of Western Europe, have given great assistance and occasionally played an important personal rôle in the organisation and activities of the various institutions of commercial and economic education. For example, in Moscow, at the beginnig of the present century, by the combined efforts of Moscow merchants and professors of the Moscow University, a higher commercial college — «The Moscow Commercial Institute» was founded. A similar Institute was opened in Kieff.

Both these schools were successful in giving their pupils a very wide commercial and economic education, and have attracted great numbers of zealous students. They also established a close contact with the industrial and commercial life and its interests.

The Petrograd, Riga, Odessa and other Politechnical Schools had each their special economic sections. Beside the higher schools enumerated above, there existed a large number of secondary commercial schools in various provincial centres, such as Odessa, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Rostov etc.

The average standards of commercial and economic education in Russian schools were, certainly, not lower and even, occasionally, actually higher than those of similar schools abroad.

Having finished with the past, let us now look into the future of Russia.

CHAPTER II.

Russian Problems and the Lines to be Followed in their solution. Russia is a country of the future. Among many Russians, now scattered throughout the world, or still remaining on Russian territory, the idea is ripening of the imperative necessity of securing the independence of the Russian National Economy. This process is so deep and so pregnant with far-reaching constructive possibilities, that it is probably bound to inaugurate an entirely new era in Russia's life.

Any future Russian Government will have to deal from the very outset with the problem of the economic reconstruction of the country: with production, in all its branches, exchange and the increase of the efficiency of national labour.

The problems of national economy and of the development of national initiative are bound to become the decisive factors of all constructive work in the social and political sphere. They are the key to the satisfactory solution of the internal problems of the country, as well as of the problem of its relations with the outer world.

In connection with this problem of economic reconstruction and of the development of productive forces, the question naturally arises of the «right man». Russia is now, more than ever, in need of men capable of creative work. This type can only be developed on the condition that men are constantly able to check and improve their personal business experience in the atmosphere of a scientific organisation of the study of all technical and economic problems of Russia, and that the school is harmoniously combining in its teaching both the theory and the practice of their future professions.

The Institute of Transport and Practical Economics. On the two principles, referred to above, we will endeavour to build our Institute of Transport.

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The particular importance of transport and the dependence on it of the other branches of economic activities, were responsible for the fact that its problems have become the subject of special detailed study in many American, English and German Universities and economic schools. There already exists in England and America a very extensive literature specially dealing with problems of Transport. There exist excellent special courses of transport in all of the big Universities of those countries. The necessity of a thorough knowledge of it is becoming ever more obvious. As a result, in America a special Bureau of Railway Economics was founded, which became a national centre as to all problems of railway economics and transport.

In England, a special Institute dealing with Transport was founded in 1919 under the name of «The Institute of Transport» whose purpose is the development and diffusion of knowledge on the ways and means of communication, the art of their exploitation and their use in Trade and Industry.

The organisers and Directors of this Institute intend to publish and circulate in printed form the papers read at its meetings, as well as the various information at their disposal, manuals, reference books, statistical data etc.

With a view to making the application of science to transport clear, they intend to arrange exhibitions of equipment, apparatuses, models etc. A special library of works on transport is being formed; those persons who undertake some work conforming with the interests of the Institute, are granted pecuniary assistance or awarded premiums, while being also assisted in their studies by the provision of books, apparatuses, instruments and materials necessary for their work. Were this Institute to undertake the organisation of systematic lectures and classes for students, it would become an excellent source of knowledge on transport and would put the younger generation into close contact with its present business leaders and its vital problems.

Russian Transport, to deal only with the railways and inland waterways alone, presents much greater problems, more complicated in their conditions and richer in possible solutions, than any English transport problems. Therefore, the need of a Transport Institute is undoubtedly urgent.

It is not a mere question of some imaginary theoretical undertaking. The question consists in a better organisation, an increase, extention and thorough reconstruction of what had already existed in Russia before and, though far from being perfect, had to meet the most extensive demands of the country in transportation.

To satisfy this demand on a national scale, there existed in Russia a number of establishments, organisations and schools, which, often working on parallel lines, were not properly co-ordinated, being limited to their own narrow special or departmental horizons and, therefore, were uselessly spending much energy without always achieving adequate results. Whatever these shortcomings, one should point to the fact that great successes were often achieved; occasionally a deep insight in the future was displayed, great professional keenness in the work and an astonishing degree of ingenuity in carrying out enormous undertakings with very limited financial resources were shown.

The institutions I have referred to— State, public, private, corporative, professional, or mixed — either existed permanently or were of a temporary nature, being established with a view of coping with some special transport problems of the moment.

I will draw your attention, for example, to the New Railways Section of the II Department of the Council of State, — whose business it was to examine the economic expediency of new railways and to approve new concessions; the

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Tariff Conferences and Committees; the Regional Committees; the Committee for the construction of the Great Siberian Railway; Permanent Councils on waterways and metalled roads and a series of commissions which played such an important rôle in the Russian transport policy: the Baranoff's, N. P. Petroff's, and I. K. Borissoff's commissions, and, finally, those separate Exchange Committees, Zemstvo and municipalities which dealt with newly projected railways in their areas etc.

To sum up the work of these various committees we may say that they were dealing with two fundamental problems of the national Economy:

1) The improvement, both technical and economic, of the country's trade by means of its existing transport system.

2) The direction which the development of Russian Transport should follow in order to assist the desired or proposed development of Russia's productive forces.

Transport personnel was trained by: the Institute of Ways of Communication, one of the oldest higher schools in Russia, over a hundred years old; the mechanical sections of the Technological and Politechnical Institutes, the Moscow Technical School, and a number of secondary technical schools of rail and water-way transport.

The business side was far less developed, particularly in its traffic and commercial branches. Their personnel obtained its professional training only through practice, having previously received but a very inadequate purely theoretical general education, insufficiently adapted for their further activities. Only lately, and then in a very limited number, personnel for the traffic and commercial services could be found among the pupils of the economic Sections of the Politechnical and Commercial Institutes. Even the leading Russian transport engineers always felt the lack of an institution which would enable them, within a short time, to get acquainted with modern methods of practical economic solution of various transport problems. They either had to undertake a strenuous search in various sources, or to confide the job to persons without proper training in matters of practical transport economy. The scarcity and imperfection of sources from which information on the «practical economics of transport» could be obtained, has always been a weak point of Russia's transport.

The proposed «Institute of Transport and Practical Economics», along with its other objectives, is intended to supplement this deficiency.

The proposed «Institute of Transport and Practical Economics» will have to develop its activities in three main directions: 1) To raise the traffic capacity of the existing transport system to a level at which it will meet the demands of the country's trade; 2) To work out a plan for the extension of the transport system, in view of a further development of Russia's productive forces. 3) To prepare trained technical and commercial personnel for transport.

The Institute will unite institutions, organisations and individual students engaged in the study of the above mentioned three fundamental transport problems and possessing the necessary qualifications. Individual experts in every branch of transport may become members of this Institute. Russian and, in certain cases, foreign institutions, organisations and societies, can become members of the Institute or establish a close contact and be associated with the activities of the Transport Institute.

This connection may have a flexible form adaptable to every particular case. For instance — collaboration and distribution of work, according to a common programme, in the study of some definite problems of transport,

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mutual use of libraries, museums etc, financial support given to, or by the Institute etc.

The Institute will be an establishment: a) scientific, b) educational, c) carrying the investigation of various transport problems, d) advising in various transport cases.

The Institute should be organised as a private Society, while governmental, commercial, industrial, co-operative, zemstvo and municipal organisations would take part in its work and in the results achieved by it, as Associates. The Institute of Transport should, certainly, not pretend to legislate or administer. But, with sufficient authority and tact on the part of its leaders, it would be bound very soon to become the intellectual centre, where creative ideas on transport would be conceived, developed and appraised. This centre would soon develop into an authority whose opinions would be taken into consideration by the Government in its transport legislation, tariff policy, development of a new railway net, etc. Some of the work of preparation and investigation, previously done by the numerous organisations mentioned above, would naturally be included in the Scope of the Institute's work.

The suggested system would bring about: a) unification of work; b) reduction of costs; c) increased authority and, especially, d) the co-ordination, better understanding and reconciliation of the conflicting demands of — (1) the technique and economics of transport, and (2) the transport apparatus, as a whole, and those whom it is called to serve.

The Institute would be administered by a Board of Directors, elected by both Members and Associates. At the head of the Institute would be a President, assisted by several Vice-Presidents in charge of the sections and principal branches of the Institute.

Beside the members of the Institute there will be: a) graduates working on separate questions concerning transport and making use of the Institute's libraries and other facilities; b) students receiving their higher education in the Institute and, finally, c) persons attending separate lectures or short courses for the workers of various branches of transport.

The Institute should be divided into five main sections, to which its members, both technicians and economists, would belong, viz.:

1) Railways; 2) Inland waterways; 3) Road transport; 4) Transport by sea; 5) Air transport.

The activities of the Institute should consist in a) reports, read at sectional and general conferences; b) periodical meetings of those engaged in work on various problems of transport; c) excursions abroad, in view of studying the organization of transport in foreign countries; d) all-Russian competitions on various problems of transport, with prizes and awards to the winners, e) the publication of books and periodicals on transport, f) the maintenance of higher schools for the education of transport personnel, g) courses for the improvement of special qualifications of the existing personnel in various branches of tranport; h) the improvement of and the investigation into transport and the examination of the methods of systematic reconstruction of transport (the the latter would be temporary, until the work of reconstruction is completed), i) library, statistical cabinet, museum of transport.

I do not wish to overburden my argument in favour of the necessity of a Transport Institute by unnecessary detail. It is practical work and not written statutes that are essential to give weight to an institution and to make it really useful. I shall, however, briefly deal with some of the problems enumerated above, partly in view of giving a clear idea of the Institute, and partly to describe the activities of similar institutions abroad.

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CHAPTER III.

Periodical Conferences of transport workers in Russia have a long and gratifying history. These conferences, as a rule, were convened annually (e.g. those on waterways and metalled road transport). The exchange of opinions between persons coming from every corner of the vast Russian Empire, who, working under very different conditions, reported the achievements of the year's work and exchanged views on the next year's programmes, are a very good stimulant to individual activity and progress. This practice should be adopted by the new branches of transport as well.

Higher Schools for the Professional Education of Transport Workers. As mentioned before, the standards of training of engineers and technicians of various specialities were very high in Russia, even when compared with those of the most advanced countries. It is possible that our engineer is too much of an encyclopaedist. It might be useful to alter the curricula, so as to achieve greater concentration on special details and, consequently, a more specialised and less general knowlegde. The above mostly refers to the engineers of haulage, generally recruited among graduates of mechanical sections of the Technological Institutes. The demand for technical personnel was met by technical schools, the number of which, especially of the higher type, had considerably grown before the war. What is really needed, are certain alterations in the curricula of these schools (I mean the schools associated with the Institute), aimed at their greater standardisation and, perhaps, a narrower specialisation, which should be introduced for those of the students who want to specialise on transport. With regard the problem of training transport personnel in the economic and commercial aspects of their work, a new higher school of Practical Economics of Transport, consisting of two branches, is simply indispensable. These branches should be: a) that dealing with the problems of exchange and circulation, in view of obtaining the best results for the national economy by means of the existing transport facilities, b) that dealing with the development of the future network of transport and of the productive forces of Russia.

New transport calls forth new productive forces, and then itself grows and develops under the impulse of the new productivity it evoked.

Nowhere has this principle been so clearly proved as in the development of the railway net of the United States of America and of the Great Siberian Railway in Russia.

The purpose of the «School of Practical Economics of Transport» does not only consist in the preparation of efficient chiefs of commercial departments of the railways, or practical tariff experts, or managers of shipping companies, but also in affording facilities for engineers to broaden their narrowly technical outlook and to rise to the positions of directors of railways and to other responsible posts.

This school must give them the possibility of supplementing their technical experience by a universal acquaintance with the whole cycle of economic knowledge, thus broadening their horizons and enabling them to gain a correct view of the problems with which they are bound to be faced in their new situations.

The lectures of the «School of Practical Economics» would be open to students receiving a systematic course of education, as well as to all members and graduates of the Institute of Transport.

The main lines of the programme of the «School of Practical Economics« should be as follows.

The essential branches of knowledge, giving a sufficient insight in the

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complex phenomena of economic life, must. in the case of the so-called «basic cycle», be common to both sections. This cycle would consist of: 1) Obligatory studies, 2) Studies obligatory only for those following a certain special course and 3) Studies only recommended.

I do not propose to enumerate the sciences composing the «basic cycle», and shall only point that, in Western Europe and America, it is composed of such subjects as: applied mathematics, physics, chemistry, genetic and evolution, elements of practical sociology, civil and business ethics, general political economy, social psychology, economic history; history of civilisation, economic geography, history-general and of individual countries, statistics, book-keeping, general course of law, modern social reforms and progress, modern nationalism, political organisation, etc.

This «basic cycle» should be followed during the first two years in such a way that, during the second year, the courses which can be considered as introductory to further specilisation, would be completed. These courses should be carefully constructed, in view of making them short, clear and comprehensive and, thus, of gaining time for special courses.

On the completion of the «basic cycle» there should be a bifurcation in the two suggested sections which, again, would take another two years each. The first section would deal mostly with commercial matters; the second — with various branches of production and industry in Russia.

First Section. — Russian commerce used to be of a simple and rather patriarchal type, and mainly confined itself to the simplest operations: — a fact well known abroad. Julius Boehm, who shortly before the war was sent to Russia by the Vienna Commercial Museum with a special mission to investigate the conditions of trade, in his extensive report dwells at length on the peculiarities of trade, the business methods and psychology of merchants, and emphasises the fact that the Russian merchant does not even realise how much the merchant in Europe has to learn and to know to be able effectively to cope with his problems.

This first course must give all the necessary knowledge of trade and scientific management, in as much as trade is connected with and depends upon the available means of transport, as well as of the economics of transport itself.

The approximate composition of this cycle is as follows: 1) *Internal trade:* Science of trading, commercial and industrial geography of Russia; knowledge of merchandise; organisation of trading concerns, co-operation, finance and credit in trading, banking and insurance business; legislation on trade and bills of exchange; methods of business statistics; personal factor in economics and trade; organisation and technique of retail and wholesale trade; commercial policy; packing; storage; commercial calculations; practical course of commercial technique; drafting of commercial contracts; State control; regulation and taxation of trade; book-keeping and accounting; commercial correspondence; analysis of market prices.

2) *Foreign trade:* World economics and international exchange; international economics and politics; finance and credit in international trade, State control and regulation; trade agreements and customs duties; Russia's foreign trade and its problems in the system of international commerce; national economics and foreign markets; sea transport in international trade and freights; practices of foreign banks; foreign commercial technique and customs; organisation of international grain trade and Russia's part in it; same regarding coal, timber, oil, and other goods of world importance or important for Russia; economic geography of the world and of various countries; their financial, commercial and industrial history and policy; foreign languages and correspondence, etc.

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An interesting programme has been worked out in America by the Department of Commerce — «Training for Foreign Trade» — published in 1919.

Germany has a special Institute dealing with questions of international exchange and with sea transport as one of its main factors — «Das Institut fûr Weltwirtschaft und Seeverkehr». Another Institute deals with problems of the organisation and technique of commerce—«Institut für Verkehrslehre»—in Cologne.

3) *Transport in its connection with trade:* railway net; inland waterways; sea, road and air communications. — Economics of the exploitation of these means of transport; system of railway tariffs; sea and river freights; economics of warehousing concerns; economics of loading, unloading and transshipment; economics of local railways and roads; economics of town communications: tramways, autobuses, lorries, etc.

The Second Section. — The process of production, gradually becoming more complicated, both economically and technically, in Europe, as well as in America, is calling for great attention to be paid to the economics and the scientific organisation and management of industrial concerns. In nearly every commercial school and University one finds systematic courses dealing with these problems in their application both to the relatively simple forms of enterprise, such as farming, forestry, fisheries etc., and to the most complicated types of extractive and manufacturing industries. As mentioned above, the succesfull development of transport depends on the development of the productive forces of the country, while, on the other hand, new communications tend to develop the productive forces in those regions in which, before, they were dormant or had no opportunities to develop.

The second section would give instruction in economics and in the organisation of production and would make clear the rôle played by transport in awakening the productive forces of the country.

The subjects taught should be, approximately, as follows: Natural resources of Russia; the general history of the development of industries in Russia; farming — a) grain, b) technical plants, c) vegetable gardening and fruit growing; d) dairy farming; e) cattle-breeding; f) poultry-keeping; g) the sugar industry and other branches of industries connected with farming; production of raw materials — a) coal, b) oil, c) timber, d) ores, e) animal products; f) fisheries, g) building materials. Industrial metallurgy: a) steel and iron; b) white and coloured metals; c) metal industry; d) textile; e) benzol and its by-products; f) oil refining; g) various chemical industries; average-sized and small industrial entreprises; comparative economic analysis of the yield of various branches of production; personal consumption (standard of life) and the accumulation of capital in each of these branches; the national wealth and the dinamics of national income of Russia, as compared with other countries; scientific organisation of industrial concerns; interdependence of Russia's industry and transport; peculiarities depending on the kinds of goods transported — occasional, bulk, expensive, perishable; tariff system and reduced tariffs for freight on new ways of communication during the first years of their exploitation; direction of the world's trade routes and the dynamics of the latter; lines of long transit in Russia; lines of internal exchange; principal freight currents between the various economic regions of Russia; possibilities of developing productive capacities in new regions of Russia; projects of new roads in Russia and the order of their construction; the accumulation of capital in the world and capital markets; financing of new transport concerns and their possible yield.

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Courses intended for the improvement of the qualifications of the existing transport personnel should be so arranged as to conform with the needs of the various branches of practical work. Such courses should continue from six weeks to two months. They should either take place at the Institute or be given in other towns by lecturers delegated by the Institute. Those wishing to attend them should be given leave for the time required to follow the course. Those who would succesfully pass examinations in several of the subjects should be given priority in promotion.

Section of Research and Improvements. — In many similar higher schools in America and in England, beside the general educational and special courses, there exist also the so-called «Research Departments», where persons sufficiently competent and having passed special courses are enabled independently to carry their economic researches and investigations.

In some of the Universities, work in this Department is indispensable for anyone who wants to obtain a diploma. In America, instead of final examinations, the students have often to go through a period of practical work in the school and in a business concern and to present a report on their work, as well as an essay on some definite commercial or industrial problem.

The «Research Department» of the «London School of Economics and Political Science» can serve as a model; this Department, within a very short time, has attracted much interest and has proved its vitality. It soon became a centre of specialisation for persons who had completed their course at the school, as well as for those who had received adequate education in other schools in England. In some cases, «Research Departments» are established as separate institutions, independent of the schools. The Section of Research and Improvements of the proposed Institute should be of this latter type. Its work would be greatly helped by the existence of a School of Practical Economics. The specialists who would give lectures, occupying two or three hours of their time, could also undertake research work in different branches of transport. Owing to such a combination it would, probably, be easy to secure the very welcome assistance of certain leading experts.

The Research Section, however, should be an entirely independent organisation, having its own purposes in view. Its aim would be the unbiassed, careful and scientific examination of the defects of transport and the practical means to their elimination, its general improvement, the reduction of the costs of the existing transport; the drafting of schemes for the development of the productive forces in various regions of Russia and, in connection with this, the study of the future construction and extension of the network of communications.

Beside the persons, who would be entrusted with the carrying out of some special work in this sphere by the Institute,every individual member or graduate of the latter, as well as establishments or organisations, would be permitted to work there on the problems in which they are concerned. All works completed in the Research Departement would be presented to sectional conferences or to the general conference of the Institute. The students of the School of Practical Economics might work in that Department in the capacity of assistants. They would derive more benefit from such work, than from any seminarium or classes of the best school type. I have no doubts of the impulses and of the widening of the horizon, which are bound to result for any practical worker from his participation in the studies of the Research Department, in which practical experience would be harmoniously combined with the theoretical and scientific view of the transport problems dealt with. I believe that work in the Research Department would greatly assist the development of transport

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and would be responsible for the creation and development of many future prominent leaders of this branch of economic activities.

In the first instance, attention should be directed to the collection of a large special library of works on transport.

A good library of technical works on transport exists at the Institute of Engineers of Ways and Communications. Thus, it would be necessary to collect mòstly books on the economics of transport and all the new literature of the subject, mostly in English, which has appeared in the course of the last years. It may be interesting to note the means by which the library of the London School of Economics and Political Science has been formed, and the efforts that have been made to develop it into what it is now. The library has been founded in 1896 by subscription, and now contains more than half-a-million volumes of special literature. It contains, without exception, all the standard works — in English and other languages, both general and special, on problems of economics, sociology — general and applied, — economic policy, finance, geography, transport, commerce and allied subjects. The library has received from Governments of other countries very valuable and interesting gifts of official documents, reports, statistical publications and all sorts of materials published by the Governments. For example, the Government of the U. S. A. presented the library with a collection of its publications beginning from 1873, and is regulaly sypplying it with new volumes. The same was done by the Governments of Canada, Australia, India, South Africa etc. Many interesting works on municipalities and municipal administration are regularly received from more than 300 municipalities of England, France, Germany, America, Austria, Holland, Belgium and Italy. This collection on municipal questions is probably unique, and no library in England or in any other country could boast of anything to equal it. Parlamentary documents of different countries, protocols of conferences etc. form a large section of the library.

Private persons and associations have also given to the library their own libraries or collections of books on special subjects. Among these is the collection given by Mr. W.M. Acworth, on problems of transport. This collection was founded by means of a special fund subscribed by English railway Companies and contains more than 5000 volumes of special literature. The collection is constantly increased by new books at the expense of the same fund. Those in charge, the school personnel, the students and the public have paid much interest to the library and have done their best to help its organisation. The future Institute of Transport must endeavour to collect a similar library. All of us, who are interested in the problems of Russian transport, should do all in their power to secure for this library as many volumes as possible.

The library of the Institute must be open to all ptactical workers of transport, commercial and industrial concerns, municipal and zemstvo administrations, State and public institutions etc. This kind of public library should be provided with adequate reading accommodation. The reading room must be supplied with encyclopadias, handbooks, dictionaries, atlases, maps etc; there must be also a section containing the periodicals and newspapers, both general and dealing with the economic life in Russia and other countries. A very interesting addition might be a collection of catalogues, prospectuses, bulletins, etc. The system adopted by the Patent Office in London might be taken as a model in the classification of this type of literature and periodicals. Then, it would be of interest to have a section containing various monographs, reports — read before Societies, Associations, Clubs etc., on various kinds of local requirements, problems, interests, resources and economic possibilities.

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This section of the library would render great service in establishing a closer contact between the work of our Institute, on the one hand, and the life, requirements and local interests of the outlying parts of Russia, on the other. Local questions and needs would be brought forward to the centre, which would help to find their practical solutions. The library should also have a section of bibliography and information which would have to keep in touch with all that appears at home and in other countries, on the subjects of transport and economics, and should answer enquiries addressed to it verbally or in writing.

Museum. — The technical side of Russian transport is well represented in the Museum of the Institute of Engineers of Ways and Communications and in that of the Ministry of Ways and Communications,in which the history and progress of transport for the last hundred years are represented. But Russia lacks a museum that would represent the economics of transport, the productive forces and the trade of the country. The Institute should possess such a museum. In America, many Universities and Schools have special economic museums. Here we will note only two: the Harward University's «Social Museum», where one can find illustrations of many things connected with municipal and social problems, and the «Commercial Museum», organised by the University of Boston at the «College of Business Administration». Russia's producing processes and the natural resources of her various regions should be represented in our museum. Special attention should be paid to all new achievements in the technique, organisation and management of industry.

Samples should be classified and shown as they are produced, worked, manufactured, etc.,up to the stage in which they reach the consumer. Tables and diagram must show the quantities produced and consumed in various localities of Russia and abroad, as well as data concerning markets, packing, shipping, prices, customs duties, etc. The system adopted by the Commercial Museum in Brussels in showing samples and methods of packing, should be followed. Russia's import and export of goods must by fully represented in samples and diagrams.

CHAPTER IV.

On this I conclude my scheme of the organisation of a «Russian Institute of Transport and Practical Economics». It would be premature at present to go into details. This, or something approaching it, will have to be done, and to be done, I firmly believe, as soon as Russia emerges from the chaos in which she was plunged by the Communist régime to orderly conditions and healthy economic life.

But what could we do at present? We should endeavour to popularise the idea of such an Institute, to study and get in contact with similar foreign institutions and also with those circles abroad who would be interested in giving assistance in this work of great inaportance for the whole Russian National Economy; lastly—to collect materials for the future Institute.

To conclude, I would like to make one more observation. In any case, I expect to meet one retort: Such an Institute would require an enormous expenditure; its maintenance would cost roughly twice as much as that of the Petrograd Politechnical Institute! I think, however, that this argument should not prevent the realisation of the suggestion.

If efficiently organised, its useful results would be of the greatest value. and the expenditure would be a profitable investment for the future Associates of the Institute.

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BUSINESS FORECASTING AS A STATISTICAL PROBLEM.

By G A. Pavlovsky.

Paper read before the Association on March 1st, 1923.

Much has been written by economists on the subject of crises in the course of the last hundred years. Many theories were brought forward in explanation of their nature and causes. Yet, the business world is still faced with uncertainty as to the course which market conditions may be expected to take in the immediate future. Depression always takes it unawares, unavoidably inflicting severe losses on the community and the individual. It is only natural in such conditions that one should try to gain some insight into the uncertainties of the future, so as to be able to foresee the changes that are to come and, accordingly, to adapt one's activities and to avoid the evil effects of market fluctuations.

The achievements of modern statistical methods in their application to economic investigations have encouraged the belief that the problem of trade forecasting can be solved by means of a thorough statistical study of the whole course of past business cycles. Direct observation tended to point that, among the many elements of economic activities, there are several which, in their development and their variations, appear to be particularly sensitive to every change in the general conditions of the market. In the case of some of these elements, changes appear to precede a general depression or improvement; in that of other elements, they, apparently, tend to accompany them or to lag behind by some more or less definite period of time. It is precisely on these symptomatic elements that the attention of all those engaged in the study of the problem of forecasting was centred. From the study of the past, by applying the principles of the mathematical theory of probability, which has borne such abundant crops in the field of statistical investigation, the students of the problem are trying to draw definite conclusions as to the future course of events. This is the idea underlying all attempts at business forecasting, on which what are now known as «business barometers» or «trade charts» are based.

The idea, or, at least, its first suggestion has, apparently, originated in France. After the American crisis of 1907, whose effects were painfully felt throughout the civilised world, the French Government has appointed a special committee of experts for the purpose of studying the means to mitigate unemployment arising out of periodic depressions. In the course of its work, the Committee has considered the problem of the symptoms preceding a general crisis. It has come to the conclusion that such symptoms are available and that, in the case of France, the elements whose changes are symptomatic in this respect are as follows: 1) Commercial loans and discounts of the Banque de France; 2) Cash resources of that Bank; 3) Prices of raw materials, foodstuffs and other commodities; 4) Foreign trade of France; 5) Consumption of coal; 6) Prices of pig iron; 7) Traffic turnover of the railways and, 8) Number of unemployed. According to the Committee's opinion, variations in some of these elements tend to coincide with the crisis or to follow it, while in others they tend to precede general changes, and, thus, could be used to forecast them.*) Beyond this general suggestion, however, the Committee has not advanced.

*) See, W. M. Persons, «Construction of a Business Barometer based on annual data», «Americ. Econ. Review», December, 1916.

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About the same time, the problem began to attract attention in America, where its solution was sought along purely practical lines, and, where, later, it was submitted to more thorough scientific investigation by statisticians. This was the direct outcome of the characteristic American striving towards a thorough rationalisation of economic and commercial activities, and an equally strong tendency to put any new achievement of scientific research to practical uses. There, the problem of business cycles engaged attention both in its relation to the management of a private concern*) and in its influence on business as a whole.

As far as the present writer is aware, the first to submit the problem of the «business barometer» to detailed investigation was R. W. Babson, whose book was published in America in 1910.**) The way in which he treats his subject, however, appears to be somewhat peculiar and not altogether scientific. Thus, it is hardly scientific to approach a highly intricate and contentious subject by declaring, from the very outset, that «the use of fundamental statistics eliminates all guessing and uncertainty concerning mercantile or stock market movements» (p. 17).

Even more striking is the further assertion that «the amount of money that can be made by the study of such statistics is limited only by the original capital and the number of years the study is continued» (p. 25). The two chapters devoted to the calculation of the profits accruing to a merchant or a stock exchange operator, as a result of such study, leave the scientifically-minded reader actually bewildered. He may even be inclined to give up further reading, but, in doing so, he would be wrong, as, apart from these peculiarities of treatment, the book contains much interesting material and suggestions, on which the later development of the study of our problem has been based to a very considerable extent. Whether or not a solution of the problem of business forecasting by statistical methods is eventually to be achieved, such investigations are bound to add a good deal to our knowledge of the more intimate relations of complicated economic phenomena.

Babson constructed his «business barometer» on the basis of twelve groups, including 25 separate elements, which he assumed to be the most sensitive to changes in general economic conditions. These 12 groups are as follows: 1) Building and real estate; 2) Bank clearings; 3) Business failures; 4) Labour conditions; 5) Money conditions; 6) Foreign trade; 7) Gold movements; 8) Commodity prices; 9) Investment market; 10) Condition of crops; 11) Railway earnings and, 12) Social conditions. «These twelve subjects, he writes, have by custom come to be known among merchants as the twelve Barometers of Trade». (p. 19).

Somewhat different is the selection of elements adopted by the «Brookmire Economic Service» which, along with Babson, was one of the pioneers in this field of study. But it is beyond the scope of this article to consider these earliest attempts at the solution of the problem. Neither space and time, nor the direct purpose of this brief paper, permit the writer to dwell on the criticisms and suggestions advanced by Prof. M. T. Copeland***), or on the fundamental work

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*) See, e.g., H. S. Dennyson: «Management and the Business Cycle», Journal of the Americ. Statist. Association, March, 1922.

**) R. W. Babson «Business Barometers used in forecasting Trade and Security Prices», 1910.

***) Prof. M. T. Copeland. «Business Statistics», 1917.

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of Prof. W. C. Mitchell devoted to the statistical investigation of business cycles, which is closely allied to our immediate problem.*)

At present, the subject appears to be attracting considerable attention in England, where, before, little interest was shown to it. The prolonged business depression, which began in 1920, has apparently given a strong impetus in this direction. Before 1922, the only attempt, as far as the present writer is aware, was made by Mr. J. Kitchin, who has published his «Trade Chart» in 1919. Now, Prof. Sir William Beveridge, in addressing a meeting of business men in Manchester in November, 1922, has called their attention to an arrangement, by which the London School of Economics, jointly with the University of Cambridge, is starting the compilation and publication of a trade chart, which might be studied by the business man with «the same confidence with which he now consulted the indications of the thermometer or the barometer».**) Another attempt is being made by the weekly «Economic Review», which constructs a «barometer of trade» in the form of index numbers of prices of a list of 10 specially selected sensitive commodities.***)

It is not the purpose of this article to give a detailed account of all that has been done or is being done to solve the problem of business forecasting. The published materials are rather scarce, while much of the work now in progress is not easily accessible to an outsider. Moreover, such an account is not the actual object, aimed at in this brief study. In it we are trying to give a general idea of the subject, as far as this is made clear by the works hitherto published, and to answer the question, whether or not the problem of business farecasting can at all be adequately solved by statistical methods. Accordingly, we are dealing rather with the fundamental principles involved in it, than with the technical methods applied to its solution by various authors. By way of illustration, to make the treatment of the problem sufficiently clear, we shall only briefly deal with what appears, hitherto, to have been the most scientific attempt to the construction of a «business barometer», viz. with Prof. Warren M. Persons' original investigations.

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM.

What is the nature of our problem, and how are we able to approach it? In throwing a glance over the course of economic development during the past hundred years or so, in which the present organisation of trade has been gradually evolved, we see a series of completed business cycles. Periods of prosperity have, at more or less regular intervals, alternated with periods of depression, as if there existed some definite and implacable law, intermittently checking economic progress and forcing it to recoil and to start afresh after having reached a minimum. The whole development of business conditions appears to be represented by some curve, whose maxima mark the critical points, at which depression sets in, and whose minima signify the beginning of new waves of increasing activity and improved market conditions. Had we been able, by means of statistical analysis, to find the law by which the course of past cycles was determined, or had we succeeded in establishing, by

*) W. C. Mitchell. «Business Cycles», 1912. See also its analysis by B. W. King in his article «A study of Mitchell's inquiries into Prices», Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1916-1917.

**) «The Times», November 21st, 1922.

***) «The Economic Review», December 15th, 1922.

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the same methods, certain definite symptoms pointing to the approach of turning points in general business conditions, we would be in a position to say that the problem of business forecasting is practically solved, within the limits assigned by mathematical probability to the validity of our conclusions based on the observation of past cycles.

Accordingly, the problem can be approached from two entirely different points of view.

On the one hand, in studying the course of business conditions for the longest period possible, provided that it is sufficiently homogeneous throughout to allow of general conclusions to be drawn, we could try to establish the general laws to which the variations observed tend to conform. Then, on the basis of our observations and of the empirical probabilities resulting from the careful statistical study of past business cycles, we could attempt to extrapolate the future trend of events.

In approaching the problem from this angle, we should combine the synchronous values of a certain number of symptomatic economic elements into a series or a curve, representing the course of general business conditions, and then submit the series or curve obtained to mathematical analysis. This would enable us, subject to a certain value of probable error, derived from the empirical series, to extrapolate the future course of business conditions for any reasonable lenght of time, provided that our universe remains sufficiently homogeneous.

This would be the most difficult but, at the same time, the most promising way of approaching the problem. Besides, this conception would be in complete agreement with the popular theory of the regular periodicity of economic crises, which reached its culminating point and found, perhaps, its *reductio ad absurdum* in W. S. Jevons' hypothesis of sun spots. The whole conception would be based on a purely mechanical view of economic development, which would be interpreted as subject to definite «laws» in the physical sense of the word.

This ideal mathematical solution, however, would meet with unsurmountable obstacles. Even apart from the far too mechanical conception of economic phenomena it implies, and of the great multiplicity of causes affecting them, this method of approaching the problem is rendered impracticable by the extreme scarcity of data at our disposal. Our study cannot be carried back beyond a few decades, comprising, at the outside, a score of completed cycles. This means that the lengths of periods that might be found by trial, would be subject to very large probable errors, which would deprive them of any significance and would make the laborious calculations practically worthless. As a result, we are forced to give up this method of dealing with our problem, which would be the most effective, had our observations been more numerous, the periodicily regular and the phenomena investigated less complex as to their nature and causation.

Thus, there remains the other method. In adopting this alternative way of approaching our problem, we leave out the question of the periodicity of cycles, as such, and confine our attention to the symptoms by which a change in the general course of business could be foretold. The only purpose of our investigation in this particular case is that of finding out the chronological order in which, in the course of past business cycles, the variations in a representative set of economic elements, such as, e. g., prices, clearings, amounts of various commodities produced, etc., preceded, accompanied or followed general changes in business conditions. This is achieved by means of a careful

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statistical study of the whole course of past business cycles. If our analysis shows that, in the course of these cycles, definite variations in certain symptomatic elements tended, on the whole, to coincide with the changes in general business conditions, as to time and direction, these elements can be combined into a «business barometer». Those elements, on the other hand, whose variations tended, as a rule, to precede the fluctuations recorded by the «barometer» by a certain constant period of time, can then be combined into another series, which can be used for the purpose of forecasting future developments. In the latter case, on the basis of the regularities observed in the past, we would be able to deduce the *a posteriori* probability of the repetition of the same sequence of events in any given cycle, belonging to a period reasonably homogeneous as to its general conditions. On observing the appearance of certain symptomatic variations in the forecasting elements, which, in the past, as a rule, preceded turning points in the general conditions of business by a certain period, we would be in a position to say that, *ceteris paribus*, a general change in the course of the given cycle should reasonably be expected to take place within the same period of time $\pm$ e, or the probable error of that period, as given by the observation of past cycles.

The probability that, in the course of the present $(n+1)$st cycle, a turning point in the general conditions of business would be reached within a specified period $m \pm e$, would be given by the fraction

$$P_m = \frac{(n-\kappa)+1}{n+2},$$

where n stands for the number of observations and κ — for the number of cases in which exceptions to the general rule were observed. Obviously, the value of P_m, i. e. the probability of our expectations, depends on the values of n and κ; P_m tends to approach the value 1, or certainty, with n indefinitely growing and κ tending to become zero. This points to the necessity of extending our observations over the longest period possible, provided that the universe studied remains throughout sufficiently homogeneous.

Were we to achieve the solution of the problem of business forecasting in this particular form, by eliminating and combining the symptoms pointing to the approach of a change in the general course of economic conditions, we would, indeed, not be in a position mathematically to extrapolate the future maxima and minima in these conditions; yet, we would acquire a degree of insight in the immediate future sufficient for all practical purposes. With a certain degree of probability, depending on the number of past cycles studied and on the regularity of the variations observed, we would be able to forecast future changes and, accordingly, to adapt our activities, thus avoiding or, at least, mitigating their disastrous effects.

It is precisely along these lines that have been directed prof. W. M. Persons' interesting investigations, of which a brief outline is given in the following pages.

PROFESSOR W. M. PERSONS' «BUSINESS BAROMETER».

As we have had the occasion to mention, the problem of the «business barometer» has received particularly detailed and scientific treatment at the

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hands of Warren M. Persons, Professor of Statistics at the Harvard University, whose work was published at the close of 1916.*)

He has studied American business conditions for 35 years from 1879 to 1913, which period, in his opinion, was sufficiently homogeneous to allow such study to be made.

He has examined the cycles of the following series of annual statistics from 1879 to 1913:

1) Wholesale prices of commodities; 2) Gross receipts of railroads; 3) Net earnings of railroads; 4) Coal produced; 5) Exports from the U. S.; 6) Imports into the U. S.; 7) Pig iron produced; 8) Price of pig iron; 9) Immigration; 10) Shares sold on the New York Stock Exchange; 11) Average prices of shares sold on the N. Y. S. E'.; 12) New York clearings plus five times outside clearings (clearing index); 13) Clearing index divided by relative wholesale prices (corrected clearing index); 14) New railroad mileage; 15) P. cent. of business failures; 16) Liabilities of business failures; 17) Balance of trade; 18) Weighted index numbers of the yield per acre of nine leading crops; 19) Ratio of loans to resources of banks; 20) Ratio of cash to deposits of banks; 21) Surplus reserves of New York associated banks. Beside, for the years 1890-1911, he has investigated Prof. W. C. Mitchell's figures of

1) The average rate of interest on ten railroad bonds; 2) The average rate of interest on 4-6 month commercial paper; 3) The average rate of interest on 2-3 month commercial paper; 4) The average rate of interest on call loans in New-York.

Prof. Persons' method of dealing with the problem, to quote his own words, was briefly as follows.

«1. The selection of a first approximation to a business barometer to be used as a standard with which to compare the other series. Wholesale prices of commodities was the standard chosen.

«2. The elimination of the growth element or secular trend from each series and the securing of the periodic variations or ,,cycles".

«3. Computation of the degree of correlation between the cycles of each series and the cycles of wholesale prices, for concurrent items, also for various degrees of lag in prices and in the given series; the object being the determination of the point of maximum correlation. The questions to be answered are: Do the fluctuations synchronise? If not, in which direction is the lag and how long?

«4. Computation of the degree of correlation between the first differences of cycles (i. e., changes, plus or minus, of each year, as compared with the preceding year) of each series and of prices for concurrent items and for various degrees of lag; the object being the securing of further evidence concerning the points of maximum correlation as found in number 3 above.

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*) W. M. Persons. «Construction of a Business Barometer based on annual data», American Economic Review, December, 1916.

As Prof. Persons' later researches in connection with the Harvard University Economic Service were not known to the present writer, who had to confine himself to that author's earlier work, published in 1916, which, however, has served to form the methodological basis of more recent investigations, this brief sketch does not pretend at being a strictly scientific analysis of Prof. Persons' achievements. Referring to his investigations as an example of the methods of approaching the problem of business forecasting, we shall, accordingly, make only such remarks as appear to be of more or less general application to the subject and to the methods of treatment adopted in its study.

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«5. Combination of the various series having concurrent fluctuations with wholesale prices into a business barometer.

«6. Computation of the degree of correlation between the cycles of each series and of the business barometer, as obtained in number 5 above, to verify the selection of the series composing the barometer.

«7. Computation of the degree of correlation between the first differences of each series and of the business barometer as a further confirmation of the selection of the series composing it.

«8. Combination of the various series having the maximum correlation for a lag of one year in relative wholesale prices into a one-year forecaster.

«9. Computation of the degree of correlation between the cycles and first differences, respectively, of the one-year forecaster and of the business barometer in order to determine the accuracy with which the former forecasts the latter».*)

Accordingly, the «barometer» was composed of the following nine series, whose fluctuations were found by Prof. Persons to synchronise: 1) Gross receipts of railroads; 2) Net earnings of railroads; 3) Coal produced; 4) Exports from the United States; 5) Imports into the United States; 6) Pig iron produced; 7) Price of pig iron; 8) Immigration; 9) Relative wholesale prices.

The following five elements were included in the «one-year forecaster»: 1) Shares sold on New York Stock Exchange; 2) Average prices of shares sold on N. Y. Stock Exchange; 3) Corrected clearing index; 4) New railroad mileage; 5) Per cent. of business failures.

Both the «business barometer» and the «one-year forecaster» constructed by Prof. Persons, are shown on the diagram.

Now, how far have Prof. Persons' investigations helped in the solution of the practical problem of business forecasting;?

As far as the «business barometer», as distinguished from the «forecaster», is concerned, we think that Prof. Persons' researches have proved that, as a matter of fact, instead of constructing a special «barometer» composed of a number of heterogeneous elements, one may as well use a good series of index numbers of wholesale prices. Prof. Persons himself assumes them to be the best «first approximation» to a business barometer, and adopts them as the actual basis of all his further investigations. In index numbers of prices he sees the criterion by which he judges, whether or not a given element should be included in his «barometer». Whenever a given representative or «symptomatic» series, on being correlated with prices, yields a higher coefficient of correlation for synchronous values, than for a lag in either factor, and that coefficient proves to be absolutely significant, the series is found fit for inclusion in the «barometer». But, on equally logical grounds, one could have put the question the other way round and asked: how far the variations in the level of wholesale prices, as recorded by index numbers, do really agree with those in other representative elements, which are especially sensitive to changes in general business conditions? Prof. Persons' investigations tend to prove that, on the whole, the agreement is very close. Accordingly, one, naturally, feels a strong inclination to ask: if so, is it really necessary to construct a special «business barometer», or should index numbers of wholesale prices be considered a sufficienty good instrument for our purpose?

The present writer is inclined to think that, as a matter of fact, Prof.

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*) Op. cit., p. 750.

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

Persons' investigations have resulted in showing that index numbers of prices are as good a «barometer». as any other, and that no useful purpose can be served by constructing new ones. Beside the economy in time and effort, there is another particularly important consideration in favour of adopting index numbers of prices in the capacity of a «business barometer»: it is in prices that any changes in general business conditions always find their ultimate expression, and the actual meaning of a price series is much clearer to the average man than that of a series constructed of a number of heterogeneous elements, which requires special interpretation.

As a matter of fact, however, the «business barometer», in Prof. Persons' scheme, as we understand it, plays only a subsidiary part in the actual solution of the problem of forecasting. It gives a more or less accurate idea of past changes, but, taken alone, it cannot be used for the purpose of forecasting, unless we succeed to solve the problem in the first of the two ways suggested above, i. e. unless we are able to reduce the composite series into a harmonic function, which is more than doubtful, because, even apart from the scarcity of observations, the cycles fail to exhibit any definite tendency to regular periodicity. In approaching the problem from the alternative point of view, which, as pointed above, is clearly the one chosen by Prof. Persons, the vital

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element of the scheme is the *one-year forecaster*, indicating the changes that are to come.

The «one-year forecaster», is very highly correlated with the «business barometer» for a lag of one year in the latter. The coefficients of correlation are 0.860 for the series and 0.510 for the first differences.

In studying the «forecaster», as ploted in our diagram (broken line), we arrive at the following conclusions.

We see that the agreement in the fluctuations of the two series, viz. the barometer and the forecaster, for a lag of one year in the former, is not at all so close as we would be inclined to expect it to be, judging by the coefficients of correlation.

Seeing that our object is that of forecasting *changes* in business conditions, it is clear that we are interested not so much in the general agreement between the two series throughout their whole length, as in that between their turning points, i. e. their maxima and minima. In examining the diagram we see that, of the 19 cases of more or less abrupt changes registered by the «barometer», only in 6 does a change in the «forecaster» precede that in the «barometer» by one year; in 13 cases this does not happen. This is a matter of decisive importance, because the solution of the problem of forecasting entirely depends on the degree to which the correspondence between the variations of the two series is stable. The reader remembers that the probability of our conclusion as to the time at which a change in general business conditions should be expected to happen, based, as it is, on empirical data, is given by the fraction

$$P = \frac{(n-\kappa)+1}{n+2}$$

In this case, in the course of a period of 35 years, from 1879 to 1913, we have observed 19 changes in the «barometer»; of these, in 13 cases the changes in the «forecaster» preceded those in the «barometer» by either a longer or a shorter period, instead of one year, as they should. Accordingly, the probability that, on having observed a change in the «forecaster», we should expect a corresponding change to take place in the general conditions of business in a year's time, is expressed by the fraction

$$P = \frac{(19-13)+1}{19+2} = 1/3.$$

In other words, the odds are 2 to 1 that the «forecaster» will fail.

Such results appear rather striking, seeing that the «forecaster» is so highly correlated with the «barometer» for a one-year lag in the latter. In fact, however, the explanation is simple enough. The correlation is right, but the conclusion is wrong. If we are interested in forecasting, our attention is centred on the turning points of the two series — the «barometer» and the «forecaster». What we want to know is, whether the changes in the «forecaster» for a given year correspond in sign to those in the «barometer» for the following year, while from the size of the coefficient of correlation we only learn that, on the whole, the two series tend to move in the same direction. Accordingly, the fact which was here mathematically proved by the method of correlation is that, throughout the 35 years' period studied, the values of the «forecaster» tend, on the whole, to move in agreement with those of the «barometer», and that the agreement is the closest for a one-year lag in the «barometer». The coefficient is

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dominated by the general trend of the two series, while disagreements in particular cases are subject to the general rule of chance deviations and, thus, scarcely affect the correlation, as expressed in the Pearsonian coefficient.

This is the reason why Prof. Persons has had recourse, beside the correlation of the series concerned, to that of their first differences; in correlating the first differences of the «barometer» and the «forecaster», he obtained a much lower coefficient than that for the series (+0.510). But, though allowing a certain measure of influence to the direction of individual changes in the values of the series correlated, the coefficient for the first differences is still mainly dependent on the general trend of the series. Accordingly, with regard to the «barometer» series, Prof. Persons proceeded to the application of the «method of variate differences», which, however, he did not apply to measure the correlation of the «barometer» and the «forecaster». Meanwhile, the fact that the correlation between the first differences of the two series is so much lower than that between the series themselves, tends to point to the existence in the latter of individual cases of disagreement in the direction of changes, which is precisely the most important point of the whole investigation. This applies to both Prof. Persons' forecasting series, i. e. to the original one, including five elements, and to the second one, including three series whose coefficients of correlation with the «barometer», in the case of first differences, gave significant values.

Prof. Persons expresses the opinion that his «forecaster» would be improved by the use, instead of annual data, of data for shorter periods, viz. quarters or months, and of a lag of three, six or nine months. We think that this would not help much, as in this case the «forecaster» would, naturally, have to be broken up into several series, according to the varying periods of lag of the «barometer». The number of elements, however, being very small, this would make the separate forecasting series too much subject to the influence of individual disturbing causes and could, thus, hardly be expected to yield satisfactory results.

To this we are bound to confine our remarks, our main purpose having been that of giving an illustration of the methods applied to the treatment of the problem of forecasting, and to call attention to to necessity of great discrimination in the application to it of the method of correlation, which appears to be the general practice of all modern investigators of this subject. The application of the method of correlation to the solution of the problem of business forecasting appears to bring forward the agreement in the general trend of the series correlated, while in this case it is not the general agreement between them, but the details, i. e. the agreement between individual turning points that is all-important. The result is that, when turning, as we did, to a closer examination of the graphs of the «barometer» and the «forecaster», we find that the value of the latter for practical purposes is rather doubtful, to say the least of it.

CONCLUSIONS.

What is, then, the right solution of the problem or, rather, can the problem of business forecasting be solved by statistical methods? The present writer will beg his reader to excuse him for being rather sceptical on this score. To him it appears that, however desirable it would be to solve the problem, it can hardly be expected ever to find a solution on strictly scientific lines, owing to the very nature of the elements involved. In our opinion, the task is one beyond the powers of statistics to cope with.

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The difficulties are not essentially of methodological nature: a suitable method, sooner or later, might be found, as the technical equipment of statistics improves. The obstacle is in the nature of the problem, viz. in the fact that the evolution of economic phenomena cannot be treated as a mechanical process. It is determined by too numerous causes to be treated in this way.

Beside the fact that, as Heraclites has once put it, πάντα ῥεῖ in the world, or, as we now say, there exists the law of *evolution* in all things, tending to change them as time goes on, the same effects in the domain of economics can result from widely different causes. Such are, among other things, commercial crises, generally resulting from a disturbance of the balance between the various branches of production, and bringing about over-production and an ultimate depression of the market. Forecasting is based on the order in which certain symptomatic changes tend, as a rule, to precede general changes in business conditions. We have seen, how often this general rule appears to break down in the case of Prof. Persons' «forecaster». Now, this is precisely the result of the multiplicity of ways, by which a change in business conditions can possibly come upon the commercial world; it may be war, or financial failure in some big centre, or failure of crops, or real over-production, etc. In each separate case, the order in which the crisis will affect the various elements of economic activities, is not the same, although all these roads inevitably lead to Rome, i. e. to ultimate depression. Accordingly, there can be no set of such elements which would throughout any long period of time be really symptomatic in the sense that their variations would always precede the crisis by a certain definite periode of time; they may do so in certain conditions; in others—they may not. All depends on the causes from which the crisis has taken its origin and on the way in which these causes have affected the various elements of economic activities.

There may have been a number of cases, in which a certain order could be observed in the development of events leading to a crisis; but this is not necessarily so; there is no law compelling events to follow this course in all cases. And any conjectures, based, as they actually are, on a very limited number of observations, are bound to possess only a slight degree of probability in their favour. Economic conditions and the whole economic organisation of society are constantly changing. When faced with economic phenomena, we actually have to do with a bag in which the proportions of balls of various colours are being altered before every drawing, with the result that it is practically impossible, from experience, to calculate the probability of drawing a ball of some chosen colour. Being aware of this impossibility, one does, as this is the case with Prof. Persons, introduce the assumption that, within the period studied, economic conditions are sufficiently homogeneous for the purpose of comparison. In other words, it is assumed that, theoretically, for the whole of a given period of, say, 35 years, we have to do with a bag containing balls of various colours in constant proportions, and that the 35 consecutive drawings are made under strictly identical conditions, the mathematical probability remaining constant. This is, clearly, an arbitrary assumption, necessary to achieve the solution of the problem. It is equally clear that any conclusions drawn on this assumption are valid only so long as the conditions remain reasonably homogeneous; as soon as they change, the possibility of forecasting on this basis is gone.

What does the term «homogeneity», as applied to economic conditions, actually mean? Does it imply that, throughout the period studied, the economic factors analysed possess an equally representative and symptomatic character?

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This should be so, or no «barometer» could be constructed. But is it so, as a matter of fact? I think that it is not, and that these factors are continually undergoing changes in their relative importance and their representative character. As an example, let us take the series included in Prof. Persons' «barometer» and «forecaster». In the first instance, it would be difficult to follow his lead in assuming that the 35 years' period chosen by him was really «homogeneous» throughout. Begining from 1879, when the United States has just recovered from the consequences of the Civil War, it is a period of vigorous growth of America's economic activities and of great changes in her economic organisation. One would hardly be able to assume that the formation of trusts or other combinations, controlling most of America's principal branches of production, has had no influence on general business conditions. This is an example of the changes in economic organisation. Then, as to separate symptomatic elements, one may point, e. g., to coal. Its rôle, as well as its representative character, as a component part of the «business barometer», could not have been the same throughout the whole period. Its economic importance has undergone a very considerable change in the course of the last two decades of the period studied, owing to the growing use of mineral oil and electricity in industry, transport and private households. Accordingly, a decline in the production of coal could well have been made good by an increase in the use of these alternative heating and lighting materials. Practically the same is the position with another item—railway earnings, because, up to the beginning of the current century, the railways had no competitors, while since that time the growing use of mechanical transport by road could not fail to take away part of their earnings, and the latter could easily have fallen, without this being due to any business depression. Clearing figures could have been affected by the increase in the number of separate banks or, *vice versa*, by their amalgamation. Similar considerations apply to many other factors as well, this tending to point that not only the general conditions of business, but even individual economic factors cannot be considered as necessarily homogeneous through several decades, only because there were no wars or revolutions that would utterly upset the whole economic organisation. There is a general trend towards growth in all branches of economic activities, but this does not prevent them from being continually re-shuffled as to their respective importance and representative character. Thus, even apart from political and social factors, interfering with the even course of business, the term «homogeneity» can be applied only in a purely conventional sense, as a definite fiction. In our problem, however, this fiction tends to acquire far too much importance.

Among the many uncertainties, with which business is faced in post-war economic conditions, the problem of business forecasting appears to attract particular attention. At the same time, however, its solution at present is more difficult than ever it was. The war has utterly upset the former economic equilibrium, with the result that the present economic conditions are absolutely unlike those that existed before. No fiction of homogeneity of the two would stand serious scrutiny. Accordingly, all attempts at scientific forecasting now appear to the present writer to be doomed to inevitable failure. Even apart from political and social factors, which cannot be foreseen and whose influence cannot be calculated beforehand, purely economic factors would certainly defeat any such attempt. It would do to point to the fantastic fluctuations in foreign exchanges — an element which used to be regarded as, practically, a constant of the problem before the war, and which now affects not only

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international trade relations, but the whole course of business in every separate country as well. What are the data from which we should start, under such conditions, in trying to find a solution of our problem? Pre-war experience, which used to supply us with certain data, on which to base our calculation of the probability of our conclusions as to the future, is not available, on account of conditions being absolutely different. As to new experience — it has to be accumulated for decades, and this under continually changing conditions, in which there exists no homogeneity whatever.

What are the colours and the proportions of balls in the bag with which we have to do now — we do not know, because we have not yet completed even the first series of drawings — we have not yet seen through even a single business cycle since the war. Only on having completed serveral series of such drawings, perhaps in some fifty years or more, our grandchildren would be able to speak of forecasting based on statistical methods, and to construct new «barometers», if, by then, they would not come to the conclusion that such laborious computations are useless. If they chose to construct a «barometer», they would be bound to assume the homogeneity of economic conditions, as a useful fiction. Then, there might come another world war or some great social catastrophe, upsetting all forecasting, and some statisticians would again begin to collect materials for future barometers, and so on... Meanwhile, even apart from universal catastrophes, ever-changing life would go on throwing new handfuls of uncounted balls in the classical «probability-bag» of the statistician.

Does this mean that changes in general conditions of business can never be foreseen in time? Certainly, not. The failure to achieve a solution of the problem by statistical methods only means that these changes cannot be *forecasted* by any mechanical device. That they cannot be thus *forecasted* does not imply that they cannot be *foreseen* by one possessing the necessary capacities of vision.

All attempts at business forecasting similar to that made by Prof. Persons, are based on a purely mechanical conception of the extremely complicated domain of economic phenomena.

From the application to them of the most refined modern methods of mathematical statistics, one is often tempted to expect more then mathematics can possibly give. Mathematical reasoning, however unimpeachable in itself, can be faulty because of its being applied to some object, whose nature does not permit of its being treated in this way. Thus, mathematical methods are the only way of establishing relations between objects in the domain of mechanics, in which all separate causes and effects are easily distinguished and eliminated; but, when applied to meteorology which is very much akin to our subject, they are almost as often wrong as they are right, just on account of the great multiplicity of influences and of the practical impossibility to grasp and to separate their effects.

The problem of forecasting business conditions does not lend itself to solution by statistical methods; for this, their causation presents too much complexity, and too numerous are in it the influences that cannot be accounted for *a priori*. Men of great business genius and insight can often be able, on the basis of separate pieces of evidence, guided by their commercial instinct, to form a judgment of the turn which market conditions can be expected to take in the immediate future, and accordingly to direct their activities. To supply the evidence needed by them, to increase the scope of such evidence and to improve it in every respect-such is the highly important task of the statistician in this domain, and in fulfilling it statistics would do more to enable the

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business world to understand the course and to estimate the trend of economic conditions than by trying to reduce them to scholastical formulae which, however correct they might be, taken by themselves, do not fit the object to which they are applied. Thus, the method of correlation, when applied to the study of the mutual dependence of two or more economic phenomena, has more than once proved useful in making clear various points in their relations to each other, and has justified the application of mathematical analysis to this particular field of investigation. In the vast domain of economics there still exist many regions that remain to be explored, before we can even give a really exact definition of what we mean under good or bad business conditions. It is on the exploration of this field, on the gradual clearing away of all uncertainties as to the interdepedence of economic phenomena that the attention of the statistician and the economist should be centred. In this field there still remains very much to the done, before we are in a position to say that economic science has really mastered it. Accordingly, in so far as any study intended at the solution of the problem of forecasting helps, in its course, to disclose some new facts concerning the interdependence of economic factors, it serves a distinctly useful purpose, even if it fails, as, in our opinion, it is necessarily bound to, in achieving its direct object. Without thoroughly understanding the present, how could we be able to predict the future, when every fact of to-morrow has its roots in to-day?

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY.

(The Communist Industries in 1922).

By M. V. Braikevitch.

Paper read before the Association on April 26th, 1923.

Are there any grounds for the hope that the New Economic Policy (N. E.P.) would be able help the Russian national economy to get out of its present impasse by means of gradual evolution?

An objective and correct answer to this question is extremely important.

Let us assume that, seeing the tremendous misfortunes that have befallen Russia, we possess sufficient courage, to do away with all personal and class considerations, and to obey only to the dictates of purely public and national interests. On this assumption, if we find that the reply is in the affirmative, we are bound to go to the logical conclusion, i.e. to reconcile ourselves to the rule of the Communist Government and to devote all our efforts to work on the lines indicated by the N.E.P.. Revolution is always a costly expedient, and the vital interests of the State make it imperative to avoid it by all means.

If, on the contrary, the reply is in the negative, it is our duty, in spite of all sufferings and privations involved, to spare no efforts in objectively and persistently criticising the Soviet Government and the N.E.P., to devote all our energy to bring the N.E.P. to an end as soon as possible and to dispel the illusions created by it, by which the Communists are drugging the consciosuness of the people and are sowing discord among the various classes of Russia's population. This is because, in this case, any delay in doing away with the N. E. P., any prolongation of that régime, even by a single day, tends to ruin and to bleed Russia white.

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Only by assuming this radical and self-denying attitude to the question of whether the N. E. P. really saves or ruins Russia, can the Russian political emigrants maintain a real and active connection with those who have remained and are suffering in Russia.

The first step in this direction in that of finding a really unbiassed and correct reply to the question put at the beginning of this article.

As far as I am concerned, as a result of a careful analysis of the N. E. P., which is now being presented for your consideration, I am convinced that the reply is in the negative.

In case if you find any faults with this analysis or if it gives rise to any doubts, we will discuss the problem with the greatest care and objectivity, because it involves very grave responsibility for any one of us and is, accordingly, one to be considered and solved with the greatest conscientiousness.

By the end of 1922 the practical influence of the New Economic Policy on the economic conditions of Russia has become sufficiently evident to allow of a definite judgment being passed on the expediency of that policy and on its chances of survival. Not only outside Soviet Russia, but even within its borders, among business men actually concerned in the carrying out of that policy and among the Communists themselves, approximately since November last, a sceptical attitude to it has begun to prevail,and many doubts were felt and expressed as to the possibility of carrying, under the régime it has established, the various branches of production.

That the N. E. P. was unavoidably doomed ultimately to collapse, has been perfectly clear to us since the early spring of 1922. The appearance at that time of the first signs of a crisis of overproduction made the position absolutely clear. Now, a year later, the N. E. P. is finally losing its prestige among the Communists as well, if it has not yet lost it before.

We are bound, however, to confess that the fact that our forecasts with regard to the ultimate fate of the N. E. P. have materialised, is very far from filling us with joy. In fact, the position being as it is, we feel extremely anxious about the immediate future of Russia. The causes of our anxiety are as follows.

The N. E. P. has brought about great changes in the whole political and economic organisation of Russia. As a matter of fact, during the period of the N. E. P., Russia squandered and exhausted what was still left of her capital, forming the material basis of her productive forces, even faster than she did before, under the régime of militant Communism. As far as productive capital was concerned, the N. E. P. can be said to have burned the candle from both ends. This was the greatest fault of the N. E. P. Beside, it is a fault which is bound to affect not only the Communist régime, but any other régime, which would come in its stead, as well, because that future Government will have to cope with the consequences of that reckless squandering of the country's resources during the period of the N.E.P.

The N. E. P., however, has had some highly important positive results as well. It has brought about a real revolution in the psychology of the masses in Russia and in their life, by having made perfectly clear and evident to them the nature of the economic and political régime under which they are living, by having somewhat improved the condition of experts with higher qualifications and enabled them to escape starvation, and by having revived some sparks of hope in the hearts of those who have long ceased to hope.

Then, finally, the N. E. P. has driven a wedge in the hitherto united

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Communist Party, thus having split it into two camps, between which no compromise can ever be reached, i.e. into «politicians» and «business men».

So deep and important are the material and psychological changes, brought about by the N.E.P. that now, when that policy has broken down, the Communist Government is absolutely unable to return to its old position of militant Communism and of the «single socialistic economic plan». The whole of the material and psychological conditions of Russia are driving her towards a new tremendous crisis. She is now at the parting of the ways. What of the two alternative paths Russia will ultimately choose, depends on whether the positive or the negative effects of the N. E.P., will prove stronger.

In case of the positive results proving stronger, Russia is bound very soon to discard her present Communist oligarchy and to establish a democratic capitalist régime. In this case, whatever might have been Lenin's real intention when he introduced the N. E. P. the latter will ultimately prove beneficial, because it will accelerate the crisis resulting in the recovery of Russia. The wounds, inflicted on Russia by the destruction of her capital, would then be healed comparatively soon.

The alternative solution is bound to bring about an unprecedented economic crisis, unheard of even under the Communist régime, a practically complete stoppage of the nationalised large industrial concerns and of transport, and the consequent prolonged prostration of the whole of Russia's national economy. Should this happen, all the technical personnel, skilled workers, traders, etc., whose conditions have been slightly improved by the N. E. P., in other words — the whole of the town population, would be doomed to suffer even worse than they did during the worst periods of the past, and the terrible winter of 1920 would pale as compared with their coming plight. In this latter case, the effect of the N. E. P. would be only that it would sooner bring about the dramatic day of reckoning, on which a final balance would be drawn of the results of the Communist system.

This is what causes us to be so painfully anxious about the immediate future of Russia.

I firmly believe in the great vitality and in the future of Russia, and accordlingly, I am sure that she will choose the first of the two ways open to her. At the same time, however, I feel that no one could be able to predict it for certain.

Apart from all conjectures as to the probable future, and keeping to present-days' realities, one is bound to admit that, as matters now stand, the Communist Government is absolutely unable to keep to its present positions with regard to the N. E. P.. These positions have been broken into at many points, and the front of the N. E. P. is crumbling to pieces. A highly characteristic proof of this is the fact that, even among the Communists, who should have defended and supported it, it now finds no supporters and partisans.

Both camps, into which the Communist Party has been split by the N.E.P., viz. that of «politicians» and that of «business men», have lost faith in it and are equally dissatisfied with its results.

Such is, in a brief outline, the general position in the spring of 1923, i.e. two years since the inauguration of the N. E. P.

CH. I. « MAKING A CORNER ».

In the following pages I shall endeavour to prove by facts that the picture as drawn above is really correct.

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When Lenin introduced the N.E.P., he wanted, by so doing, to carry out the difficult and risky work of laying a new social and economic foundation on which the superstructure of the Communist Party's dictatorship, dangerously suspended in the air after years of militant Communism, might rest. The idea itself of the N.E.P., as well as its actual carrying out, in fact, was skilfully copied by Lenin from the expedient of «making a corner», familiar among speculators[1]. The essence of the trick is that a group of speculators in some product proceeds to monopolise the trade in it in its favour, thus driving the consumer into a corner. If the group is strong enough, it is able to keep the consumer in that corner. In such case, sooner or later, he will be bound to pay greatly inflated prices for the product and for the outlay involved in the formation of the «corner». The speculators will earn huge profits. If, on the contrary, the corner happens to be broken, the speculating group will be severely punished and will ultimately go down. The N.E.P. was based on the same principle : it was aimed at driving the consumers into a corner. At the same time, however, it contains a new element, which has been brought into the scheme by Lenin. This new element is that the «cornering» is carried out on a huge scale, involving the whole of Russia's national economy, and is being systematically assisted by the whole machinery of the Communist Government and by the powerful expedient of Communist monopoly of foreign and home trade. The «cornering» was mainly carried out by the nationalised large industries. Its purpose was to catch the peasant. Simultaneously with this principal game, smaller «secondary» corners are being continually organised by various trusts and syndicates against each other[2]. The fact that the principal purpose of the N.E.P. is that of making a corner for the peasant in favour of the Communist industry, may be easily proved. Already long ago, when the N.E.P. was in course of introduction, I have had the occasion to point to this characteristic feature of the N.E.P., which was made sufficiently clear in Lenin's speeches and Kuraieff's articles on this subject[3]. The peasant was actually rounded up as a bear in his haunt. At that time, in March-August, 1921, the beaters, in accordance with Lenin's plans, were not yet permitted to frighten the peasant : he had to be encouraged to cultivate more land. In September, 1922, when the peasant has just begun to recover a little, on having garnered a comparatively good crop, the Communist Government has started the beat, driving the bear on the guns.

It was precisely in September, 1922, that the Communist Government has attempted to reap the fruits of its policy, by driving the peasant into the «corner». To achieve this purpose, it simultaneously applied two distinct sets of measures. On the one hand, it has organised a special Conference on the

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1) To be fair, I feel bound to say that Lenin has not simply copied the N. E. P. from the examples given by the world of speculation. As far, at least, as I am concerned, I feel perfectly certain that even if the N. E. P. has been entirely the product of Lenin's own ingenuity, the paths along which his thought travelled were no cleaner or better than those by which speculators are usually preparing their «capitalistic corners».

2) I do not intend to dwell here on these smaller «corners», whose effects on the N. E. P. are far less important. Suffice it to point that during the N. E. P. they are being frequently formed and that this is being done in a rather cynical way. As an example, we may point to the «corner» rather ingeniously formed by the Shterovsky Dynamite Works for the whole of the Donetz coal industry. Details of this operation can be found in L. Ryssin's article «Commercialisation» in the «E. J.» (9.12.22).

3) See «Social Treason», «Rus. Econ.», p. 1182.

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Regulation of Grain Prces, which was attached to the Plenipotentiary of the Council of Labour and Defence [1]). This practically meant the creation of an apparatus aimed at keeping grain prices down by means of an agreement between Government purchasing organisations, of a deliberate extension or restriction of credits by the State Bank for purchases of grain and, finally, by the actual monopoly of internal trade [2]).

On the other hand, since August, 1922, the syndicates and trusts of the Communist nationalised industry have begun to raise the prices of industrial products, having recourse, as A. Kaktyn cautiously puts it, « to some abuse of the monopoly enjoyed in the market by our large industries». [3])

What were the practical results of this policy, as far as they can be expressed in figures? Grain prices have been brought down to a tremendous extent. At the All-Russian Food Supply Conference, in giving account of the difficulties with which the «Khliebproduct» is faced in its operations, Prigojin stated that «in September, a pood of grain cost 1.05 gold roubles, while in December the price fell to 41 copecks». (E.J. 6.3.23). At the same time, the prices of industrial products have risen to such an extent that, in terms of merchandise, the grain sold by the peasants was still cheaper than it was in gold. « Before the war, says G. Kroomin, [4]) an arshine of printed calico was exchanging for 5,5 Rus. lbrs of rye flour ; on January 1st, 1922, it was worth 8.8 Rus. lbrs of flour ; in October, 1922 —9.4 lbrs ; on December 1st, 1922 — 13,5 lbrs ; on Dec. 15th 1922 — 15 lbrs ; on January 1st 1923 — 17 to 18 lbrs... As to salt, before the war, a pound, of it was equivalent to 0.4 lbrs of rye flour ; on October, 1st 1922, to 0,7 lbrs ; on December 1st, 1922 — to 0,9 lbrs ; on January 1st, 1923, it reached already 1,2 lbrs... A similar movement is in progress in all branches of industrial production».

No less interesting is the following table, given by J. Yakovleff [5]), in which are shown the present (spring of 1923) values of a series of industrial products in terms of grain, as compared with those of the pre-Communist period:

Description of goods:	Present values in terms of grain	Pre-war values:	
		In money	In grain
Printed calico, 1 arsh.	1 pood 10 lbrs	14 cop.	8 lbrs.
Salt, 1 pood	3 poods	35 »	20 »
Pig iron, 1 pood	15 »	1 r. 60 cop.	2 p. 11 lbrs.
Kerosene, 1 pood	6 » 20 lbrs	1 r. 40 cop.	2 p. —
Herrings, 1 pood	10 » —	2 r. 25 cop.	2 p. 10 lbrs.
Nails, small, 1 pood.	7 » —	2 r. 25 cop.	3 p. 9 lbrs.
Iron, piece and tire, 1 pood	4 » 20 lbrs	2 r. —	2 p. 34 lbrs

Under the capitalist régime grain prices also usually tended to come down during the period when the harvest was brought to the market, as com-

1) The Conference met in September, 1922; see details in «Rus. Econ.», p. 2974.

2) I am inclined to think that the Communist Government, in its official statistics, did deliberately exaggerate the yield of crops in 1922 by 650 to 850 million poods (see «Rus. Econ.», p. 2596); this it did not only to create a good impression at The Hague, but mainly to bring about a depression in the home market at the time of the realisation of surpluses.

3) See A. Kaktyn: «The Results and the Prospects of the N. E. P.», («Ec. J.» 23. 2. 23.).

4) «Ec. J.» (9. 2. 23).

5) «Pravda» (30. 3. 23.).

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pared with other seasons, but the decline was practically negligible in comparison with the present fall, in terms of other articles of personal consumption, amounting to 3-6 times, and in those of the most essential requisites of production (nails, iron etc.), reaching 1.5 to 2 times.

Such a robbery of the peasant population in favour of the Communistic nationalised industry is rendered possible only by the systematical carrying out by the Government of its «cornering» policy.

The way in which this «corner» was gradually tightening up the noose around the neck of the Russian peasantry, is clearly shown in the diagram of the movement of retail prices, given by G. Kroomin (E.J. 9.2. 23). The diagram represents the total index numbers of prices, alongside with separate indices for agricultural and industrial products for the period from Jan 1st., 1922 to Jan. 1st, 1923. In this diagram (№ 1), up to the middle of July, the curve of prices of agricultural produce (I) rises at a slightly faster rate than that for industrial products (III). Beginning from August, on the contrary, the curve (III) shows a very steep rise, as compared with the curve (I), which it leaves very far behind.

Saying that «such a relation between the prices of the products of the two essential branches of the national economy, viz. of industry and farming, is gradually assuming dangerous forms, from the economic point of view», Kroomin makes a timid and rather laughable attempt to conceal the real causes of these development by pointing to the failure of crops in 1921 and to the peasants' tendency, from May, 1922, to throw their stocks of grain on the market, relying on the new crops. In other words, he tried to explain the situation away by pointing to the fall in grain prices as resulting from the conditions of supply and demand under free trade.

We understand very well, however, that the real cause of this phenomenon was not in this, but in the «cornering» policy of the Communist Government with regard to the peasatry, which found its expression in the two measures already referred to, viz. 1) in the creation of the Committee for the regulation of grain prices and, 2) in the raising of the prices of the products of the nationalised Communist industries. The «corner», however, as we will show later, has proved a failure. This fact is one of enormous importance for the future of Russia. Had it been a success, Lenin would have been able to create the industrial apparatus required out of Communists of the «business man» variety, technical experts, N.E.P. — men and skilled workers [1]). This apparatus would become an obedient tool of the Communist Party, which has converted all Russia's national resources into its party funds. It would be bound to be obedeint to its actual masters — the Communists of the «politician» type—because the heads of trusts or syndicates would not be owners of the concerns controlled by them; on its masters' orders, it would do its best to squeeze the last penny out of the peasants.

Thus, the Communist dictatorship over Russia would have been provided with the necessary resources for its maintenance, and the Communist Government would be able to prolong its rule for an indefinite period.

It is worth mentioning that, from the outset, when first invented, «cornering» was carried in a very resolute manner, causing the differences in pri-

1) Lenin's attempt to create a similar apparatus out of the Glavki and Centres during the period of militant Communism and of the single socialistic economic plan, as the reader is aware, had proved a failure.

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

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ces before and after the formation of a «corner» to be excessively great ; accordingly, the game was very difficult and involved great risks. In those lands where the «cornering» trick has originated, in capitalist markets and exchanges, it was very seldom successful, because the «cornering» groups, as soon as their activities began to affect the interests of the consumers, were meeting with the resistance of the governments, responsible to the electors, and of the laws of the country, which took up the defence of the community. This is why the «cornering» practice, in the case of democratic capitalist countries, has very soon been reduced to the dimensions of a relatively modest speculation, which does not cause any particular trouble not only in the national economy of the country concerned, but even in the stock or produce exchanges. In Russia, under the Communist régime, the Government, in carrying out its «cornering» policy, does not meet with any opposition of this kind : it is simply doing what it thinks fit, without the population being able to defend its interests by means of the exercice of democratic electoral laws. At the same time, however, there exist another method of resistance on the part of the population, which is very little known to the capitalist world : the consumers (in our case — the peasantry), on being driven into a «corner», have lost practically the whole of their pruchasing capacity.

This latter fact has played a decisive rôle in the breaking of the «corner» and in the present collapse of the whole structure of the N.E.P. In its substance, every «corner», whether capitalistic or communistic, is, to a greater or lesser extent, a kind of expropriation. The first essential of a successful expropriation, or of any expropriation that is worth carrying out, is the existence in the possession of those against whom it is directed, of more or less considerable funds ; the peasantry now possesses nothing at all.

Beside this principal cause, the breakdown of the N.E.P. was also due to two other important causes. The unsound principles and administration of the Communist nationalised industry under the régime of the N.E.P., on the one hand, and the unreasonable greediness shown by the Communist Government in the taxation of the concerns created under that régime, have struck the last fatal blow on the N.E.P.

CH. II. THE BALANCE OF THE EXCHANGE BETWEEN FARMING AND INDUSTRY DURING THE PERIOD OF THE N.E.P.

Let us now see, how much was the Communist Government able actually to extort from the peasantry by means of the «cornering» policy carried out by the nationalised industries. The tremendous fall in the purchasing capacity of the agricultural population, as compared with the pre - Communist period, has first become evident in the early spring of 1922. It was the unavoidable result of the decline in the income derived from agricultural production. What have been the results of this decline ? We would remind the reader, that the former Head of the C. Stat. Office, Popoff, [1]) estimated the value of industrial goods which the peasantry was able to purchase in 1920 at 335 million gold roubles ; in 1921 — at 200 millions. For 1922 the figure is put at 356 millions [2]). During the pre - Communist period, in 1912, it was estimated

1) «Rus. Econ.», p.

2) 9 p. cent. of the total income derived from agriculture in 1922 (3.955 mil. gold roubles). See art. by Popoff «The Industries of the R. S. F. S. R. in 1912-1922 and the economic connections between industry and agriculture» in the collection of articles «Na Novykh Pootiakh», quoted from the «Ec. J.» (23. 2. 23).

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at 2.000 millions, thus being about six times greater than the estimate for 1922.

More than once I have had the occasion to point to Popoff's official optimism. Judging by what we read in the Communist Press concerning the purchasing capacity of the village population of separate regions, we are bound to assume that the total purchasing capacity of the Russian countryside in 1922 should, probably, be put at a lower figure than the 356 millions at which it is estimated by Popoff. Thus, the paper «Petrogradskaia Pravda» (10.3.23) quotes the following example of the conditions of peasant farming in the district of Rybinsk. It describes a peasant family, consisting of 4 adults and 5 childern ; the holding is 9 dessiatins; the live stock — 1 horses, 3 cows, 1 heifer and 3 sheep ; the quantity of grain collected — 70 poods of rye and 40 poods of oats, barley and wheat. The taxes paid by the family are : 34,5 poods in food tax; 11 roubles 50 cop. in local land taxes; 15 roubles in household tax; citizens' tax (2 roubles from the head of the household and one rouble each member of the family) — 10 roubles. The total paid in taxes thus amounts to 390 roubles 50 cop., or to the equivalent of 39 poods of rye. The paper comes to the following conclusion: «The normal consumption of the family should be 81 poods (9x9) but, taking into account potatoes and other farming produce consumed by a peasant family, we will reduce the norm to 5 poods per head, i.e. to a total of 45 poods. By adding to it 20 poods required for autumn and spring sowing we will obtain a «surplus» of 6 poods. Such a surplus is absolutely insufficient for trading purposes, and the peasant can only rely on his live stock and on what he can earn by work outside his farm. He could possibly sell one sheep. Further he could not possibly go without direct injury to his farming».

In the province of Tomsk the local Agricultural Department (the local organisation of the Commissariat of Agriculture) has made an inquiry into the yield of peasant farms in 1922 and has reached the conclusion that the net income of the peasant farmer has decreased by three times, as compared with 1917, and is insufficient to meet even the «essential needs of the peasant families.» («E. J.» 14.3. 23).

Now, let us return to the question of how much the Communist Governement was able to take from agriculture in exchange for industrial products.

In estimating this figure, A. Kaktyn («E. J.» 23.2. 23), in agreement with Popoff, to the 356 millions roubles available to the peasants for the purchase of industrial products, adds 330 million gold roubles collected from the peasantry in the form of food tax. Thus, out of a total of 3.955 million gold roubles, representing the aggregate value of agricultural production in 1922, 686 millions are being handed over to the industry. The latter figure, thus, represents the utmost limit of the purchasing capacity of the countryside.

The addition of 330 millions collected in food tax appears, at first sight, to be a rather arbitrary proceeding. The meaning of the opertation becomes somewhat clearer if we consider the results of the investigations carried out by the Committee of the Council of Labour and Defence, appointed to report on the indebtedness of the trusts to the Treasury for the period of the N.E.P. («E. J.» 3.3. 23). In the report, i.a., we read: « The indebtedness of the trusts and other State-owned concerns in the whole of Russia, which have been granted loans by the Treasury and have not yet repaid them, according to preliminary computations, amounts to 3000 million gold roubles. The number of concerns indebted is 600. The Exchange Department of the People's

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Commissariat of Finance expects, in the course of the current year, to obtain about 20 million gold roubles in repayment of the advances made by it.»

It is quite possible that the practical impossibility ever to recover the advances made which, instead of the restoration of fixed capital, have been expended in current production and have not been written off before, as well as the fact that some other expenses of the industry have also been met out of the Treasury's funds, without having been included in the cost of the goods produced in 1922, have compelled Popoff and, later, A. Kaktyn, to debit the Communist industry for the goods sold by it to the peasants not only what the latter have actually paid for them, but what they have paid to the State in food tax as well.

Thus, by a rather curious expedient of throwing together the receipts from the Treasury and those from actual trading, Popoff and Kaktyn are conventionally raising the purchasing capacity of the agricultural population to the figure of 686 million gold roubles.

Beside, we should bear in mind one very important consideration. The figure, calculated with such patent exaggerations, besides being, nevertheless, very small and absolutely inadequate to ensure the disposal of industrial products at their present prices, as this will be shown later, is extremely unstable, even in the immediate future. Its size and, with it, the fate of the whole of industrial production, is entirely dependent on the rainfall. The comparatively good crops of 1922 were entirely due to rainfall. The yield of crops in 1922 exceeded that of 1920, which, according to the standards of farming under the Communist régime, should be regarded as an average yield, by 700 million poods. Deducting this extra yield of 1922, estimated at current prices at 350 million gold roubles, we find that the purchasing capacity of the countryside is reduced to practically nothing.

This, however, is a problem of the dynamics of the purchasing capacity and of economic conditions of a more or less distant future. Now, let us return to the study of its statics and to our present balance. How much did the industry produce in 1922 and what was the amount of goods it had to dispose of ? P. Popoff and A. Kaktyn give the following figures («E. J.» 23.2. 23) : large and average-sized concerns, of which the majority belong to the nationalised Communistic industries, in 1922, have produced 705 mil. gold roubles worth of goods ; the production of small concerns and of the village home industries, both of which are entirely under private control, was estimated at 395 million gold roubles, the total thus amounting to 1.100 million gold roubles.

These figures tend clearly to show that, at current prices, the balance which cannot be disposed of, according to Popoff, amounts to 1.100 — 686 = = 414 mil. gold roubles' worth ; in my opinion, it is larger still.

How are these 414 million gold roubles, worth of unsold products distributed between the nationalised Communistic industries and the small private entreprises ? A priori, we can safely assume that the percentage is higher in the former than in the latter [1]).

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1) A. Kaktyn («E. J.» 23. 2. 23) says that «the share of agricultural produce that falls to the lot of small handicraft and home industries, which, in the course of the last year, had grown at a much faster rate than the production of the large and average-sized concerns, has increased to over 50 p. cent. of its pre-war figures».

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Such is the balance of exchange. Even taken alone, this tends to prove that the «corner» has failed. The nationalised industry is faced with a worse catastrophe than that in which it was involved before the inauguration of the N.E.P. The disposal of the crops by the peasants in 1922 has only helped, for some time, to suspend the crisis which has begun in the spring of that year. Since the early winter of 1922, the crisis has resumed its course and has reached its height in the spring of 1923. Neither the N.E.P.., nor any «corners» can help in this crisis. The only way to remove it is that of restoring the balance of exchange. The latter, however, can be restored only by one of the following two means : either by the re - establishment of agricultural production and the raising of industrial output to their pre-war standards, or by a more or less speedy *déclassement* and dying-out of industrial and town population to a level at which its numbers would correspond to the needs of the industry adapted to the standards of to-day's purchasing capacity of the peasants.

The crisis affects both the «heavy» and the «light» industries. Beginning from the branches of industry producing articles of personal consumption and other necessaries, it has gradually passed on to other branches, connected with the former, but not directly working for the countryside. Thus, it has developed into a general crisis, involving the whole of the Russian market.

The character of the crisis is well illustrated by an inquiry made by the S.C. N.E. in the conditions of the market. It contains the following information concerning various branches of industry.

Matches. «Beginning from January, 1923, there were growing difficulties in the disposal of the output, which continued in February and up to the present. The supply continually exceeded the demand ». (E.J. 6.3. 23.).

Makhorka (coarse tobacco) : «The Makhorka Syndicate is meeting difficulties in the disposal of its products, which are especially marked since January last. The explanation is that, though the output of factory-made makhorka is considerably lower than the requirements, the fall in the purchasing capacity of the population and the consumption of cheap home-made makhorka, on which no excise duties are paid, has produced a decline in the demand for good factory-made grades of the product ». (E.J. 9.3. 23).

Sievero-patoka (Northern Treacle Syndicate) : «The difficulties met with in the disposal of the output in November, January and February are confirmed. They have mainly affected dry starch, treacle and chemical products ». (E.J. 9.3. 23).

Leather Industry: «The Leather Syndicate states that it was meeting with difficulties in the disposal of its output, and particularly, in that of leather foot-wear, since October last. These difficulties are still continuing, especially in so far as civilian foot-wear and harness are concerned. The demand for these articles has been abnormally reduced by the lack of money in the hands of the population ».

Chemical industry : «The Bondiujsky works state that difficulties in the disposal of the products are, of late, particulary marked with regard to chromium salts, such as alums of chromic calium, and chromic natrium, mainly used in the leather industry, which is, apparently, reducing its activities owing to the lack of raw materials».

Pottery and bricks. «The Borovitchsky Combine states that, in September and October, the concerns at work were: two fire-proof bricks works, the branch of acid-resisting ware and the clay quarries. The Combine was experiencing difficulties in the disposal of its products since December, when the

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railways, the heavy industry, armament works, the naval department, the textile and chemical industries have either reduced their orders or even discontinued them altogether, owing to the shortage of funds ». «The extent of the difficulties is shown by the fact that the actual requirements in fire-proof bricks are about three times greater than the quantities that the industries and railways are able to pay for ». (E.J. 3.3. 23).

Coloured metals. «As far as the copper industry is concerned, the market for its product mainly depends on the demand on the part of the small artisans («koustari») ; the development of the work of the latter is, however, proceeding very slowly. The *samovar* factories of Tula, which are the principal consumers of copper, are idle. Beside, the disposal of the product is rendered difficult by the fact that market prices for copper are very low. Owing to the existence of old stocks and to the sales by Government institutions of considerable quantities of various metal scrap, combined with the smallness of demand, the prices of metal have fallen to a quite extraordinary extent. The free market is making use of the metal by working it in concerns leased by private individuals, thus making it impossible (for the nationalised industry—M.B.) to sell the products at prices that would cover the cost of production. The ratio of market prices to reasonable cost prices is as low as 1:6». (E.J. 9.3.23.)

«Electrosteel». «Even the «Electrosteel» works, producing special and tool steel, which is practically the only concern of its kind in Russia, is meeting with difficulties in the disposal of its products. Indeed, these difficulties were mainly experienced in October. Now they appear to be over, which is only natural, seeing that the production is very limited. Even here, however, the supply exceeds the demand». (E.J.6.3.23.)

Rubber. «In the last quarter of 1922, the greatest difficulties were met with in the disposal of goloshes, pneumatics and technical appliances... The turnover of the Rubber Trust, calculated in gold or «merchandise» roubles, has been steadily declining». (E.J.6.3.23.)

To these few examples we will confine our illustration of the fall in the capacity of the market. They could be extended to practically all branches of production, because the metal, the textile, the sugar and even the salt industries are all experiencing great difficulties in the disposal of their products. The consumer has, indeed, been driven into a corner, but this has proved to be absolutely useless, because he has been found to be pennyless.

CH. III. THE GENERAL CONDITION OF THE INDUSTRIES.

The «corner» has failed not only because those, against whom it was directed by the Communist Government, i.e. the peasants, have proved to be insolvent, but also because the Communistic Nationalised Industry, through which the operation had to be carried, has proved economically too weak to cope with the task.

Was the nationalised industry really so weak during the period of the N.E.P.?

In the first instance,we should point that, externally, in 1922, it appeared to have been in a flourishing condition. Its output in 1922 was higher and, in some cases, even considerably higher, than in 1921.

The Output. The fact that trained experts have been invited to work

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in the newly formed trusts; the influence again enjoyed by them in the industry; the re-organisation of concerns on commercial lines; the modicum of independence of managers under the N.E.P., which they did not possess under the control of the «Glavki»; better remuneration—all these factors have helped to raise the spirit of the personnel and have brought about a considerable improvement in the technical and commercial sides of business. The latter has often created a tendency to raise the production. In some cases this tendency has resulted in a real increase of output. From the moral and psychological point of view, this increase is a very important constructive factor. From the material point of view, however, the increase of production in the course of 1922 has no really serious importance, because the successes achieved, 1) are quantitatively unsignificant and even negligible, as compared with pre-Communist standards and, 2) are extremely unstable, in so far as the future is concerned. These successes have no really solid basis and are easily destroyed.

As far as the industry, as a whole, is concerned, we may accept the following general propositions, applying to all its branches: 1) That the output in 1922 has been somewhat and, in certain cases, even considerably higher, than that of 1921; 2) The output for the second half of 1922 is either equal to that of the first half or even smaller; 3) In some branches of production (e.g. in the coal industry) the decline in the output for the second half of 1922 is so great that it is not only lower than the output of the second half of 1921, but actually approaches the figures of the worst period of the Communist régime, i.e. the second half of 1919; finally, 4) The output of the industries engaged in the production of goods for personal consumption is higher than that of the branches producing implements of production or other necessaries for the carrying of economic activities.

These propositions are entirely corroborated by the data contained in the article «The Communist Industry in 1922», in the present number of this Journal.

The greatest increase in the output, among all branches of production, as compared with the preceding years of the Communist régime, has been achieved in the sugar industry. The output of sugar was as follows (in million poods): 1922 — 12,5; 1921 — 3,6; 1920 — 5,4; 1919 — 4,7. The output for 1922, amounting to 12,5 million poods, is very large, as compared with that for 1921; but, compared to the pre-war figures, it is very small, amounting to only 13 p. cent. of the latter. In the following we are going to show how bad the position of the sugar industry actually is, in spite of the improvement achieved in 1922.

Next comes the textile industry, which is being separately dealt with in this number of the Journal.

These two branches of production, under the present economic conditions of Russia, are the principal ones among those supplying goods for immediate consumption. Both the output and the demand in their case are the largest.

In going over to the examination of the branches of industry producing goods for industrial consumption, we see that the increase in their output, as a rule, is very much smaller than in the branches supplying articles for immediate consumption. In the first instance, this is marked in the coal industry, details of which will be given later. As to the metallurgical and the metal working industries, their position is made clear by an inquiry into the con-

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dition of the Southern concerns carried out in February and early March last, whose results were given by the Head of the Chief metal Department P.J. Soudakoff in the «Econ. Jizn» (7.3.23.).

Petrovsky works: One blast furnace and a few rolling plants are working. The Martin furnace was idle at the time of the Commission's visit, because snowstorms have prevented gas coke from being brought to the works in time. It was lighted again two days after the Commission has left. As to the continuation of the work at the Petrovsky works, Soudakoff thinks that this would be difficult, «especially taking into account the wear of the engines», The pits of the Petrovsky mines are in a satisfactory condition, but in them. as everywhere in the South, there is a great shortage of skilled hewers, especially as compared with the number of other categories of workers.

The Makeevsky works were visited by the Commission at a time when they were being closed and put into a «state of conservation». Only two of their auxiliary workshops are actually working. Beside, work is being done there in connection with the installation of a gas generating set, from which the current is to be supplied to the mines, in view of easying the work of a number of worn-out steam engines. As to the Makeevsky pipe-casting works, it is going under full pressure.

At the *Yuzovsky works* only one blast furnace and the roof-iron plant are working. In the course of March the rail-rolling plant is expected to be set to work on an order for the Commissariat of Communications. The work will be started on the available stock of castings, while later it is hoped to start two Marten furnaces. At the *Mariupol works* one Marten furnace, two sheet-rolling plants — one large and one small — and the pipe section, making pipes for the naphtha industry, are working. The section making pipes welded by gas is in course of being started at an early date.

The *Briansky works*. The piece goods, wire and roof-iron plants are working. The condition of the concern is satisfactory. The blast furnace can be re-started only when sufficient stocks of fuel are accumulated.

At *Chaudoir A.*, two Marten furnaces burning oil fuel, and the pipe-rolling plant are working.

The *Gantke* is working on the production of nails, bolts, nuts and telegraph wire. It works at 60 p. cent. of its pre-war capacity.

At the *Dnieprovsky works* one Marten furnace and one small rolling plant are working.

The *Kharkov Locomotive-building* works are doing satisfactorily on the production of new and the repair of old locomotives. This gives an idea of the activities of those Southern works which, up to the present, have not been closed down and put in a «state of conservation» and, under the N.E.P., are still carrying on to some extent.

A general idea of the productivity of the various branches of the industry in 1922, as compared with 1921, 1920 and pre-Communist days, can be obtained from the following table, compiled by P.I. Popoff («Na Novykh Pootiakh», E.J. 31.3.23.) (see also diagr. № 2) :

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Branches of production	The value of the output at pre-war prices in p. cent. of the value of the output of the respect. branch.in 1912		
	1920	1921	1922*)
Working of minerals	16.7	26.8	24.6
Mining and allied industries	33.0	29.7	36.3
Refinement of naphtha	16.6	35.8	39.2
Metal industry	6.1	9.0	7.3
Wood-working industry	11.6	11.6	13.4
Chemical industry	20.8	28.6	30.4
Articles of food	12.3	12.7	11.0
Leather industry	113.4	95.6	99.0
Cotton »	6.6	7.5	15.4
Woollen »	35.9	34.0	55.0
Silk »	2.2	3.1	9.3
Linen »	35.1	29.3	72.7
Hemp etc. »	32.7	24.1	15.4
Paper »	24.1	18.9	17.9
Total	15.0 p.c.	17.0 p.cen.	20.3 p.cen.
Absolute aggregate figures of the value of the output of these 14 branches of production	473 mil.gol. roubles	535 mil.gol. roubles	641 m. g. rs

In 1912 the value of the output of the some 14 groups of industries amounted to 3.151 million gold roubles.

*) Estimated percentages.

The lack of stability in the conditions of Industry. The rise in the output is only creating a superficial impression of increasing prosperity. As a matter of fact, the condition of industry is very bad, owing to the utter lack of stability. A proof of this instability is the steady fall in the stocks of raw materials, which the N.E.P. has been unable to stay, combined with the lack of any improvement in,or even an actual depletion of,the stocks of finished goods. The first open acknowledgement of this fact, i.e. of the failure of the N.E.P. to make industrial production positive, instead of negative, as it was before, was made by A. Rykoff already in October, 1922 [1]).

We should also point to another highly important feature of the position which has recently come to light not through the Communist Press, but from persons having recently visited Russia.

The first steps of the N.E.P. were accompanied and facilitated by the appearance in the market of capital which was hitherto lying idle at the disposal of the Glavki. The more we study the Russian national economy, the more we are impressed by the enormous vitality of that huge body, and the greater is our legitimate pride in its hidden powers. There always is some «last penny», which manages to survive even the Communist robbery. At the time of wholesale nationalisation in 1918, the Communist Government has closed and sealed most, if not the whole, of the warehouses with their contents. Not all, however, even of those stocks which were duly sealed and guarded by soldiers, were known to the central institutions controlling the industry. In many cases it has even been forgotten, what authority had been responsible for the requisition of the stocks and who is entitled to use them. At the time when

1) See, «The Communistic v. the Capitalistic International», «R. Ec.» № 7-8.

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the industry was under the control of central institutions, neither the technical personnel, nor any one of those concerned, had any desire to remind the authorities of the existence of these hidden riches. When, however, the N.E.P. has placed these individuals at the head of trusts, etc., all these «invisible» stocks have been brought to light and included in the capital of the respective concerns. From the outset of the N.E.P., the revival of industry was to a very great extent due to the influx of new capital in the form of these hitherto «invisible» goods.

When Rykoff was speaking of the squanderig of the capital of the industry, he naturally meant not only the part of that capital directly received by the newly organised concerns from Government institutions, but the hitherto «invisible» capital newly brought into the industry, as well.

Thus, the increase in the output, the improvement in the conditions of the personnel, of N.E.P. — men and of the population of the towns — all, in a word, that has resulted from the N.E.P. — was achieved, in fact, at the expense of the final exhaustion of the old stocks of raw materials and finished goods. As a result, by, approximately, the middle of 1923, in a number of industries the old stocks, inherited from the former capitalist régime and either sequestrated or taken over at fixed prices by the Government during the period of militant Communism, are bound to be completely exhausted. Raw materials thus obtained have cost very little. About the use made of them by the N.E.P., A. Kaktyn says («E.J.» 31.3.23.): «The raw and some of the auxiliary materials, obtained by the concerns from old stocks, were valued by them in their calculations at pre-war prices or at prices at which they were taken over during the period of militant Communism, which, on the one hand, were very low and, on the other, were often the result of pure guess-work, because the goods were not actually bought, but either collected by assessment or obtained by direct barter. This fact is responsible for a considerable margin of error in the calculation of costs, which are thus evidently minimised».

If even goods produced from these extremely cheap materials cannot find a market in Russia at present, the carrying of further production on expensive imported raw materials or on those bought in Russia in the free market is clearly impossible, both commercially and politically.

Such are the material and the psychological causes of the instability of the industry under the N.E.P. We will briefly deal with the psychological causes.

The resources of the industry under the N.E.P. are daily dwindling. What is the psychological influence of this fact? The realisation of its utter helplessness in this domain, and of the imminent complete exhaustion of these resources, have a depressing influence on the Communist Government which is losing its head and cannot find a way out of the impasse. Any slight improvement in the agonizing nationalised industry makes the Communist Chiefs more arrogant and increases their innate tendency to lie. The return to gloomy realities, by which these mirages are always sooner or later dispelled, again makes the Communist Government subservient and solicitous.

No understanding between the Government and the towns, on the one hand, ant the peasants, on the other, has thus been reached.

The town, making a living out of the N.E.P. and out of service under the Communist Government, is like a fortress completely isolated from the outside world, in which the available supplies of water and food are daily dwindling. To say exactly for how long these supplies may be expected to last, on the basis of the information contained in official accounts, we would, na-

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turally, be unable. The actual position, in so far as the old stocks of raw materials are concerned, is, probably, much worse than official Communist publications admit it to be. It is perfectly natural for any commander of a besieged fortress to hide from its inhabitants the real condition of its food and water supplies. But the anxiety about to-morrow is growing in Communist Government circles and is gradually spreading to the N.E.P.-men and, through them, to the whole population of the towns.

We thus see that the line of «beaters» in the N.E.P.'s cornening campaign against the peasant is not very thick and strong; it can be broken through at any point.

CH. IV. WHAT CAUSES THE INDUSTRY TO WORK AT A LOSS.

What caused the industry under the N.E.P. to work at a loss; what made it so uneconomical and its position so utterly insecure? Here we are going to dwell only on a few principal causes.

The shortage of capital at the disposal of the Communist Government, for the restoration of the material basis of industrial and agricultural production is one of the fundamental causes of this position. The lack of capital is shadowing and compromising every endeavour of the Communist rulers. To borrow they are absolutely unable, because they enjoy no credit whatever, either abroad or in Russia. The shortage of capital is not equally acute in all branches of production.

In some branches, in spite of the reduction in orders and in output, the equipment has to be maintained and repaired. Such is the case with the railways, because rails, sleepers etc. have got to be replaced and maintained, practically without regard to the density of traffic. In this and similar cases the lack of capital for reconstruction is evident to anyone. It is perfectly clear to all that in the first instance, it results here in the growth of various extra expenditure, usually accompanying the conduct of a disorganised enterprise and ultimately brings about a final catastrophe, i. e. a complete cessation of work. *This final collapse is only a question of time.*

In other branches in which it is possible to work only some of the concerns, thus adapting the output to the existing demand, as this is the case, e.g., with textile factories, the «contraction» of industrial production and the «stripping» of idle concerns, so widely practised under the N.E.P., are able, for some time at least, to conceal from the public's eye the fatal consequences for these industries of the lack of capital and of credits at the disposal of the Communist Government. The concerns that are actually working appear to be well provided with orders and are under the illusion that the fact that other concerns belonging to the same branch of industry are idle has no influence whatever on the cost of their own products. This illusion, however, is very soon dispelled, because, over and above their usual overhead charges, the working concerns have to bear the expenditure involved in the maintenance of the idle works in a «state of conservation». Meanwhile, owing to the fall in the yield of agricultural production and to the consequent decline in the purchasing capacity of the countryside, the number of idle concerns is continually growing. Farming, however, cannot be restored to any considerable extent without the investment in it of fresh capital from outside.

In any case, as far as the actual efficiency of production is concerned, the position of both these groups of concerns is equally bad. Owing to the lack of capital and to the insufficiency of orders, overhead charges are gro-

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wing in both groups [1]). Their costs, as compared with pre-Communist days, have very much increased.

The apparatus in control of the industry. Overhead charges have increased to such an extent that it would be a mistake to look for the causes of their rise only to the lack of credit for the restoration and improvement of the equipment. The increase in the costs is made clear by the study of the following table compiled by A. Kaktyn («E.J.» 31.3.23) and showing the percentage distribution of the costs of a number of products among the various elements of expenditure:

Description of products	1913			1922		
	Materials and fuel	Labour	Overhead charges	Materials and fuel	Labour	Overhead charges
1 pair goloshes («Krasny Treougolnik» Factory)	78.0	5.0	17.0	39.0	4.0	57.0
1.000 cigarettes (State Tobacco F-ry, form. Laferm), without excise duties	71.0	19.0	10.0	58.0	20.0	22.0
Cloth for uniforms («Mossoukno»)	80.1	7.4	12.5	60.7	11.1	28.2
1 pood of sole leather at the Kiev Contract Fair	86.7	4.2	9.1	64.5	6.2	29.3
1 pood of coal in the Donetz basin	23.4	44.5	32.2	28.7	32.2	39.1
1 pood of slack pig iron at the Tashinsky Works	71.1	7.6	21.3	63.9	5.2	36.9

The growth of overhead charges was thus not only absolute, along with that of prices, but also relative, at the expense of other elements of the costs — viz. materials and labour.

Beside the causes mentioned above, high overhead charges are also due to two other causes, viz., 1) to the fact that the apparatus in control of the industry is commercially inefficient and, 2) to the heavy burden of taxes. As to the first of these two causes, A. Kaktyn says («E.J.» 23.2.23): «Our syndicates and trusts are too much inclined to raise prices far beyond the rise in the total index; by so doing, they try to conceal their unavoidable defects, both «objective» and «subjective», such as the defects of organisation, excessive staffs and superstructures, a bureaucratic, rather than commercial, centralisation of control, reminding one of the Glavks, high overhead charges, etc., etc.»

1) The rise in costs, due to the decrease in the intensity of work, is clearly evident, e. g., in the case of the coal industry of the Donetz basin. Below is given a table borrowed from an article by A.Kaktyn («Ec. J.» 1. 4. 23):

Mines	Intensity of work in 1922, in p. cent. of 1913.	Cost of coal per 1 pood in copecks
Bakovsky (p. c. of 1914 and 1915)	49	11.7
Paramonovsky	39	15.1
Golubovsky	26	11.4
Routchenkovsky	22	14.3
Stcherbinovsky	21	15.0
Briansky	14	19.6
Gorlovsky	11	23.4
Kaznevsky	10	27.1
Ekaterininsky	2	56.2

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According to Svidersky, the Chairman of the Commission of the Council of Labour and Defence appointed to inquire into the costs of production («E.J.» 31.3.23.): «The high rate of overhead charges in the industry is due to the height of its expenses on the purchase of raw materials, their packing, examination and warehousing... to the uneffective use of power installations and steam engines... and, particularly, to the payment of commissions».

The controlling apparatus is, evidently, inefficient from the business point of view. To what is this inefficiency due? Is it due to the lack of business capacities or of training in the personnel? To a certain extent, yes. To obtain an idea about this, the reader would be well advised to peruse the article on the social composition of the controlling bodies of the Communist industry in the present issue of this Journal. The principal cause, however, is not in the qualifications of the personnel, but in the conditions under which it has to manage the industry. Inadequate training of the personnel can well help to account for the height of overhead charges, for leakage, cost of inspection and warehousing, uneffective use of plants, etc. But not only «inadequate training», but even a low level of honesty of the personnel are entirely insufficient to account for excessive over-staffing, bureaucratic centralisation of management and, especially, an absolutely unheard-of expenditure on «commissions».

In other cases, the Communist Press treats these «commissions» plainly as «bribes», which, through the intermediary of commission agents, are taken by many among the administration of the trusts not only from private merchants, but from other trusts as well.

Bribery on such a scale has had no precedent in the private industry of either Russia or any other country. It happens, indeed, that in a somewhat carelessly managed concern some individual member of the staff is taking bribes. This, however, is an exception, while in the Communistic industry under the N.E.P. it is rather the rule. The best among the heads and the directors of the concerns are, apparently, absolutely powerless to cope with this evil. It is clear that the fault is not with the personnel, but rather with something that is essentially wrong in the whole system, viz. in the legal basis on which the managing apparatus stands with regard to the industry controlled by it. That apparatus does not own the concerns at the head of which it is placed, as this is more or less generally the case in a capitalist society, in which, being owner, it is directly concerned not only with the present of the industry, but with its future as well. It is rather in the position of a subordinate agent of a bankrupt owner, having no real interest in the job, and only appointed by the grace of the Communist dictators.

Then, the head or the manager of such a concern, in the depth of his soul, utterly despises the Communist authority and does not believe in either its stability or its future. Accordingly, the best, really heroic elements, the «rightfull men» among the administrative personnel spare no efforts to preserve or to make all in their power for the sake of future non-Communist Russia, while the average men among the industrial administration are taking out of the industry all they can lay their hands upon [1]).

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1) The managing apparatus consists of : 1) former directors and other higher personnel, who used to stand at the head of concerns before the Communist period. These men have more or less preserved the spirit of capitalist industrial discipline and, what is particularly important, their love to their job. In so far as

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All this results in the industry being managed in an unbusiness — like way and in its working at a loss.

The burden of taxation. P.I. Popoff («*Na Novykh Pootiakh*», see, *E. J.* 23.2.23.) gives an approximate estimate of the changes in the amount of national income derived from agriculture and industry during the last three years, which he compares with the figure for 1912. The latter figure he bases on Prof. S.N. Prokopovitch's estimate, which he reduces in accordance with the changes in the territory having taken place within the intervening period.

	1912	1920	1921	1922
	In 1.000.000 gold roubles			
Aggregate value of the production of farming and industry	10.568	5.681(1)	5.178	5.055
Out of which, separately:				
a) Farming	6.117	4.970(1)	4.633	3.955
b) Industry (including handicraft and village industries)	4.451	711	845	1.100
c) Large and average-sized concerns only	3.721	518	585	705
d) Handicraft and village industries only	730	193	260	395

1) The figure 4.970 was not given by Popoff. It was approximately estimated from that for 1921, the latter being multiplied by the ratio 1738/1638, i. e. by the ratio of the gross yields of crops in 1920 and 1921. The figure of aggregate value of production in 1920, i. e. 5.681 is based on the amount 4.970, arrived at as a result of this calculation.

The figures for the period 1920 to 1922 are, evidently, very much exaggerated by Popoff. Thus, for instance, the income from farming in 1921, at 1912 prices, according to our own calculations, could hardly have exceeded 2.800 million gold roubles (45 p. cent. of 6.117 millions) 1).

By means of this optimistic exaggeration Popoff is, apparently, trying to mitigate the bad impression that naturally results from a comparison of the amount of national income in Communist and pre-Communist Russia. Even if the figures for 1920-1922 are incorrect as to their absolute amounts, they are yet highly interesting, because they give a certain idea of the changes in the composition of the national income and of the relative importance of various branches in the aggregate. The position is shown in diagram № 3,

they have preserved these qualities, they are still doing their best to preserve the equipment of the industry and to achieve its development and future prosperity; 2) former owners of concerns, who, once having got into the concerns formerly owned by them, are naturally inclined to carry them on business lines; finally, 3) former workers and subordinate employees, who have been put in control of concerns as a result of Communist revolution and dictatorship. Of these, those who possess the characteristics essential in a «producer» or industrialist, as well as talent, are very quickly developing their outlook, become familiar with their new sphere of activities and are trying to gain a strong foothold in their present position and to keep it in the future capitalist organisation. These are strongly inclined to assume a business-like attitude. All the rest are entirely devoid of any desire to do any real business.

One should bear in mind, however, that even among the best elements of these three groups the business impulse is bound gradually to dwindle, because the stability of their present position in the industry does not depend on their personal qualifications and achievements. It depends, in the first instance, on the «protection and grace» of their masters in the Communist Party.

1) See, «Rus. Econ.», p. 1105.

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which brings to light a very important process; viz. that, *in the course of the last three years of Communist economic régime, the national income has been steadily falling.*

Even according to Popoff's optimistic estimate of Communist achievements, the national income in 1922 amounts to no more than 48 p. cent. of that of 1912. [1])

Comparing the burden of taxes borne to-day with that of pre-Communist Russia, we find that direct and indirect taxes in the Communist Budget for 1922-23 (E. J. 4.3. 23.) amount to 518 million roubles, thus reaching 53 p. cent. of the revenue from the same sources in 1914. There is no doubt whatever that the present taxation, as well as the whole Budget for 1922-23, is excessively heavy, considering the amount of national income. Since May, 1921, the Communist Government was continually reducing the expenditure on the maintenance of the machinery of Government and of the Communist Party, vainly trying to bring it down to a level, at which it could be met out of what can be extorted from the peasantry, because the nationalised industry is clearly working at a loss. This the Communist Party is compelled to do, because it wants to keep in power as long as possible, staving off the moment of unavoidable bankruptcy. Any such reduction, however, is naturally limited by the size of the country. Beside, when carried beyond a certain limit, the reduction becomes dangerous for the party in power. Hence the present amount of the Budget. As far as the peasantry is concerned, the pressure of taxation was carried to the extreme limit even before the N.E.P.. Taking into account the food tax, the direct and indirect open taxation and the camouflaged taxation in the form of the issue of paper money, we find that the peasants are paying in taxes no less than 25 p. cent. of their gross income.

Meanwhile, as the legacy of the capitalist régime is gradually exhausted, the Soviet Government is finding it ever more difficult to find fresh sources of revenue in current production. As a result, the Communists-politicians are exercising an ever increasing pressure on the industry.

By the way, we should mention that a heavy taxation of industry is logically an essential part of the idea and the practice of the N.E.P.. By means of taxation, the Communist Party and its dictators, the Communists-politicians, were trying to wrest from the Communists-business men the lion's share of the profits which the nationalised industry was expected to derive out of its «cornering» of the peasants. Hence came the violent struggle between the Communists-politicians and the Commissariat of Finance, on the one hand, and the Communists-business men, on the other: the latter had to pay tributes to the former. It is precisely to this struggle that one should look for an explanation of the present strife in the Communist Party.

In some branches of production, as, e.g., in the sugar industry, the taxes paid amount to 50 p. cent. of the cost of the product, i.e. to precisely the extent by which the prices of industrial products were raised as compared with those for farming produce (see, curves III and I in diagram № 1).

Fictitious calculations. The fact that calculations are, practically, ficti

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1) On the assumption that the income derived from farming has fallen according to my estimate, to 45 p. cent., and that derived from industry, according to Popoff, to 20 p. cent. of the pre-war amount. I. Reingold («E. J.» 22.3.23) says: «If we take Popoff's estimates of the income from industry and farming, and take into account that the fall in the income derived from trade, transport, etc. is still greater, we find that the present amount of national income (1922) does not exceed 35-40 p. cent. of the pre-war figure».

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tious, results not only in losses, but in even greater evils, by making impossible any reasonable degree of insight into the future of business. Any calculation is fictitious because, as a matter of fact, even the best among the units in which in can be made — the pre-war gold rouble — does not really exist. It is either a shadow of the past or a vision of the distant realm of the future.

As to the prices expressed in Soviet roubles, they have no real economic basis, because; 1) The Soviet rouble is continually being depreciated by inflation, of which the Communist Government has made a form of indirect taxation. Whatever superhuman efforts in economy, labour, etc. the classes now engaged in the production of goods in Russia may make, they are unable to improve their position, as far as the stabilisation of currency is concerned. 2) The free market, with its unfettered play of supply and demand, is as much non-existent as it was under the control of the Glavki during the period of militant Communism. To a certain extent, one is able to speak of a free market only with regard to the exchange of the products of village craftsmen (see diagr. № 3), involving no more than 8 p. cent. of the total amount of the national income in 1922. The whole of the large and average — sized industries are forming part of the Government's «corner».

When dealing with these industries, we are compelled to use military terms, and to speak of an economic civil war between town and country, of the more or less successful forcible spoliation of the latter by the former, of more or less effective flanking movements and breaking through, etc. In such conditions there is no room for a free market.

The whole price policy of the Communist Government, with its trusts and syndicates, is very much like a game of poker, in which one can win with bad cards and lose with good ones. When, speaking of trade under the N.E.P., a Communist economist or a NEP-man uses the terms «balance», «profit», «loss», «rouble», «price», «profitability», etc., it would be a great mistake to suppose that these words imply the notions to which they correspond in a capitalist society. Their actual meaning is absolutely different or, rather, they are devoid of any real meaning at all. They are utterly unreal, imaginary, changing and unaccountable.

Whenever a Communist economist or a NEP-man are making calculations or drawing up balances, they are like men walking in their sleep or being hopelessly drunk. When waking up or once again getting rid of the influence of drink they suddenly find that their expected profits have turned into huge losses, and that the heaps of gold they have been dreaming of are really heaps of sand and litter. Even at the time of making their calculations they are never certain that these calculations are correct.

A curious example of the imaginary character of such calculations is the story with the balance of the «Mossoukno» («Moscow Cloth Trust»), told in the «Econ. Jizn» (26.II.22 and 14.12.22). We are generally used to think that it is a very easy matter for the owner of a concern to establish, at the end of a year of operations, whether he has gained or lost on his business; so, at least, it is under the capitalist régime. Under the N.E.P., however, the position is different altogether.

Thus, the Board of the «Mossoukno», a trust representing 22 factories with 10.500 workers, in publishing its balance sheet («E.J.» 26.11.22), prefaces it with the following introductory remark: «It is a difficult task to work when the currency is depreciating. No less difficult it is, however, under such conditions, to draw a correct balance sheet, which would really represent the

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condition of the concern and would bring to light the real, as distinquished from the «paper», results of the year's work. We would like to acquaint our comrades-business men with our methods of drawing and checking our balance sheet and to submit these methods to friendly discussion, because these problems now present a very urgent importance. In the course of the next month the first year's work of a considerable part of our trusts is coming to an end, and it is time to take stock of the results achieved».

The balance sheets of November 11th, 1921, and October, Ist, 1922, were both expressed in roubles of 1922 pattern. In the case of the initial balance, the costs of the stocks and equipment received from the Government were calculated at pre-war prices and then converted into roubles of 1922 pattern, assuming the pre-war rouble to be worth 6 roubles (1922). Eleven months later, in the balance sheet of October 1st, 1922, the same items were re-valuated at the rate of 1 pre-war rouble = 520 roubles (1922). It is clear that the amount of profit entirely depends on the theoretically assumed relation between the Soviet rouble and the pre-war rouble, which can be put either under or over 520 roubles. The «Mossoukno» has put this coefficient at 520 and, accordingly, has found that the profit earned by it during 11 months amounted to 3.22 million gold roubles, assuming 1 pre-war rouble to be equal to 545 Soviet roubles of the 1922 pottern.

The «Mossoukno» is well aware that its calculations are built on a foundation of sand. It makes an attempt, once again, to solve the problem, which does not lend itself to solution under the N.E.P., of whether it was working at a profit or at a loss. by re-calculating the balance sheet in terms of arshines of cloth and of what it calls the «cloth roubles». This calculation leads it to the conclusion that the year's work has closed at a profit. Of this, however, it is also uncertain, and proceeds to another solution of the problem. It says: «Owing to the difficulty of drawing up a balance sheet, because of the *conventional* meaning of all the indices and *the lack of stability in market prices* caused by the fluctuation in the value of the rouble, we have ance again approached the problem from an altogether different angle». This time, the problem was approached by means of checking the actual stocks. The faith in mere book-keeping has been entirely shattered. As the representative of the «Mossoukno» puts it, «the actual stocks are more trustworthy than books».

To solve the problem, whether the «comrades» in the «Mossoukno» have worked at a profit or at a loss, it was necessary to start a special discussion at the editorial office of the «Economich Jizn» (see a curious account of it in E.J., 14.12.22). In the course of that discussion, according to the account, «the expert advisers of the State Funds Commission have expressed the opinion that the profits shown have not been derived from production, but could have come from other sources, such as, e.g., some side-activities of the trust». According to Comrade Stoklitzky, «individual inefficient factories could have worked at a loss, while the general profit could have been earned on trading operations (by means, e.g., of raising prices) and thus could have made good the losses incurred by individual concerns».

Thus, the highly qualified experts assembled at the editorial office of the «Econ. Jizn» were unable to decide, whether the result was profit or loss. This is a fitting example of «imaginary calculation».

A typical example of the destruction of an industry and of the breaking of the «corner». A good illustration of the destruction under the N.E.P., as a result of all the causes mentioned above, of a branch of industry, as well as of the collapse of the «cornering» policy and of the utter disappointement

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

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of those who hoped that the N.E.P. will enable industrial enterprises to be carried and who have spared no efforts to do it as best they could, is given by K. Taranenko in his article «Thoughts and Facts» («E.J.» 17.3.23.). In it he deals with the condition of the Sugar Trust — the one which, for the successes achieved by it, has earned from the Gosplan the title of «hero of the day».

K. Taranenko says: «The splendid achievements (we are bound openly to admit this) of the present year's campaign which, after having repaid all the debts incurred in 1922, has trebled the capital (in poods of sugar), originally received from the State, have failed, however, to create favourable conditions for the continuation of the work and now, more than ever... we feel anxious for the future of the sugar industry...

«Last year, many responsible comrades in the Commissariats of Foreign Trade and of Finance did not believe that the results we expected to achieve would ever materialise and held the opinion that the idea of producing 12 million poods of sugar was purely fantastic; they were building castles in the air with regard to the peasant cousumers and insisted on the importation of sugar from abroad... Now, the C. of F. Trade is silent... we *have* produced our 12 million poods of sugar... Of these we have spent 6 million poods on the liquidation of last years' campaign and on preparations for that of 1923; we hold in stock, for disposal in 1923, the balance of 6 million poods of sugar, beside 1 million poods of sugar products (rhum, treacle, etc.), i.e. a total of 7 million poods. Theoretically, this amounts to 40 p. cent. of the quantity required for the campaign, as against last year's 18 p. cent.

«Thus, everything seems to be going well... Unfortunately, this well-being is only apparent. What is the matter?

The table given below supplies the first answer to this question [1]).

In Moscow, a pood of granulated sugar of 1921-1922 production, excise duty included, was exchanging for the following amounts of money or goods:

Months	Gold roubles	Printed calico, arsh.	Sheet iron, poods	Coal, poods	P. cent of excise duty to price of sugar
Jan., 1922 (excl. of excise)	29.62	80.00	—	60.00	—
May, » (excise includ)	13.30	71.90	4.13	45.49	31.25
June, »	17.50	54.42	1.02	28.00	28.58
July, »	15.79	43.64	3.54	20.69	33.33
August, »	20.81	66.64	5.23	31.59	21.84
Septem., »	18.87	60.61	3.85	34.96	20.00
October, »	Nothing sold				
November (new sugar,1922	6.74	26.71	2.10	23.59	36.56
December -1923 camp.	6.00	25.24	2.70	24.83	25.65

«This table points to a decidedly unfavourable tendency in the relative prices of sugar, as compared with other industrial products, which has set in since the appearance on the market of the sugar produced in the winter 1922-23; the tendency was the same in January and February, 1923.

1) For purposes of clearness I have plotted these figures in digaram № 4. In the latter, curve I shows the variations in the prices of sugar in gold roubles. Curves II, III and IV show the percentage variations in the value of sugar as expressed in terms of other goods, viz. printed calico, sheet iron and coal. The relatives are referred to the figures for January and, in case of sheet iron, to that of May. To make this clear, the respective figures are shown on the diagram at the turning points of the curves II, III, and IV.

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«The second reply. In the course of the period from February to September we have got to dispose of 7 million poods of sugar, i.e. of one million pood per month. Thus, on the basis of prices ruling in February, we have got to take from the market up to 2.000.000 million roubles per month, which, owing to the general depression of the market, is a clearly impossible task. Accordingly, we will have either to reduce the price of sugar and to sell at a loss, i.e. to spend our working capital, or to reduce the sales and, consequently, to lower the rate of production, or, finally, to go begging for credit.

«The third reply is that we pay in taxes to the State about 50 p. cent. of the market price of sugar. This statement will, probably, surprise our comrades in the Commissariat of Finance. Accordingly, we shall explain it. Excise duties on sugar sold amount, on the average, to 30 p. cent.. For the «planters' sugar» (i.e. that issued to peasants in exchange for sugar beet) and for sugar given to peasants for work, on both of which excise duties are paid by the Sugar Trust,... they amount to about 10 p. cent. The equalising industrial tax — 7 p. cent. Local taxes, payment of the personnel of the schools, on account of the Commissariat of Education, municipal rates, etc. amount to another 3 p. cent. Thus, the total percentage to pay is 50 p. cent. If to this we add the repeated levying of the industrial tax, as well as social insurance (21 p. cent. of the wages in the Ukraine and 25 p. cent. in the R.S.F.S.R.), culture and education — 10 p. cent.; Works Committees — 2 p. cent.; Higher Schools and Colleges — 2 p. cent.; the expenses involved in being honorary *chefs* (of various Army units), reaching about 5 p. cent. of the market price of sugar, we see that the burden is far too heavy even for a flourishing industry.

«All these taxes, which, in our opinion, are the principal evil, did not exist last year, because excise duties were introduced only on May 15th, when the whole of our stock of sugar was already disposed of. The equalising tax was also introduced only at the end of the working year; social insurance etc., also appeared only in the middle of the summer. Now, however, from the very outset we have got to pay for the whole production of 1922. As a result, now (on February 25th), at the Bolshe-Gribanovsky works in the province of Tambov, sugar is being compulsorily sold for failure to pay the equalising tax, and we are unable to help the concern...

«Under such conditions our working capital is reduced straight away by 50 p. cent. owing to taxation alone. Taking into account the relative value of sugar, as compared with gold and other industrial products, we find that, in fact, there is left to us no more than 98 p. cent. of last year's working capital or only 12 p. cent. of the resources needed by us. It is perfectly clear that, if the net cost of sugar to us (exclusive of maintenance and depreciation) is 5 r. 10 cop. per pood, and if, in December, we were selling sugar for 6 r. 30 cop. per pood, and paid half of this amount to the State in taxes, we were actually losing 2 r. 40 cop. per pood, thus spending our working capital.

«People may ask, why are we selling sugar at such prices? The answer is very simple. The Sugar Trust has been launched on its voyage with 18 p. cent. of the working capital required for its operations... We had to make purely acrobatic tricks to provide credit for the 82 p. cent. that had to be found in some way.

«Our principal creditors were the peasant-planters; next came the workers and, finally, the Government, with its «general industrial loans», credits secured on merchandise, etc. But, when the terms of the loans expired, we had, in the course of 3 months, to sell up to 6 million poods of sugar...

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Under such conditions it was impossible to arrange for a regular disposal of the product. The greatest harm has been done to the industry by the peasant-planters, who have put on the market the sugar, for which the excise duties have been paid by the Sugar Trust, at half-price; this they were compelled to do under the pressure of taxation in the beginning of December. And the peasants, we have to bear in mind, have received about 3 million poods of sugar in exchange for the raw materials supplied by them, which is a large amount». On this we will conclude our *verbatim* quotation from Taranenko's article, and shall only briefly deal with what he says of the causes which do not allow the sugar industry to be carried on business lines. He accuses the economists of the Commissariat of Finance of being absolutely wrong in applying pre-war rates of taxations to concerns working under the N.E.P.. In this he sees a mistake, because: 1) Before the war, there was the necessary working capital. Now, under the N.E.P., «there is no credit, because, what we now have is not credit but, in the majority of cases, pure robbery, except, naturally, the general industrial loans»; 2) «The industry, as to its size, has gone back to the condition of about 40 years ago, i.e. its present volume corresponds to that of the period 1875-1880»; 3) «The concerns are worn out and are in need of thorough repairs and, for the time being, at least, of careful temporary mending»; 4) In farming it is urgently necessary to restore the buildings, the stocks and the cultivation of land; 5) In order to preserve the equipment of the works now idle and maintened «in conservation», the sugar industry, beside its own immediate expenditure on production, has got to bear an extremely heavy burden of expenses, to keep them in *statu quo* and to prevent their further dilapidation». Then, Taranenko proceeds to compare the profitability of the sugar industry during two periods. The results of his comparison are given, for brevity, in the following table:

	1875-1880	1922
Total production, in million poods	12	12
Sale price per pood	5r. 25c. f.o.r.	6 r. (Moscow)
Excise duties, in p. cent. of sale price	5 p. cent.	40 p. cent
Direct taxes	1-3 p. cent.	10 p. cent.

In considering these figures, one can easily understand the bitterness with which Taranenko attacks the comrades from the Com. of. Finance. We see that beside the general fall in the purchasing capacity of the countryside (to which Taranenko refers in speaking of the «castle in the air» built by the Comrades from the C. of F. Trade and of Finance with regard to the peasant consumers), the conditions of production due to the N.E.P. are ruining the sugar industry. The lack of capital for re-equipment, impossibly high taxation and the imaginary character of all calculations are all working hand-in-hand in this direction. The conditions are rendered absolutely prohibitive for the conduct of any serious industrial concern whatsoever.

It would do to look at the diagram № 4 and to see the feverish rise in the price of sugar up to November, 1922, and its subsequent heavy fall to understand Taranenko's utterly hopeless attitude. Now, however, we will leave Taranenko and his heated controversy with the Comrades in the Commissariats of Finance and of Foreign Trade, and will take an impartial view of the situation.

The real economic nature of the situation is very simple (see diagr. № 4). The cost of sugar per pood amounts to 5 roubles 10 copecks. Had the Sugar Trust added to it a reasonable amount, say, 30 p. cent., for depreciation and

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profit, and had the Commissariat of Finance imposed on it a moderate taxation, reaching, say, 10 p. cent., the sale price would not be exorbitant, and would work out at something like 7 roubles 25 cop. As a matter of fact, up to October last, the Sugar Trust was selling at much higher prices, thus pocketing very large profits. This it did by means of the «corner», into which, together with the Com. of. Foreign Trade with its imported sugar, it drove the consumer. The tension was very great and, finally, the «corner» in the sugar industry has broken down, as did all the other «corners». The only difference was that the collapse of the sugar «corner» happened earlier than that of similar machinations in other industries: in the former it happened in October; in the latter the breakdown spread over the period from December to March.

Now, both the Sugar Trust and the Commissariat of Finance will have to bear the consequences of this collapse of their «cornering» policy.

CH. V.

THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE COLLAPSE OF THE N.E.P.

The material collapse of the N.E.P. dispels the last illusion as to the possible success and the eventual evolution of the Soviet régime, even among the most romantic people. The collapse itself and, particularly, the possibility by means of direct calculation, unsatisfactory as this necessarily is, to take stock of the extent of this collapse, have helped to make clear to the masses of the various social groups of Russia one very important truth.

Briefly, this truth is that the Communist régime and its creator-the Communist Party, are now both materially and morally bankrupt. And an avowedly bankrupt god can have no worshipers.

How did this process of the squandering of moral and material values actually run its course?

Having been due to the desire of achieving the emancipation of the individual from economic exploitation, Communism has resulted in bringing about a worse economic and political slavery than had ever been known before.

In the material domain, the practice of the Communist Government was that of gradual expropriation, one by one, of various social classes, and of devouring, as soon as it appeared, any sprout that could be expected to bear fruit in future. The process has been started from the *bourgeoisie*; then, it involved the peasants, the industrial workers and, finally, the Communist-comrades of the «business man» type.

In this work of destruction the Communist Party is like a swarm of locusts. Wherever it appears, everything is left bare; it leaves nothing behind. The difference between Communists and locusts is only that the latter are devouring everything on their way, while the former are choosing their victims and acting along the line of least political and social resistance. It was precisely this search for the line of least resistance that suggested to them the adoption of the N.E.P.

This is why I am so emphatic in my negative attitude to the N.E.P., which, I hope, is entirely shared by the great majority of those who have remained and are now suffering in Russia.

The Communist Party has originally built its power on the social antagonisms of the old Russian régime. It has created a peculiar solidarity among the social groups of to-day's Russia, because all are rendered equally desti-

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tute and no one hopes for any improvement of his lot to come from the Communist Party. To this is due the equally hostile attitude to Communism of all the main groups of the population.

The N.E.P. has failed in destroying or even in mitigating the antagonism between the peasantry, on the one hand, and the Worker's and Peasants' Government, which, in reality, is the Communist Party. By the autumn of 1922, the beautiful flowers of the N.E.P., which were so nice to look at in the spring of 1921, have ripened into very sour fruits, viz., the «corner» made by the nationalised industry and the Commission for bringing down grain prices. The antagonism has only become more pronounced, and the Communist Government has apparently lost the last vestige of authority in the eyes of the peasantry.

The industrial workers were ungrudgingly leaving the concerns, whose activities were being reduced under the N.E.P., in the hope that, when the process of deliberate «contraction of industry» is over, their position would be improved. Now, they see that, under the N.E.P. and the Communist Government, this «contraction» is bound to go on for ever. Naturally, disaffection spreads in their ranks. Communists-business men have come to see that all profits, if ever such would be earned by them thanks to the «cornering» of the peasants by the nationalised industry, or by any other business transactions, would, in the majority of cases, escape them and fall into the hands of the Communists-politicians and of their bureaucracy. The Communists - business men have become convinced that their rôle is that of drawing chestnuts from the fire for the benefit of their comrades in the Commissariats of Foreign Trade and of Finance, for the Che-Ka (now the Chief Political Department), the Political Bureau, etc. They are also dissatisfied.

Finally, as to the masses of the population in the towns, when the N.E.P., at the outset, has brought about some slight signs of revival in the industry, almost killed during the preceding period of bureaucratic centralisation, it has increased the demand for brains in various professions connected with the industries. It has given work to the population and improved the conditions of life in the towns. The town-dweller has even begun to look better. People, who, in 1919 and 1920, have lost all hope and became apathetic, who, for months, have not had a piece of soap to wash with, since the N.E.P. have begun to wash and to mend their clothes. Now, with the N.E.P. nearing the end of its career, the stocks of raw materials and of finished goods are daily dwindling. People in towns are beginning to feel like living in a besieged fortress. Bread is getting scarce. Unemployment is growing. For the towns, the N.E.P. has proved to be the last fraud of the Communist Government. And, with the N.E.P. heading to a final collapse, the prospects for the population of the towns appear to be even gloomier than the past. Hence — an intense discontent.

In the foregoing I have dwelt on the factors undermining the industry, of which several are to be found in the industry itself, and one — viz. the decline in the purchasing capacity of the countryside — outside it. Our account would be incomplete, if we omitted to point to yet another factor, which can be looked upon as at the same time lying within and without the industry. The rôle of this particular factor or, rather, of this particular branch of economic activities, is so important, that by its collapse, it may at any time smash up the whole of the Russian industry. I mean railway transport.

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CH. VI. RAILWAY TRANSPORT.

In the Communist economic organisation of Russia, railway transport was called upon to play a peculiar part. It was the first among all the branches of economic activities, to prove the absolute insolvency of the Communist economic régime; this has become clear beyond a shadow of doubt as early as in the winter of 1919-1920, and was acknowledged even by the Communists themselves.[1])

In the early spring of 1920 the Communist Press was full of the most picturesque descriptions of the utter disorganisation of transport, of its effects on the whole of Russia's national economy and of the fatal consequences it could have for the very existence of Communist Government in Russia.

Having then worked out a certain programme for the reconstruction of transport, the Commissariat of Ways and Communications has bluntly declared that to save transport actually means to save the Soviet Government, which, according to that statement, «is bound to die with the death of transport». That programme, embodied in the so-called «historical order № 1042» (May 28th, 1920), was to be carried into effect before 1925, when transport should be entirely re-established.

Since the spring of 1920 and up to the present day, transport and, particularly, the railways, have newer ceased to be a *locus minoris resistentiae* in the Communist economic organisation. Every successive crisis in any branch of economic activities, always, to a greater or smaller degree, had exercised an influence on transport in the first instance. Whenever there was a fall in the output of coal, fuel wood or naphtha, the first to feel the effect were the railways. The latter, which were already almost entirely paralised, had to work at a greatly reduced rate, being constantly threatened with complete stoppage, because their stocks of fuel were barely sufficient for two or three days. As a result, in the accounts of the work of the railways there appeared a new heading — «cold engines» — i. e. locomotives that were kept idle owing to the lack of fuel. At the same time, whenever the heavy industry, which was in very precarious conditions throughout the whole period of Communist domination in Russia, got into one of its intermittent acute crises, owing to some difficulties in the supply of metal or in the metal industry, the category of «cold engines» immediately disappeared, and the railways were threatened with stoppage on account of the lack of locomotives in working order. The Communist Government then usually started a «shock» campaign of engine repairs, the latter being carried in every workshop of whatever factory or works. Whenever the position was so bad, the Communists began in the Press, at Congresses, meetings etc., again and again to console the population by holding out the hope of an improvement which was bound to come as soon as the locomotives ordered abroad were delivered. The reader will remember that the order for locomotives was placed abroad as a result of a famous report by Engineer Lomonosoff, presented in the course of the winter of 1919-1920, in which he stated that the condition of railway transport threatens very soon to become catastrophic and pointed to the means by which the catastrophe could be averted. The report has caused a panic not only at the Congress of the Councils of National Economy, at which it was read, but in the Council of People's Commissaries as well.

In spite of the heavy fall in production and trade and the consequently

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1) See M. V. Braikevitch's «The Revival of Railway Transport in Russia», «Rus. Econ.», p. 11.

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small quantities of goods handled by the available transport, the latter was unable to cope with the slightest increase in traffic, with the result that all «shock» measures in the domain of economics were frustrated by the failure of transport facilities. This was invariably the case, for instance, with the transport of seed grain to the places of destination. As a rule, they reached it when sowing time was long over.

Broken up in a number of economically isolated regions, owing to the disorganisation of transport, Russia, even had its industry shown a tendency towards re-establishment, which is not actually the case, would be doomed to live under a régime of «natural economy» and in conditions of practical stagnation, until her transport is restored.

The disorganisation of industry results in the ruin of transport; on the other hand, the latter tends to accelerate the destruction of industry.

The above serves to explain why the conditions of railway transport are a very sensitive barometer of the real condition of, at least, the principal branches of Russia's industry.

We are now going to examine the condition and the work of the Russian railway net in 1922, and to see what had been done in the course of that year in carrying out the provisions of the famous «order № 1042». If we find an improvement in the conditions, it will be a sign of things getting better since the inauguration of the New Economic Policy and of there being a hope that the Communistic industry would get out of its impasse.

In June, 1920, we wrote: «If these means of reconstructing the «economic front» fail (i. e. if the curve showing the numbers of locomotives in need of repair on the Russian railways does not show a steady decline) it will mean that, as Lenin and Rykoff feared, the internal wreck of the Soviet power is an accomplished fact».[1]) The position then was correctly formulated; it is the same now. What we have got to study is, whether and, if so, to what extent have transport conditions in general and locomotive repairs, in particular, been improved since the spring of 1920 and, especially, in the course of 1922. Any conclusions as to the immediate political and economic prospects of the Communist régime, drawn from the information thus obtained, are, I think, bound to be essentially the same for Communist and «bourgeois» economic experts alike.

Locomotives. Table *A* (Engines) of the article «The Communist Industry in figures for 1922», in the present issue of this Journal shows that, in the course of 1922,the percentage of locomotives in need of repair had fallen from 65,3 p. cent. to 58 p. cent. The number of locomotives in good working order has increased from 6.573 in January to 8.044 in December, 1922, or by 1.471. Does this really mean that the Russian industry and transport are improving and that the improvement is stable? The reply to both questions is in the negative.

The New Economic Policy has, certainly, had a favourable effect on the output of locomotive-building works. In table D we see that the output of locomotives has risen from 78 in 1921 to 105 in 1922, the latter figure amounting to 12,8 p. cent. of that for 1914.

At the same time, however, the work of the same concerns on the thorough, medium and current repairs of locomotives was reduced, the number of locomotives repaired having decreased by 102. Accordingly, the bulk of the repairs was done, as before, at railway workshops. As a matter of fact, all that can be expected is that these workshops, with the transition to the New

1) See, «Rus. Econ.», p. 26-27.

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Economic Policy, will be able to prevent an increase in the number of engines in need of repair. To reduce the percentage of locomotives in need of repair the workshops would be absolutely unable, however much they would do to achieve this, because the general condition of industry in Russia would not permit them to do it. This is made perfectly clear from the position with the supply to the railways of the necessary materials, on which we are going to dwell at a later stage.

The increase in the number of locomotives in working order was the result of altogether different courses. Engineer V. Fomin («E. J.» 9. 11. 22) writes: «On October 1st, 1922, according to the data of the Exploitation Department, the total number of locomotives available was 7.913, including about 700 new engines, imported from abroad». No information is available as yet of the number of such locomotives obtained since that date, as well as of the actual origin of the 700 new locomotives, i. e., whether all of them have been imported from Germany, or some of them came from Sweden. As far as the arrival of locomotives from Sweden is concerned, the «Econ. Jizn» (17. 1. 23) writes: «Up to January 1st, 1923, the number of locomotives that was to arrive from Sweden, was 230; the number actually received reached 204.

If we put the number of locomotives imported from abroad in 1922 at, approximately, the figure of 1.000, we see that the fall in the percentage of locomotives in need of repair from 65.3 to 58 p. cent. is a proof not of any real improvement in the economic conditions of Russia, but, rather, of the fact that, owing to the insistence of Russian railway experts, the Communist Government, now wantonly wasting the old Russian gold reserve, has had to spend at least some part of it not on its own maintenance, but on something useful for the future of the country, viz. on the purchase of new railway engines.

Purchases of locomotives abroad cannot, however, be continued indefinitely; they are essentially a purely temporary expedient, because the gold reserve is now, practically, at an end, and no other means of payment for them are available. Meanwhile, without these new engines, the percentage of locomotives in need of repair would be 61.3 p. cent., instead of 58 p. cent.: in other words, in December, 1922, the percentage would be even higher than it was in February, 1920, when it amounted to 59.2 p. cent.[1])

Thus we see that the curve of the percentages of engines in need of repair did not show a steady decline in 1922.

The catastrophic shortage of locomotives in 1920 has caused a panic in the Communist Government and has forced it to adopt the programme of railway reconstruction embodied in the «order № 1042».

The decrease in the percentage of locomotives in need of repair, according to that programme, should have proceeded as shown in the following table, reprinted from Engineer V. Fomin's article «Five years of Soviet Transport» («E. J.» 9. 11. 22):

Date	Total number of locomotiv.	Number of locomotives in need of				Percent of locomotiv. in need of repair
		Thorough repair	Medium repair	Current repair	Total	
1. 7. 20	16.000	1.800	3.700	4.100	9.600	60
1. 1. 21	16.000	2.100	3.000	3.500	8.600	54
1. 1. 22	16.000	1.700	1.500	3.000	5.200	39
1. 1. 23	16.000	1.100	900	2.500	4.500	28
1. 1. 24	16.000	900	900	2.000	3.800	24
1. 1. 25	16.000	700	900	1.600	3.200	20 %

1) See «The Revival of Russian Railway Transport», «Rus. Econ.», p. 16.

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We see that, according to this programme, the number of locomotives in need of repair on January 1st, 1923, should have been 4.500, or, taking into account the increase of their total number from 16.000 to 19.200 (see, table I A), it should have reached 5.300 at the outside; in fact, their number on December 31st, 1922, was 11.156. Their percentage should have been 28 p. cent., while in fact it is more than twice as high.

We should, however, point to the fact that, at present, i. e. at the end of 1922, the *locus minoris resistentiae* of railway transport is not the shortage of engines. The lack of fuel, on the one hand, and the extreme fall in production and in the traffic of goods, on the other, tend to make even 5.800 good locomotives sufficient to cope with the requirements. Accordingly, we see that the number of locomotives keept idle owing to lack of fuel was continually increasing from January, when it was 1.061, to December, when it reached 2.157. As will be shown later, the weakest point in the railways is the condition of the permanent way and, particularly, of sleepers.

Wagons. The number of wagons theoretically being in good working order, from January to the end of 1922 has decreased by, roughly, 27.000 (see table I, B). I say «theoretically», because far from all such «sound» wagons can really be used for actual work. In October, 1922, the number of wagons actually working amounted to 193.000. About 73.000 were used for living, storage of goods, in service trains, etc. Beside, it would be a great mistake to consider all the wagons described as available for work, as necessarily being in good working order. With regard to this point, the «Survey of the condition and the work of transport in 1921», published by the Commissariat of Communications, already in 1921, stated, that «the very meaning of ,,good working order", when applied to wagons, has greatly changed. In judging the wagons by pre-war standards, we should say that the number of those in really good working order at present is small, and that their condition is still continually becoming worse; thus, the percentage of wagons in need of repair and absolutely unfit for service, as compared with normal times (1913), has risen, on the average, by 300 p. cent. These conditions find an expression in the actual impossibility of providing even a relatively small number of really good wagons, for special cases, requiring the rolling stock to be in good condition; thus, for instance, for the transport of grain and the despatch of freights to Esthonia, it was difficult to find some 30-50.000 trucks». In 1922 the condition of wagons has either not improved at all, or the improvement was, practically, negligible.

The volume of traffic and the exploitation of the rolling stock. We have seen that neither in the numbers of rolling stock available, nor in its condition, has there been any serious improvement in 1922. But, as far as its exploitation is concerned, the New Economic Policy has given much greater freedom to the managing personnel and enabled them considerably to improve the traffic capacity and the exploitation of the available rolling stock. The decree concerning the introduction of charges for transport, approved by the C. P. C. on January 9th, 1921, and the «Statute of Railways of the R. S. F. S. R.» of June 22nd, 1922, have once again restored the railways, at least to a certain extent, to their position of regular commercial concerns.

This new régime is still, certainly, very far from what real commercial conditions should be. Thus, it is a difficult matter for the railways to obtain payment for the transport of goods carried for Government institutions and trusts, which are usually in arrear; there are constantly movements on foot for various changes in the tariffs; the depreciation of the rouble does not allow

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of any calculations to be made beforehand, etc. Yet, even under such conditions, there is some possibility of regulating the mutual relations between the consigners and the railways, between the separate services of the latter and of the introduction of some elements of sound working discipline and responsibility among the railway personnel.

All this has resulted in increased efficiency of work, in a reduction of staff, a more effective exploitation of the available rolling stock, etc. This is clearly seen from table I C of the «Communist Industry in Figures». The total of train -versts for 1922, calculated from the figures available for the first 9 months of that year, amounts to 113.334.000, i. e. to 104 p. cent. of the figure for 1921, 102 p. cent. of that for 1920, but only 27 p. cent of that for 1913. Indeed, in figures the successes achieved do not appear to be great, but the important point is that, in 1922, amidst the general chaos in the conditions of transport, one can already notice some points on which the future real improvement can be based as soon as the present monstrous combination of Communism with the New Economic Policy is done away with.

This improvement, slight as it is, and the appearance of these few points, forming a basis for future development, enables every expert and worker in transport better to preserve their physical and moral powers for real work in future. In this respect, the New Economic Policy, in the domain of transport, has given some grounds for hope and has been a source of some moral encouragement. It has, however, entirely failed in creating any real basis for the reconstruction and revival of transport. It is perfectly certain that, unless constitutional government and capitalism are very soon firmly established in Russia, transport is doomed to unavoidable destruction. Whether its destruction will mean the end of the Communist régime, as this was predicted by the Commissary of Communications and by many leading Communists in 1920, I would not venture to say.

To me, one thing is perfectly clear, viz. that the New Economic Policy does not create a really solid basis for the re-establishment of transport. For this, the requisites are lacking, because the Russian national income from all branches of production has fallen too much.

The supply of metals. This last point will be made clear by a study of the resources, which were provided for the material reconstruction of the railways by the Communist Government and the nationalised industry.

In the first instance, we shall examine the position with the supply of the necessary metals. This problem is one of paramount importance with regard, on the one hand, to the repair of rolling stock, to which reference was made above, and, on the other, for the maintenance of the permanent way, with which we are going to deal later.

The following table, compiled from data published by the Communist Government in 1923, shows the present total requirements of all the Russian railways for the main descriptions of materials, and the degree to which those requirements have been met.

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Table showing the principal materials required by the railways and the degree to which the requirements have been met.

(In 1.000 poods).

Description of materials	1920			1921			1922		
	Requir.	Supplied		Requir.	Supplied		Requir.	Supplied	
		Quant	P. cent		Quant	P. cent		Quant	P. cent
Pig iron	2.484	1.741	70	3.429	2.685	79	2.307	1.260	55
Piece iron	4.520	1.408	31	5.807	867	15	5.306	1.065	20
Roof iron	1.265	527	42	1.464	371	25	1.430	670	47
Spring steel	380	39	10	385	95	25	—	—	—
Wire	460	161	35	594	46	7	377	34	9
Nails	610	137	22	749	270	36	897	199	22
Bolts	447	161	36	662	112	16	728	140	19
Tin	22	18	79	39	6	19	18	15	84
Lead	59	33	55	130	78	60	47	123	251
Babbite	155	100	65	213	47	22	317	47	15
Tyres	1273	549	44	1.388	68	49	563	269	47
Axles	344	106	31	146	54	37	16	8.7	55
Smoke funnels	399	204	51	400	390	98	411	224	54
Copper parts of firegrates	53	21	39	10	8	80	26	15	58
Sp. parts of engines	315	151	51	218	93	42	360	42	12
Forgings of wagon sp. p	310	50	16	406	46	11	351	24	7
Iron castings » » »	360	152	42	570	140	24	730	58	8
Carriage springs	200	85	42	262	66	26	281	40	14
Rails	8.300	1.336	16	5.709	2.734	48	5.891	1.413	24
Total	20.956	6.979	33	22.581	8.801	39	20.056	5.640	28

In examining this table we see that the comparatively negligible requirements in metals and metallic articles in 1920 were met to the extent of 33 p. cent.; in 1921 — to that of 39 p. cent. and in 1922, in spite of a considerable importation of materials from abroad, to only 28 p. cent. The prospects for 1923 are very bad indeed. Since the inauguration of the New Economic Policy and the re-organisation of concerns in trusts «on commercial lines», the Commissariat of Communications has entered into agreements with separate trusts, but in no case had it been able to pay in full for the goods delivered by the latter. At present, a number of concerns are unable to execute orders for the Com. of Communications, unless they get sufficient funds to finance them. According to the «Econ. Jizn» (24. 1. 23), in 1923, «the shortage of funds at the disposal of the railways, which are spending the greater part of their resources in wages, does not permit them to place orders for the necessary materials and articles... Reserves, accumulated in the course of past years, are being exhausted, while the necessity of better provision of materials and spare parts becomes ever more urgent». In other words, the growing wear of the rolling stock makes it unfit for service, and the demands for spare parts are increasing every month.

Under such conditions not only the carrying of thorough and medium repairs is impossible on the scale provided for by the «order № 1042», but, in spite of the arrival of new locomotives from abroad, even the maintenance of the service on its present extremely reduced scale is bound very soon to become inpossible.

Rails. Let us now see how does the shortage of metal affect the condition of the upper structure of the permanent way.

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The position with rails on January 1st, 1923, is thus described by P. N. Krassovsky: «The average pre-war yearly rate of renewal of rails on the whole railway net was generally 2½ p. cent. of the total length of main lines, this working out at about 2.000 versts a year... The present position is that, on main lines, the renewal of rails falls short of pre-war standards by 11.000 versts; beside, 50 p. cent. of the normal reserve of rails, amounting to 400 versts, have been spent; finally, nearly 2.000 versts of rails, obtained by dismantling double tracks on main lines, have been diverted to the construction of lines for strategical purposes and the transport of fuel... The position with rail fastenings is analogous to that with rails».

The People's Commisariat of Communications has been compelled to reduce the rate of renewal for the period from 1923 to 1927 from 2½ p. cent. to 1½ p. cent., with the intention of gradually raising it later to the former figure. According to this plan, the railways would return to the normal rate of renewal, i. e. to 2.000 versts a year; only by 1941. In accordance with it, the P. C. of Communications for the year 1923 made an application for 1.600 versts of rails, which, together with fastenings, works out at a total of 8.6 mil. poods of metal.

Already in January last, the central organs of the Communist Government have, however, declared, that it would be impossible to allocate for that purpose in 1923 more than 5.3 mil. poods of metal. The allocation of rails, in particular, was reduced from 1.600 to 800 versts. What the railways will actually obtain, will be seen by the end of the year.

Sleppers, bars and other wooden materials. The weakest point of the railways at present is not the shortage of locomotives or of fuel, but the condition of the upper structure of the lines and, in particular, that of sleepers. The fact that even in this the position is so bad, in spite of wooden sleepers being very easy to provide, tends more than anything else to prove the utter insolvency of the communist economic system, even when, as this is the case now, with the New Economic Policy, it is combined with capitalism into a certain hibrid form. Metallurgy or the metal working industry are, comparatively, complicated forms of production, requiring careful commercial calculation and a certain legal and political régime to enable them to be carried, as well as adequate equipment. Sleepers, however, are things simple enough to provide. All that is needed for their manufacture is an axe and a saw, as well as a modicum of commercial understanding, enabling the work to be done if not cheap, which would be impossible under Communist mismanagement, then, at least so, as to provide for the maintenance of the upper structure of lines in working order.

In spite of all this, however, it is precisely with the renewal of sleepers that the position on Russian railways is really catastrophic. In my opinion, this is indeed the most vulnerable point of Russian transport. A complete breakdown of the whole work of Russian railways can, at any time, result from the wholesale loss of working capacity by the most unobtrusive and modest railway workers — the wooden sleepers. Even the sleepers are utterly tired of Communism and cannot work any more. That this is really so, anyone can see for himself by consulting the «Survey of the Condition and Work of Transport in 1921», published by the P. C. of Communications for the IXth Congress of Soviets.

Appendix 35th to that works shows the years, when the sleepers now in service on Russian railways have been laid. In the extract given below I am not going back beyond 1908, though some of the sleepers were laid as long

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ago as 1904-1907. But their number is so small (0.13 p. cent. of oak sleepers and 0.59 p. cent. of impregnated pine-wood sleepers for the whole of those 4 years), that we can safely leave them out of account. The table is given below.

Percentage distribution of sleepers on the main lines of Russian railways, according to the years when they were laid.

Years when laid	Term of service	Percentages of the total number					Percentages of every given kind.				
		Oak	Impregn. pine	Plain pine	Fir	Larch	Oak	Impregn. pine	Plain pine	Fir	Larch
20	1	0.17	0.83	4.67	0.68	0.05	1.99	1.57	16.43	22.26	8.63
19	2	0.33	1.40	4.35	0.42	0.05	3.83	2.62	15.29	13.75	10.98
18	3	0.64	2.17	5.63	0.30	0.04	7.50	4.12	19.80	9.79	7.26
17	4	1.01	3.59	4,34	0.18	0.10	11.85	6.8	15.25	5.99	20.69
16	5	1.34	5.85	4.66	0.80	0.07	15.77	11.08	16.37	26.08	12.98
15	6	0.91	7.60	3.28	0.58	0.14	10.71	14.40	11.54	19.00	27.86
14	7	1.15	6.89	1.26	0.09	—	13.51	13.05	4.42	2.95	0.29
13	8	1.30	6.55	0.14	—	0.03	15.29	12.41	0.49	0.07	6.73
12	9	0.54	6.44	0.03	—	—	6.33	11.64	0.12	0.05	0.60
11	10	0.41	7.08	0.03	—	0.01	4.80	13.42	0.12	0.04	2.09
10	11	0.42	2.12	0.03	—	0.01	4.97	4.02	0.11	0.02	1.89
09	12	0.09	1.30	—	—	—	1.08	2.46	0.01	—	—
08	13	0.07	0.78	0.01	—	—	0.87	1.48	0.03	—	—

The really dramatic meaning of this table is made perfectly clear by the following explanatory note, accompanying it in the publication quoted :

«Taking, as a basis, this year's rate of replacement of sleepers, and considering that the majority of the sleepers laid now are not impregnated, the actual average age of sleepers now in service on the lines on January 1st, 1922, is as follows:

for	plain pine-wood sleepers	.....	4.2 years;
»	impregn. » »	.....	7.3 »
»	fir-wood »	.....	4.5 »
»	oak »	.....	7.2 »
»	larch »	.....	4.6 »

The usual average terms of service of sleepers on Russian railways, according to the data of railway statistics, were:

for	plain pine-wood sleepers	.....	4.5 years
»	impregn »	.....	8 »
»	fir-wood »	.....	3.75 »
»	oak »	.....	8 »
»	larch-wood »	.....	3 »

«Thus, it is clear that in 1922 the age of the main bulk of impregnated and plain pine-wood sleepers is approaching the normal limit of service, while other types, i. e. fir-wood and larch-wood sleepers are in course of exceeding the limit of duration. These data are characteristical of the critical condition with which the railways of the Republic are bound to be faced in 1922».

When, before the war, the replacement of sleepers was proceeding regularly, the usual requirements of the railways amounted to 19 to 20 million

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sleepers a year. It is clear that now, when replacement was so much in arrear for a number of years, this figure would not do. What is the position in this respect and what can the Com. of Communications actually hope to obtain from the Co:mmunist Government with its institutions and trusts?

The «Survey of the Conditions and the Work of Transport in 1921» gives the following reply to this question: «The extreme shortage of sleepers was felt for a long time, since 1919. In 1920 it became particularly acute and has assumed threatening proportions, especially in the South. Throughout this period, the Chief Committee of Forests, in spite of a series of extraordinary measures, was supplying the requirements of the railways to an extremely inadequate extent. As a result of demands not being met, the requirements for the season of 1920-1921, as compared with those of 1919-1920, have risen by two-thirds, viz., from 18-20 mil. to 30-32 million sleepers for the whole of the railway net... The Chief Committee of Forests has undertaken to supply in 1921 66 p. cent. of these requirements, i. e. 20 millions, but even of this extremely inadequate number of sleepers it has actually delivered only 19 p. cent. According to the information of which the P. Com. of Communications was in possession on October 15th, 1921, up to September 1st, 1921, the railways have actually obtained from the Forest Committee only 3.765.000 sleepers».

What was the position in this respect in 1922? P. I. Krassovsky (see, «The Technical Condition of the Railways», «Ec. J.» 24. 1. 23) says: «For the year 1922, the railways have applied for a total of 44 million sleepers, while the final programme of replacement, as approved by the Gosplan and the Council of Labour and Defence, provided for 22.765.000 sleepers... The work now being brought to completion tends to show that, as a matter of fact, the railways have received only 10.5 million sleepers... The proportion of sleepers entirely unfit for further service now amounts to about 50 p. cent. of the whole, and to replace them in the course of 1923, 60 million new sleepers would be needed. It is however, perfectly evident that to provide and to lay such a number of sleepers in a year's time would be absolutely impossible... We should be aware of the fact that the failure satisfactorily to cope with the task of providing sleepers in the course of the coming season is bound to result in a general collapse of the railways, because the latter, owing to the general wear and unsound condition of the upper structure of the lines will be unable to guarantee the security of traffic, unless its speed is very much reduced». To what extent the speed of trains is already reduced, we will say later. Now, by the way, we will quote the remarks contained in the «Account», concerning the impregnation of sleepers, as it now stands.

«The carrying out of the impregnation of sleepers is controlled by the Chief Timber Preservation Department, but it is being done without any system.[1]) Some of the impregnating works are in full working order and, had raw materials been available, they could proceed with the work». To this we may add that, before the Communist revolution, 60 p. cent. of the sleepers were impregnated.

The position of railways, as to their supply with wooden bars, balks,

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1) Page 47. The fall in the percentage of impregnated sleepers is shown by the table given above.

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planks and other wooden materials is no better than that with regard to sleepers.

New regulations as to the exploitation of railways. As we have had the occasion to point, table I C appears to show a certain improvement in traffic and in the exploitation of the available rolling stock, i. e. some progress in the work of transport. At the same time, however, recent changes in the regulations as to exploitation bear unmistakable evidence of great regress. This process of regress is evident: what used to be known in Russia as «regular traffic» is now disappearing from the whole of the Russian railway net, being supplanted by what was known as «temporary traffic», which, in its very nature, is altogether different from the «regular». This apparent contradiction of simultaneous «progress» and «regress» has definite real causes. The new regulations concerning exploitation have been called for not so much by reasons of economy and a desire to achieve reduction in the personnel, on which the Communist Press lays so much stress, as by other reasons, though economy had, naturally, played a certain rôle in their creation. The principal reason, however, is different altogether: it is to be found in the generally unsound condition of the upper structure of the railways, owing to which the speed of trains and the whole character of traffic must be the same as those adopted on lines, whose construction is not yet quite completed, in which the permanent way is not adequately strengthened and various constructions, buildings etc. are not yet finished; in other words, on railways not yet opened for general use and «regular traffic». The train service on such lines is carried in accordance with a simplified regulation for «temporary traffic».

This retrograde transition of Russian railways to a régime of «temporary traffic» was inaugurated by a division of all lines into three separate classes. According to this division, it was intended to maintain something like «regular traffic» on certain railways; on others — to introduce a kind of «temporary traffic», while the rest were condemned to «conservation», which became fashionable since the inauguration of the New Economic Policy and actually meant that they were given up altogether.

A further development of this process, leading to the gradual disappearance of «regular traffic» from the Russian railways, has found expression in the points proposed by the Gosplan for the «simplification of the methods of exploitation of railways». («Ec. J.» 6. 2. 23).

Of these points we will quote those which tend unmistakably to show a transition to a régime of characteristical «temporary traffic». Thus, it is proposed: 1) to do away with double track sections, whenever they are not technically essential (?); temporarily or permanently to close all those stations, whose activities are small; to do away with double track on all lines belonging to the 2nd category, whose traffic capacity does not exceed 5 pairs of trains a day; to permit lights not to be maintained and even to remove them on all switches except on main lines; to abolish the priority of trains on all lines, except those with dense passenger traffic; to abolish restrictions imposed on the movement of trains hauled by locomotives moving backwards, i. e. with tenders in front of them; to increase the length of maintenance sections to 200 versts and that of sub-sections — to 24 versts; to keep guards at crossings only in towns, large villages and on roads with heavy traffic; to allow the removal of the flour on iron bridges in the spaces between the rails; to reduce the number and the area of technical and service buildings on the railways; to reduce the number of working water tanks.

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What do these measures actually mean? A certain lowering of the safety of traffic [1]), a reduction in the traffic capacity and in the speed of trains on Russian railways.

Are these measures technically and commercially reasonable? However painful it is to say so, seeing the present condition of Russian transport, on which so much love and energy have been spent by whole generations of experts, we are bound to say — yes. If, as P. N. Krassovsky admits («Ec. J.» 24. 1. 23), one-half of the sleepers on the lines are rotten, one has got to forget of a speed of 30-40 versts per hour for goods trains, and to haul them between the stations that have not yet been closed at a speed of 10-15 versts per hour, the only possible under the New Economic Policy, when trains have to run on rails, supported by only ½ of the normal number of sleepers. The destruction by rot of the rest of the sleepers is a question of months or, at the outside, of a year or two, and the day is approaching when the remaining half will also refuse to work any longer, while it will be impossible to replace it.

The huge body of Russian transport, lying across the whole of the Russian plain, under the régime of the New Economic Policy is being devoured by a gangrenous process. It is now losing its limbs one by one. And the railway experts were, perhaps, right, when, in 1920, they said that the Communist Government would not survive the death of transport.

A great consolation, however, for future free Russia will be the fact that, when that tragical moment of collapse is over, the fates of the Communist Government and of Russian Transport are necessarily bound to be different. Russian transport is bound to recover and to be restored to healthy and, I hope, to luxurious growth. Even now, in 1922, under the New Economic Policy, we could discover some signs pointing in that direction and some healthy seeds of future development. Those engineers and workers of transport, who, at the cost of tremendous efforts and sacrifices, have succeeded in keeping these seeds alive throughout the Communist period, have done a great and patriotic work for future free Russia.

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1) The Communist Government is ,apparently, aware of the situation. To quote the report of the meeting of the Gosplan, at which the methods of simplifying exploitation were discussed («E. J.» 6. 2. 23): «The Section emphasises that the carrying out of the proposed methods of simplification of the exploitation of transport, is bound ultimately to result in an unavoidable deterioration of the mechanism of transport. But, owing to the lack of material and financial resources and the consequent possibility of an entire cessation of traffic on some railways of the 3rd category, the adoption of these measures of simplified exploitation appears to be imperative.»

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THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLIC.

By A. J. Halpern.

Paper read before the Association on March 28th, 1923.

The Civil Code of the Russian Soviet Republic has been published on the 25th November, 1922, and comes into force on the 1st January, 1923. The publication of a new civil code is usually an event of national, I should say even, of international importance. Every new civil code usually embodies the united efforts of a generation of jurists and is hailed by the whole juridicial world as a new step in the progress and development of civil law. The far-reaching importance which civil law has on the life of the people renders the legislator very cautious with regard to any innovations the new code may bring in the daily intercourse of life. On the other hand, the growing complications of social life, the differentiation of society into various groups and classes, the growth of international relations, the development of a strong progressive social policy bring every day new problems for the civil legislator which he has to consider and decide in order to work out a new civil code which would satisfy the modern requirements and which would be worthy of his country. The great interest which was felt by the jurists of all countries when the new German B.G.B. was published; the enthusiasm of some, the bitter criticisms of others, which accompanied the issue of the new Swiss Civil Code are remembered by all the jurists of the older generation. Imperial Russia was also following the example of some of its Western neighbours. As early as at the end of the nineteenth century drafts were made of a new civil code which meant to supersede the antiquated code which was in force in Russia, and some of whose provisions date from the eighteenth century. An enormous labour was spent on the preparation of the various drafts, and the bill in its final shape was ready after a work of some 30 years when the revolution broke out. The new civil code of Soviet Russia which I want to analyse in the following lines is hardly a step in the development of the work referred to, notwithstanding the fact that it contains a great number of rules, taken from the above draft. Between the draft of the new Russian civil code and the Soviet Code there is a big gap. The continuity of the legal development in Russia was broken up by the revolution. The old order of things has collapsed, and with it all its legal forms and rules. A new order has set in. It is idle to prophesy whether the Bolshevist revolution represents a staying period or just an episode in the life of the Russian people. It has stayed for 5 years, and it is far more interesting to follow the various stages of its evolution than to repeat the formulas which were true in 1918-1919 but are hopelessly out of date now.

The fact that the Bolshevist state required a code of civil laws at all may have come as a surprise not only to an orthodox Communist. In the first years of the Communist régime, when the work of the Communist Party which came into power into Russia was devoted to the radical destruction of the existing economic order and to the implanting, however forcibly, of a full communistic system, the word itself of civil rights seemed obnoxious. Civil rights are in the first instance merely rights protecting property, but to a Communist property was and is still a thing of the evil which has to be suppressed altogether.

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Thus the rules of the first Bolshevist judicature decree were beautifully simple. The courts were to decide all matters in accordance with the laws issued by the governments preceding the Soviet, *only so far* as these laws were not cancelled by the revolution and were not in contradiction with the revolutionary conscience and the revolutionary sense of right. All the laws which are in contradiction to the decrees of the Soviet authorities or to the minimum programme of the Social Democratic and Social Revolutionary parties were considered as cancelled. A *tabula rasa* was placed where there was a developed and complete system of law. We can only, for want of really trustworthy information, surmise how these courts worked. We know that, with the general collapse of the communist policy, the courts had to require something more tangible than mere «revolutionary conscience». The facts explaining the rise of the so-called new economic policy, (N.E.P.) are more or less widely known, and it is sufficient to say that this new economic policy which, notwithstanding the opposition of the sincere Communists had to make headway in Russia, required a set of laws affecting such civil rights whose protection was necessary as a *conditio sine qua non* for its success. The result was the publication of the new civil code. It came as a result of a bitter struggle between the sincere Communists and the advocates of the N. E. P.

It is the shortest code which we know. The old Russian code had 2,334 art.; the French Civil Code has 2,281 art.; the German Code has 2,385 art. The brevity of the new Russian code, in the first instance, is explained by the absence from the code of provisions regulating a variety of questions usually included in the Code. The Contract of Labour and the laws on Land are subjects of separate laws. So are the laws on family relations, which were embodied in a special code issued in 1918 and have not been affected by the present code. But even allowing for the absence of these important chapters in the new code its brevity cannot but surprise us.

However, if we look at its drafting, we shall find the explanation of the said brevity. The authors or the author have apparently proceeded in the following way. They took the draft of the new Civil Code which was prepared during the Imperial Government, extracted the main provisions, left out the detailed working of the various questions and added a few rules which were required in order to make them fit in with the remnants of the communist experiments. The result was that the rules of the code are scanty, that they are couched in a most general wording and that they are constantly interspersed with regulations of a constitutional character. Numerous and important questions are left out altogether, many rules are contradictory, a great scope is left to the jurisdiction of the courts. Whether it was made intentionally or whether this was a result of the impossible task in which the author found himself, namely to construct a full system of civil rights on the precarious basis of the new economic policy of the Soviet Government, can only be surmised.

We do not propose to go into a detailed study of the new code. That can be left to the future, provided the code succeeds in having a future. What we would like to do is to point out those features of the new law which throw a light on the general conditions of Russia.

The new civil code is preceded by a decree determining the conditions of its coming into force. As stated before, the date was fixed for the 1st January, 1923, and the decree states that all civil disputes or litigations originated before the Bolshevist revolution are not considered by the courts at all. All the rights which originated before November 7th, 1917, and which are in dispute are thus extinguished altogether. The general term for prescription which

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in the old law was ten years is reduced to three years,and no title exists if it has not been affirmed within three years after its creation.

The introductory decree makes the break in the legal continuity between the former and the Bolshevist régime absolute. It states expressly that it prohibits the interpretation of the rules of the new code by means of the old laws or of the practice of the old courts. It also contains some information with regard to the rights of foreign subjects. Whereas the old Russian law proclaimed as a general principle that foreign subjects residing in Russia enjoy the rights of Russian subjects subject to the restrictions imposed by the law, thus admitting the principle of equality, the new code makes some important reservations. It distinguishes between subjects of countries which have concluded treaties or conventions with Soviet Russia and of those which have not concluded such treaties. In the first case, the rights of the foreigner are determined by the treaty or convention. In the latter the executive is entitled to restrict the rights of foreign subjects with regard to free travel, choice of profession, and acquisition of real rights on building or land. We do not hear, in these rules, even a faint echo of the fraternity of the peoples, which was so grandiloquently proclaimed by the Soviet International.

The Civil Code proper is divided into the following parts:—

a) general part, art. 1-51
b) iura in rem art. 52-105
c) law of obligations, art. 106-415
d) law of succession, art. 416-434.

In addition, we have some annexes dealing with the important questions of requisitions and confiscation.

The most interesting part is the first. Here we find the most salient features of the new order of things. The reading of the provisions cannot but give the impression that the subject matters are in rather a state of flux and that the general provisions are, as stated above, more or less patchwork in order to achieve some compromise between the radical principles of Communism and the practical requirements of the new economic policy. The civil rights, states art. 1, «are protected by the law, with the exception of these cases when they are exercised in contradiction with their social economic purposes». So reads the general principles of the new code. The law protects civil rights, that means the laws of property, but only so far as these rights are exercised in accordance with their social economic purpose. The Code does not define the meaning of this reservation and we shall have to go to to general constitutional rules of the Soviet Republic in order to ascertain its exact meaning.

The Soviet constitutional laws offer many instances which illustrate it. Thus under art. 23 of the Soviet constitution we read «whilst protecting the interests of the working class as a whole, the Russian Soviet Republic deprives individual persons and individual groups of rights who exercise them to the prejudice of the interests of the socialist revolution».

It is for the courts to decide when a right is used properly and not in contradiction with its social economic purpose and, the superior courts are expressly entitled to quash decisions which are in obvious contradiction to the general principles of the Soviet legislation and to the general policy of the Soviet Government (see decree concerning the Supreme Judicial Control).

Modern legislation has advanced a great deal since the dictum of the Roman law «qui iure suo utitur nemini facit iniuriam».It was generally felt that social life necessarily impose restrictions upon the unlimited and wanton exercise of rights, if this exercise has no other purpose but to hurt somebody

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else or if the use of a right grows into an abuse. The two recent civil codes — the German and the Swiss — have acknowledged the necessity of such restrictions in rules of positive law. It may be said that the authors of art. 1 of the Code had a vague idea of inserting a similar provision. Unfortunately, the wording they used reflects mainly the political ideas of the régime, and the application of the principle expressed in this article depends on the quality of the courts and on the intrinsic value of the principles which these courts have to administer. Viewed in connection with the fundamental ideas of the Bolshevist legislation one cannot but be anxious that the reservation in favour of the «social economic purpose» may turn to nought the protection of the civil rights established by the Code.

Civil disputes must be decided by courts of law, and all citizens are equally entitled to acquire civil rights and to incur civil obligations, and no one can be deprived of or restricted in his rights otherwise than by a way defined in the law. A citizen of the Soviet Republic has accordingly the right of free travel and free settlement within the territory of the Republic. He has a free choice of a profession. He can acquire and dispose of property, make contracts, incur liabilities, organise constitutions subject to other provisions of the law. The Code fixes the majority at 18 years instead of 21 as before. It acknowledges the existence of artificial persons such as corporations. These corporations are bound to have a statute duly confirmed or registered by the government. A body corporate can be suspended by the government if it deviates from the principles of its statutes or if it works against the interests of the State.

Foreign trade can be conducted either by individuals or by corporations only through the medium of the State.

All actionable rights are extinguished three years after the rights have been created.

The Code proceeds with the enumeration of the *res extra commercium*. It is in these provisions, as also in the following rules concerning *iura iurem* that we find how far the Bolshevist legislation has gone from its initial stages. It is true that,even in 1918 and 1919, when the confiscatory policy of the Bolshevist Government was at its height, the Bolshevists never dared to abolish private property *per se*. They went gradually by stages nationalising one day one thing and the next day another. The result was that when the new economic policy was declared, the government was bound to retract and to start with the partial denationalisation of the various nationalised goods. The rules of the new Code show us what has been left of the original communistic plan. Land property is abolished altogether and land declared to be *res extra commercium*.*) The ownership of land can be enjoyed only in the form of a lease or use. The Code states proudly that it abolishes the distinction of realty and personalty. In Russia, Russian Soviet law will know only personalty. *Res extra commercium* are also the nationalised undertakings, nationalised vessels and buildings, arms, explosives, ammunition, poisons and cancelled securities of the old régime. The meaning of these rules lies in the gulf they create between the old order and the new. *Res extra commercium* are now things of the

*) A special land law was issued on Oct. 30, 1922 dealing with the use of land. It is based on the principle that a lease with no time limit is granted to persons who will work the land themselves. Personal work of the lessee is essential. No one can obtain a larger plot than he could work himself or with his family. Hired labour and sublease are only admitted by exceptions. All disputes concerning land are exempted from the jurisdiction of civil courts and are decided by special land commission. The law is worth of a special study.

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past which have been swept away by the first storm of the communist legislation. There is no restriction, for instance, as to securities generally. Only the old securities are cancelled and declared to be *res extra commercium*. New can be created with the authorisation of the State. The same applies to industrial undertakings, sea-going vessels and buildings. The legislator confirms what he has done in his earliest stage, but he does not want to proceed on the same lines any more. He sets out this with some detail in the first chapter of the second part of the Code which is intitulated «the right of property». This heading in particular was naturally very obnoxious to the orthodox Communist whose own theory was based on the assumption that property is an institution which must be removed altogether, and the author of the Code had apparently no little trouble in order to conciliate the requirements of the communist doctrine with the necessities of the new economic policy. On the main point the new economic policy achieved a secure victory. Private property was acknowledged and confirmed as such. Art. 52 reads «there are three sorts of property (a) State property (b) co-operative property (c) private property».

Private property is thus an acknowledged and legalised institution. and its scope can be seen if we consider what kind of property is reserved as State or co-operative property.

Art. 53 states that lands, minerals, forests, water-ways, railways, and airships can be only property of the State. State property is subdivided into nationalised and municipalised, though no details are given as to what kind of property comes under the one or the other heading. Still, we can say that real property situate in towns, including building and unbuilt plots, is municipalised, viz., municipal property, whereas the land outside the towns, all minerals, forests, etc., are direct property of the State.

The distinction seems to be,so far as the Code goes, mainly a technical one.

The setting up of co-operative property, viz., property belonging to co-operative organisations as a special category has no meaning and is probably explained by some political considerations. With a few exceptions the co-operatives are placed in the same position as private persons; they are however, not restricted as to the ownership of industrial undertakings with a large number of workmen.

We have already learnt from the preceding articles that the new law acknowledges only personalty. Realty is now outside the civil law altogether; it became now entirely a subject matter of public law.

When we come to the description of «private property» in the communist Code, we naturally find there only personal rights.

The following «chattels» can be held in private property under the new rule.

1. The non-municipalised buildings, namely those buildings in town areas which have not been taken over by the municipality. They are personalty because the land on which they are built is only leased from the town, and buildings on land not belonging to the owner of the building are personalty in Russian law.
2. Commercial undertakings.
3. Industrial undertakings provided the number of the workmen engaged thereon does not exceed a certain number defined in special laws.
4. Means of production (machinery and fittings).
5. Money.
6. Securities, including gold and silver coin and foreign currencies.
7. Personal effects and necessities of consumption.

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8. Goods, the sale of which is not forbidden by law.
9. Other property which is not declared *extra commercium*.

By virtue of a special concession private property can be acquired on an industrial undertaking with a number of workmen exceeding the aforesaid limit and on any other enterprise which may be considered of public importance.

The above distinction means that whereas with regard to large industrial undertakings property can be acquired only under special permit of the State, property with regard to the other «chattels» enumerated in par. 54 is not subject to this restriction. The owner has the right to possess, use and dispose of his property and to claim his property from any detentor. It is specially provided that the former owners, whose property has been expropriated in accordance with the revolutionary law or has passed generally into the possession of the working people before May 22, 1922, are not entitled to recover their property. This very important provision means to dispose of any claims arising out of the nationalisation which has been effected during the first years of the Bolshevist régime, and must kill a lot of hopes. The code makes here one step backwards even with regard to the previous Bolshevist legislation. It was, e. g. enacted in March, 1922, that the unfortunate people whom we have got to designate under the style of «former owners» were entitled to recover at least their personal effects from the «actual detentors». This rule meant to mitigate the absurdities and cruelties of the wholesale spoliation in which the Soviet régime indulged in its first years. This decree is, however, cancelled by the new Code. The remaining dispositions of the code relating to property do not present anything of special interest and importance. They are based, so far as we can judge, mainly on the paragraphs of the old draft referred to above. They contain, however, new rules concerning requisition and confiscation with which we can conveniently deal now.

These rules state openly that the old principles of confiscating and requisitioning anything from anybody are to be cancelled in order to bring the matter in agreement with the new economic policy.

However, the reading of the rules does not inspire with much confidence in the inviolability of property either. They distinguish, however, between requisitions and confiscations, the difference lying in the compensation which is allowed for the requisition. The requisition is applied in cases of public necessity by order of the Council of Labour of Defence. The confiscation is fixed at the market price of the requisitioned goods by a special local authority. Confiscation is applied either by a judgment of the courts, revolutionary tribunal or the extraordinary commissions (the famous Tche-Ka) or by order of the administrative authorities.

Property of the undertakings which are worked under a concession granted by the State can be confiscated only subject to the terms of the concession agreement. Personal effects and foodstuffs required for personal consumption and instruments of work are exempt from confiscation. Subject to confiscation are besides, arms, explosives, etc. — the cancelled securities, namely Government stock and private shares of the former order, and the property of Russians who have fled from Soviet Russia. The wide scope accorded to the executive authorities in connection with confiscation makes these elaborate rules rather disquieting.

The Code devotes considerable attention to the so-called building leases, viz. to contracts under which the municipalities lease unbuilt plots of land in towns to private persons for building purposes. It is worth while mentioning that the term of such building leases is fixed at 49 years for stone buildings and

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at 20 years for other buildings. During the period of the building lease the builder is entitled to all benefits and, on the expiration of the lease, the building becomes the property of the municipality which is, however, bound to compensate the builder at the full value of the building. The builder can during the term of the lease dispose of his lease to third persons and raise mortgages.

The next chapter (art. 85-105) is devoted to mortgages, or more correctly to pledges, as everything which can be mortgaged is treated as personalty. A pledge is created either by a contract or by special rules of the law. The contract must be in writing. The pledged property must be transferred to the creditor, with the exception of building and building leases. The law allows subsequent pledges or charges with the privilege of the prior charge. These rules also are condensed versions of the old draft.

We now come to the third part of the Code — to the law of obligation which occupies the bulk of the new law, namely art. 126-415.

One should think that this chapter would be particularly affected by the social and political ideas of the Bolshevist authorities, and one is rather astonished on finding that this is not the case. The whole section seems to be copied, so far as general principles go, from the Imperial draft which we have mentioned so often and accomodated to the obvious demands of the new régime. The generous ideas of the new school of civil law which worked hard in order to soften the strict interpretation of the law and to bring it in harmony with the conditions of life and the just demands of the lower classes, have had hardly any effect at all,and it seems that when the author was free from particular political prejudices he was bent on *ius strictum* and nothing else. This is particularly illustrated by the short time limits which are so popular with the author.

The Code states that the obligations are created either by contract or by other causes indicated in the law and particularly by unjustified profit or damage done. The main source of the obligations is naturally a contract, and the Code deals separately with the following contracts:

a) lease
b) sale
c) exchange
d) loan
e) contract of enterprise
f) guarantee
g) mandate
h) partnership and societies.
i) insurance (*)

It deals further with obligations created by unjustified profits or by damage done, «torts». The general rules concerning all obligations or contracts do not very materially differ from the civil legislation of any ordinary capitalist State. The full consensus of the parties to all the points of the contract is required; the contract must be in writing; if the subject matter exceeds 500 gold roubles (£50); it must be certified or registered in most cases when one of the parties is the Crown or an industrial undertaking; the execution of the contract can be guaranteed by a contractual fine, the amount of which can, however, be reduced by the courts. The debtor is free from the execution of the obligation if he proves that he is unable to execute owing to circumstances which he could not avoid or owing to the animus or negligence of the debtor. The force majeure clause can be suppressed by a special provision of the contract.

We shall cast a very brief glance on those provisions of the Code relating to contracts which are characteristic of the present political régime in Russia.

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*) The relations between master and servant (locatio conductio operarum) are regulated by a special «law on labour».

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a) *Lease.* A lease for a term exceeding one year must be in writing. Its maximum term cannot exceed 12 years. It can be renewed by a new contract for a new period or by *tacito consensu* for an indefinite term, subject to three months' notice. However, when the leaseholder is a government authority or a working man, or employee, pupil of a State school, invalid, or a member of a family of persons serving in the Red Army, the term of the lease is automatically prolonged, the consent of the lessor is not required and he cannot give notice. In these cases the rents must be within the limits fixed by local authority.

b) *Purchase and sale.* The new Code contains some restrictions which ought to be mentioned. The regulations concerning purchase and sale contain a restriction with regard to the purchase of houses. This restriction amounts to a prohibition to concentrate in the hands of one person or of one family more than one building. Correspondingly a person or a family cannot sell houses more than once during three years. The State Bank has the monopoly for the purchase and sale of gold, silver and platinum coins and of foreign exchange. Private persons can freely dispose only of precious metals in ingots and of precious stones. They can also freely purchase and sell foreign currency, but only through the medium of the State Bank.

The other regulations concerning the contract of sale contain nothing politically characteristic. They repeat the rules of the old draft.

The same can be said of the other contract, but very few words are sufficient in order to point out the salient points of the new Code.

c) *Contracts of loan* must be in writing, whenever the borrowed amount exceeds 50 gold roubles (£5). The interest accrues on the loan only if provided for in the contract. In any case it accrues only on the capital. Interests on interests are prohibited. This restriction, however, does not affect banks.

d) *The contract of guarantee* must also be in writing. The guarantor and the principal debtor are responsible jointly and separately. The creditor can sue them both; if he sues the guarantor only, the guarantor is bound to notify the debtor, if he intends to make payment in his stead. The guarantor can be called upon only within three months after maturity of the debt. If the payment is fixed on demand the guarantor remains liable within one year after the execution of the contract of guarantee.

There is nothing of particular interest in the provisions of the Code concerning the contract of work, the mandatum or power of attorney or the contract of insurance. We note, i.a. the short term which has been fixed for the validity of the power of attorney; it cannot be used for the period exceeding three years and if the time limit of the power is not stated therein, the power is valid during one year only.

e) The new Code deals more fully with *the contract or partnerships or societies.* It distinguishes the following groups of partnerships.

1) Simple partnerships in which each partner is responsible pro parte rata, for his part.

2) An unlimited partnership where the responsibility of all the partners is limited.

3) A partnership with silent partners where the managing partners have unlimited responsibility and the silent partners are limited to the amount of their share.

4) A partnership with limited liability where the liability of the partners is limited to an amount representing a certain multiplied amount of their shares and

5) Companies with limited liability or joint stock companies.

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With the exception of the partnership mentioned under all the other partnerships trade under the firm of the partnership. The contracts must be in writing. The limited partnership and limited companies are established subject to a special permit or concession of the government.

It is not necessary to deal with the first three groups, as the new Code does not contain any important innovations as compared with the old law. The type of the limited partnership, under (4) was unknown to the Russian law, and the few regulations of the new Code are taken over from the corresponding German law.

As regards joint stock companies, the new Code presents distinct steps backwards as compared with the old law.

Imperial Russia required government authority for the creation of every joint stock company. When the first revolution broke out, the Provisional Government issued a law which was eagerly awaited by the whole Russian industrial and commercial world and which replaced the old concession system by a system of simple registration. A new company could be formed, subject only to a few formalities the performance of which was examined by government autorities similarly to the registrar of joint stock companies in this country. Statutes of the company must be passed through various government authorities in order to be confirmed. The share capital must be not less than 100.000 gold roubles (£10.000).

After the confirmation of the statutes by the government and the paying up of the share capital, the company has to hold statutory meetings in order to resolve that it is duly constituted. Then, the company has again to apply to the government for registration and only after due registration can the company commence operations and act as a separate body corporate. The management of the company is construed on the lines of the old law.

The rules on «torts» and unjustified profits contain nothing new. It is worth while, however, to mention that persons who get enriched for the reason of other persons acting illegally or against the interest of the Crown are bound to return to the Crown whatever they obtained without consideration. The Code concludes with a few rules concerning succession and testaments. We take the following from them.

Nobody can inherit, either by will or testament, more than 10.000 gold roubles (£1.000). If the estate of the deceased exceeds 10.000 roubles the excess goes to the Crown. If the division of the estate is impracticable the law provides for joint ownership. The 10.000 gold roubles limit does not apply to the rights arising out of contracts entered into by the Crown with private persons concerning concessions, building leases, etc. They remain intact for the time of the validity of these contracts.

The following persons only are entitled to inherit, either by testament or will: the direct descendants (childern or granchildern and so forth) and the surviving husband or wife, and also destitute persons who, being unable to work were actually maintained by the deceased not less than one year before his death. All the heirs participate in equal parts, unless otherwise provided by a last will or testament. The testament must be registered with a notary. If the heirs do not appear within 6 months after the death, the estate goes to the Crown.

The new Code has come into force only a few months ago, and we do not know how it works. We cannot even pass a definite judgment on it, unless we want to indulge in purely negative criticism for which the logical inconsistencies, the obvious mistakes, the careless and often ignorant drafting of the new

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rules afford a wide scope. But all this is hardly helpful. One must not shut one's eyes to the real importance which the Code has. It is not a great legislative achievment. It does not represent any real advance in civil law. But it is a milestone in the great struggle between the communist Utopia and the bitter necessities of economic development. The end of this struggle is not yet in sight. We do not even know how long the present stage, as represented by the Code, will last. Still, so long as the Code remains the law of Russia, we have to take it for what it is worth.

The new law asserts the supremacy of the State in dealing with civil rights. It does not admit ownership of land, it keeps the big industries under the direct control of the State. But, on the other hand, it has decreed private property, it has admitted interest on loans, joint stock companies and all the apparatus of capitalist society. Communism has abdicated. It has buried itself when it wrote the heading «on private property» in the new Code. And it will hardly revive. Let us, without prejudice or bias, *sine ira et studio*, follow the further development. If the next step will be as far of the new Code as the new Code itself has wandered away from the original communist legislation of 1917-1921, there is still hope left.

THE CONDITION OF THE RUSSIAN TEXTILE INDUSTRY.

Of all branches of the Russian industry the textile deserves particular attention. The output of textiles, as well as their sales and the provision of raw materials in 1922 have undergone great changes, as compared with 1921.

In spite of a considerable increase in the output of the textile indus ry in 1922, as compared with 1920 and 1921, the general conditions of that branch of production at the beginning of 1923 tend to prove, even more conclusively than those of any other branch, that, in spite of the compromise between Capitalism and Communism in the New Economic Policy, the Communist industry is rapidly nearing its inevitable collapse.

The fact that the textile industry is so particularly indicative of the general conditions is due to the following causes: 1) The rôle of the textile industry in the Russian national income has always been very important. In 1913, out of the total gross output of the Russian manufacturing industries, approximately valued at 4.250 million gold roubles*), the textile industry was responsible for 1.440 million roubles' worth, or for 34 p. cent, of the whole. Then, 2) The textile industry in Russia, always held and is still holding a particularly advantageous position with regard to the disposal of its products. The law of marginal utility tends now to make a yard of textile material almost as precious in the eyes of the population, as a piece of bread. The production of industrial equipment — the heavy industry — naturally tends to recede to the background in the eyes of the consumer, as compared with the textile industry.

Accordingly, if even the textile industry, in spite of the advantages it enjoys, is nearing inevitable collapse, the Communist economic organisation is evidently doomed to fall within a very short time.

*) In European Russia: manufacturing concerns — 3.840 million roubles, and concerns subject to excise duties 410 millions. The net profit reached 1.003 mil. and 130 milions respectively. (See, S. N. Prokopovitch: «National Income»).

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As to the separate facts, characteristic of the present condition of the textile industry, they are as follows.

The output. The need of textile products is enormous. As soon as the Russian population has obtained the negligible degree of economic freedom conferred on it by the New Economic Policy, its demand, in the first instance, have been directed to textile fabrics. Neither the stocks of fabrics available in Russia, nor the output of the Russian industry, were able to meet the demand. In spite of the extreme shortage of foreign exchange, textiles had to be imported to Russia from abroad.

At the Congress of the Textile Industry, in October, 1922, Prof. Kafenhaus has stated that the value of foreign fabrics and ready-made clothing imported to Russia during the first six months of 1922, calculated on the basis of the prices of 1913, reached the figure of 45 million gold roubles, which, according to present standards, is an enormous amount. If to this are added the textiles imported through Batum, the Far-Eastern Republic and smuggled across the Central-Asia frontier, we find that 40 p. cent. of the whole amount of textile goods consumed in Soviet Russia was imported from abroad. («E. J.», 17. 10. 22).

The re-organisation of industrial concerns on commercial lines has given an impetus to the production of cotton, flax, hemp and silk, which has been on an increase since October, 1921.

An idea of this increase is given by a table, compiled by Engineer A. A. Lebedeff, which appeared in the «Khlopkovoie Dielo».*) It covered the period from October 1st, 1921, to July 1st, 1922; here, we have supplemented it by later data up to January 1st, 1923.

Production of the cotton industry:

Months	Yarn (1.000 poods)	Coarse fabrics (Million arshin.)	Finish. fabrics (Million arshin.)	Months	Yarn (1.000 poods)	Coarse fabrics (Million arshin.)	Finish. fabrics (Million arshin.)
October 1921 ..	119	11.7	17.7	June 1922 ..	290	52.7	41.5
Novemb. » ...	171	19.4	23.7	July » ...	180	30.1	31.9
Decem. » ...	288	32.2	37.0	August » ...	240	41.4	29.5
January 1922 ..	179	36.8	34.0	Septem. » ...	330	59.0	40.0
February » ...	311	42.9	36.6	October » ...	383	70.0	58.6
March » ...	364	58.9	46.8	Novem. » ...	375	65.8	55.6
April » ...	184	28.8	25.8	Decem. » ...	409	73.9	62.6
May » ...	287	46.5	34.8				

The representatives of the Soviet Government, who were at pain to persuade both their opponents and their supporters that the communistic economic organisation is now finding its way out of the impasse, used of late to point to the growth of production in the branches working directly for the market, and, particularly, to that in the output of the principal among such industries, viz. the textile. In his report to the X Congress of Soviets, the Chairman of the S. C. N. E., P. A. Bogdanoff, emphasising the difficult conditions of pro-

*) Report to the V All-Russian Congress of Textile Workers, October 7th, 1922. («Khlopkovoe Dielo», № 9-10, 1922). The figures given by A. A. Lebedeff in the cassc of some ssparats months somewhat differ from those given before in Communist Goverоment publications and quoted in № № 6 and 7-8 of the «Russian Economist». The yearly total, however, is very slightly affected by these discrepancies.

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duction and of the market, with which the industry had to struggle in 1922, pointed to the great improvement in the textile industry as a proof of its being able to cope with its tasks. These successes were also emphasised by L. B. Kameneff in his report.

It is our purpose to find out, whether the textile industry is really improving and, if so, whether such improvement can be regarded as healthy and lasting.

How much has the output actually increased? By comparing the figures for 1921 and 1922, we arrive at the following results (000 omitted):

Years	Linen Industry		Cotton Industry			Woollen Industry		
	Yarn (poods)	Tissues (arsh.)	Yarn (poods)	Coarse fabrics (arshines)	Finish. fabrics (arshines)	Yarn (poods)	Coarse fabrics (arshines)	Finish. fabrics (arshines)
1921	495	38.191	1.117	158.236	214.094	371	12.484	19.357
1922	1.225	93.691	3.496	584.039	470.041	731	38.183	31.667
Percentage incr..	145 p.c.	145 p.c.	214 p.c.	270 p.c.	120 p.c.	97 p.c.	305 p.c.	64 p.c.

Thus, the output in 1922 was about 2 to 2½ times that of 1921. Relatively it is a great success, but absolutely the increase is practically insignificant. There is nothing like a return to pre-war standards of output. As stated by the Chairman of the S. C. N. E., P. A. Bogdanoff, at the Congress of Textile Workers, the output of the cotton industry is five times smaller than it was before the war, while the consumption of fuel is three times greater. At the same Congress it was stated that the linen industry produces 35-40 p- cent., the hemp industry — 21 p. cent.; the knitting industry — 17 p. cent. and the silk industry — 3 p. cent. of their respective pre-war output. («E. J.» 13. 10. 22).

The stability of the improvement. One should note that, in the second half of 1922, the increase of production was checked. To see it, one should only compare the figures given in the № 7-8 of this Journal for the first half of 1922 with those for the second half of the year, which are given below. Already at the time when P. A. Bogdanoff was boasting of the successes achieved by the textile industry, at the Xth Congress of Soviets, it was clear to him that the improvement is coming to an end. He refers to this fact *en passant* in the following words: «*The improvement now being witnessed in the production of the light industry is outstripping the increase in our production raw materials.* In the course of the current year we have got to purchase abroad 2 million poods of cotton, as well as 300.000 poods of wool, because our own fine wool sheep-breeding is entirely ruined. One of our principal tasks in the coming year will be that of improving our raw material production». («Izv.» 27. 12. 22).

This is an imminent and great danger. Beside the causes pointed to by P. A. Bogdanoff, that danger has other causes as well. The first among them is the high cost of production, tending to make reproduction negative. As a result, the industry is living on capital, the stocks of raw materials and of finished goods being gradually exhausted. The second cause is the extreme fall in the purchasing capacity of the population, which became very marked as soon as the first feverish demands have been met. As early as in October, 1922, in his speech referred to above at the Congress of Textile Workers,

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Prof. Kafenhaus insisted on the necessity of protecting the Russian textiel industry against foreign competition.

The high costs of production. When quoting the «Characteristic of the general condition of industry, according to the Budget of the S. C. N. E. for the October-December quarter of 1922», given by Engineers Yakub and Abramovitch, we have had the occasion to point that the work of nationalised industrial concerns results in a loss reaching 38 p. cent. In their «characteristic», Engineers Yakub and Abramovitch are classing, among the branches of nationalised industries working definitely at a loss, the metal, electrical, coal, napthha, and ore and gold mining industries. The branches working at a profit, according to them, are: the textile industry, the production of foodstuffs, the leather, the chemical, the paper and the silicate industries. To this, however, they add the reservation («E. J.», 7 and 8, 10. 22), that the meaning attached by them to the word «profit» is purely conventional: «To start with, a few words about the actual meanings of the terms «profit» and «loss». When using these terms we do not include the cost of depreciation (in the form of any repairs or restorations); neither do we take into account, when calculating the costs, the interests on the capital invested or the depreciation of money.»

Profits and losses having been calculated on this rather peculiar basis, the profits of the textile industry were expected to amount in the fourth quarter of 1922 to 20 p. cent. in the case of the cotton industry and to 17 p. cent. in that of the linen industry. The hemp industry was expected to work at a definite loss. The woollen industry also, apparently, was working at a loss, because, to make both ends meet after its «re-organisation on commercial lines», it «intended to sell a part of its stocks of finished goods».

What are the causes that exercise so adverse an effect on the cost of production? According to Yakub and Abramovitch, they are mainly to be found in the work done for Government institutions. We have already had the occasion to dwell on the ruinous effects of such work on the business of «commercialised» concerns: Government institutions either do not pay at all for their orders, or are paying very badly. Thus, the greater losses incurred by the linen industry, as compared with the cotton industry, depend, to a very considerable extent, on the fact that the former is working on Government orders to the extent of 60 p. cent. of its production, and the latter to only 40 p. cent. Government orders are an overhead charge on the production. The second cause of high costs is the nearly three-fold increase in the expenditure on fuel in 1922, as compared with 1908 (15.5 p. cent. of the total costs as against 5.5 p. cent.). Other technical and commercial causes of high costs, which are due to the increase in the productivity of the textile industry and the exhaustion of old stocks of auxiliary materials, owing to the low output of other branches of Russian industry, are dealt with by A. A. Lebedeff («Khlopk. Dielo», № 9-10, 1922).

Losses. Let us now return to the question, to what extent the production proved to be profitable or the reverse. Beside the reservation already made with regard to the meaning of the terms «profit» and «loss», we should add that the problem is greatly complicated by the fact that the units in which prices are measured — Soviet roubles, gold roubles or «merchandise roubles» —have long become purely conventional terms, devoid of any definite meaning, subject to enormous changes in time and, practically, almost imaginary quantities.

But even without taking these reservations into account, we are bound

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to say that all the expectations of Engineers Yakub and Abramovitch, as to the profits to be earned by the textile industry have been disappointed, and, as a matter of fact, the textile industry was working at a loss.

The conditions in which the textile industry had to dispose of its products in the market during the first nine months of 1922, can be seen from the table below.

Printed cotton fabric № 6; pre-war price — 18 cop. per arshine.

Date:	Cost of production	Price fixed by the syndicate	Market price actually obtain.
	Soviet	Roubles	
March 25th	198.000	190.000	150.000
April 24th	380.000	240.000	200.000
May 8th	—	290.000	240.000
May 15th	610.000	375.000	290.000
May 29th	—	550.000	375.000
June 15th	625.000	625.000	550.000-375.000
August 1st	—	687.000	625.000
August 15th	825.000	825.000	687.000
September 15th	—	825.000	825.000
October 2nd	1.520.000	1.520.000	1.100.000

(«Ec. J.» 13. 12. 22)

The exhaustion of the market. We see that the policy of raising prices in advance failed to yield satisfactory results; throughout the whole year prices did not cover the costs. In the beginning of 1923 it has proved to be definitely inexpedient. The purchasing capacity of the so-called «free» market was evidently overtaxed. Highly instructive in this respect is the last 14th Bulletin of the Merchandise Index published by the Planning Commission, which points to the fact that the disposal of goods in the market is beginning to meet with difficulties and that a decline has set in in the real prices of all descriptions of textiles. The textile group as a whole, as well as the majority of its separate branches, as late as in the course of the last quarter of 1922, were still, as a rule, going ahead of the general rise in prices. In January, 1923, however, the rise in the prices of textiles was continually lagging behind that of prices in general, with the result that in January the real prices of textiles have considerably fallen. This change for the worse in the conditions of the textile market can be seen from the following table, in which the rise or fall in the real value of textiles is expressed in percentages of the changes in the general price level:

	October	Novemb.	Decemb.	January
Cotton goods	+ 29	+ 10	+ 50	—18
Flax, hemp and their products	+ 23	0	— 6	— 4
Wool and woollen goods	+ 18	+ 11	+ 18	— 7
Textile raw materials	+ 11	+ 13	— 3	—17
» fabrics	+ 22	+ 10	+ 34	— 9
Average for the textile industry	+ 27	+ 7	+ 28	—13

The crisis of disposal has come and is, apparently, making itself felt. At the recent congress of representatives of the textile syndicate, its Chairman, V.P. Nogin, has pointed to the necessity of a reduction in the supply of goods

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in Moscow and of a transfer of activities to the provincial markets. («E. J.» 4. 2. 23). It thus appears that the demand of the prosperous Communist minority is not sufficient to build on it an adequate market for the products of the textile industry. The textile industry, as all other branches of production, has finally got into the blind alley of the fall in the purchasing capacity of the population. The first signs of this fall have become evident as early as in March, 1922. The cause of this fall is to be found in the general decline of production and in the decrease of the national income from all branches of the national economy of Russia.

The textile industry, in increasing its output, has got too far beyond the limits set by the depressed condition of all other branches of production in Russia. Its advance was not supported by a similar movement in other branches. Its impetus is gradually dwindling, as this is always the case with any one who rushes too far and loses contact with the main body of forces on his side. Accordingly, after having suffered considerable losses, the textile industry is forced to retreat to its former positions. What were the actual losses suffered by the textile industry in its advance, we are going to show.

The stocks of raw materials. That the increase in the production of the textile industry had no really solid basis on which to grow, and that the essential elements of production, viz. the stocks of raw materials and the capital in the form of finished goods, were bound to become exhausted, was made sufficiently clear to the reader by the figures of costs, as far at least as these figures can be regarded as correct, and of market prices, which were given above.

What did really happen to the material basis of the textile industry? Its fate was absolutely similar to that of the essential elements of production in every other branch of industry. In spite of the evasive character of L. B. Kameneff's speech at the Xth Congress of Soviets (23. 12. 22), it makes the position sufficiently clear. Kameneff says: «We have been very bad traders, and have actually been guilty of overtrading. This fault of ours we cannot conceal. It can be explained by the lack of cash resources. We had to sell at too low prices to be able to provide the wherewithall to pay wages; there was no regular registration of sales, etc. *Our material resources have been depleted.* Until recently, all losses suffered by the industry have been made good on account of *cheap* raw materials (he should rather have said — *free*, because they were actually inherited from the capitalistic régime. *Edit.*).

«As a result, we had to face either the final ruin of the production of raw materials, or an increase in the prices of the latter and, consequently, in the cost of the product, to a level, at which it was beyond the purchasing capacity of the town and village population. The position is rendered still worse by a «considerable rise in wages». The real crux of the problem, however, is not in bad trading alone. Not only trading was bad, but the whole economic organisation was at fault.

What, then, is the actual position with raw materials? In a former article we have already quoted the figures given by Rykoff.*) From January 1st to August 1st, 1922, the stocks of cotton have decreased by 2.5 million poods (6.530.000 and 4.500.000 poods respectively); those of wool — from 1.117.000 poods on January 1st, to 731.000 poods on September 1st, 1922, or by 0.38 mil. poods; those of flax — from 4.750.000 poods on Jan. 1st, to 1.460.000 pods on June 1st, 1922, or by 3.29 million poods.

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*) See, «Russ. Econ.», p. 2625.

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In December 1922, the position became worse still. F. I. Plenkin writes: «The available stocks of cotton cannot last longer than to March 15th, 1923». *) A. A. Lebedeff gives a somewhat less pessimistic account of the situation. **) He has given a computation of the stocks available on August 1st, 1922. Taking into account the cotton crop of 1922 in Turkestan, the stocks at the factories of the Cotton Committee and in the latter's warehouses, as well as the cotton to be purchased in Bokhara, Khorezme, Persia and the Caucasus, and actually delivered, he puts the whole of the stock available for the cotton industry for the coming season af 3.700.000 poods of cotton of Russian origin. Putting the monthly expenditure of cotton at the factories at 400.000 poods, the industry is supplied with cotton for nine months from August 1st, 1922, to May, 1923.

With regard to flax, according to A.A. Lebedeff, the position is as follows: «The stocks of flax at the factories on August 1st, 1922, amounted to 1.500.000 poods, of which 0.5 mil. poods are not quite fit for spinning. To carry out the programme, for the period from October 1st, 1922, to October 1st, 1923, it would be necessary to have up to 2.5 million poods of flax. It is absolutely necessary urgently to obtain flax, before the season is over. To do this, the factories need very large amounts of money, which they have not got; even before the revolution they used to buy flax on credit. Otherwise flax is bound to be exported abroad, or to get into some strong hands, while the factories will be left without raw material».

The quantities of wool needed for the year's work, to produce a total of 27.152.000 arshines of woollen fabrics (viz. (in 1.000 arshines): coarse cloth— 6.350; fine cloth — 7.000; pure and mixed woollen fabrics — 13.802; total — 27.152.000 arshines), according to Lebedeff, are as follows: merino, washed — 197; medium grade — 44; coarse wool — 363, or a total of 604.000 poods.

The stocks available on September 1st, 1922, were:

	Merino	Medium	Coarse.
	(1.000 poods)		
In the possession of the trusts	45	40	255
» » » » » «Wool» Co	45	8	276
In the possession of various individuals and organisation.	20	20	15
Total	110	68	546

According to later data («Izv.» 18. 1. 23), the woollen industry was provided with raw materials, on the average, only for 4 months, up to May, 1923.

How great was the decrease in the supply of raw materials for the textile industry? What are the prospects of its re-establishment? Let us examine the available sources of supply.

I. Liubimoff («Ec. J.» 26. 12. 22) writes: «The area sown with cotton in Turkestan (exclusive of Khiva and Bokhara)***) has fallen from 578.000

*) See article «Industry in figures», «E. J.», 24. 12. 22.

**) «The condition of the Textile Industry in Russia», «Khlopk. Dielo», № 9-10, 1922.

***) Including Khiva and Bokhara, the total area under cotton in Turkestan was: in 1916 — 714.346 des.; in 1915 — 679.033 des.; in 1914 — 566.328 des.; in 1913 — 497.858 des. (See «Transactions of the Section of Industry and Commerce», Moscow, 1920).

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des. in 1916 to 52.000 des. in 1922, a reduction of 91 p. cent... The yield of fibre has declined from 15.000.000 poods to 0.6-0.7 mil. poods. The yield of crops per dessiatin has fallen from 80-90 poods to 30-40 poods».

A. A. Lebedeff («Khlopk. Dielo», № 9-10) writes: «Our sources of wool supply have been weakened, as seen from the following table,*) showing the numbers of sheep, camels and goats in European and Asiatic Russia in 1921, according to the data of the Commissariat of Agriculture:

	Coarse sheep.	Merinos	Camels	Goats
1921	50.000.000	200.000	1.300.000	1.500.000
1916	80.000.000	2.500.000	—	—

Considering the figures of the census of 1916, we see that the total number of sheep decreased by 35 p. cent. up to 1921, while in 1922 the decrease reached 70 p. cent. In the case of merinos, the reduction was 90 p. cent. and 97 p. cent. respectively (according to the Central Statistical Office, Lossitzky and Prof. Ivanoff)»**).

By the way, we should point that, before the war, Russia used to export coarse wool, merino wool forming only 2 to 3 p. cent. of the total exported. The importation of wool from abroad, on the other hand, tended to grow, and this mainly on account of the increasing purchases abroad of merino wool. Now, the Russian source of supply of merinoe wool has, practically, ceased to exist.

Somewhat better is the position with flax. The area under fiber flax in 1922 amounts to about 400.000 dessiatins or about 50 p. cent. of the pre-war area, while the yearly yield of fiber flax is 5 million poods or about 25 p. cent. of the pre-war figures. According to V. S. Koziansky, a member of the Board of the «Lnotorg» («Flax Trade»), the amount available for disposal in the market may reach 3 to 3.5 million poods. («Ec. J.», 9. 12. 22).

To sum up the above, we are bound to say that only the linen industry appears to be provided with raw materials produced in Russia. Both the cotton and the woollen industries are greatly dependent on supplies of raw materials from abroad.

This fact is one of decisive importance. It strikes at the very roots of the successes achieved by the textile industry in the course of 1922.

For the Communistic nationalised industry *Russian* raw materials are always synonimous with *cheap* raw materials. Most of them have never been paid for, because they were requisitioned, sequestrated etc. from their former owners. The rest of them, i. e. raw materials produced after 1917, were also very cheap, because they were taken from the population under pressure, by means of various measures of regulation, fixed prices, compulsory exchange, etc., which were so freely applied by the dictatorial Communist Government.

If, even being in possession of these cheap raw materials, the textile industry in 1922, as we have had the occasion to show, was working at a loss, and, already in January, 1923, could not dispose of its products, what shall happen to it when it will have to work on expensive raw materials imported

*) The quantity of wool yielded per head is: 1) common coarse wool sheep — 2.4 R. lbs, washed; 2) merino — 2.5 R. lbs, washed; 3) camel — 9 R. lbs., cleaned and, 4) goat — 4 R. lbs. uncleaned.

**) The number of merinos in Russia in 1912 reached 3.7 millions; in 1922 they numbered only 100.000. («E. J.» 9. 12. 22; «Torg. Prom. Gaz.» 7. 12. 22).

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from abroad? Then, the Communist Government will be unable to apply its favourite measures of pressure to provide cheap raw materials for its factories. This will be beyond its power. Raw materials will have to be paid for in real money or in real gold. They are bound to prove expensive. It is clear that the roots of the tree of the Communist's textile industry, under the new economic policy, have already exhausted all the cheap nutritive elements that the Russian soil could yield, and have now struck the rocky ground of foreign raw materials. Even the « Red Merchant» A. M. Krasnostchekoff, who is not a particularly prominent figure in the Communistic hierarchy, realises that the position is hopeless. At the conference of the representatives of large industry and transport he said («Torg.-Prom. Gazeta», 20. 12. 22): «... The textile industry which, according to the Budget, was expected to yield a certain amount of revenue to the State, is now without raw materials. We have no cotton; we are short of wool; we have got to buy everything abroad, *and for this we have got no money. Even the textile industry, to make both ends meet, would have to consume the whole of its resources and then to remain without raw materials*».

He gives, on the whole, a correct idea of the situation. In any case, he is more right than were P. A. Bogdanoff and L. B. Kameneff in their statements before the Xth Congress of Soviets, to which we have had the occasion to refer.

There remains to add a few words. The Communist Government is now spending its last ammunition: the foreign agencies of the textile trusts are energetically purchasing raw materials in America and in England.

Cotton is being bought either at Liverpool, or direct from American firms. Purchasing operations are concentrated in the Textile Syndicate . Beside merchandise and exchange transactions with the Centrosoyous, the syndicate has obtained a credit for the purchase of cotton from the Commissariat of Finance, to the amount of 6 million gold roubles, and has secured credits from the State Bank for 11.33 million gold roubles. Up to January 26th, 1923, 13.200 bales of American and 1.075 bales of Egyptian cotton were purchased. Now, negotiations are being concluded about new contracts for another 6 or 7.000 bales («Ec.J.» 28. 1. 23). The Moscow Woollen Cloth Trust («Mossoukno») has bought abroad a quantity of merino wool, of which 4.700 poods have already arrived to Moscow and were distributed among the factories.

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THE PERSONNEL OF THE ORGANISATIONS CONTROLLING THE COMMUNIST INDUSTRIES.

The «Econ. Jizn» (4. 1. 23) published highly interesting data concerning the qualifications of the personnel placed in control of the industries under the Communist regime.

The materials published contain data concerning the number of Communists in the controlling bodies and the distribution of the personnel according to the education received and to the social class to which they belong.

The table below shows the distribution of the personnel of the Supreme Council of National Economy, i. e. of the body placed in supreme control of the industries.

	Number of separate boards	Number of employees			Heads of Admin. Bodies and Members of Boards								
		Total	Including Communists		Total number	Including Communists		Education received					
			Number	P. cent.		Number	P. cent.	Higher technical	Higher general	Secondary technical	Secondary general	Elementary technical	Elementary general
epartments and organisations ranking as Dptmts ...	14	4.478	166	3.7	105	19	18	28	54	2	11	1	9
rganisations ranking as Chief Administrations	13	5.542	215	3.9	274	52	19	106	98	3	32	4	31
yndicates	16	1.881	135	7.0	111	34	30.5	31	37	4	16	0	23
	43	11.901	516	4.3	490	105	21.4	165	189	9	59	5	63

Thus, the percentage of Communists among the actual workers of the organisation placed in supreme control of the economic life of the country, numbering 11.901, is only 4.3 p. cent. Among the higher officials of the S. C. N. E., however, the percentage of Communists is as high as 21.4 p. cent. The author of the article remarks, with a certain bitterness, that the fact that 95.7 p. cent. of the bulk of the employees of the S. C. N. E. are officially classed as independent, does not imply that they hold no political views whatever.

Among the experts in higher positions 72,3 p. cent. have received higher technical or general education.

Different is the composition of the Boards of trusts. According to an inquiry involving 300 trusts, the educational qualifications of the members of their Boards are as follows:

Total numbership of Boards	Spec. technical education			General education			Unspecified
	Higher	Secondary	Elementary or received at home	Higher	Secondary	Elementary or received at home	
875	223	67	17	43	139	365	21

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The percentage of persons with higher educational qualifications among the members of Boards of the trusts, thus, does not exceed 30.3 p. cent. The majority have received their education at home (43.7 p. cent.). «One should bear in mind, writes the «Ec. Jizn», that the term «home education» as applied to members of trust Boards, includes also former self-education in prison, which is mainly the case with Communists».

On the other hand, the political composition of the Boards of trusts is far more welcome to the Communist writer. It is shown in the following table.

Total numbership of Boards	Communists	Belonging to no party	Unspecified
875	325	502	48

Thus, Communists form 37.2 p. cent. of the whole, and persons belonging to no party — 57.4 p. cent.

As to the distribution of the members of trust Boards according to the social classes to which they belong, the inquiry shows that the percentage of workmen and peasants is 68 p. cent. of the total number. As a matter of fact, however, not all those registered as «workmen» or «peasants» really answer this description. The replies to the question about the main occupation before 1914, obtained as a result of the inquiry, gave the following distribution by professions:

Total numbership of Boards	Engineers	Landowners	Manufacturers	Professional men	Pecupation unspecified	Employees	Workmen	Peasants	Traders
875	232	1	27	12	86	237	256	6	18

Thus, as to real occupation, only 56.3 p. cent., instead of the 68 p. cent. shown, are workmen or peasants. Many have declared themselves as belonging to the privilleged classes of Soviet Russia only on account of their parents having formerly belonged to these classes.

An inquiry among the higher administrative personnel (directors of concerns) has yielded the following results, as to political parties to which they belong:

Total number	Before 1918	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	Unknown
1.951	259	96	125	274	498	629	70

Thus, 75 p. cent. of the whole administrative and technical personnel of the industry are politically independent.

According to educational qualifications, the distribution is as follows:

Total number	Higher	Secondary	Lower	Home	Unknown
1.951	387	445	932	142	45

Thus, only 19 p. cent. of the directors of concerns are men with university or higher college education; only 23 p. cent. have received secondary school education. All the rest, i. e. 58 p. cent., have received only elementary or home education or, as pointed by the «Econ. Jizn», have educated themselves in prison.

«Taking into account the small percentage of men belonging to political parties, says the author of the article in the «Ec. Jizn», the low educational

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qualifications of the members of the managing bodies of the concerns cannot be looked upon as a positive feature of the situation».

The distribution as to the time of joining the concerns is as follows:

Total number:	Communists	Other parties	Independent	Unknown
1951	441	2	1.458	50

This interesting table shows that only 13 p. cent. of the directors have been working in their concerns since 1918. The great majority have been at the works now managed by them for *no more than 2 years*.

If we take into account the fact that 58 p. cent. of the directors have received only elementary education and could have learned their business only from practical experience in the concern itself, we easily agree with the conclusion to which the author of the article quoted has come, viz. that «the Boards of the concerns are hardly in a position clearly to understand the commercial and technical aspect of their business, as well as to know their concerns themselves and to yield that minimum of efficiency which is required by commercial conditions and ensures the stability of the enterprise».

THE TRAGEDY OF THE LOSS OF EQUILIBRIUM ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE.

By M. V. Braikevitch.

Paper read before the Association on May 17th, 1923.

Some six months ago I wrote about the imminence of a stormy period of drastic and violent changes in the atmosphere of post-Versailles Europe *).

Two events have happened, sinsewhich have already brought about conerable changes in the European situation and are bound, in the nearest future, to have still more important consequences. The first of these two events was the French occupation of the Ruhr; the second is the Note, addressed by Lord to the Soviet Government on May 9th, 1923.

No doubt, these two events mean that we have entered the zone of the storm. These events have greatly increased the pressure in the economic and political atmosphere of both Western Europe and Russia. The climax of the storm has not yet been reached, but we are undoubtedly approaching it.

CH. I.

THE OCCUPATION OF THE RUHR AND LORD CURZON'S NOTE — TWO ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF EQUILIBRIUM.

However remote the Ruhr may appear to be from Moscow, I am inclined to think that Lord Curzon's Note to the Soviet Government stands in a very close economic and political connection with the French occupation of the Ruhr.

To make my conception clear, I would remind the reader of some facts of the recent past. Very soon after the Versailles conference, if not at the time

*) Q.v. « Communistic v. Capitalistic International », « Rus. Ec. » № 7-8.

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when it was in progress, many among the more important Allied statesmen, i.e. among those of them who not only dictated the future of nations, lightheartedly and with the only view of achieving an easy and passing succes, but were really inclined to consider the extent to which their dictations can be carried into effect, have come to realise that the new European international situation, created at Versailles, is very far from being perfect and lacks the necessary equilibrium.

Indeed, the problem of the rôle to be played in that new European arrangement by two important factors — Russia and Germany, remained unsolved, and was, practically relegated to the future.

Their rôles, as far as they have been taken into consideration at all, were, apparently, supposed to be those of some entirely passive objects, unconditionally abiding by the will of the Entente and ready to take or to leave any place or job which the Entente may wish to give them or to take away from them.

What was the basis on which the Allied statesmen of the less serious type, more inclined to prescribe than to consider the practicability of their prescriptions, built their expectations of the abject submission of Russia and Germany ?

In the case of Russia their hopes were based on her balkanisation, on civil war which was to a considerable extent encouraged from abroad, on Bolshevik dictatorship over the country and, finally, on her post—war economic exhaustion. In the case of Germany — on depriving her of a considerable part of her sources of coal and iron ore,on impossibly high amounts of reparations, to reduce which to the level of Germany's real paying capacity depended on the free will of the Entente, and, finally, on her actual disarmament.

In order to make this international arrangement stable the Allies were in need of possessing a really overhelming superiority in power and of the continual exercise of their dictatorship over the rest of Europe. Otherwise, the whole system was bound to collapse. As long as the spirit of victory was still alive and cemented tha bonds of the Entente, enhancing the préstige of the latter, while post-war economic conditions have not yet made themselves keenly felt in the life of the allied countries, the building erected at Versailles could, to a certain extent, be regarded as comparatively secure. But what was it to become with the passing of these conditions, with the return of the world to its work - a - day life ?

In brief, the old «system of European equilibrium» was replaced by the dictatorship of the Entente, and the feeling or, rather, the foreboding, of the tragedy involved in the loss of that equilibrium on the continent of Europe accompanied the birth of the «new régime» in Europe.

The Versailles Conference was followed by a whole series of attempts made by the Allies, by combined efforts to complete the building which was threatening to come down. In all these attempts they have invariably been faced with the same two aspects of the problem of European equilibrium, viz. with the respective positions of Russia and Germany.

When they discussed reparations and the guarantees of peace on the Franco-German frontier, they were, in fact, dealing with the position and the future rôle of Germany in European affairs.

Whenever they came to the problem of the economic reconstruction of Europe, they were invariably involved, in the first instance, in the discussion of Russia's future position and rôle in the European situation.

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The first of the two problems was a matter of particular interest to France; the second — to England.

Especially noteworthy and characteristic is the fact that every attempt at the solution of the first of these two problems independently of the second, had proved impracticable ; its solution proved to be impossible without the second problem having been solved first. Both these problems were only two different aspects of the same great problem — that of the loss of equilibrium on the continent of Europe.

All joint attempts of the Allies ended in failures. As a result of dictarship, post-war economic conditions have brought about a decline in the material powers and in the prestige of the Allies : both were dwindling. Accordingly, it was urgently necessary to complete the building.

This was the way in which the tragedy of the search for the lost equilibrium on the continent of Europe had developed up to the present.

Having failed in their joint efforts to solve the problem, the two principal Allies have started on an independent search. Hence-the two different solutions of the problem. One is that adopted by the French and resulting in the occupation of the Ruhr. The other solution is of a more elaborate nature, and was attempted by England. It involved the transition from dictatorship and arrogance, characteristic of the days of Lloyd-George, to a policy of «peace and retrenchment», anounced by Bonnar-Law and Mac Kenna*). This policy is seeking compromise and agreements between the interests of Britain and those of other nations. It has already achieved certain successes. The new course was inaugurated by an agreement with the U.S. on the subject of the repayment of the debts, was continued by co-operation with Ireland in stamping out civil war in the latter and by a number of concessions to Turkey, intended to satisfy her legitimate national aspirations and to meet the interests of the Turkich people. Finally, I am inclined to think that Lord Curzon's recent note to the Soviet Government is also an outcome of this new policy. At a later stage, I intend to refer to some proofs of this statement of mine, which appear to me as being conclusive. Meanwhile, I would ask my reader to take it for granted.

This being so, Lord Curzon's Note is bound to be the first step in the direction of establishing friendly relations with the Russian people, because it points to a definite intention to put an end to Lloyd-George's policy of supporting the Communist's dictatorship over Russia and to all plans of exploiting Russia through that dictatorship. It is a step which can greatly help the process of restoration of a sound political organisation in Russia.

It is my considered opinion that the occupation of the Ruhr, on the one hand, and Lord Curzon's last Note to the Soviet Government, on the other, are but two aspects of the attempt to find the solution of the same problem of re-establishing European equilibrium. Lord Curzon's Note is, logically, an answer to the French occupation of the Ruhr or, rather, an English attempt to counter the effects of the measures by which the French are seeking to solve the problem of equilibrium. This step can, possibly, mitigate the effects of the drastic solution attempted by the French, thus making it acceptable for Germany and ensuring the practical achievement of France's direct objectives, viz. of the highest possible amount of reparations and of security against German aggression.

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*) See, « Rus. Ec. », p.2630.

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By the way, one cannot fail to notice the great difference in the very spirit of the two solutions and in their fundamental ideas, due to the fact that both the national psychology and the economic conditions of the French people, on the one hand, and the English, on the other, are so absolutely unlike.

The occupation of the Ruhr and the new attitude of Britain to the Soviets are the two focuses on which the events of the present stormy period of European history are bound to hinge. This is why they present so much interest.

It is natural that the motives of the methods of re-establishing equilibrium in Europe, applied by France, on the one hand, and by England, on the other, as well as their probable consequences, are eagerly discussed by all nations and all social classes.

In the following I will do all in my power to avoid any personal bias and to speak of the attitudes taken by various countries only in so far as these attitudes are dictated not by the will of their leaders or their respective Governments, but by the vital necessities of their economic and political existence ; finally, I am going to deal with these attitudes with the only purpose of showing the extent to which they are compatible with the achievement of the real objective of every European nation — that of re-establishing equilibrium on the European continent.

CH. II.

THE STATIC AND THE DYNAMIC SYSTEMS OF EQUILIBRIUM.

The essence of the new system of European equilibrium can be thus formulated :

1) Economic equilibrium. This implies the existence of absolutely independent national economic units, enabling several of them to combine for opposing any one of their number, which would assume a too distinctly aggressive attitude towards the others.

2) Military equilibrium, implying the existence of completely independent powers, capable of combining against any among them which would aspire at dictatorship over the rest.

This formula is dictated by the experience of Europe, first, during the period from 1914 to the Versailles Conference and, then, particularly, during that from the Versailles Conference to the beginning of the present stormy events in Europe.

This conception somewhat differs from the old idea of European equilibrium, which it tends to modify and to make more complete. That old conception implied the necessity of the existence in Europe of several mutually independent powers, as definite armed forces, which, in case of any of them growing too dangerously strong, would be able to offer to it combined opposition.

The old conception was, thus, mainly based on the actual amounts and the statics of forces. The new conception introduces serious corrections by considering the quality and the dynamics of the forces available.

The old formula reckoned, in the first instance, with the numbers of effectives on peace or war footing and with the stocks of military supplies available for the purposes of warfare. The new formula reckons with the quality of human material at the front and in the rear, with its psychological fitness for co-ordinated action *en masse* or individually and with the poten-

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tial amounts of war supplies, i.e. not so much with the stocks already available, as with the quantities that can be turned out by the mobilised industries when the war has broken out.

These modifications are due to the fact that industrialisation, mass production and the whole industrial régime, since the last few decades of the XIX century, has proved capable of very quickly changing human qualities and psychology and has greatly increased the efficiency of the human material.

Not very long ago, when Europe was still inhabited by a population of farmers and artisans, the psychology and the productivity of the average man in any European nation were but slowly changing and developing. One can safely assume that, during that period, the civilisation of Europe, based on agriculture and handicraft, was practically in a static condition. The growth of industries has made it dynamic. It has greatly increased the rate of both the material and the spiritual progress of the human race. A nation, whose industrial development has been quicker than that of its neighbour, with the same number of population and the same numerical strength of the army, became three or four times stronger than that neighbour.

The industrial era, being an era of dynamic civilisation, makes it imperative for any country to go abreast of its neighbours not only in the number of soldiers, but in industrial development as well. This is precisely what calls for the substitution of the new formula of European equilibrium for the old one.

One should not, naturally, assume that the old formula of European equilibrium did not at all take into account the dynamics of the forces. This, to a certain extent, it also did, but only to a slight degree, because the rate of development of forces was very much slower than it is in our days of dynamic civilisation.

Accordingly, one would be justified in describing the new system of European equilibrium as *dynamic*, to distinguish it from the old, which, in its essential character, was rather *static*.

This is the principal point of distinction between the two systems of equilibrium. The basic idea of the old system, however, preserves the whole of its applicability and of its constructive importance in the new formula of dynamic equilibrium. This idea is the repudiation of dictatorship and the insurance against it.

We have said that the new formula of European equilibrium is, in the first instance, the result of experience accumulated in the course of the period from the Versailles Conference to the beginning of the present wave of stormy changes. This period was characteristic by the utter repudiation in theory and in practice, of the necessity of European equilibrium. In the domain of practical politics, Mr Lloyd George has tried to establish in Europe the dictatorship of the two principal Allies — a régime, which could be described as *pax Sociorum*. We are not concerned here with the problem of what were Mr Lloyd George's chances to see that *pax Sociorum* ultimately develop into a *pax Britannica* and not a *pax Gallica*.

A far interesting fact is that a whole school of young British Liberals, although disapproving of Lloyd George's policy, was also convinced that the system of European equilibrium was obsolete *).

The idea of doing away with the old system of European equilibrium

*) See, *Prof. Pollard*, Essays in Liberalism. Lectures and papers which were delivered at the Liberal Summer School at Oxford. London, 1922.

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was popular not only with Liberals, but in many Conservative and Labour circles as well. It would not be an exaggeration to say that, during the period from the Versailles Conference to the present day, the great majority of English public opinion was in favour of doing away with the system of equilibrium. This is particularly interesting because this change of attitude has taken place in England, whose whole influence on European affairs used formerly to depend on the maintenance of equilibrium on the continent.

In all cases, when, according to the English point of view, some European Power became too strong, England has always assumed the rôle of an organiser and promoter of a coalition of other countries against the one which was on the ascendant. This was England's speciality and her uncontested privilege. Besides, the system of European equilibrium had that great advantage for England that it cost her very little to maintain. The principal requisites for its maintenance were the intelligence, the experience and the talent of English diplomatists, and not a costly display of military power. English diplomacy has always been successful in dividing the five or six European Powers into two competing and approximately equivalent groups. It was sufficient for England, in her « splendid isolation », to add a small military force to those of one of the two groups, to ensure peace and, by the way, to obtain some compensation for herself. Even apart from these compensations, the system of equilibrium on the European continent was highly profitable for England, because, 1) it secured the peace, essential for the progress of her trade and, 2) it reduced to a minimum her expenditure on armaments. Beside being highly profitable for England, the system of equilibrium was also, ultimately, beneficient for Europe, because it ensured the independence of national economic development and contributed to the increase of the national income of the countries concerned.

Thus, if British statesmen, since the war, have changed their attitude to this system, so profitable to England, there was, apparently, some other alternative arrangement, which presented itself as still more desirable from the point of view of her interests. This alternative system was that of the «dictatorship of the Allies ».

They proceeded to its practical application. The system of dictatorship, however, after four years of experience, failed to justify the hopes that have been based on it. I have already had the opportunity in a previous article *) to explain how this system has brought about a loss of equilibrium between agricultural and industrial production in Europe, a fall in the purchasing capacity of the farming population and a weakening of the economic and military power of the dictators themselves.

To this we should add that, from the purely military viewpoint, the system, in the first instance, failed to satisfy England's partner — France — as to the security of her frontiers from German aggression, and, then, it has brought a considerable amount of hostility in the relations between many other European countries **).

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*) «Rus. Econ.», «Com. v. Cap. Intern.», № 7-8.

**) No less an authority than the former Premier, Mr Lloyd George, while speaking in the course of the discussion in Parliament of the relations between England and the Soviets, thus describes the present condition of Europe (« The Times », 16.5.23) : « He would beg the Government to take into account the condition of the world. It was very grave. It was not a world to drop matches in There were thousands of miles of frontier from the Baltic to the Black Sea in a very dangerous condition. Poland, with its quarrel about Galicia — the Galicians

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The fact that the system of Allied dictatorship proved bankrupt in practical application, as yet, has come to be clearly realised only by a certain group of British statesmen ; in particular, by the Bonar Law - Baldwin - Curzon Government. Accordingly, they are beginning gradually to reconstruct the international relations between England and the European countries on the principles of the dynamic system of European equilibrium.

Another group of British statesmen is still sticking to the system of dictatorship. Hence-the great controversy in British public opinion about Anglo-Soviet relations, that has been provoked by Lord Curzon's Note. The real meaning of this controversy is that those who want to see European equilibrium restored, believe that the existence in Europe of several large independent States — France, Russia, Italy and Germany, provided that certain guarantees are imposed on the latter, is beneficial to England. But, to form a combination of two equivalent groups of Powers, one needs at least four countries. Accordingly, the partisans of the idea of equilibrium begin keenly to feel the necessity of restoring Russia to healthy life. On the other hand, the ideal of the partisans of dictatorship is the existence in Europe of one independent and dictatorial country, whose overlordship over the rest would, in their view, serve England's interests best. All other countries should be reduced to various degrees of dependence *). They want to see Russia in a state of dissolution.

Is this ideal of a single country, exercising dictatorship over the rest, attainable in practice ? Under the present - day's dynamic civilisation, a country can have any hope to keep its dictatorial power, even for a short time, only on the condition that it possesses superiority in both the military and the industrial domains. England does not possess and can hardly be expected ever to possess an army syfficiently strong to ensure her position of overlord on the European continent. France does not possess the necessary industrial equipment on a sufficiently large scale for that purpose. Even had she been determined to change her whole national psychology and systematically to build up a large industry, this would require at least 15 to 20 years.

In the past, there was only one country in Europe in which both these elements were harmoniusly combined and which, accordingly, was very dangerous to its neighbours. That country was Germany.

As a result, instead of the ideal position, in which dictatorship is vested in a single country, it was necessary to aequiesce in a joint dictatorship of two countries, with all the unavoidable complications involved in this arrangement. This was the second weak point in the scheme of British Young Liberals and in the « system of dictatorship ». The first, as we explained above, is based on economic considerations: dictatorship destroys the purchasing capacity of the farming population.

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were the same race as the Russians — provided a situation full of possibilities of great danger. There was Bessarabia further south ; troubles in the little republics along the Baltic coast ; trouble in Germany over the Ruhr. We were not yet out of our trouble in the Far East » trade was not revivng. He was not so sure of the immediate or of the remote prospects. He was not sure, with all these racial angers fomenting throughout Europe and all these troubles, what might happen. Russia was a country with 120.000.000 people touching us at every point, touching Poland, Rumania, and with Germany in a condition of resentment ».

*) A considerable part of Europe is now represented by one of the following types of States : 1) so-called « kept States » and, 2) tribute-paying States. Both are in a position of vassals.

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In the foregoing I have shown why I think that the the partisans of the system of European equilibrium have a fair chance to triumph over their opponents.

This being so, it is only natural to ask oneself : is really the system of equilibrium a kind of « eternal ideal » in international relations ? Certainly. not. We are very well aware that the U. S. and the other countries of the New World are living well without any system of equilibrium and, even, practically, without standing armies. If, however, we ask ourselves, whether such conditions are practicable in Europe, we are bound to reply that, as things now are, they are impossible, because Europe has not yet reached the moral standards by which international relations in the New World are controlled. An obstacle to this is the fact that the economic organisation of the majority of leading European countries is dominated by an exessive export of industrial products and an equally excessive importation of agricultural produce and raw materials *). Until this organisation is changed, the competition of European countries for foreign markets enabling them to dispose of their industrial production is bound to bring them into conflicts.

This being so, the system of equilibrium is the only international arrangement by which Europe can be saved from her present economic and political chaos.

Now, to conclude our discussion of equilibrium, we shall briefly return to the attitude of the British Young Liberals. While condemning the system of European equilibrium, they are, naturally, unable, for political and psychological reasons, to proceed to a frank and straight for ward exposition of the necessity of England's dictatorship in Europe. They simply say that England must have her way in international relations and that, to achieve this. she should be more active in her foregn policy, than she was required to be according to the principles of old Liberalism.

What are the practical means suggested by them, that would ensure the success of this active foregn policy ? Such means is the League of Nations. through which the propaganda is to be carried of the idea that international conflicts in Europe are caused not by a deliberate desire to rob each other. but by a mutual lack of confidence, which is not at all unavoidable, and by the constant fear in which the nations are of each other.

Thus, Young Liberals do not admit the paramount importance in European international relations of economic interests and of conflicts resulting from them. This conception is, certainly, very noble, but it is, unfortunately, very far from European realities.

This is, probably, why up to the present, the League of Nations has failed to convert the peoples of Europe to the new creed of British Young Liberalism.

CH. III.

LORD CURZON'S NOTE — A TURNING POINT IN ENGLAND'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS RUSSIA.

What are the grounds for my belief that Lord Curzon's recent Note is the result of a change in England's foreign policy, aimed at the re-establishment of «European equilibrium» and that it signifies the beginning of the end of Lloyd Georges friendly support of the Communist dictatorship over Russia and,

*) See « Rus. Econ.», № 6, p. 2162.

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consequently, the inauguration of a benevolent attitude on the part of the British Government towards the rehabilation of the Russian people and the Russian State ?

I am bound to admit that, at present at least, a considerable section of Russian public opinion, perhaps, even the majority, with regard to Curzon's Note holds views different from my own. Their point of view can be formulated as follows : Lord Curzon's Note is directed not against the Communist Government, but against Russia. It is the continuation and the development of the former policy, inaugurated by Mr Lloyd George, and aimed at the weakening of Russia. Now Russia is more exhausted than she was in 1921, while the prestige of the Communist Party is almost entirely lost both in Russia and abroad. Any external complication can bring about the downfall of the Soviet Government and of the Communist Party in Russia. At present, the Communist Party is in greater need of support from abroad, enabling it to remain in power in Russia, than it was at the time of the Provisional Government, and its power to resist pressure from outside is reduced to a minimum, and it is, therefore, time to press hard in pursuing one's national interests in Russia.

From this point of view, the purpose of the Note is, in the first instance, to snub the Soviet Government and to put it in its due place, to the rôle assigned to it, viz. that of a « kept Government » in the service of English imperialist capital or, to use old terms, of an English satelite. The other purpose of the Note is to squeeze out of Russia as much as possible, by using the Communist Government, made obedient by the lesson it has been taught, as an instrument for her exploitation. This, at present, involves concessions with regard to the zone of territorial waters ; then, it would mean a new trade agreement, providing for special privileges to be granted to English merchants, then, later still, a whole series of various conditions, aimed at the further weakening of Russia.

In my opinion, the partisans of this point of view are wrong. That it exists, is only natural, seeing the general disappointment of the Russians in the attitude of other peoples towards their country, resulting from Russia's participation in the Great war. This does not prevent the conception from being radically mistaken. It is mainly based on three considerations, of which two are of purely temporary importance and the third is misunderstood. The first of these considerations is based on our purely pathological inclination to identify England's attitude towards Russia with that of the former British Premier, Mr Lloyd George; the second is Lord Curzon's old—established reputation of an enemy of Russia, and the third — the rudeness and the peremptory character of the Note.

It is, certainly, difficult conclusively to prove what are the ultimate aims of any diplomatic act almost at the time of its accomplishment. The very nature of diplomacy is that of a game, whose essential purpose it is to veil, for as long a time as this is possible, the ultimate aims pursued by it.

In so far, however, as a diplomatic act is directed by economic considerations, there is a thread by following which its ultimate aim canbe reached. It is precisely by analysing the economic factors underlying the move that I reached the conclusion here expounded, which is altogether different from the majority's view. To the latter view I have pointed from the very outset to enable my reader more critically to scrutinise the opinion I am here expressing.

Now, my opinion is as follows.

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The official motives of the Note were : 1) Anti-British propaganda carried by the Communist Government in the East ; 2) interference with British fishing and, 3) the undecent tone of Mr Weinstein's Note in reply to the British Government's intervention on behalf of the clergy condemned to death as a result of religions persecutions.

Had this correspondence taken place not between two governments, mutually repudiating the very foundations on which each other is based, of which one, beside, is busily engaged in undermining the capitalist system, while the other puts up with the existence of Communism only in view of certain special advantages to itself, the three considerations enumerated above would have been amply sufficient to justify a break of friendly relations and the presentation of an ultimatum.

As things are, however, these grounds can hardly be regarded as sufficient to justify such action. As a matter of fact, no new or extraordinary events have happened in the recent past. As far as propaganda in the East is concerned, it was carried by the Communist before the signing of the Agreement, during its negotiation and ever since it was concluded; the propaganda was the more poisonous because it was based on a combination of national aspirations with class war and with the world socialist revolution.

Such propaganda is the Bolsheviks' speciality ; as I have already had the occasion to explain in a previous article *), at the present time, they are forced to carry it more than ever before, by their actual position. Religious persecution and, what is worse still, the profanation of the very idea of religion, by the Bolsheviks, have never ceased. Before and since the conclusion of the Trade Agreement, the utterances of Communist leaders not only at the meetings of the Communist International, but at official congresses and conferences organised by the Government and in the official Communist Press as well, have not been more polite with regard to England, than was the tone of Weinstein's Notes. As a matter of fact, at the very height of Anglo-Soviet friedship, the Communists in Russia burned the effigy of their supporter, Mr Lloyd George, amid much pomp and acrimonious speeches.

The former British Government has borne these insults withhout uttering a word of protest. The present Government delivered an ultimatum. This difference in the behaviour of the two can be explained in either of the two following ways.

The first explanation is that, in fact, the three official causes of the ultimatum were not causes, but only pretexts, the ultimatum being really due to some other causes of very recent origin, to which, however, no reference is made in the document.

The second explanation is that, a) Mr Lloyd George's Government has patiently borne the insults inflicted on it by the Communists, because, as compared with the importance of the interests of England which it was aiming at to secure, the pin-pricks suffered by British prestige from the Communist diplomacy were trifling matters, not worth serious attention, and, b) that at present the Bonar - Law - Baldwin - Curzon Government regards these aims as either unattainable or less important to England.

I am inclined to think that both these explanations apply to the case.

The causes of the ultimatum were, certainly, not those or, at least, not only those to which the ultimatum explicitely refers. In reality, these causes

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*) See, «Com. v. Cap. International», «Russ. Econ.», № 7-8.

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are much deeper and involve the most vital and intimate interests of Britain. With these I have dealt in detail when speaking of the probability of Europes entering into a period of stormy changes ; now I shall only briefly recall them to the memory of the reader.

In the first instance, there is the cooling down of the friendship and alliance between British political capital and the Communist International, due to the impossibility for the two partners to realise the benefits which both were expecting from their co-operation. This is an important cause of the ultimatum, but not the most important of all ; it involves the interests of a comparatively small, but very active and influential section of British capital.

The other set of causes is much more important, because it affects the interests of the whole of British national capital. These causes are as follows : 1) The Communist dictatorship has brought about a decline in the purchasing capacity of Russia and, along with her, of all European countries, producing food stuffs and raw materials, by reducing their effective demand for industrial products, and, 2) That, having proved absolutely unable, by its very nature, to restore production in Russia, that dictatorship was inevitably compelled to speculate on the promotion of world revolution in the East and the West by means of fostering the revolt of Eastern nations against imperialist exploitation, of fomenting class war and of inciting European peoples against each other.

As a result, the European continent is now seething with hostilities and is utterly uncertain as to its economic and political future. These conditions severely affect the British foreign trade and the interests of British capital, as a whole, which is only natural, seeing that *74 picent*, of England's *national income are, in some way or other, dependent on foreign trade*, being ultimately based on exports and imports. Finally, there is a third cause, and a very prosaic one, which, besides, is easily understood by every man in the street : the Communist Government is, practically, at the end of its gold reserve. This latter cause is sufficient to put a stop to all trade with Russia *de facto* even if, *de jure*, the Trade Agreement remains in force.

I think that the first of the causes referred to above is so evident that it needs no proof. As to the second, a few words will do, because, instead of any proofs, it is sufficient to refer to a certain fact of enormous importance in English political life. I have mentioned that fact before : the policy of Mr Lloyd-George's Government was based on an idea absolutely different from the one underlying the policy of the present British Government. The former aimed at dictatorship ; the latter is aiming at equilibrium. Strictly speaking, this alone would be sufficient, I think, to justify my point of view on Lord Curzon's Note. Here, however, I would like to develop the brief remarks I have made on the alternative point of view, and to submit the latter to a more detailed analysis. That alternative attitude requires very careful handling and much consideration, because it was born in the depths of the Russian soul, so generous, calm and trusting by nature, but now made distrustful by terrible sufferings.

By the way, that analysis is bound to produce some new arguments in favour of my own conception, which I hope to see closely and carefully scrutinised. I am bound to avow that it would cause me great pain, not only for the sake of Russia, but also for that of the moral of European peoples, if, as a result of our analysis, we should come to the conclusion that the pessimistic view point on Lord Curzon's Note is the right one, and that I am wrong in my

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optimistic conception. Naturally, however, I would prefer to see the thing in the right light, however disagreable this may be, than to live in my optimistic illusion, if such it is proved to be.

Now, let us analyse the pessimistic conception. Among its main points there are two which deserve particular attention. Of these the first is that the Note is a continuation of Mr Lloyd George's policy, and the second—that it is directed not against the Communist Government, but against Russia.

Is Lord Curson's Note a continuation of Mr Lloyd George's policy ? What are the actual facts of the case and do they confirm this view ? Had the present Government's policy been a continuation of that inaugurated by Mr Lloyd George, the Ministry would not have had to face the violent opposition in Parliament with which its steps were met and which very nearly resulted in a breach of the established parliamentary tradition, forbidding to move a vote of confidence in the Government on an issue of foreign policy.

Mr Lloyd George has once again formulated the principles of his policy with regard to Russia. His point of view, apparently, coincided with that of the Opposition. He gave an exhaustive account of these principles in a few sentences. Thus, he said, he was always afraid of Russia. Then, he proceeds : « Bolshevism was something that was evanescent. No country could keep that temperature without perishing ». This is his diagnosis. The prescription he gives to the Government to treat the illness, is — to avoid any interference with Bolshevik domination and to maintain friendly relations with them. Why? With the purpose to prevent the acceleration of the events leading to the imminent collapse of the Bolshevik Government which he thinks unavoidable. The Under - Secretary, Mr Mac Neil, replied in a very polite but equally firm statement that the Government has its own considered policy in this matter. He said: «These demands were not put forward hastily —and I would say, in view of some things in the Press, they were not put forward without the due approval and consideration of the Prime Minister. (Cheers.). They were arrived at by a full Cabinet, over which the Prime Minister himself presided. Therefore, the whole policy, of course, has his sanction and approval ».

Thus, it appears that we are justified in assuming that, 1) Lord Curzon's Note signifies a change in the attitude and cannot be regarded as a continuation of Mr Lloyd George's policy and, 2) that the responsibility for that change rests not with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but with the Cabinet as a whole, attaching great importance to it. That this is really so is proved by the fact that even a higher authority than the Under—Secretary of State, viz. the acting — Prime Minister, Mr Baldwing, who has appeared before the House twice — once before and once after the debate, has pointed with great determination to the readiness of the Government to make of the problem an issue of confidence.

The turn taken by the House of Commons' debate on Anglo — Soviet relations enables us to draw two conclusiona, beside those already reached. These two conclusions are : 1) The idea that the Note is only a demonstration, whose purpose it is to frighten the Communist Government and to compel it to urther concessions in the question of territorial waters, is enterely without foundation. To achieve this purpose, no such publicity would be needed. Publicity is rather making concessions on the part of the Bolsheviks more difficult. 2) The suggestion that the Note was dictated by Lord Curzon's «hostile attitude» to Russia, is also unfounded. In this connection I would make two remarks : a) Lord Curzon and the Foreign Office have quite clearly shown

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their disagreement with Mr Lloyd George's policy of supporting the Communist Government as early as at the time of the negotiation of the Trade Agreement ; and, b) The whole practice of the British governing apparatus is such as enterely to exclude the possibility of the Foreign Secretary's personal sympathies influencing the policy of his Office. The British foreign policy should be looked upon as controlled by the nation as a whole and not by parties or, liss seill, by individuals. If Lord Curzon had ever been an « enemy » of Russia, his hostility to her was due to the fact that, at that time, England, in her attempts to ensure European equilibrium, was arranging a combination of Powers againts Russia. He, as well as any other British Foreign Secretary, is bound to become a « friend » of Russia as soon as England, driven by the same desire to maintain European equilibrium, begins to arrange combinations against the excessive increase in the power of any other continental country, say - Germany. As a matter of fact, any British Foreign Secretary is neither an « enemy », nor a « friend » of Russia : he is simply a friend of his own country. All other peoples for him are about as indifferent as whites and blacks for a chess player. Such is the real position.

Against whom is the Note directed ? The reply to this question should be prefaced by two general remarks. In the first instance, there are certain points in which it is very difficult to distinguish between Russia and the Communist Government. In these cases, when striking at the Communist Government, one can painfully hurt Russia, thus failing in his duty towards the future Russia and towards all the non - Communist elements living within her frontiers and suffering worse under the Communist régime than are suffering those non - Communists, who live abroad as emigrants.

These points are : the problem s of the Straits, territorial waters, trade and general relations of Russia with the outer world and some others, whose number, however, is relatively small. In the case of all other points it may be safely assumed that, as a rule, the worst for the Communist Government is the best for Russia. The longer the feverish temperature produced by the Communist Government is permitted to last, the more are Russia and the Russian people exhausted. In this, I think, all of us are ready to agree with Mr Lloyd George. We will only disagree with him as to the conclusion, because he wants the Communist régime to last as long, as possible, while we want to see its early collapse.

Then, it had always been a characteristic feature of the Russian national psychology that we were inclined, in international politics, to pursue moral, rather then material purposes. These moral purposes could have been cleverly or stupidly conceied, they could be reactionary or progressive, but, in the great majority of cases they were animated by higher moral motives. The best among the Russian public were always ready actively to intervene, in the domain of international affairs, on behalf of an oppressed people, related to Russia by religion or by race, or to be swayed by the impulse of liberating Europe from the domination of brute force, as this was the case in the war with Germany. Any one, however, who would attempt to persuade the Russian to take action, basing his argument on economic considerations, such as the benefits to Russian industry and trade, would unavoidably fail in achieving his purpose. I am not going to discuss here, whether this was right or wrong ; neither shall I attempt to trace the origins of this peculiar psychology, although the latter problem is also highly interesting. I am only stating the case. It is always difficult for any one to get rid of his customary psychology, and the Russian public would be wrong in expecting to see in British diplo-

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matic acts, in idea and in form, the motives to which they have been used in Russia's foregin policy. In the sphere of international relations, the British attitude is mainly determined by material considerations. British diplomacy is the diplomacy of a huge business concern. Its purpose is, in the first instance, to secure certain definite material objectives for the benefit of the British national economy. Any other nation, from its point of view, is, in the first instance, a customer, and its attitude towards it is entirely determined by the qualities and characteristics of the given country as a customer. In this connection, one should bear in mind the words said by Mr Askwith about two years ago, when he was also speaking about Anglo - Russian relations : « I am not bound to make my country the knight errant of the human race ». You will perceie the great difference in the psychology of the two nations. None of them could possibly change it at will. All we can do is clearly to realise this difference and to bear it in mind, while considering Lord Curzon's Note.

Now, what is our reply to the alternative point of view ? The Note, certainly, contains certain elements which, perhaps even in spite of logic, under the influence of pure emotion, create the impression among many Russians that the Note is directed against Russia. These clements are the tone of the Note and its rather agressive attitude with regard to Russia's sovereign right over her terriotorial waters. It is truc that no British Government had ever spoken to any Russian Government, as Lord Curzon speaks to the Communists. But, the other aspect of the situation should also be remembered. No Russian Government had ever spoken to any British Government as Mr Weinstein spoke in his Notes. If our national pride is offended by the language of Lord Curzon's Note, we should in fairness recognise the right of the British to take offence at the tone of Notes delivered to them by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in the name of Russia. This being so, the parties are quit.

In fact, we should pay more attention to the inner meaning of the Note, than to this external rudeness of its wording. What were the real causes that have prompted both sides to be so rude to each other ? By making this clear, we will be better able to say, whether the Note was directed against the Soviet Government or against Russia.

To start with, I would remind my reader of the two essential elements of the formula of « dynamic equilibrium » in Europe, and would ask him to see what these elements would look like, asuming that the economic and political condition of the Communist Government remains as it is.

I have already had the occasion to say, in this as well as in a previous article (« Rus. Ec. », № 7-8, p. 2634), that the present economic and political condition of the Communist Government compels it, at all costs, to strive towards the achievement of the « world revolution ».

In fact, the Weinstein Notes are not a simple business-like reply to the British Government's request to reprive the condemned ecclesiastics, aimed at finding out some way out of the complications, in which the relations between the two Governments were involved. Had this been the purpose, the reply, at the worst, would have assumed the form of a polite refusal. As it is, its tone is deliberately rude and extremely arrogant. Why ? In any case, it is not the result of a blunder or of lightheartedness on the part of Mr Weinstein, who is a man trained and competent in his business. Beside, the matter being one of great importance, he would, certainly, not have sent his Notes without having previously shown them to the Head of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Accordingly, the only reasonable explanations should be

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that the rudeness and the arrogance of the Notes were *not the result of the British Government's intervention* on behalf of the condemned, but that the intervention has been used as *a pretext* for the use of such language and that, besides, the arrogance was entirely deliberate and went much further than was justified by the question of the reprieve. The Notes were, really, intended not as a reply to the diplomatic representation, but to speak to the peoples of the whole world, over the head of the British Representative, i.e. of the application of the old Bolshevik method of broadcasting to « All, all, all !» This was a piece of propaganda, aimed at discrediting Great Britain. Such propaganda is only the natural result of the present Communist Government's striving to bring about a « world revolution », by which the Communist International would achieve its ultimate purpose *). The Bolshiviks intended, by their arrogance, to increase their prestige, mainly in the East at the expense of England. Over the head of the British Foreign Office they are thus speaking to the peoples of the East, to whom they say : « This is the tone in which we are speaking to England. We are strong. England dares not attack us ». And we know that the East does not yield to the Western civilised world in its esteem of armed force.

Why does the Soviet Government permit itself such arrogance ? Just because it knows the weakness of England's present position, when European equilibrium is lost. The particular weakness which the Soviet Government is now taking into account lies in the second of the two elements of the formula of dynamic equilibrium. England does not now dispose of sufficient military power and, especially, of the power required to prevent the Communist Government from using the language of the Weinstein Notes.

Indeed, so long as the Communist Government has control over the Red Army, England is powerless against it : no war against Russia can be waged by England, because, for this purpose, she would need a large army. The arrogant tone of Weinstein's Notes is a sign of the fact that, as far as the second element of the formula of « dynamic equilibrium » is concerned, Russia is held to be strong. This fact alone, is, however, insufficient, the more that, on account of the ruined condition of the Russian industries, the military power of Russia is only *statically* great : she has a large army, but she is not technically equipped fot warfare.

Accordingly, the arrogance of the Weinstein Notes has no justification whatever from the *dynamic* point of view, because it stands in no relation to the *dynamic* power of Russia, as compared with other countries. The first of the two elements of the formula of «*dynamic equilibrium*», which depends on economic strength and independence, is very small in Russia under her present conditions. And this weakness is entirely due to the Communist Government, which has ruined the Russian industry. This makes the Communist Government vulnerable both materially, because it is very sensitive to any outside pressure, and morally, because its prestige in Russia is very precarious : any demonstration of its weakness makes it miserable and helpless in the eyes of the Russian Army and of the population.

There scarcely exists a single move in the diplomatic game with which such an experienced diplomatist as Lord Curzon would not be familiar. The Bolshevik method of speaking to the peoples over the heads of their Govern-

*) See, «Russ. Econ.», p. 2630.

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ments, thus undermining the prestige of the latter, is also well known to him, and he is now only paying them back in their own coin.

In replying to the rudeness of the Communist Commissary of Foreign Affairs, who, we should remember, was the first to speak such language, Lord Curzon is also rude. His blow is almost entirely aimed at showing the weakness of the Communist Government's economic position, i.e. the lack of the first of the two essential elements of the formula of « dynamic equilibrium ». He threatens to break the Trade Agreement.

By the way, I would emphasise my complete agreement with the partisans of the pessimistic view of Lord Curzon's Note in that the power of the Communist Government to resist foreign pressure is bound, at present, to be very much reduced. Even now the Bolsheviks have been very quick in making concessions. Beyond doubt, they will go farther in that direction. But the conclusion to which I am led by these considerations is altogether different from that reached by the pessimists.

I think that, while making use of this decrease in the capacity of resistance of the Communist Government, Lord Curzon does not do it for the purpose of achieving an easy success, such as a concession with regard to the zone of territorial waters *), though he, naturally, would not refuse such concession ; in my opinion, his real purpose is much more complicated and important.

Presisely by the very rudeness of its tone, Lord Curzon's Note is a call over the head of the Communist Government, to the Russian people ; it directs the attention of all non - Communist elements in Russia to the consideration of the following facts :

« How desperately weak is the position of the Communist Government, and how utterly it has ruined the economic organisation of Russia, if, not to risk losing the possibility of buying in England £ 4,5 mil. worth and selling £ 4.9 mil.worth of goods, it is compelled,in panic,to give up the offensive started by Mr Weinstein's Notes, and to surrender to Lord Curzon its most important positions, viz., 1) that of the propaganda of world revolution in the East and of class war in capitalist countries, so dear to the heart of every Communist, and, 2) the sovereignty and the prestige of Russia, precious to many millions of patriotic Russians ?»

The masquerade is over. The Communist Government is in a feverish hurry to throw off the magnificent cloak of the «Great Leader of peoples and classes in their world-wide revolt against imperialistic Capital », which it was wearing when charging Weinstein, through the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, with the drafting of his Notes. Instead, it orders Krassin to done the dress of a «lackey of the imperialistic foreign capital», which fits much better its position and its administrative and economic capacities, and to fly to London at top speed in order abjectly to bow before Lord Curzon. Thus, arrogance changes into cowardice.

This is a spectacle very detrimental to the prestige of the Communist Government not only among the Communists themselves, but also in the eyes of many millions of patriotic Russians and in those of the so-called Red

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*) I am inclined to think that the question of fishing and of territorial waters was specially extracted from the archives of the Foreign Office and included in the Note only because in raising it the British Foreign Secretary was able to point to a sphere, in which, however limited that sphere may be, England is in a position to demonstrate her superiority in power to Russia.

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Army, which, in reality, has long ceased to be «red», and has become an ordinary National Army, but which, at the same time, is the only real force to which the Communist Government owes its existence.

As to myself, I prefer the rudeness of Lord Curzon's Note, which painfully scratches on Russian national feeling and wakes it up, to the flattering and quasi-friendly language of Mr Lloyde George and Maltzahn, speaking of a «powerful Russia under the wise leadership of the evolutionary Communist Government», which is, beside, «the only possible Government in Russia», because their tone lulls the national watchfulness of the Russians to sleep.

The rudeness of Lord Curzon's Note is of distinct value to us, because it puts everyone into his due place, while, at the same time, ruthlessly, but in a business-like way, showing Russia's present real weight in international relations and, thus, dispelling the illusions created by the lies of the Communist leaders concerning their ability to defend Russia's national interests*).

Once having been given an impetus, the thought goes on in its logical development.

In fact, as we have said before, only the combination of the two essential elements of the formula of dynamic «equilibrium», viz. of economic and military independance and power, can secure Russia's independence and prestige in the sphere of international relations. Is this idea an entirely new one for the Russian Army and the Russian industry? We know for certain that it is not new at all, that it is well understood not only by separate individuals, but by the masses, because it was not theoretically taught to them, but learnt in a series of painful practical lessons on the vast blood - soaked fields of Galicia in the memorable retreat of 1915.

But, then, the economic organisation and the industries of Russia wanted only adaptation to the purposes of the defence of Russia's national interests. They could be so adapted, and this was done. Even then, however, the lack of rifles and ammunition in the Army has cost the Government its prestige, and the loss of prestige went so far, that the Army has turned against the old régime and contributed to its overthrow.

Now, the industry and the whole economic organisation of the country are being steadily destroyed, and, under the Communist régime there is no hope of seeing them restored. The Red Army, on which alone the existence of the Communist Government depends, is doomed by that Government to unavoidable slaughter and defeat in the case of a war with a well - equipped enemy, because it is not provided with arms or munitions.

No one in the Red Army would ever seriously think of believing Trotzky's boasts that he will capture the French-made weapons of the enemy. However heroical an army might be, it would never be able, bare-handed, to capture the guns and machine-guns of its adversary. It is the task of the country's industry to supply the Army with weapons.

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*) The Communist Government is doing its best to persuade Russia and the world that it forms an inseparable entity with Russia, and that anyone attacking the Communist Government, is necessarily attacking Russia. They say that they are the «real Russia». To the propaganda of this idea the Communist Government attaches enormous importance. The rôle of «Knights of national Russia» and of «National Russian Government» became an object to which the Bolsheviks have striven since the end of 1920. I have esplained the origins of this striving before («Russ. Econ.», p. 338). At present, it is especially K. Radek who appears in the rôle of a defender of Russian national interests.

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But how much should the economic strength of the country have fallen, if even a threat to break the Trade Agreement makes the Communist Government so panicky and abjectly servile !

No doubt, as far as the prestige of the Communist Government is concerned, the results of the Weinstein Notes were altogether different from those which they were intended to produce. Lord Curzon's ultimatum did, certainly, inflict a heavy blow on the shattered prestige of the Communist Government. This was so, whether Lord Curzon's real intentions were friendly or hostile to Russia, and the effect is bound to be practically the same, whether the Communist Governments accepts or rejects this ultimatum. So far, at least, Lord Curzon's Note should be looked upon as an act, favourable to the real interests of Russia.

Trade relations. The consequences of Lord Curzon's Note can be dangerous for Russia only in the case if that Note would ultimately bring about the cessation of trade relations not only with the Trade Delegation of the Communist Government, but with Russia in general. This would greatly hinder the very slow process of emancipation of private and co-operative entreprise from Communist dictatorship, which has begun since the transition to the N.E.P.. However insignifiant are the absolute achievements in that direction, yet they are a certain gain.

Then, apart from this material result, the cessation of trade relations with Russia is bound to have certain negative consequences of a moral kind : any such blocade is bound to produce a bitter feeling among the non - Communist elements in Russia, because in it they will see a new obstacle to the progress of the slight improvement which became noticeable under the N.E.P.

Up to the present, the British Government has made several statements to the effect that, even in case if the Trade Agreement were cancelled, it intends to maintain trade relations with Russia.

As a matter of fact, the Trade Agreement is a document of double purpose. On the one hand, it is a political act, to which, at the time of its negotiation, much importance was attached, because it was, 1) the first step towards *de jure* recognition ; and, 2) a demonstration on the part of England, of her potential support to the Communist Government in the consolidation of the latter's dictatorship over Russia. On the other hand, it was a commercial treaty, establishing the procedure of purely trading intercourse.

In British Government circles, objection is mainly taken to the political side of the Trade Agreement. As far as its commercial side concerned, it should be mentioned that, among the more serious and influential elements of the City, there is a desire to see the Trade Agreement modified in the direction of the extension of direct trade relations with private business concerns now being formed in Russia and with independent co-operative organisations, while curtailing or even discontinuing those with the organisations representing the Communist Government monopoly of foreign trade.

In the view of these serious elements of the City, the Communist trade monopoly, while pitilessly exploiting the producers, destroys the latter's stimuli to economic activity, thus hindering the development of English trade with Russia and ruining all prospects for the future, by making the Russian market unable to restore its purchasing capacity.

These *desiderata* with regard to the modification of the Trade Agreement are, certainly, to a certain exttent, contrary to the interests of the Communist Government, but they cannot be regarded as contrary to those of Russia.

Thus, so far, at least, trade relations with Russia are not threatened.

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They would be broken only if the Communist Government would desire to break them and would take particularly energetic measures to achieve this purpose.

Conclusion. Summing up the above, we arrive to the conclusion that :

1) The change in the British Government's attitude to the Communist Government is caused by important economic considerations.

2) The manifestation of this change in Lord Curzon's Note was not caused but only accelerated, by Mr Weinstein's Notes.

3) No war is possible between England and Russia.

4) There is no intention whatever to impose a blockade on Russia's trade.

5) England is simply and in a business—like way refusing her support to the Communist Government, as a party in trade transactions, which has not only gone bankrupt, but has also caused great trouble in the rest of the world, thus interfering with the progress of England's trade and compromising the establishment of «dynamic equilibrium» on the continent of Europe.

This refusal does not mean that England is interfering with Russia's internal affairs: on the contrary, it means that England abandons the Communist Government to its fate, which is to be decided upon by Russia's internal forces.

Accordingly, so long as no new information is available, pointing to the contrary, Lord Curzon's Note should be looked upon as, withien the limits and in the sense indicated above, directed against the Communist Government, and not against Russia; as far as Russia is concerned, the Note is, indeed, a step in the right direction.

To this I would add that the fact whether or not the Trade Agreement will be cancelled, as a result of Lord Curzon's Note, is not so important a question for Russia. My own opinion is that it will not be broken, because the Communist Government will go all the length to meet the ultimatum. To adopt this «New Foreign Policy» the Communists will, certainly, be compelled by the failure of their «New Economic Policy».

It would not be improbable and, perhaps, it would not even be very bad for Russia, if, for a short time, up to its final collapse, the Communist Government would become a «kept Government», dependent on British Capitalism or, to use the old expression, if it would for a short period become a «satelite of England». All this, I emphasise it, would be practically unimportant and would last a very short time. What is really important is that the conditions in Europe have taken such a turn now, that England's vital interests make it absolutely imperative for her to give up Lloyd George's policy with regard to Russia. Lord Curzon's Note is the first symptom of the fact that the British Government became aware of this necessity.

The ultimatum and the negotiations as interpreted by the Communists. In order clearly to understand the developments that are bound to follow on Lord Curzon's Note, it is important to see what is the Communist Government's view of such things as negotiations with Capitalist Governments, ultimata, its own and the Capitalist Governments' vulnerable points and, finally, the ultimate purposes of all such negotiations.

A precedent, more or less akin to the present situation, is known. It was the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. I will limit my reference to it to an extract from a very interesting preface, written by Trotzky for the official history of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, published by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs *). It was written on August 1st, 1919. So far as one can judge

*) «Peace Negotiations at Brest-Litovsk». Publ. by the P. C. F. A. Moscow, 1920

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by reading the articles in the Soviet Press, dealing with Ind Curzon's Note, the leading ideas of the Soviet diplomacy have not changed since. Trotzky writes: «We were all perfectly agreed that the negotiations should be protracted as long as possible, so as to enable us to make out of them as much «capital» for purposes of propaganda as we could, while simultaneously gaining time for the development of historical processes, which would bring us nearer to revolution in Germany and in the whole of Europe. Disagreements began over the question: what to do in case of an ultimatum? Comrade Lenin put the question plainly: in no case to permit the negotiations to be broken off. If we are unable to fight, we should not play at war. The minority of the Party, on the other hand, thought that it is essential to carry negotiations to the breaking point, and then to face the German offensive with guerilla warfare. Finally, there was a current which, while recognising the impossibility of fighting, insisted on negotiations to be continued until they are openly broken off by Germany, so as to be compelled to surrender only in the face of the use of imperialist power, thus avoiding any possible insinuations or suspicions to the effect that the negotiations are only a cloak on a transaction which has been agreed upon in advance *). This last argument, based on considerations of propaganda, appeared decisive to the author of this Preface. In the ensuing struggle between the two extreme currents of thought in the Party, the middle course has been temporarily chosen, enabling both wings to hope that the future development of events would justify their diagnosis and expectations. The negotiations were broken off... The German offensive, the occupation by them of a number of towns, the shooting of Communists in the Ukraine — all this has proved boyond a shadow of doubt that there was no question of any secret transaction. Nothing remained to us but temporarily to bow before physical force.

«If, then, we have not been involved in a hopeless war, which was bound to result in an utter defeat of the Russian revolution (this should be read «Bolshevik counter-revolution» *M.B.*), in the course of some 2 or 3 months, the party owes it to the unfaltering determination with which Comrade Lenin has put the question of the necessity of temporary capitulation — of «assuming a position of underground revulutionary organisation with regard to German imperialism», as he put it at Party meetings. But now, when looking back, we see that, beyond doubt, the temporary suspension of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and the consequent offensive of the German armies against us, far from having done harm to the cause of European revolution, has actually helped the latter (this should really mean that it has helped to strengthen the prestige of the Communist Government in Russia and to clear the Bolshevik leaders from the suspicion of hawing been the tools of General Ludendorf's Headquarters Staff. *M.B.*). After the occupation by the Germans of Dvinsk, Reval and Pskov, English and French workers have, naturally, become convinced that there can exist no secret understanding between the

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*) This is a reference to the accusations, very widely levelled against the Bolsheviks in 1917, that they have obtained pecuniary and other assistance from the German General Staff for the purpose of bringing about the dissolution of the Russian Army and to the consequent suspicions that, at Brest-Litovsk, the Communist Government was not acting *bona fide*, but was carrying out a previous agreement concluded by its members with the German Government.

The rôle played by Bolshevik leaders in bringing about the dissolution of the Russian Army and their connections with the German General Staff, as this is now generally known, has been confirmed by General Ludendorf in his Memoirs.

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Bolsheviks and the Hohenzollern. This has made the bandits of the Entente for a long time unable to attack us... In any case, we can say, in this connection, that all is well that ends well».

This is Trotzky's and the Communist Party's view of negotiations and ultimata. What, according to Trotzky, is the weak point of the Communist Party's position? It is its connection and co-operation with the Intelligence Departement of the German General Staff. He does all he can to erase from the memory of the Russians and of the working class of the Entente countries this corrupt and shameful past of the Communist Party. In his preface he is constantly returning to this point.

What, on the other hand, are the strongest points in the Communist Party's positions, according to the same authority?

Trotzky says: «We had, however, an immense advantage over our adversaries in that we understood them better than they understood us... Kühlman imagined the Bolsheviks to be a revolutionary variety of those obscure colonial «politicians», upstarts and demagogues, who could be made use of at a certain moment of history, and who, at the next, if that be needed, could be dismissed by a kick in the back... There is no doubt that German Imperialism would never have started peace negotiations with us, had it *understood* (italics in the original) or foreseen the dangers of that course... They did not understand us, while we knew all about them and foresaw the future developments... This is why the Brest-Litovsk negotiations have ultimately proved helpful to the Russian (meaning «the Bolshevik», *M. B.*) and to the world revolution. After our formal surrender at Brest-Litovsk, German Imperialism was done away with in less than nine months».

Trotzky's last proud assertion does, certainly, require some amendment. If «German Imperialism was done away with in less than nine months», this was not only because Trotzky was «making capital» for his propaganda out of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and the Bolsheviks' surrender, although he has also done his part of the work.

What was then, in 1919, Trotzky's idea of the future policy of the Communist Party, based on the experience of Brest-Litovsk? In this connection he writes: «As far as we were concerned, we were ready to repeat the Brest - Litovsk negotiations with the English and the French, because it was proved by events that then we have lost nothing. But, precisely on that account, the *bourgeois* classes of the Entente, after considerable vacillations and gossip, have apparartly come to a final decision not to engage in negotiations with the Bolshevik Government. This refusal to negotiate is important as a historical acknowledgement of the soundness of our Brest-Litovsk policy and of our growing power. German Imperialism has started negotiations with us, because it was confident of its power to master us without difficulty. Anglo-French Imperialism does not trust itself and, accordingly, is afraid of us. If, on the road to the destruction of German Imperialism, Brest-Litovsk was an historical necessity, this does not imply that, by avoiding Brest-Litovsk, English and French beasts of prey will escape destruction. History is resourceful: it has many means and methods at its disposal, and we are not at all doctrinaires and would welcome the destruction of our enemies, in whatever form it would happen to befall them».

Such were Trotzky's and the Communist Party's ideas about the future policy of the Communist Government. They have not lost their interest, as helping to understand the events we are witnessing now.

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In some respects, the situation has, certainly, changed, and not to the advantage of the Communist Government. The internal pathos of the Communists is gone, and all faith in them in the outside world has vanished. Not only in the eyes of Kühlmann and of many others, in no way connected with Kühlmann, but even in their own eyes — the Communist Party is now rather a clique of «obscure colonial politicians, of upstarts and demagogues», than the leader of the world Socialist revolution. Faith in the saving grace of that revolution is also compromised to a very considerable extent.

CH. IV. GERMANY'S AND RUSSIA'S RESPECTIVE POSITIONS IN THE SYSTEM OF DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE.

In the foregoing I have pointed that the present change in England's attitude towards Russia is due to Mssrs Bonar Law-Baldwin-Curzon Cabinet's policy aiming at the establishment of «dynamic equilibrium» in Europe.

In the preceding chapter an attempt was made to explain the way in which the disorganisation of Russia's national economy affects the interests of British foreign trade and, ultimately, those of British national capital as a whole.

The depressed condition of British trade and the resulting crisis of industrial over-production — a consequence of the fall of the effective demand in the world market, combined with an excessive development of British industrial production and with social unrest caused by unemployment — tend gradually to reduce the *dynamic weight**) of England by affecting, in the first instance, the first of its two components.

To be able to get out of this impasse, the Bonar Law-Baldwin-Curzon Government cannot go on with the speculative, adventurous policy and the petty trade of the days of Mr Lloyd George, with regard to Russia, but needs to see there the establishment of conditions which would give ground for hope and would make possible the resumption of serious business intercourse on a large scale; in other words, it wants Russia economically to recover. The Communist régime has clearly demonstrated its unability to achieve such reconstruction. The last attempt to do it by adopting the New Economic Policy, also proved a failure.

Hence, the prolongation of the Communist régime in Russia does nomore correspond to England's most vital interests and does not agree with the policy of «peace and tranquility», inaugurated by Mr Bonar Law's Cabinet.

The reader will see that, at present, at least, the question of Russia's political independence and of her dynamic weight, is not yet put quite categorically and bluntly. In the present chapter, however, it is my intention to show that, in reality, this question is already assuming the aspect of an important and pressing problem for England as well.

In order to make this proposition clear, we shall extend the scope of the

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*) For brevity, I am using the term «dynamic weight», as applied to a country, to designate, 1) the economic resources of that country, plus, 2) its military resources, in the modern sense of this term. To achieve dynamic equilibrium, Europe must, accordingly, be divided into two groups of countries, whose respective «dynamic weights» would be equal. In the limiting case, each of the groups may consist even of a single country.

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study made in the preceding chapter, which was confined to an analysis of the relations between only two countries — England and Russia, — to the examination on a larger scale of the complicated network of mutual relations between the principal European countries, viz. England, France, Russia and Germany.

Once again I would remind my reader of the two essential elements of the formula of dynamic equilibrium and would invite him to imagine what they are bound to be like in their final form, viz. on the background of European international relations. For this purpose, we shall examine the respective dynamic weights of the countries concerned, as well as their possible combinations.

I have already had the occasion to point that, up to 1914, as far as her dynamic weight was concerned, Germany held an extremely advantageous, not to say a unique position in Europe. The great and harmonious growth of the two essential elements making for her dynamic weight tended enormously to increase the latter both absolutely and as compared with the respective dynamic weights of England and France.

England and France, pursuing their idea of their joint «dictatorship» at Versailles, struck the second of these two elements of Germany's dynamic weight at its very roots by disarming her, and inflicted a heavy blow on the first element of her power by depriving Germany of a large part of her iron and coal and by imposing on her an indefinite burden of reparations.

As a result of these operations, the combined dynamic weights of England and France were, apparently, bound greatly to exceed the dynamic weight of Germany. Together with the additional weights of so-called «kept States», the two countries appeared to have in their favour a tremendous reserve of strength, sufficient to meet the most extravagant requirements.

In other words, everything was, apparently, in perfect order, and the system of joint dictatorship of the two principal Allies — *Pax Sociorum* — seemed secure for many years to come. Accordingly, Russia's dynamic weight did not come into consideration and could well be permitted to fall to zero.

In the course of the four years which elapsed since Versailles, the dynamic weight of England and, to a certain extent, that of France, had, however, decreased, while that of Germany had considerably increased, in spite of the burdens imposed on that country by the Entente in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles.

The problem of the defence of England's vital interests against the speedy growth of Germany's dynamic weight is now assuming for England an even more threatening form than that in which it faced her in the days of King Edward VII. The more direct and simple solution of the problem, proposed by France and involving the occupation of Germany's main industrial area on the Ruhr, was not approved of by far-sighted British statesmanship, which rejected it as a mere palliative of purely temporary expediency, capable, at its best, only partially and precariously to improve the situation. Beside, this solution involved the danger of a new and terrible catastrophe on the European continent. Accordingly, England is trying to find a better solution of the problem.

In these circumstances, Russia's dynamic weight tends to become an important factor and cannot any more be put equal to zero. Accordingly, England is beginning to return to the attitude of friendliness and care which

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was characteristic of her relations to Russia in the days of King Edward VII, and is endeavouring to restore and to increase Russia's dynamic weight.*)

How far the premises of the conclusion just reached are really right? To answer this question, we should first consider in some detail the following points:

1) Has the dynamic weight of Germany really increased since the Treaty of Versailles? 2) What is the importance of Russia's dynamic weight for the equilibrium of Europe? and, finally, 3) Does the occupation of the Ruhr constitute an effective safeguard against Germany's speedily increasing dynamic weight?

An objective examination of these three questions will enable us to judge whether the present fears of French and British statesmen for the vital interests of their respective countries are based on realities or on pure imagination, and whether it is really necessary to have recourse to some new measures, for which the Treaty of Versailles did not provide, in order to prevent not only the existing *pax Sociorum*, but the independence of all European nations as

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*) In order to get rid of the impressions created by the Lloyd George period and to convince himself that England can really care about the dynamic weight of Russia, the reader would be well advised to read the brief but masterly sketches of British statesmen in the «Mirrors of Downing Street». This book should be read without too much old Russian trust; but also without our newly-developed excessive suspiciousness; in it its very well informed author—«a Gentleman with the Duster» — deals, i. a., with Russia, England, Germany and the rôle played by Lord Carnock, of whom, in the circles closely connected with the British Foreign Office, in 1920, it was usual to speak as of «the man who made the war». Lord Carnock himself treated this reference to his services as a friendly joke. Both he and the author of the book, who has a very high esteem for what he has done for England, have the following to say about the origin of the war.

The Gentleman with the Duster says: «But there is no living politician who watched so intelligently the long beginnings of the war or knew so certainly in the days of tension that war had come, as this modest and gracious gentleman...

«As Sir Arthur Nicholson, our Ambassador at St.Petersburg, Lord Carnock won for England, as no other man has done before him, the love of Russia. The rulers of Russia trusted him. He was their friend in darkness which had begun to alarm them, a darkness which made them conscious of their country's weakness, and which brought to their ears again and again the rumbles of approaching storm. Lord Carnock sincerly loving these people received their confidence as one friend receives the confidence of another. His advice was honourable advice. He counselled these friends to set their house in order and to stand firm in the conviction of their strength. Their finances were a chaos, their army was disorganized; let them begin in those quarters; let them bring order into their finances and let them reorganize their army.

«While he was at St. Petersbourg after a wide experience in other countries, he twice saw Russia humiliated by Germany... Lord Carnock was at the Foreign Office in July 1914. He alone knew that Russia would fight. For the rest of mankind, certainly for the German Kaiser, it was to be another bloodless humiliation of the Russian Bear... But this time Russia was ready, and this time Lord Carnock knew Russia would fight. I am not sure that Lord Carnock was not the only statesman in Europe who possessed this knowledge — the knowledge on which everything hung...

«He saw that Russia was tempting the worst passions of Germany by her weakness... A strong Russia might alarm Germany and precipitate a conflict, but it was the world's chief fortress against Prussian domination.

«For the sake of Russia he worked for Russia... hoping that self respecting Russia might save mankind from the horrors of war and, if war came, the worse horrors of a German world conquest.»

We know, that Lord Carnock's efforts were not animated by his love to Russia alone, but by that to his own country as well. This latter consideration, however, is only one more reason for the expectation that England, once again, will come to the assistance of Russia in the increase by the latter of her dynamic weight.

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well, from being destroyed and supplanted by a *pax Germanica*, under which, as General Bernhardi puts it, the only things left to the peoples would be their eyes, so that they might weep.

This is not an idle question at all, because, at present, there exists a great apprehension among the more far-sighted of European statesmen, that, as this was the case before 1914, Germany is still striving at imposing the *pax Germanica* upon Europe. Whether these fears are justified or not, has to be decided.

Has Germany's dynamic weight increased since Versailles? This question is most carefully studied by both England and France in every detail. Here, I intend briefly to refer to some of the latest results of this close and careful observation.*)

According to these observations, the characteristic features of Germany's economic development since Versailles consist, on the one hand, of the destruction, as a result of inflation, of credit and of the finances of the State and, on the other, of, 1) the creation within Germany's present frontiers, of industries in place of those lost with the territories ceded in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles and of concerns and industrial equipment confiscated as a result of that Treaty; 2) in the organization and the extension, generally, of industrial concerns, beside those mentioned under (1); 3) in the amalgamation of industrial concerns into huge combines, involving a great cheapening and technical improvement of production.

The German Government has very nearly gone bankrupt, while at the same time having acted with most commendable firmness in preserving its gold reserve almost intact (£51,5 millions on December 31st, 1922, as compared with £58.5 millions in 1913). As far as the country is concerned, it has actually increased its productive power, as compared with what was left to it after the meeting of the first claims resulting from the Armistice and the Treaty of Versailles.

To point to some particular cases: 1) Germany's metallurgical production in 1922 reached 8.75-9 million tons of pig iron and no less than 9 million tons of cast steel. The whole of this output was consumed at home. In the case of pig iron Germany's home consumption reached 180 p. cent. and in that of steel 150 p. cent. of the total production of these metals in Great Britain in 1922. This points to a feverish activity in the reconstruction and extension of the German industry, because the whole of Germany's export abroad of finished articles of iron and steel was entirely covered, as far as the metals used in it are concerned, by metals from other than German home sources. Taken by weight, these exports were entirely covered by the tonnage of crude pig iron and steel imported to Germany from abroad, mainly from industrial areas immediately adjoining her Western frontier. These figures tend also to show that, in 1922, the general pressure of work and the output in the German metallurgical industry were very much higher than those in the British industry, the two countries possessing nearly the same equipment for metal-

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*) 1) «Report on the Economic and Financial Conditions in Germany to March, 1923, by Mr J. W. F. Thelwall, Commercial Secretary to H. M. Embassy, Berlin, assisted by Mr C. J. Kavanagh, Commercial Secretary Occupied Territories, etc. Cologne. Publ. by Department of Overseas Trade.
2) «Le Ruhr et l'Allemagne» par L. Coupaye, Ingénier en Chef d'Artillerie navale, Chargé de Mission. Préface d'Andrien Doriac, Président de la Commission des Finances de la Chambre des Députés. Encyclopédie Parlementaire. 1922.

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lurgical production. 2) The vertical combination of German industries into large concerns, beside having considerably reduced the cost of production, resulted in great commercial advantages for Germany, by merging into a single whole the profits of all separate concerns and thus facilitating the adaptation of costs and of dividends in separate undertakings to the varying conditions of the market. The German manufacturer is thus enabled, whenever this is needed, drastically to cut down his selling prices in any of the separate enterprises, say, in those producing raw materials, and to make up for the loss by raising the prices charged for finished goods, without affecting the aggregate profits of the combine.

3) The German industry enjoys particular advantages in its competition in foreign markets with industries working under different conditions, as, say, the British industry, owing to her costs being very low. The latter fact is due, beside the amalgamation, and even, perhaps, to a still greater extent, to inflation.

4) Not only the advantages enjoyed by the German industry in foreign markets, but the feverish demand for its products a thome are also due mainly to inflation.

The majority of British experts express the opinion that the present German policy of inflation is bound to end in disaster and to make Germany bankrupt; then, after the catastrophe, according to them, Germany's economic life will have to be thoroughly re-organized on the basis of a stable gold standard. Then, England's position in her competition with Germany on the world market will be improved, and she will have a fair chance against the German industry. Practical British statesmen, naturally, agree with the experts' opinion: they also think that Germany is bound ultimately to recover her financial stability and to restore her currency. They are, however, also concerned with the practical aspect of the case: *when* is this change to take place? This may happen too late, when the present depression and unemployment in England will already assume dangerous proportions, especially because, sooner or later, Germany's home demand for the reconstruction and the extension of her own industries is bound to cease, and Germany will flood the impoverished foreign markets with her increased industrial output. This trade offensive may easily prove even more dangerous than the tremendous attacks led by Mackensen in the Great War. 5) Unemployment and strikes of industrial workers are, practically, unknown to Germany now.

Summing up the above, and considering the results of Mssrs J. W. F. Thelwall's and C. J. Kavanagh's observations, which are highly interesting from the practical and the theoretical points of view, one would hardly be able to think that the German Government would be able or willing to give up the policy of inflation.

At least under the present conditions, inflation, while being, on the one hand, a kind of levy on the consumers at home, and, on the other, a sort of unrepayable borrowing abroad, does, nevertheless, serve the useful purpose of greatly increasing the productive capacity of the German industry, of meeting the adverse balance of trade, which reached 2.300 million marks in 1922, and, finally, of helping the German exporter to accumulate large balances in foreign banks. The exporters are thus enabled to concentrate in their hands the whole of the foreign exchange available to Germany, by squeezing it out of all classes of her population, which are paid in marks. This, naturally, results in resentment being created among the public in Germany against the industrialists-exporters and against the Government, granting licenses for

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such exports. On the other hand, however, this disaffection can be allayed by the assertion that the accumulation by the exporters of balances abroad, in foreign banks, is not only due to the pursuit by them of their own selfish purposes, but is forced on them as the only means by which the capital thus accumulated can be made secure from diversion to the payment of reparations and can thus be made available for Germany in future, under normal conditions. This is, certainly, a rather slippery ground; it is so easy on it to slip from the national to the selfish. Hence, the suspicions and the bitter attacks against inflation and the industrialists-exporters.

Besides, inflation practically annuls the liabilities of industrial concerns on their debentures*) and those of farmers on mortgages and hypothecary bonds. Hence — a new group of partisans of inflation and a new source of social discontent.

Inflation, undoubtedly, makes the position very unstable and fosters social disaffection; yet, it would be hardly possible to expect that Germany would be able to give it up in her present conditions. Her present attitude is one of economic war or of preparation to it. Moreover, beside being an external economic war, it is also an economic civil war of various social groups within the German State.

And inflation is the unavoidable companion of every war.

As things are, however, either in spite or because of the disorganisation of Germany's finances and of her currency system, there is one important fact with which we have got to reckon: Germany's industrial equipment has been renovated and improved since Versailles. The personnel of the industry is maintained, well fed, and its class claims are kept within certain bounds by patriotic considerations. This industrial apparatus is a highly important factor in thei ncrease of Germany's dynamic weight. Accordingly, to the question of whether Germany's dynamic weight has increased since the days of Versailles, we are bound to reply in the affirmative without any hesitation.

What is the importance of Russia's dynamic weight for the equilibrium? Its importance had always been put very high since the Napoleonic wars. Accordingly, whenever the old system of European equilibrium had been directed against Russia, it had always combined against her almost the whole of the Great European Powers. On the other hand, when Europe was confronted with the growing menace of German dictatorship, and the system of equilibrium required a combination of Powers to be formed to oppose it, England, as we could see from what has been said of Lord Carnock's rôle, saw the cornerstone of the whole building in Russia. And England was not alone in her high estimation of the importance of Russia. Bismarck's advice to Germany was also to the effect that she should avoid war with Russia. At an earlier stage, the collapse of Napoleon's career of conquest was brought about by his attack on Russia's independence.

In the periods of great national trials, Russia's strength was not often displayed in dramatic and picturesque forms. As a rule, there was something dull and indifferent in her resistance, something that tended, on the long run, to entangle and to exhaust the enemy, and which, by its very dulness, was terrible to him. How great is the latent power of Russia and how much it is still bound to grow, was often discussed by us in the Russian Economic

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*) These liabilities amount, approximately, to about 15 to 20,000 million gold marks.

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Association. But, considering the importance attached to them by foreigners, to whose views reference has just been made, we see that, if anything, even the most optimistic among us have underestimated Russia's real dynamic weight.

No European country aiming at the establishment of its own dictatorship in Europe or of a system of European equilibrium, could fail to take Russia's dynamic weight into account. It must have this weight on her side of the balance and would be unable to allow Russia to join hands with any other country which either is or may eventually become its enemy.

What were the ratios of the dynamic weights of England, France, Germany and Russia at the time of the «joint dictatorship» of the two former countries? England and France were then convinced that Germany's dynamic weight is destroyed for ever. It was only due to this conviction that they have done nothing to prevent the destruction of Russia's dynamic weight which was prepared by the German General Staff and by the leaders of the German industry already during the war through the medium of the Communist Party, and which found its further expression in Germany's policy of supporting the Communist dictatorship over Russia. Later, Mr Lloyd George has even gone farther than Germany did ever venture. Being always first in everything, he engaged in the work of destroying Russia's dynamic weight, at first having followed the ideas of the German General Staff, which used to be England's enemy, and then having soon begun to play an active and leading rôle in their carrying into effect.

Why is it that, at present, these borrowed ideas are considered as being unsuitable for England and dangerous to the most vital interests of the British people? This is due to two causes. In the first instance, the conclusion that Germany's dynamic weight is done away with for ever, has proved premature; then, the destruction of the dynamic weight of Russia as an independent entity, would leave behind a number of fragments, which, being dispersed, might add a great deal to the dynamic weight of Germany, an account of purely geographical proximity.

With regard to Russia, there can be only one alternative. Either Russia preserves her independent dynamic weight and thus remains a factor of European equilibrium, or her independence is destroyed and, consequently, as a factor of European equilibrium, Russia is lost. In the latter case she is bound to become a vassal of Germany and an enormous addition to Germany's dynamic weight.

The independent dynamic weight of Russia is destroyed by the destruction of the first component element of the formula by which that weight is expressed. Russia's weakness has always been in the backwardness of her industrial development, as compared with that of European industrial countries and, in particular, with that of Germany. With considerable energy and with a measure of success amazing to ourselves, we were making good for this lag in the course of the war.

Now, the Communist Government has practically killed the Russian coal, benzol, metallurgical and metal industries and her transport. Without these industries, Russia's military power cannot exist as an independent national force. As long as the Russian Army disposes of some remnants of the former stocks of war materials, it is able, in the case of the country being attacked, to do its duty to Russia, on the condition that such attack greatly rouses the national feeling in its ranks. But all this is purely static. In no more than two or three years, the utter destruction of the Russian industry is bound to

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deprive the Russian Army of any independent importance, and to make it entirely dependent on the German industry.*) Whether the destruction by the Communist Government of the Russian industry and its efforts to corrupt the healthy constructive spirit of the Russian industrial army by the N. E. P. and its practices, are a result of a special secret agreement of the Political Bureau and of the leaders of the Communist Party with the German General Staff,**) or whether this is being done owing to the *bona fide* stupidity and incompetence of the Communist Government, as administrator of Russia's economic organization — does not matter, because in both cases the ultimate result is the destruction of the dynamic weight of Russia. What is really important is *what* is being actually done, and not *why* it is being done.

German economic Imperialism, which was always preparing to enforce a *pax Germanica* on Europe and, especially, on Russia, is very resourcefull, and has many means and methods at its disposal. It is no more doctrinaire than is Trotzky, and is ready to accept the destruction of Russia's independent dynamic weight from whomever can achieve it — from the Communist Government, from Mr Lloyd George or, finally, from the reactionary and agrarian supporters of Russian authocracy, who, even in Witte's times, thought that all the evils and revolutionary tendencies in Russia are due to the development of industry.

The actual position was that, in 1922, Germany was getting over-industrialised, while Russia's industries were being destroyed.

Accordingly, Russia's dynamic weight was ceasing to exist as an independent factor, and was gradually becoming a satelite of that of Germany, forming its agricultural or colonial *hinterland*.

In order to be able to say whether this condition favours the establishment in Europe of a *pax Germanica*, or whether it helps to bring about a world Socialist revolution, it is necessary to re-consider the problem, which has

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*) Before the war, German capitalists were generally hostile to the development of the industry in Russia. Comparing the concerns in Russia, founded on Belgian, French or English capital with those founded on German capital, one can see that Germany's rôle in the industrial development of Russia was practically negligible. Germany used to invest her capital in Russia only in purely commercial concernes. To this practice she adhers now also. J. W. F. Thelwall (p. 53) gives some data concerning certain very important agreements, concluded between Germany and the Communist Government and trusts in 1922. These include: 1) the contract with Siemens and Schukkert for the supply of installation materials to the «Electrotrust», on credit, to the amount of 500 million marks; 2) the agreement with Wolff and Strauss concerning the organization by the latter of a trading company with a capital of £0.03 millions, the firm paying to the Communist Government for the lisence by advancing to it £0.75 million worth of goods and by opening in its favour an additional credit to the extent of £0.5 millions; 3) even Krupp, when he got to Russia, gave up his usual line of business, as metallurgist and metal-worker, and becomes a farmer and a gardener.

Another fact which it is interesting to mention, is that the Communist Government, while having acknowledged the existence of a crisis of overproduction and the fact that over one-half of the actual output of the Russian industry could not be disposed of in 1922 owing to the fall in the effective demand on the part of the farming population of Russia, has yet managed to import from Germany no less than 37.8 million gold roubles' worth of industrial products. (See, J.W.F. Thelwall, Report, p. 56).

**) As mentioned above, Trotzky was very anxious, at the time of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, to acquit his Party from the suspicion that it had ever come to such an «understanding» with the German General Staff. His efforts, however, were utterly frustrated by the subsequent publication of Gen. Ludendorf's memoirs.

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been solved by Trotzky in his Preface to the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, in a sense too favourable, perhaps, to the Communist cause.

This problem is: «Who does know and understand his opponent better?» Is it the German economic Imperialism, or the Communist International, which now controls the dynamic weight of Russia.

Here, we enter the sphere of adventurous enterprise and of a game of chance, which the two are now playing on a European scale. I would not venture to say, whose chances of gain are better. This is beyond my sphere.

Of one thing, however, I am certain: if the changes in the respective dynamic weights of Russia and Germany are allowed to proceed in the same direction as in 1922, no third party has any chance to gain. There can be no possible advantage in it for either the «joint dictatorship» of the two principal Allies , or for the system of dynamic equilibrium in Europe, or, finally, for the future independence of Russia.

Is the occupation of the Ruhr a real guarantee against the increase in Germany's dynamic weight? The occupation of the Ruhr is the last act of the great tragedy involved in the loss of equilibrium on the European continent. What matters in it are not petty ambitions or the desire to extort from Germany an extra milliard of gold marks. In fact, a judgement is being pronounced now by the Almighty on the fates of at least four great nations of Europe, each of which, in the course of its history, has had great merits before humanity and also has heavily sinned against the human race and civilization.

As far as the four principal actors of the tragedy, namely — England, France, Belgium and Germany, — are concerned, there arises the really tremendous question of whether it is not time for them to give up playing the principal rôles on the historical stage of the world. Any of these four principal figures can easily receive a fatal wound in the battle on the Ruhr, and can be forced to retire and to spend the rest of its life in provincial obscurity, far away from the great highways of history. None of the four, after having started the whole game at Versailles, can now stand aloof from the great tragedy of the Ruhr, and escape its consequences.

In order to decide whom it shall relegate to the realm of the past, and before reaching a definite decision, Fate is now confronting the four nations with the supreme trial of their human intelligence, their conscience and of their will and capacity to survive.

As to us, Russians, we have already passed through an even deeper and more cruel tragedy of the greatest of revolutions, which has stamped out of our souls all pettiness and greed. It is clear, therefore, that it is with the keenest sense of justice and with the deepest sympathy that we should follow the development of this supreme trial in the history of other nations. We should carefully follow all that is being done by the best and the worst among the representatives of the four great nations involved in that trial and trying to do all in their power to prevent the tragedy from ending in the old traditional fashion, by the destruction of both the heroes and the vilains. At the same time, we must maintain our strict sense of reality, with regard to the conditions in which the tragedy is developing, namely, with regard to the «force of circumstances» and to the «complexity of the characters» of modern heroes, who are neither too good nor too bad, and are more often expressing a collective will than their own individual will.

What are the vital national interests of these four countries and the real means by which these interests can be secured, ultimately depending on their respective dynamic weights?

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Russia. Before proceeding to answer this question, we should insert a brief remark about the position of Russia. Russia's national interests are in no way affected by the principal object over which the Ruhr battle is being fought, namely — the struggle for foreign markets for industrial products. The Russian national economy is essentially different from those of the countries of group A,*) i. e. of countries living on the proceeds of foreign trade, whose industry has outgrown the demand of their internal market. The very type of our national economy, harmoniously combining a development of productive powers and of the internal demand, permits us to keep to a policy of «splendid isolation» from the violent struggle for foreign markets in which other European countries are constantly engaged. Russia is a peaceful country, in no way interested in the conquest of foreign markets. Besides, any dictatorship over Europe does not suit Russia in the least. The *pax Sociorum* would, certainly, be bad enough for her, but a *pax Germanica* would be fatal for her, if not for ever, than, at least, for a few generations to come.

Now, let us return to the respective positions of the four leading figures of the tragedy.

Belgium is very much concerned in the acquisition of foreign markets for her industries. The second element of Belgium's dynamic weight is, certainly, very small, as compared with other European countries. Accordingly, the conquest of foreign markets is carried out by her by peaceful methods alone, namely, by the hard work and the organizing abilities of her people. Her position is exclusively defensive and is entirely aimed at the defence of her own economic independence. Belgium's participation in the battle now being fought on the Ruhr is only due to the fact that she is happy or, perhaps, in certain respects, unhappy enough to find herself situated at the crossing of the great routes of the world's trade, and is, accordingly, involved in the tragedy against her will, entirely owing to her geographic position. Belgium, as well as Russia, would gain nothing and lose much from any form of dictatorship over Europe.

France. The growth of Germany's dynamic weight, which became perfectly evident by the end of 1922, has finally convinced French politicians that the building erected at Versailles is by no means secure. The anxiety has begun to gain ground that the dynamic weight of Germany has already become so great as to enable her very soon to get rid of the burden imposed on her by the Treaty of Versailles and to substitute her own dictatorship over Europe for that of the two principal Allies. In order fully to realize that anxiety for her national future which has got hold of France, we have only to recall to our minds the fears common to all the Allied peoples, during the Great War, when everybody was keenly anxious for the future of his own native country.

France thinks that the *pax Germanica* is bound to be forced upon Europe by a new War, and she has no doubt that it is only by armed force that she can defend her national interests in the case of a conflict with Germany.

As France sees it, the increase of Germany's military power can be brought about by: 1) A development, intensification and amalgamation of the industries in the Ruhr. As Adrien Doriac anxiously puts it, «The heavy industry of the Ruhr is entirely concentrated in the hands of a few individuals and is bound to play a decisive part in the events that will take place in Germany

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*) See «Rus. Econ.», p. 2102.

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in the nearest future». Indeed, as far as large industries are concerned, Germany enjoys very important advantages over France, in case of a war, because she has coal, steel. metal-working industries, explosives and gases. This is especially important now, when the technique generally, and the technique of warfare, in particular, appear to be on the eve of great discoveries in many domains. The concentration of the huge apparatus of German industry in the control of a few enables her effectively and quickly to apply to practical purposes any new achievement of military technique. Germany's industrial organization is able, therefore, very quickly to bring to nothing France's present military superiority. Then, 2) in her present anxiety France has very soon come to realize her actual loneliness. In the case of a war with Germany, the French army should have to fight single-handed. Russia would no more divert German forces to the East. Whether her place will be effectively filled by the armies of the newly created countries, owing their very existence to the Entente, has yet to be proved, while Eugland's army during the Great war has played a smaller part than her Navy.

We have seen that the dynamic weight of Germany has now increased at the expense of the independent dynamic weight of Russia. France is unable to estimate with any degree of accuracy, how much will Germany's dynamic weight be increased as a result of the final destruction of the Russian industry by the Communist Government and by the consequent fact of the inevitable accession to Germany of the fragments of Russia's former dynamic weight. These fears, moreover, have been greatly increased by the tactless behaviour of German diplomatists who, to the great detriment of their own people, have done all in their power to emphasise this point by the demonstrative display of their alliance and their military convention with the Communist Government. Anxiety was also increased by the empty talk about the possibility of the Red Army's appearance on the Ruhr. Reasonable people in France did, naturally, understand, that there is a good deal of bluff in these demonstrations. But, at the same time, they could not fail to realize that both the time and the Communist Government are working in the same direction and that what is only bluff to-day may become reality to-morrow. This, naturally, tended to make people nervous.

As a result, while France still enjoyed superiority over Germany in effective military power, she decided to anticipate the events, without waiting for the time when the relation of dynamic weights change so much as to permit Germany to destroy the *pax Sociorum* by force of arms and to establish the *pax Germanica* instead.

The solution of the problem has been found in the military occupation of the Ruhr, as the centre of the whole industrial apparatus of Germany. Reparations, of which there is so much talk, are, really, a matter of secondary importance. What is being aimed at in the first instance are «guarantees».

«As long as we maintain our present position on the Rhine, we are bound to remain a constant menace to those 10 or 12 German industrial magnates, who, actually, exircise financial control over the whole of Germany»...—this is what Adrien Dariac wrote on the very eve of the occupation of the Ruhr. «If, he proceeds, the customs frontier established between the zone of occupation and the free parts of Germany, is not, at present, yieding any large and direct commercial profits, yet, the very fact that it exists serves to remind those concerned that all exchange between the works producing black metal and the concerns, at which that metal is manufactured into finished goods, is entirely *under our control*. By the simple expedient of raising the customs

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duties we are in a position to exact, practically, any contribution from the German metallurgical production or even to achieve its utter disorganization... At any cost we must strive to preserve this instrument of control over that industrial Germany, which is now *completing her organization*. Now we are in a position *either to destroy it or to exploit it for our own benefit by means of our control*. Germany feels that she is always under this menace. It may be that the necessity of getting rid of this Nessos shirt will suggest to the German Government, which is now acting on the advice and with the support of people immediately concerned in the matter, some such proposal that would give us immediate satisfaction».

Adrien Dariac wrote this in October, 1922. Now, in May, 1923, the headquarters of French dictatorship are not at the customs frontier, but on the premises of a metallurgical concern. We are witnessing a situation which can at any time be transformed by the French military authorities into a kind of «nationalization» of the industry, similar to the one that had existed in Russia in 1917 and 1918. Naturally, the attitude of the civilized and well-educated French military authorities to German owners of concerns in the heavy industry and to German workers is much more lenient than that of the Communist Government, which had been materially and morally supported by the German heavy industry, by German Labour and by the German General Staff, to Russian industrialists and workers. This, however, is a very slight consolation, because, as a matters of fact, the right of ownership and of freedisposal of the concerns is as much threatened now in the German heavy industry, as it was in Russia in 1917 and 1918.

No passive resistance, no sabotage, etc., can alter the essential fact, that the military occupation is solidly established. This military success has strongly buttressed the shattered building of the «joint dictatorship» of the two principal Allies.

Thus, for the time being, which, in my opinion, cannot last long, the menace of the growth of Germany's dynamic weight and of the establishment of the *pax Germanica*, was averted by the French solution of the problem of European equilibrium.

England. The occupation of the Ruhr does not, however, eliminate the principal causes which tend to undermine the building of the «joint dictatorship» of the two principal Allies. These causes are still working, in spite of the occupation. If these causes are not eliminated, not only the «joint dictatorship» is doomed to destruction, but any hope of peace in Europe is also bound to disappear, and to be replaced by the dictatorship of Germany or by general chaos.

«The establishment of the *pax Germanica* on the continent of Europe, if ever it should happen, would, not, probably, be the result of military aggression, of which France is so much afraid, but of a far more formidable and destructive economic war.

This danger is, apparently, realized by the Bonar Law-Baldwin-Curzon Government which supplements the French temporary solution by one calculated to be more lasting, namely, by its present course directed to the establishment of a system of dynamic equilibrium on the continent of Europe.

The military phalanx of Mackensen, with its plenty of shells from the Ruhr is not so terrible as the German industrial phalanx, which is bound to start the offensive as soon as the German industry is re-organized, and to destroy all its enemies in the world market by the mere expedient of cutting down prices. This is not a dream, but a very real possibility of the *near future*.

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For the *immediate future* this offensive is temporarily averted by the French occupation of the Ruhr. As long as passive resistance in the Ruhr, on the one hand, and repressions for it, on the other, will continue, the output of coal and of the heavy industry are bound to be small, and the equipment of the German industrial phalanx will be delayed, with the result that it will not be able to start its offensive. Moreover, during the occupation of the Ruhr the position of England in the world market had improved, with regard to competition. What does the English manufacturer need to meet his German competitor in the foreign market on terms of equality? He wants, 1) the German mark, if not to appreciate, then, at least, to be stabilized, and, 2) the costs of German finished goods to be raised up to the level of the costs of manufacture in England, as far as the raw materials used are concerned; in other words, he wants the prices of German coal and iron to be increased. For a time, at least, the occupation of the Ruhr has brought about the fulfilment of both these *desiderata*. Beside, it brought about an increase in the export of English coal to Germany.

England, certainly, is not the Knight Errant of Germany. This is the attitude in all cases when English and German interests are in conflict, not only of *bourgeois* ministers, but of Labour as well. If you want proofs, you would be well advised to consult the report made to the British Parliamentary Labour Party by four of its members who have made an investigation of the position in the Ruhr during the occupation *). This is a highly interesting document for all those who have not yet lost faith in the «international solidarity of European organised Labour». You will find there some highly caracteristic arguments in favour of the «internationalization» of the Ruhr which they suggest.

But what is bound to happen in the *near future*, when this *immediate future* is over? The resistance of German industrialists will be broken, and the «nationalization», now impending, will assume definite forms. Under «nationalization», however, nothing like the successful conduct of industrial concerns in the Ruhr would be possible.

As far as the precise form which this future régime is bound to assume is concerned, very drastic schemes are now being put forward; these schemes, involving the «nationalization» by those in occupation of the bulk of shares in the concerns of the heavy industry, do not, however, appear to have originated in really responsible quarters and do not therefore, seem to be finally decided upon. Should these plans materialise, they would introduce in Germany a régime closely resembling that established by the New Economic Policy in Russia, with trusts organised as so-called «mixed concerns». The shares confiscated by the occupants for reparations could then be disposed of by the respective Governments on the Stock Exchange. Thus, a considerable part of reparations would be paid. It is supposed that German owners of concerns would obtain compensation from the German Government. In this way, the heavy industry of the Ruhr would be controlled, under the supervision of the French and Belgian governments, by boards in which the majority of directors would not be German. For the rest of Germany, the coal, iron and chemical production of the Ruhr would then practically become foreign products.

I cannot imagine such form of organization to be practicable. Should

*) See «The Times», 22.2.23.

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it materialise, it would bring about a catastrophe in Germany, would involve her population into terrible plight, misery, famine and mortality, which could compare only with those now prevailing in Russia. However great the cruelty of the *homo Europeus*, I do not think he would be capable of repeating in Germany the horrors he has recently perpetrated in Russia. It appears more probable, therefore, that a less violent course will be chosen, the German Government agreeing to pay fixed amounts of reparations, and the German industrialists being restored in the control of their concerns in the Ruhr. French troops, having reduced the severity of the régime established by them, would still remain in occupation of the Ruhr, in order to guarantee the payment of reparations and, principally, with a view of preventing the militarization of the heavy industry.

What would happen, if the whole situation were permitted to follow the course towards the solution of the problem of the re-establishement of European equilibrium suggested by France ? The military strain would not be reduced, because Russia, being gradually deprived of her independent dynamic weight, would become ever more dependent on Germany. The dynamic weight of Germany would be steadily increased at the expense of that of Russia, while Germany's military base would be gradually moved towards the East.

Far greater, however, would be the economic danger involved in this situation. The re-organisation of the German industry is nearing completion. A very considerable part of Germany's productive powers is engaged in providing for the needs of this reorganisation, and the completion of the latter is bound to reduce the demands of the German home market for industrial equipment to a very great extent. As a result, both plant and hands will need work for the foreign markets.

Circumstances will then compel Germany to export abroad much more than she did in 1922, when her exports amounted to 29 p. cent. of the pre-war figures. Even these 29 p.cent. were not easily assimilated by the world market, in its present depressed condition and with Russia rendered unable to buy by the Communist régime. There is no hope of the purchasing capacity of Russia being restored until her internal régime is drastically changed.

In view of this depressed condition of the world market, all the ingenuity of the Germans will be directed to the competition and to the further cheapening of German products by improvements in the technique of production. Failing this, they would reduce wages, because some way or other out of the situation must be found at all costs. Then the German industry would utterly smash any competitor on the world market, paying normal wages. This offensive would finally destroy the established relations between the standards of life of various classes of the population living on what they earn in various branches of production; these relations have already undergone considerable changes of late. It would be very difficult to foresee the social and political consequences of these changes in the relations of standards of life, but they would, probably, be felt throughout the whole world. They will be extremely dangerous because of the rate at which the process is bound to develop.

It may be expected that the catastrophe to be produced by the offensive of the German industrial phalanx will be far worse than that produced by Mackensen's military phalanx in Galicia.

The only way to prevent the catastrophe is that of increasing the purchasing capacity of the world market and of creating conditions under which the products of German over-industrialisation, which has developed since

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the establishment of the «joint dictatorship» of the two principal Allies over Europe, could be disposed of without causing too much disturbance in the world.

The urgent necessity of finding a satisfactory solution of this problem forms the real connecting link between the occupation of the Ruhr and the drastic change in the British attitude towards Russia. Lord Curzon's Note is only a striking expression of a well considered decision, based on a clear realization of the present economic situation on the continent of Europe. Now to help the prolongation of Communist dictatorship over Russia would mean to put Russia's dynamic weight under German control as surely, as if an international agreement were signed conferring on Germany a mandate to Russia, because, by the force of circumstances and of time, the Communist régime is bound to bring this about. No responsible British Statesman would ever have consented to put Russia's dynamic weight under German control at a time when the great vitality and growth of the German dynamic weight has been so evidently displayed, in spite of all the burdens imposed on it by the Entente and the close supervision on the part of the latter.

What remains is to refrain from helping to prolong the Communist dictatorship over Russia. Without support from the capitalist outside world, the communist régime will be unable to withstand the growing disaffection of the population in Russia. Russia by her own effort will establish a representative Government. The establishment of political freedom will be followed by that of unfettered economic activities ; the régime, probably very democratic as to the electoral laws, will be strictly *bourgeois* as to its fundamental organisation. The permanent economic civil war, unavoidably attendant on the Communist régime, will then cease ; Russia will enjoy internal peace, and foreign capital will flow to her from the only great source of capital now left in the world, namely, the United States, and from the smaller sources of England, France and Belgium.

The policy of the future democratic and national Russia, aimed only at safeguarding Russian interests, and utterly alien to any machinations to achieve a world revolution, will, naturally, be independent of Germany. This will immediately relieve the military strain in France, due to the fear lest Germany's military resources should be reinforced by those of Russia. This will create a tendency in France to reduce the pressure on Germany and will generally help to do away with militarism in Europe.

The principal result, however, will be that the purchasing capacity of the world market will grow. In the first instance, this will be due to Russia's appearance on the market as a purchaser of goods, as soon as she starts on her reconstruction. Then, the establishment of peace on the continent of Europe and the absence of any kind of «dictatorship», which could at any moment, deprive any one of the fruits of his work, will create the atmosphere of confidence essential for the intensive development of economic activities.

Then, the present over-industrialisation of Germany will be enabled to find an outlet in the increased purchasing capacity of the world market, with the result that the catastrophe involved in the impending German industrial offensive will be averted for the common benefit of Europe and of the German people.

This is the real meaning of the British solution of the problem of equilibrium, which makes this solution particularly welcome. It implies the abandonment of the idea of *dictatorship* in favour of that of *equilibrium*, which is

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the only one that is able to give peace to European peoples under the present conditions.

Germany. About Germany there is very little to be said. Her vital need at present is that of securing her right for independent political and economic existence. So far, the Republican Government had not availed itself of the opportunity to use the means that are at its disposal and that answer the situation, and had been acting on the dictates of German imperialist Capital. It revived the old dreams of *pax Germanica*, fostered by her economic Imperialism before the world war.

These dreams were: 1) The conquest of Russia and its conversion into an agrarian *hinterland* of the German industrial State, and, 2) The gegemony on the world market. They have not changed since.

The attitude of the German Republican Government to the Communist Government of Russia, as far as its meaning and purposes are concerned, has remained the same as those of the Hohenzollern Monarchy at the time of the «understanding» between Ludendorf and Lenin or Trotzky and Kühlman.

The German industrial phalanx is only a renovated form of the old German economic policy, of the «grip on the world» of pre-war German economic Imperialism.

In fairness we are bound to pay tribute to German national cleverness and tenacity : the technical execution of any scheme decided upon is always steady, logical and clever. The German national mind, however, suffers from one important shortcoming: it has not got sufficient creative genius to devise a new scheme or thoroughly to modify the old one, so as to fit it to the real interests of the nation and to the circumstances of the moment.

The conception itself of German economic imperialism was not created independently, but borrowed from the British, who originally invented it and grew prosperous on their invention. On copying it, the Germans have disfigured it to such an extent by their abstract logic and their utter lack of any sense of proportion, as to bring it into general discredit and to compel its inventors themselves to give it up in their relation with many peoples.

This deficient sense of realities, combined with the lack of genuine talent for independent creation proved fatal. The Republican Government, in the days of extreme plight for the nation, failed to find a new way and engaged into a hopeless course along the old highways of imperialism.

If, however, it proved impossible to establish the *pax Germanica*, possessing the resources and the prestige of the powerful German Empire, as it was before 1914, how could one have any hope of achieving it now, when Germany is under effective control and supervision, and the work has to be carried underhand ?

But even underhand work is impossible now, because all these very secret and very ingenious plans of the German heavy industry, of industrialists, etc., intended at the conquest of Russia and of the world market, have got to be done behind a glass wall, and all the results achieved are clear to any one who can see. You will understand this, it you read the *Report of Commercial Secretary of H.M. Embassy in Berlin* quoted above. As soon as the results appear to be dangerous, the plans are bound to be frustrated by military or economic pressure. To prepare the *pax Germanica* under such conditions is as fruitless as to do Sysiph's work.

Accordingly, all that had hitherto been sacrificed to these secret and ingenious plans, prepared by German industrial magnates, was really taken away from the people in favour of the exporter, while the inflation has utter-

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ly dispossessed whole groups of German population. All this plight has been due to the search for hopeless illusions.

All this failed in bringing Germany nearer to a real escape from her plight or to a real peace with Russia, England or France. The German Press is perfectly right in saying that at this time of supreme trial, Germany stands alone in the world.

It is time for her to give up her hopeless illusions and to start on a different path.

CH. V. CONCLUSIONS.

The two events discussed above, namely the French occupation of the Ruhr and the change in the British policy with regard to Russia, are signs of the fact that we have definitely entered in the last stormy act of the tragedy involved in the search for the lost equilibrium on the European continent.

You will ask me, what will be the end of this act, and what is likely to be the epilogue of the tragedy. But I do not engage in predictions of the future.

My intention was simply to show, how the tragedy had actually developed and what are the powers and the intentions of its various personages. It is up to them to play the tragedy to a finish and to determine the outcome, according to their will, their understanding and their conscience.

That outcome is not settled in advance by Fate, which is now the Economic Necessity of the present phase of human economic development. The Fate permits the leading figures of the drama a certain freedom of action. But, should they play badly and should they finally come to a solution, incompatible with to-day's Economic Necessity, namely, with peace and the independence of those engaged in economic activities on the European continent, it would simply relegate those who would prove to lack talent, will or conscience, to the Archives of European history.

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ПРОИЗВОДИТЕЛЬНОСТЬ КРЕСТЬЯНСКАГО ХОЗЯЙСТВА ПО ДАННЫМЪ БЮДЖЕТНЫХЪ ИЗСЛѢДОВАНІЙ.

Проф. С. Н. Прокоповичъ*)

Докладъ читанъ въ Р. Э. О. 1.2. 23.

Основною проблемою при изученіи производительности крестьянскаго хозяйства является опредѣленіе мѣры дѣйствія на его валовой доходъ различныхъ факторовъ производства, съ одной стороны, и рынка—съ другой.

Для опредѣленія этой мѣры дѣйствія я пользовался матеріаломъ бюджетныхъ обслѣдованій крестьянскихъ хозяйствъ. О способѣ, которымъ матеріалъ этотъ мною обрабатывался, я скажу ниже.

До настоящаго времени эта обработка закончена для двухъ раіоновъ Россіи, рѣзко отличающихся другъ отъ друга по условіямъ сельскаго хозяйства, а именно для Сѣверн. (Вологод.) и Черноземнаго (Староб.). Матерьялъ для Тамбовск. губ. не вполнѣ законченъ еще обработкой.

Мы начинаемъ нашъ анализъ съ самой краткой характеристики размѣровъ землевладѣнія, рабочей силы и хозяйственнаго имущества, которыми располагаютъ подвергшіяся бюджетному обслѣдованію крестьянскія хозяйства.

По размѣрамъ землевладѣнія хозяйства, съ которыми мы будемъ далѣе оперировать, группируются слѣд. образомъ:

	Волог.	Тамбов.	Староб.		Волог.	Тамбов.	Староб.
до 3,0 дес.	4	2	—	15,1 - 20,0	15	3	14
3,1 - 6,0	26	30	14	20,1 - 30,0	16	1	12
6,1 - 9,0	19	27	17	болѣе 30,0	14	2	6
9,1 - 12,0	25	9	15				
12,1 - 15,0	17	11	13	Всего...	136	85	91

Мы не можемъ быть увѣрены въ томъ, что настоящая группировка точно отображаетъ группировку по размѣрамъ землевладѣнія всѣхъ крестьянскихъ хозяйствъ обслѣдованныхъ территорій. Поэтому, на этой сторонѣ дѣла мы останавливаться не будемъ. Насъ интересуетъ другой вопросъ: каково отношеніе между собою отдѣльныхъ факторовъ производства въ крестьянскомъ хозяйствѣ? Чтобы уяснить это отношеніе, мы должны прежде

*) Мы съ особеннымъ удовольствіемъ печатаемъ докладъ Проф. С. Н. Прокоповича. Помимо теоретическаго интереса къ новому методу, дающему возможность уловить сложную совокупность зависимостей производительности крестьянскаго хозяйства отъ ряда хозяйственныхъ факторовъ, докладъ этотъ очень интересенъ и въ практическимъ отношеніи. Прежде всего онъ даетъ возможность разбить нѣсколько вредныхъ иллюзій и фетишей въ Россійской аграрной проблемѣ. Затѣмъ онъ фиксируетъ вниманіе на простой, но не для всѣхъ еще ясной мысли: — для быстраго возстановленія Россійскаго національнаго дохода необходимо возможно быстро влить капиталъ извнѣ въ Россійскую сельско-хозяйственную производственную базу.

Только быстрое вливаніе такого капитала способно быстро повысить доходность сельско-хозяйственнаго промысла, сдѣлаться твердымъ фундаментомъ для возстановленія Россійскаго Національнаго хозяйства и заполненія того вакуума, который образовался въ міровомъ хозяйствѣ съ выходомъ Россіи изъ мірового оборота. *Ред.*

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всего познакомиться съ ихъ абсолютною величиною. По числу работниковъ въ семьѣ мы получаемъ слѣд. группировку:

	Волог.	Тамбов.	Староб.		Волог.	Тамбов.	Староб.
до 1,0 раб.	2	—	1	4,1-5,0	15	14	13
1,1-2,0	42	10	21	5,1-6,0	9	13	5
2,1-3,0	37	14	19	6,1-7,0	3	4	8
3,1-4,0	28	26	19	болѣе 7,0	—	4	5
				Всего...	136	85	91

Наконецъ, по величинѣ хозяйственнаго имущества, т.-е. стоимости скота, мертваго инвентаря и построекъ, обслѣдованныя въ бюджетномъ отношеніи хозяйства даютъ слѣд. таблицу:

	Вологодск.	Тамбовск.	Старобѣльск.
до 250,0 рублей	19	3	9
250,1- 500,0	38	11	19
500,1- 750,1	37	20	10
750,1-1000,0	16	20	14
1000,1-1500,0	19	20	18
1500,1-2000,0	4	8	11
болѣе 2000,0	3	3	10
Всего.....	136	85	91

Какъ мы видимъ изъ этихъ таблицъ, по своему обезпеченію землею, хозяйственнымъ имуществомъ и рабочими силами, крестьянскія хозяйства далеко не однородны и не однотипичны. Давно замѣчено, что съ ростомъ одного изъ факторовъ въ крестьянскомъ хозяйствѣ, напр. землевладѣнія, растутъ и другіе два, число работниковъ въ семьѣ и ея хозяйственное имущество. Но мы не можемъ довольствоваться установленіемъ одного лишь направленія въ развитіи факторовъ производства, а должны попытаться измѣрить тѣсноту связи между ними.

Если бы мы имѣли дѣло съ явленіями простого строенія, въ которыхъ причины дѣйствуютъ раздѣльно, для опредѣленія функціональной зависимости между интересующими насъ факторами производства достаточно было бы установить коэффиціенты роста (или регрессіи) каждаго фактора въ зависимости отъ другихъ. Но крестьянское хозяйство представляетъ собою явленіе сложнаго строенія, и различныя причины вліяютъ на него не раздѣльно, а слитно; именно поэтому мы не довольствуемся индивидуальными наблюденіями этого хозяйства, а подвергаемъ его статистическому изученію. Попробуемъ, однако, подойти къ установленію интересующаго насъ отношенія тѣмъ путемъ, который практикуется въ области физическихъ явленій, большею частью носящихъ простой характеръ, и посмотримъ, что изъ этого выйдетъ.

Мы имѣемъ три фактора производства, и каждый изъ этихъ трехъ факторовъ вліяетъ на остальные два и испытываетъ ихъ вліяніе. Въ простыхъ явленіяхъ, когда мы имѣемъ функціональную зависимость между двумя величинами x и y, кривая x по y всегда совпадаетъ съ кривой y по x, и слѣдовательно, отношеніе между коэффиціентами роста x и y выражается слѣд. простой формулой: $b_x = \frac{1}{b_y}$. Не то въ сложныхъ явленіяхъ. Въ нихъ

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кривая x по y никогда не совпадаетъ съ кривой y по x и, слѣдовательно, коэффиціенты роста bx и by не находятся между собою въ томъ простомъ отношеніи, которое мы находимъ при функціональной зависимости между явленіями. Поэтому, мы должны имѣть дѣло не съ 3, а съ 6 коэффиціентами роста, дающими слѣд. табличку:

	Вологод.	Тамбовск.	Старобѣл.
Хоз. имущество по работн.	104,3	130,0	250,1
Работн. по хоз. имущ.	0,0011	0,0009	0,0015
Хозяист. имущ. по землевлад.	21,7	57,4	71,6
Землевлад. по хоз. имуществу	0,02	0,0045	0,0088
Землевладѣніе по ра ботникамъ	3,47	1,25	2,57
Работники по землев ладѣнію	0,026	0,07	0,1325

Единственный выводъ, который мы можемъ извлечь изъ этой таблички, заключается въ томъ, что, чѣмъ больше коэффиціентъ роста одной величины по другой, тѣмъ меньше коэффиціентъ роста второй величины по первой.

Явленіе это объясняется въ высшей степени просто. Оно зависитъ отъ соотношенія величины масштабныхъ единицъ. Такъ какъ землю мы измѣряемъ десятинами, а имущество — рублями, и такъ какъ хозяйственный вѣсъ десятины земли гораздо больше хозяйственнаго значенія рубля имущества, то измѣненіе имущества по землѣ даетъ высокій коэффиціентъ роста, а земли по имуществу — очень низкій, и тѣмъ болѣе низкій, чѣмъ выше коэффиціентъ роста имущества по землѣ. Очевидно, отношеніе величины масштабныхъ единицъ прикрываетъ, затушевываетъ въ данномъ случаѣ хозяйственное соотношеніе интересующихъ насъ величинъ. Устранить это постороннее вліяніе, намъ мѣшающее, въ высшей степени легко. Для этого мы должны перейти отъ пользованія коэффиціентами регрессіи къ коэффиціентамъ корреляціи, которые представляютъ собою среднія геометрическія между каждою парою коэффиціентовъ регрессіи, т. е.

$$b_x : r = r : b_y$$

Такъ какъ коэффиціенты регрессіи опредѣляются по формулѣ

$$b_y = \frac{Sxy}{Sx^2}, \text{ то } r = \sqrt{\frac{Sxy \cdot Sxy}{Sx^2 \cdot Sy^2}}$$

т.-е. въ числителѣ и знаменателѣ мы имѣемъ одинаковое количество какъ x, такъ и y, откуда слѣдуетъ, что величина масштабныхъ единицъ x и y на величину r, — коэффиціентъ корреляціи, — никакого вліянія оказывать не можетъ. Эти коэффиціенты корреляціи между интересующими насъ величинами даютъ слѣд. табличку:

	Вологод.	Тамбовск.	Старобѣл.
Землевлад. — хоз. имущест.	0,66	0,51	0,79
Хозяйст. имущест. — работники	0,34	0,35	0,61
Землевлад. — работники	0,30	0,30	0,58

Эти коэффиціенты корреляціи даютъ намъ мѣру связи между факторами производства въ крестьянскомъ хозяйствѣ. Какъ оказывается, мѣра эта очень различна. Между землевладѣніемъ и хозяйственнымъ имуществомъ связь гораздо тѣснѣе, чѣмъ между этими матеріальными факторами и живою рабочею силою крестьянскаго двора. Затѣмъ, въ разныхъ губерніяхъ коррелятивныя связи между одними и тѣми же факторами даютъ сильно измѣняющіеся коэффиціенты, что указываетъ на глубокое различіе въ строеніи

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крестьянскаго хозяйства въ этихъ губерніяхъ. Вопросъ этотъ заслуживаетъ самаго тщательнаго изученія.

Послѣ этого краткаго ознакомленія съ факторами крестьянскаго хозяйства, мы можемъ перейти къ изученію его производительности. Познакомимся прежде всего съ размѣрами валового дохода крестьянскаго хозяйства различныхъ губ. Группируя дворы по величинѣ получаемаго ими валового дохода отъ сельскаго хозяйства, мы получаемъ слѣд. табличку ихъ распредѣленія:

	Вологод.	Старобѣл.
до — 200,0 рублей	68	8
200,1 — 400,0 »	52	16
400,1 — 600,0 »	12	16
600,1 — 800,0 »	3	13
800,1 — 1000,0 »	1	7
1000,1 — 1500,0 »	—	19
1500,1 — 2000,0 »	—	6
болѣе 2000,0 »	—	6
Всего	136	91

Очевидно, черноземное крестьянство значительно богаче сѣвернаго. Но если мы въ основу группировки положимъ не размѣръ валового дохода, а посѣвъ, то найдемъ, что величина валового дохода на хозяйство слѣд. образомъ растетъ съ ростомъ посѣвной площади:

	Вологодс.	Старобѣл.
сѣющія до 1,0 десятины	98,0	183,6
» 1,1 — 2,0	183,8	192,7
» 2,1 — 3,0	233,5	261,7
» 3,1 — 4,0	302,4	384,5
» 4,1 — 6,0	406,6	442,7
» 6,1 — 10,0	612,9	634,0
» 10,1 — 20,0	771,6	1103,6
» болѣе 20,0	—	1959,7
Всего	236,3	868,6

Такимъ образомъ, причина большей доходности южнаго крестьянскаго хозяйства кроется не столько въ преимуществахъ южнаго чернозема надъ сѣверными суглинками и подзолами, сколько въ болѣе высокой распаханности крестьянскихъ земель и болѣе значительныхъ размѣрахъ посѣва на хозяйство.

Вопросъ о моментахъ, опредѣляющихъ размѣры годовой производительности крестьянскаго хозяйства, заслуживаетъ самаго серьезнаго вниманія, и мы не можемъ ограничиться въ его анализѣ приведенной выше группировкой по посѣву. Намъ нужно выяснить этотъ вопросъ всесторонне. Попытаемся, поэтому, прослѣдить дѣйствіе на эту производительность всѣхъ тѣхъ экономическихъ моментовъ, вліяніе которыхъ можно предполагать a priori, или на значеніе которыхъ указывалось въ экономической литературѣ. Само собой разумѣется, мы должны прежде всего начать съ факторовъ крестьянскаго хозяйства, опредѣляющихъ экономическую силу крестьянскаго двора и ихъ составныхъ частей, — землевладѣнія, землепользованія, посѣва, работниковъ, хозяйственнаго имущества, количества скота и т. д.; затѣмъ мы должны ввести и потребительные моменты — количество ѣдоковъ въ семьѣ и отношеніе числа ѣдоковъ къ числу работниковъ. На значеніе

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послѣдняго момента первый обратилъ вниманіе кн. А. И. Васильчиковъ,*) въ послѣднее же время на немъ усиленно настаивалъ А. В. Чаяновъ. Мѣра коррелятивной связи валового дохода крестьянскаго двора со всѣми этими моментами выражается въ слѣд. коэффиціентахъ:

	Вологодс.	Старобѣл.
Землевладѣніе	0,71	0,78
Землепользованіе	0,72	0,98
Посѣвъ	0,77	0,93
Покосъ	0,62	0,47
Хозяйственное имущество	0,68	0,82
Стоимость построекъ	0,53	0,64
Стоимость мертваго инвентаря	0,66	0,84
Стоимость скота	0,73	0,84
Всего штукъ скота	0,75	0,83
Коровы	0,77	0,59
Рабочій скотъ	0,46	0,76
Работники	0,42	0,61
Работники въ сельскомъ хозяйствѣ	0,55	—
Ѣдоки	0,41	0,61
Ѣдоки-работники	0,03	0,02

Таблица показываетъ, прежде всего, что факторы производства оказываютъ на величину валового дохода гораздо большее вліяніе, чѣмъ моменты потребительнаго характера, число ѣдоковъ и величина нагрузки работниковъ ѣдоками. Послѣдній моментъ даетъ такіе ничтожные коэффиціенты, которые говорятъ вообще объ отсутствіи коррелятивной связи съ валовымъ доходомъ. Само собой разумѣется, что между валовымъ доходомъ и числомъ ѣдоковъ должна быть нѣкоторая и, притомъ, значительная коррелятивная связь: если число ѣдоковъ не оказываетъ прямого вліянія на величину валового дохода, то оно въ значительной мѣрѣ зависитъ отъ этой величины, ибо валовой доходъ отъ сельскаго хозяйства опредѣляетъ величину чистаго дохода, являющагося основной частью потребительнаго бюджета крестьянской семьи, который находится въ очень тѣсной коррелятивной связи съ размѣромъ семьи, т. е. съ числомъ въ ней ѣдоковъ.

Изъ производительныхъ факторовъ наибольшее вліяніе оказываютъ землепользованіе и посѣвъ; меньшее вліяніе имѣетъ землевладѣніе, особенно въ Старобѣльскомъ уѣздѣ съ его большими арендами земли; еще менѣе значительное — величина сѣнокосныхъ угодій.

За земельнымъ факторомъ, по своимъ размѣрамъ, идетъ хозяйственное имущество, въ составѣ котораго болѣе активная часть, скотъ и мертвый инвентарь, даютъ значительно болѣе высокіе коэффиціенты корреляціи, чѣмъ болѣе пассивная часть, постройки. Размѣръ построекъ отражаетъ на себѣ въ значительной мѣрѣ не современное, а прошлое состояніе хозяйства крестьянскаго двора. Исчисленіе скота по цѣнности или въ переводѣ на голову крупнаго скота даетъ почти одни и тѣ же коэффиціенты, что свидѣтельствуетъ о полной практической пригодности принятыхъ нормъ перевода. Въ молочномъ Вологодскомъ уѣздѣ коровы даютъ болѣе высокій коэффиціентъ корреляціи, чѣмъ лошади; въ полустепномъ Старобѣльскомъ у. съ слабымъ развитіемъ молочнаго хозяйства, наоборотъ, болѣе высокій коэффиціентъ связи даетъ рабочій скотъ. Наконецъ, наименьшую коррелятивную связь съ величиною валового дохода отъ сельскаго хозяйства обнаруживаютъ рабочія силы семьи. Объясняется это явленіе отчасти тѣмъ, что значительная часть этихъ силъ занята внѣ собственнаго сельскаго хозяйства, въ промы-

*) Сельскій бытъ и сельское хозяйство въ Россіи. 1881, стр. 37-39.

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словыхъ заработкахъ. Но даже, если мы возьмемъ не всѣхъ работниковъ въ семьѣ, а только занятыхъ въ сельскомъ хозяйствѣ (вмѣстѣ съ принанимаемыми со стороны для работъ въ этомъ хозяйствѣ), — какъ это сдѣлано по Вологодскому у., — то и тогда мы получимъ болѣе слабую коррелятивную зависимость, чѣмъ отъ землепользованія и хозяйственнаго имущества.

Какъ показываетъ наша таблица, получившія столь широкое распространеніе въ земской статистикѣ группировки по землепользованію, посѣву и скоту наиболѣе отвѣчаютъ существу дѣла. Менѣе удачны группировки по работникамъ, землевладѣнію и рабочему скоту въ нечерноземныхъ губ. Поэтому мы должны отвергнуть выводъ А. А. Чупрова о преимуществахъ группировки по надѣлу надъ группировкой по посѣву*) и внести поправку въ пользующееся такою популярностью заключеніе Н. Н. Черненкова, что «наиболѣе цѣлесообразными признаками для групповыхъ дѣленій крестьянскихъ хозяйствъ, — поскольку они разсматриваются какъ хозяйства земледѣльческія, — должны, повидимому, считаться количество рабочаго скота и размѣры посѣвной площади: оба эти признака наиболѣе точно и наиболѣе полно выражаютъ собою объемъ и положеніе земледѣльческаго производства въ каждомъ дворѣ (при достаточномъ сходствѣ другихъ условій).**)» Н. Н. Черненковъ переоцѣнилъ значеніе рабочаго скота, особенно въ нечерноземныхъ губ. Еще менѣе удовлетворительна группировка по числу ѣдоковъ, и совсѣмъ ничего не можетъ дать группировка по отношенію числа ѣдоковъ къ числу работниковъ.

Итакъ, опредѣленіе величины коррелятивной зависимости валового дохода отъ различныхъ факторовъ производства устанавливаетъ извѣстную градацію въ размѣрахъ ихъ вліянія въ такомъ порядкѣ: первое мѣсто занимаетъ землепользованіе, второе — хозяйственное имущество и послѣднее — работники.

Мы не можемъ, однако, ограничиться этими результатами нашего анализа. Вѣдь въ статистическихъ данныхъ мы всегда имѣемъ дѣло со сліяніемъ дѣйствія многихъ причинъ; поэтому, при группировкѣ по какому либо признаку, напр. землепользованію, мы имѣемъ величину валового дохода, отвѣчающую не только величинѣ землепользованія, названной въ таблицѣ, но и не названнымъ въ ней, скрыто дѣйствующимъ другимъ факторамъ—хозяйственному имуществу и работникамъ. Если въ области простыхъ явленій, гдѣ причины дѣйствуютъ раздѣльно, существо отношеній между причиною и ея дѣйствіемъ можетъ быть выражено формулою

$$fx = a.$$

то въ области сложныхъ явленій, съ которыми имѣетъ дѣло статистика, существо это выражается формулой:

$$fx(y,z,.....) = a$$

причемъ x названо въ таблицѣ, а y, z и т. д. дѣйствуютъ на величину a скрыто. Возможно, что дѣйствіе явнаго x сильнѣе дѣйствія этихъ скрытыхъ y, z и т. д. Тогда величина a будетъ опредѣляться главнымъ образомъ величиною x, и эмпирически данная коррелятивная связь будетъ болѣе или менѣе отвѣчать дѣйствительности. Но возможенъ и обратный случай, что дѣйствіе x будетъ меньше дѣйствія y, z и т. д. Тогда опредѣленная нами эмпирическая коррелятивная связь двухъ величинъ x и a будетъ носить совершенно невѣрный характеръ.

Очевидно, чтобы получить дѣйствительную мѣру дѣйствія x на a, мы

*) Извѣстія СПБ Политехнич. Института, т. I, вып. 1-2, 1904, стр. 100.

**) Н. Черненковъ. Къ характеристикѣ крестьянскаго хозяйства, вып. I, изд. 2-е, 1918, стр. 112.

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должны устранить искажающее это дѣйствіе мѣшающее намъ вліяніе скрытно дѣйствующихъ y, z и т. д. Этого мы можемъ достичь примѣненіемъ комбинаціонныхъ таблицъ, выравнивающихъ въ первыхъ группировкахъ дѣйствіе тѣхъ факторовъ, которые мы хотимъ устранить, и освобождающихъ такимъ образомъ дѣйствіе фактора, который мы хотимъ изучить, и по которому производится послѣдняя группировка, отъ искажающаго вліянія другихъ факторовъ.

Комбинаціонныя таблицы были введены въ земскую статистику въ 1880-хъ г. г. черниговскимъ статистикомъ А. П. Шликевичемъ. Ихъ форма, до сихъ поръ остающаяся неизмѣнной, страдаетъ тремя недостатками.

Во-первыхъ, выборъ признаковъ для построенія комбинаціонныхъ таблицъ носитъ болѣе или менѣе произвольный характеръ. Изъ изученія матеріала съ помощью групповыхъ таблицъ статистикъ выноситъ убѣжденіе, что наибольшее вліяніе на интересующее его явленіе имѣютъ такіе-то факторы. По нимъ и строится комбинаціонная таблица. Выше мы указывали на неудовлетворительность групповыхъ таблицъ и отрицательное значеніе отношенія масштабныхъ единицъ изучаемыхъ величинъ. Очевидно, лишь коэффиціенты корреляціи могутъ дать твердое основаніе для выбора признаковъ при построеніи комбинаціонныхъ таблицъ.*)

Во-вторыхъ, мѣра связи между изучаемыми величинами въ комбинаціонныхъ таблицахъ никогда, насколько я знаю, не подвергалась точному измѣренію. Статистиковъ, очевидно, смущало то обстоятельство, что каждая подгруппа имѣетъ свой особый коэффиціентъ роста или регрессіи. Поэтому они довольствовались опредѣленіемъ этой величины «на глазъ». Между тѣмъ, вполнѣ возможно опредѣлить этотъ коэффиціентъ регрессіи и для всей совокупности случаевъ, покрываемыхъ таблицей. Особенно удобна для этого исчисленія формула $b = \frac{Sn(x - x_m)(y - y_m)}{Sn(x - x_m)^2}$, такъ какъ при пользованіи ею имѣютъ значеніе только разности $x - x_m$, $y - y_m$, а не абсолютныя значенія этихъ величинъ. Обстоятельство это позволяетъ прямо суммировать соотвѣтствующія разности всѣхъ подгруппъ комбинаціонной таблицы и, путемъ дѣленія одной суммы на другую, получить искомый коэффиціентъ регрессіи.

Въ-третьихъ, если въ комбинаціонныхъ таблицахъ не вычислялись даже коэффиціенты регрессіи, то никто и подавно не помышлялъ объ опредѣленіи коэффиціентовъ корреляціи. Конечно, отъ А. П. Шликевича, С. А. Харизоменова и др. статистиковъ 1880-хъ г.г. нельзя было этого и требовать: существованіе коррелятивныхъ зависимостей, наряду съ функціональными, было открыто Фр. Гальтономъ въ 1889 г.**)

Но и въ настоящее время никто не думаетъ объ опредѣленіи въ нихъ коррелятивныхъ зависимостей. Между тѣмъ, если въ комбинаціонной таблицѣ возможно исчисленіе коэффиціента регрессіи a по x, можно исчислить и регрессію x по a, затѣмъ по двумъ коэффиціентамъ регрессіи — коэффиціентъ корреляціи.

Такимъ образомъ, устраненіе всѣхъ этихъ дефектовъ вполнѣ возможно. Бѣда лишь въ томъ, что бюджетный матеріалъ страдаетъ однимъ крупнѣйшимъ недостаткомъ для его анализа съ помощью комбинаціонныхъ таблицъ:

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*) Этому вопросу былъ посвященъ мною спеціальный докладъ на съѣздѣ статистиковъ при Обществѣ имени А. И. Чупрова въ 1913 г.

**) См. его Natural Inheritance, 1889.

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онъ слишкомъ для такой формы разработки малочисленъ. Поэтому, мы вынуждены были допустить слишкомъ большіе интервалы при группировкахъ,*) благодаря чему не получилось полнаго выравниванія вліянія устраняемыхъ факторовъ и, тѣмъ не менѣе, въ большинствѣ подгруппъ мы получили только 2,3 и 4 хозяйства. Вмѣстѣ съ тѣмъ, во многихъ подгруппахъ оказалось только по одному хозяйству, что дѣлало невозможнымъ опредѣленіе разностей по формулѣ $x - x_m$, и всѣ такія хозяйства мы вынуждены были попросту выкинуть.**) Поэтому полученные нами результаты отличаются нѣкоторою неточностью. Тѣмъ не менѣе, они заслуживаютъ серьезнаго вниманія.

При выдѣленіи дѣйствія каждаго отдѣльнаго фактора съ помощью комбинаціонной таблицы, мы получаемъ слѣд. коэффиціенты корреляціи валового дохода отъ сельскаго хозяйства съ отдѣльными производственными факторами:

	Вологодс.	Старобѣльск.***)
Землевладѣніе	0,36	0,25
Работники	0,19	0,22
Хозяйственное имущество	0,39	0,69

Сравненіе этихъ аналитическихъ коэффиціентовъ корреляціи съ приведенными выше эмпирическими коэффиціентами показываетъ, во-первыхъ, что въ томъ случаѣ, когда факторы дѣйствуютъ въ одномъ направленіи, ихъ эмпирическіе коэффиціенты выше коэффиціентовъ аналитическихъ; лишь въ томъ случаѣ, когда факторы дѣйствуютъ въ противоположномъ направленіи, т. е. одинъ факторъ имѣетъ знакъ +, другой —, эмпирическій коэффиціентъ корреляціи можетъ быть ниже аналитическаго коэффиціента. Во-вторыхъ, по относительной величинѣ эмпирическихъ коэффиціентовъ никакъ нельзя судить объ относительной величинѣ аналитическихъ коэффиціентовъ. Такъ, по эмпирическимъ коэффиціентамъ въ Вологодскомъ у. вліяніе землевладѣнія больше вліянія хозяйственнаго имущества; по аналитическимъ коэффиціентамъ это отношеніе носитъ обратный характеръ.

Итакъ *наибольшее дѣйствіе на величину валового дохода оказываетъ количество хозяйственнаго имущества, наименьшее — число работниковъ въ семьѣ.*

Мои сотрудники продолжаютъ въ Экономическомъ Бюро въ Берлинѣ начатую мною по указанному выше методу обработку матеріаловъ бюджетныхъ обслѣдованій крестьянскихъ хозяйствъ и для другихъ мѣстностей Россіи, значительно разнящихся по характеру своего сельскаго хозяйства

*) Площадь землевладѣнія мы дѣлили на слѣд. группы: до 3,0 дес., 3,01 — 6,0, 6,01 — 9,0, 9,01 — 12,0, 12,01 — 15,0, 15,01 — 20,0, 20,01 — 30,0, 30,01 — 40,0, болѣе 40,0. Хозяйственное имущество до 250,0 руб.; 250,1 — 500,0; 500,1 — 750,0; 750,1 — 1000,0; 1000,1 — 1500,0; 1500,1 — 2000,0; 2000,1 — 3000,0 и болѣе 3000,0. Работники до 1,0; 1,1 — 2,0; 2,1 — 3,0; 3,1 — 4,0; 4,1 — 5,0; 5,1 — 6,0; 6,1 — 7,0 и болѣе 7,0.

**) Исключенію подверглись изъ 136 хозяйствъ Вологодскаго у. — 4,8 и 12 хозяйствъ, изъ 91 хоз. Старобѣльскаго у. — 12, 13 и 14.

***) Отмѣченная выше количественная недостаточность бюджетнаго матеріала для его аналитической обработки съ помощью комбинаціонныхъ таблицъ привела къ тому, что по Старобѣльскому у. сумма коэффиціентовъ корреляционной зависимости валового дохода отъ всѣхъ взаимно-изолированныхъ факторовъ крестьянскаго хозяйства даетъ 1,16 — т. е. больше единицы, чего въ дѣйствительности быть не можетъ.

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(Вельск. уѣзд., Тамбовск., Новгородск., Воронежск. губ.,) Я не имѣю основаній думать, что результаты этихъ работъ будутъ въ противорѣчіи съ результатами, уже полученными мною.

Чѣмъ для большаго количества мѣстностей Россіи выводъ этотъ подтвердится, тѣмъ большаго вниманія онъ долженъ заслуживать при созданіи плановъ россійскаго національнаго хозяйства въ области земледѣлія.

Хотя крестьянское хозяйство и носитъ трудовой характеръ, но его производительность въ гораздо большей мѣрѣ зависитъ отъ находящихся въ его распоряженіи земли и хозяйственнаго имущества, чѣмъ отъ рабочихъ силъ семьи крестьянина. Очевидно, рѣшающее значеніе имѣетъ не количество этихъ силъ, которымъ располагаетъ хозяйство, а возможность ихъ производительнаго приложенія, опредѣляемая размѣрами землевладѣнія и количествомъ живого и мертваго инвентаря. Тутъ несомнѣнна извѣстная аналогія съ плодородіемъ почвы, которое опредѣляется тѣмъ изъ питательныхъ веществъ, которое находится въ ней въ минимумѣ. Только соотношеніе факторовъ производства въ хозяйствѣ носитъ болѣе растяжимый эластичный характеръ, чѣмъ полезное сочетаніе питательныхъ веществъ почвы.

Обращаясь къ практическимъ вопросамъ россійской аграрной экономики, можно сказать слѣдующее. Въ результатѣ революціи въ Россіи, вѣроятно, установится въ различныхъ мѣстностяхъ различный средній размѣръ землевладѣнія. Этотъ размѣръ землевладѣнія для ближайшаго, по крайней мѣрѣ будущаго можно безъ большой погрѣшности считать за постоянную величину во всѣхъ тѣхъ случаяхъ, когда мы будемъ рѣшать задачу о максимализаціи валового дохода отъ сельско-хозяйственнаго промысла въ Россіи. Потому постоянной надо считать величину землевладѣнія, что мѣнять ее будетъ не въ нашей власти, тѣ же измѣненія, которыя въ ней будутъ происходить помимо нашей воли (въ зависимости, наприм., отъ прироста земледѣльческаго населенія или обратно—его уменьшенія въ случаѣ отлива въ города), будутъ протекать медленно во времени. Измѣненіями можно пренебречь. Такимъ образомъ, перемѣнной практически будетъ только «количество хозяйственнаго имущества». На величину этого послѣдняго капитала можно такъ или иначе вліять, наприм., при благопріятныхъ условіяхъ относительно быстро увеличить ее путемъ привлеченія капитала извнѣ. Только путемъ такого привлеченія и возможно создать быстрый темпъ роста возстановленія національнаго дохода въ области сельскаго хозяйства, увеличить покупательную способность внутренняго с.-хозяйственнаго рынка, со всѣми послѣдствіями отсюда проистекающими, какъ возстановленіе потребленія предметовъ индустріальнаго производства, кредитоспособности Россіи и т. д.

Я долженъ сдѣлать оговорку. Въ исключительныхъ условіяхъ рабочія силы семьи могутъ оказывать на производительность крестьянскаго хозяйства большее вліяніе, чѣмъ его обезпеченность матеріальными средствами производства. Такимъ исключительнымъ случаемъ является хозяйство крестьянъ-переселенцевъ въ Сибири. По свидѣтельству А. А. Кауфмана, въ ихъ хозяйствѣ «съ теченіемъ времени вліяніе обезпеченности семьи рабочею силою перевѣшиваетъ вліяніе другого первостепенно важнаго фактора — обезпеченности переселенцевъ денежными средствами. Если взять недавно прибывшихъ переселенцевъ, то у нихъ деньги еще замѣтно превалируютъ надъ рабочею силой. Для переселенцевъ, прожившихъ 4 года и болѣе и, значитъ, уже вышедшихъ изъ фазы первоначальнаго обзаведенія на новомъ мѣстѣ, комбинаціонная разработка по обоимъ названнымъ факторамъ — рабочей силѣ и принесеннымъ деньгамъ — даетъ иную картину:

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У дворовъ, принесшихъ съ собой денегъ:	Однорабочіе		Многорабочіе	
	Въ среднемъ на дворъ			
	раб. лошад	дес. посѣв.	раб. лошад	дес. посѣв.
Ничего	1.6	2.9	3.5	7.7
до 25 руб.	1.8	3.0	3.7	7.5
25 — 50 »	2.0	3.6	4.3	10.0
50 — 100 »	2.4	4.8	5.0	12.4
100 — 200 »	2.8	5.8	5.4	13.1
болѣе 200 »	2.6	5.4	5.6	14.9

«Мы видимъ» — говоритъ А. Кауфманъ, «переселенцы, пришедшіе безъ копейки или съ нѣсколькими рублями въ карманѣ, но сильные числомъ работниковъ, черезъ немного лѣтъ рѣшительно обгоняютъ принесшихъ хотя бы относительно большія деньги, но не располагающихъ большою рабочей силой.»*)

Исключительный характеръ этихъ условій состоитъ въ томъ, что въ процессѣ сложенія и созданія новаго хозяйства приложеніе рабочихъ силъ семьи не встрѣчаетъ никакого ограниченія ни въ размѣрахъ землепользованія, такъ какъ земли больше, чѣмъ можетъ осилить переселенецъ, ни въ хозяйственномъ инвентарѣ, потому что цѣнность остального, — сверхъ лошади—необходимаго для хозяйства переселенца инвентаря минимальна.

Обратимся теперь къ вопросу о вліяніи рынка. Большинство продуктовъ, производимыхъ въ крестьянскомъ хозяйствѣ, потребляется семьею крестьянина или расходуется въ хозяйствѣ. Однако, значительная часть ихъ отчуждается также на сторону. Въ какой мѣрѣ денежные элементы проникли въ крестьянское хозяйство, показываетъ слѣд. табличка, въ которой описанныя въ бюджетныхъ изслѣдованіяхъ хозяйства сгруппированы по % денежности валового дохода отъ сельскаго хозяйства:

	Волог.	Староб.		Волог.	Староб.
До 10 %	1	3	50.1-60.0 р. с.	24	13
10.1-20.0 »	9	5	60.1-70.0 »	5	5
20.1-30.0 »	14	24	70.1-80.0 »	7	3
30.1-40.0 »	37	19	болѣе 80.0	1	2
40.1-50.0 »	38	17			
			Всего	136	91

Быть можетъ еще болѣе показательна будетъ группировка по размѣрамъ посѣва, въ которой первый столбецъ по каждой губ. или уѣзду даетъ размѣръ денежнаго дохода въ рубляхъ на одно хозяйство, а второй — % денежности этого хозяйства:

	Волог.		Староб.			Волог.		Староб.	
	Руб.	%	Руб.	%		Руб.	%	Руб.	%
Сѣющіе до 1.0 д.	43.4	44.2	115.2	62.7	6.1-10.0 д.	322.4	52.6	259.7	41.0
1.1-2.0 »	87.0	47.3	71.4	37.1	10.1-20.0 »	350.4	45.4	435.5	39.5
2.1-3.0 »	96.5	41.3	88.7	33.9	Болѣе 20.0	—	—	830.8	42.4
3.1-4.0 »	125.5	41.5	189.3	49.2					
4.1-6.0 »	199.0	48.9	145.1	32.8	Въ среднемъ	105.7	44.7	353.1	40.7

*) А Кауфманъ, Вопросы экономики и статистики крестьянскаго хозяйства 1918, стр. 19-20.

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Неправильность рядовъ % денежности показываетъ, что на развитіе денежныхъ элементовъ въ крестьянскомъ хозяйствѣ сильное вліяніе оказываютъ моменты внѣшняго порядка, ни въ какомъ отношеніи къ размѣрамъ посѣвной площади не стоящіе, а именно—близость каждаго хозяйства къ рынкамъ и желѣзнодорожнымъ путямъ. Въ общемъ, какъ свидѣтельствуетъ эта таблица, денатурализація хозяйства русскаго крестьянина въ началѣ XX в. достигла весьма значительныхъ размѣровъ, нѣсколько большихъ въ нечерноземной полосѣ съ развитой промышленной жизнью, нѣсколько меньшихъ на черноземѣ. Крестьянинъ вырвался изъ тисковъ такъ долго порабощавшаго его натуральнаго строя и сталъ дѣятельнымъ — хотя и малосознательнымъ — участникомъ мірового хозяйства.

Это перерожденіе русскаго крестьянскаго хозяйства было отмѣчено Шульце-Геверницемъ уже въ серединѣ 1890-хъ г.г. По его словамъ «вытѣсненіе традиціоннаго натуральнаго хозяйства сельскимъ хозяйствомъ, продающимъ земледѣльческіе продукты, улучшающимъ торговый балансъ и покупающимъ произведенія промышленности — вотъ основной фактъ русскаго хозяйственнаго развитія во второй половинѣ нашего столѣтія; въ то же время онъ является основой тѣхъ успѣховъ промышленности и финансовъ, которые, хотя и бросаются наблюдателю прежде всего въ глаза, но на самомъ дѣлѣ въ причинной связи явленій занимаютъ второе мѣсто».*)

Развитіе денежныхъ элементовъ въ крестьянскомъ хозяйствѣ пореформенной Россіи было, прежде всего, вызвано расширеніемъ желѣзнодорожной сѣти и ростомъ городовъ. Рынокъ, съ помощью своихъ щупальцевъ энергично толкалъ крестьянское хозяйство въ этомъ направленіи. Но не всѣ хозяйства поддавались этому давленію. Чтобы выяснить, какіе внутрихозяйственные элементы въ крестьянскомъ хозяйствѣ шли навстрѣчу этимъ внѣшнимъ вліяніямъ, посмотримъ, какъ велика коррелятивная связь % денежности валового дохода съ тѣми элементами крестьянскаго хозяйства, которые могутъ въ данномъ случаѣ имѣть какое-либо значеніе.

	Волог.	Староб.		Волог.	Староб
Вал. дох. отъ сел.-х.	0,34	0,14	Всего скота	0,07	—0,04
Землевладѣніе	0,16	±0,03	Рабоч. скотъ	—0,18	—0,05
Землепользованіе	0,16	±0,04	Хоз. имущ./землев.	—0,03	0,08
Посѣвъ	0,04	±0,03	Ѣдоки	—0,17	—0,09
Работники	—0,21	—0,09	Землепол./ѣдоки	0,23	0,13
Землевл./работники	0,26	0,12	Аренда	±0,02	±0,03
Хозяйст. имущество	0,53	0,06	Пром. заработки	—0,26	—

Изъ этой таблицы мы можемъ извлечь слѣд. выводы. *Повышенную денежность обнаруживаютъ хозяйства съ большимъ хозяйственнымъ имуществомъ и высокимъ валовымъ доходомъ*; очевидно, % денежности находится въ прямой связи съ *высотой производительности крестьянскаго хозяйства*. Съ промысловыми заработками денежность крестьянскаго сельскаго хозяйства находится въ антагонистическихъ отношеніяхъ. Семьи съ большимъ числомъ работниковъ предпочитаютъ сторонніе заработки; денежные элементы менѣе развиты въ ихъ хозяйствѣ. Такое же сдерживающее вліяніе оказываетъ и число ѣдоковъ. Чѣмъ больше земли приходится на ѣдока, тѣмъ легче развивается работа на рынокъ. Наиболѣе важное для насъ значеніе имѣетъ связь денежности съ высотою производительности крестьян-

*) Г. Шульце-Геверницъ. Очерки общественнаго хозяйства и экономической политики Россіи, 1901, стр. 254-5.

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скаго хозяйства. Съ какою различною степенью производительности ведутъ крестьяне свое хозяйство, можно судить по размѣру валового дохода, получаемаго ими съ десятины землепользованія. По размѣрамъ этого дохода крестьянскія хозяйства группируются слѣд. образомъ:

	Волог.	Староб.		Волог.	Староб.
До 10,0 руб.	25	1	50.1-60.0 руб.	1	16
10.1-20.0 »	74	2	60.1-70.0 »	—	8
20.1-30.0 »	25	10	70.1-80.0 »	—	7
30.1-40.0 »	8	32	Бол. 80.0 »	1	2
40.1-50.0 »	2	13			
			Всего	136	91

Таблица эта довольно ярко рисуетъ то огромное расхожденіе въ производительности хозяйства, которое существуетъ въ русской деревнѣ. Прежде всего, бросается въ глаза разница между производительностью южнаго чернозема и сѣверныхъ подзоловъ и суглинковъ. Но и въ предѣлахъ одной губ. или уѣзда производительность крестьянскихъ хозяйствъ въ высшей степени различна. Дѣло тутъ, очевидно, не только въ богатствѣ почвы. Чтобы выяснить вопросъ, опредѣлимъ коррелятивную связь дохода съ десятины землепользованія съ различными моментами, способными, по нашимъ предположеніямъ, оказать вліяніе на величину этого дохода:

	Волог.	Староб.		Волог.	Староб.
Валов. дох. отъ с.-х.	0,02	0,10	Хозяйст. имущ.	—0,09	±0,02
% денеж. валов. дох.	0,11	0,19	Хоз. имущ. /землев.	0,52	0,22
Землевладѣніе	—0,40	—0,23	Ѣдоки	—0,02	—0,19
Землепользованіе	—0,40	—0,28	Ѣдоки /работники	—0,01	—0,05
Работники	±0,02	—0,07	Аренда	±0,05	—0,20
Землевл. /работники	—0,46	—0,16	Промысл. заработ.	0,24	—

Очевидно, наибольшее вліяніе на величину валового дохода съ дес. землепользованія оказываетъ оборудованность хозяйства крестьянина хозяйственнымъ имуществомъ и рабочими силами при разсчетѣ на десятину землепользованія. Всѣ остальныя коррелятивныя зависимости являются производными, за исключеніемъ зависимости отъ % денежности, ростъ котораго оказываетъ на доходъ съ дес. землепользованія положительное вліяніе. Попробуемъ конкретизировать, на основаніи данныхъ бюджетныхъ изслѣдованій, вліяніе количества живого и мертваго инвентаря, рабочей силы и развитія денежныхъ отраслей на производительность крестьянскаго хозяйства.

Здѣсь, прежде, всего мы встрѣчаемся съ вліяніемъ % распаханности земли, — на черноземѣ онъ значительно выше, чѣмъ на сѣверныхъ суглинкахъ и подзолахъ. Чѣмъ выше валовой доходъ съ дес. землепользованія, тѣмъ выше въ хозяйствѣ въ общемъ % земли подъ посѣвомъ:

	Волог.	Староб.		Волог.	Староб.
До 10.0 руб.	9.5	11.5	40.1-50.0 руб.	24.0	57.1
10.1-20.0 »	15.2	25.3	50.1-60.0 »	31.6	58.5
20.1-30.0 »	24.8	39.3	60.1-70.0 »	—	60.3
30.1-40.0 »	32.6	52.1	Бол.70.0 »	26.2	58.7
			Въ среднемъ	14.9	52.5

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Большое значеніе имѣетъ также, что сѣется. Въ этомъ отношеніи особенного вниманія заслуживаютъ трудоемкія культуры: ленъ, картофель, подсолнухъ, бахчевыя растенія и т. под. Подъ трудоемкими культурами былъ слѣдующій % посѣвной площади:

	Волог.	Староб.		Волог.	Староб.
До 10.0 руб.	6.0	3.8	50.1-60.0 руб.	6.5	8.6
10.1-20.0 »	8.3	22.8	60.1-70.0 »	—	13.7
20.1-30.0 »	8.3	5.8	Бол.70.0 » . . .	0.0	7.6
30.1-40.0 »	10.8	7.1			
40.1-50.0 »	21.8	4.8	Въ среднемъ . . .	8.1	7.2

Затѣмъ, на доходность земли оказываетъ также вліяніе количество скота на дес. землепользованія — прежде всего тѣмъ доходомъ, который приносятъ продукты скотоводства, затѣмъ скопами навоза, вліяющими на урожайность въ тѣхъ районахъ, гдѣ земля удобряется. На десятину землепользованія приходилось штукъ скота (въ переводѣ на крупный):

	Волог.	Староб.		Волог.	Староб.
До 10.0 руб.	0.13	0.22	50.1-60.0 руб.	0.56	0.33
10.1-20.0 »	0.23	0.07	60.1-70.0 »	—	0.38
20.1-30.0 »	0.32	0.25	Бол.70.0 » . . .	0.53	0.36
30.1-40.0 »	0.48	0.31			
40.1-50.0 »	0.56	0.34	Въ среднемъ . . .	0.22	0.31

На урожайность вліяютъ также тщательность и своевременность производства всѣхъ работъ. Этотъ моментъ не поддается количественному учету. Поэтому, въ бюджетныхъ изслѣдованіяхъ нѣтъ данныхъ по этому вопросу: ихъ мы должны искать въ подворныхъ описаніяхъ крестьянскаго хозяйства и въ текущей земской статистикѣ. На различія въ техническомъ совершенствѣ и своевременности работъ въ крестьянскихъ хозяйствахъ разной зажиточности уже указывалось въ литературѣ.*) Что касается урожайности, то, къ сожалѣнію, въ бюджетныхъ изслѣдованіяхъ не было обращено надлежащаго вниманія на этотъ вопросъ. Наконецъ, послѣднимъ изъ числа основныхъ моментовъ, вліяющихъ на доходность крестьянскаго хозяйства, являются цѣны на продукты: въ зажиточныхъ хозяйствахъ, имѣющихъ возможность не торопиться съ реализаціей своихъ продуктовъ, цѣны выше. Этотъ вопросъ также не освѣщенъ въ бюджетныхъ изслѣдованіяхъ.

Итакъ, на *размѣры валового дохода* съ дес. землепользованія оказываютъ вліяніе три момента: *оборудованность хозяйственнымъ имуществомъ и рабочими силами и развитіе денежныхъ элементовъ*. Изолируя съ помощью комбинаціонной таблицы дѣйствіе % денежности отъ вліянія прочихъ моментовъ, мы получаемъ слѣд. коэффиціенты зависимости дохода съ десятины землепользованія отъ % денежности:

Вологодскій уѣздъ — 0,39
Старобѣльскій у. — 0,17

Такова мѣра вліянія рынка на развитіе производительныхъ силъ крестьянскаго хозяйства.

*) В. Постниковъ, Южно-русское крестьянское хозяйство, стр. 276-9, 317, А. Кауфманъ. Вопросы экономики и статистики крестьянскаго хозяйства, стр. 165-6.

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Это вліяніе рынка заслуживаетъ особаго вниманія. Повидимому, первыя десятилѣтія послѣ реформы 1861 г. крестьянское хозяйство переживало періодъ застоя. И лишь съ середины 1880-хъ г.г., подъ прямымъ вліяніемъ, съ одной стороны, желѣзныхъ дорогъ и запросовъ рынка, съ другой — новаго поколѣнія, ставшаго во главѣ хозяйства, не испытавшаго на себѣ разслабляющаго и притупляющаго вліянія крѣпостного права, — въ крестьянскомъ хозяйствѣ начинаютъ усиленно развиваться травосѣяніе, посѣвы льна, картофеля и свеклы, молочное хозяйство и т. д. Если въ первое время рынокъ только отбиралъ у крестьянина продукты его хозяйства, понижая потребленіе имъ хлѣба, молока, льна и шерсти на одежду и не давая ему ничего взамѣнъ, такъ какъ выручаемыя за продукты деньги шли у крестьянина главнымъ образомъ на уплату податей и выкупныхъ платежей, — *то къ концу XIX в., подъ вліяніемъ запросовъ рынка*, начало замѣчаться *развитіе производительныхъ силъ крестьянскаго хозяйства*, въ строеніи котораго появились глубокія перемѣны: развитіе денежныхъ отраслей, приспособленныхъ къ требованіямъ рынка, повышало доходъ крестьянина и, вмѣстѣ съ тѣмъ, создавало прочную основу для развитія въ странѣ обрабатывающей промышленности, желѣзныхъ дорогъ и городской жизни.

Въ началѣ 1870-хъ г.г. А. Н. Энгельгардтъ имѣлъ основаніе сомнѣваться въ плодотворности вліянія на крестьянское хозяйство молочныхъ артелей, несшихъ въ него мѣновыя отношенія. Но утвержденія Николая — она, что развитіе мѣновыхъ отношеній «ведетъ къ уменьшенію успѣшности земледѣльческаго труда» и ихъ слѣдствіемъ оказывается «несоразмѣрно низкая и притомъ постоянно понижающаяся производительность его (крестьянина) собственнаго труда»,*) — представляютъ собою въ 1890-хъ г.г. явный анахронизмъ. Ник.—онъ упустилъ изъ виду то развитіе производительныхъ силъ крестьянскаго хозяйства, которое началось съ середины 1880-хъ г.г. и происходило въ формѣ развитія его денежныхъ отраслей. Весь тотъ прогрессъ, который связанъ съ дѣятельностью земской агрономической организаціи и работою сельскохозяйственной кооперациі, происходитъ въ денежной части крестьянскаго хозяйства; натуральная его часть, напротивъ, не обнаруживаетъ никакихъ признаковъ развитія, и ея техника носитъ чисто традиціонный характеръ.

*) Очерки нашего пореформеннаго общественнаго хозяйства, 1893, стр 74,188.

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ПУТИ ПРОГРЕССИВНАГО РАЗВИТІЯ И ПОЛОЖЕНІЕ РУССКАГО СЕЛЬСКАГО ХОЗЯЙСТВА

(Краткое содержаніе доклада А. С. Орлова, читаннаго въ Р. Э. О. 4.1.23 *)

ГЛ. 1. СЕЛЬСКОЕ ХОЗЯЙСТВО, КАКЪ ОСНОВА НАЦІОНАЛЬНАГО ХОЗЯЙСТВА.

Не подлежитъ сомнѣнію, что судьбы Россіи въ теченіе ближайшихъ десятилѣтій будутъ опредѣляться процессомъ экономическихъ измѣненій въ русскомъ сельскомъ, теперь цѣликомъ почти крестьянскомъ, хозяйствѣ.

Русская промышленность, внѣшняя торговля, городская жизнь, государственный бюджетъ Россіи — могутъ развиваться лишь въ той мѣрѣ, въ какой это будетъ позволять фундаментъ русской экономики — количество тѣхъ цѣнностей, которыя можетъ выдѣлить сельское хозяйство для торговаго оборота и съ заграничнымъ, и съ внутреннимъ рынкомъ.

Яркую иллюстрацію этого положенія далъ минувшій годъ. Зимою и весной 22 г. въ Россіи разразился такъ называемый «кризисъ сбыта»: раздѣтая и обнищавшая, во всемъ нуждающаяся и ничѣмъ не снабженная деревня оказалась не въ состояніи оплачивать до крайности нужныя ей издѣлія внутренней промышленности, хотя послѣдняя и работала только на 1/10 своего довоеннаго темпа, а привозъ изъ-за границы былъ ничтоженъ. Подъемъ дохода отъ сельскаго хозяйства не только до его довоеннаго уровня, но значительно выше этого уровня — есть задача громадной, совершенно исключительной важности для Россіи.

Когда, въ довоенное время, заходила рѣчь объ общей русской нищетѣ, не только соціалистическія, но и либеральныя направленія русской общественности видѣли основныя и безспорныя причины ея въ одномъ и томъ же: политическій режимъ, ревниво оберегающій интересы крупныхъ землевладѣльцевъ-дворянъ, боится созданія просвѣщеннаго, благоденствующаго и свободнаго крестьянства, и потому намѣренно держитъ мужика въ кабалѣ и темнотѣ, ничтожно мало дѣлая и много мѣшая тому, чтобы поднять деревню на высоту современной земледѣльческой культуры. Казалось, падетъ этотъ режимъ, — и способные и трудолюбивые народы, населяющіе Россію, твердымъ и быстрымъ шагомъ пойдутъ впередъ по пути къ матеріальному благосостоянію и духовной культурѣ.

Пришла великая война, а затѣмъ и эпоха великой революціи. Русская жизнь перетряхнута ими до самаго дна. Разбиты, повидимому навсегда, старыя цѣпи.

Что же, стоимъ мы теперь на пути къ экономическому процвѣтанію Россіи? Являются ли голодъ, нищета и ужасы, свирѣпствующіе теперь по лицу земли русской, лишь неизбѣжными послѣдствіями войнъ и революцій, скоропреходящими этапами русской жизни, вслѣдъ за которыми мы быстро не только вернемся къ довоенному благосостоянію, но и начнемъ догонять нашихъ сравнительно преуспѣвающихъ сосѣдей? Или новыя цѣпи, надѣтыя на огромное большинство русскаго народа, такъ же обременительны и прочны,

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*) Полностью статья А. С. Орлова печатается въ журналѣ «Современныя Записки».

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какъ и старыя? Или разрушенія такъ велики, а средства возрожденія такъ неясны и недоступны, что даже возвратъ къ благосостоянію довоенному долженъ казаться какою-то еще долго-долго несбыточной мечтой?

Вопросы объ этомъ суть, въ сущности, вопросы о томъ, куда и какимъ темпомъ идетъ и можетъ итти русское крестьянское хозяйство, что дало ему, и что отняло у него десятилѣтіе войнъ и революцій. Основой отвѣтовъ на эти вопросы должны служить, съ одной стороны— анализъ и оцѣнка положенія сельскаго хозяйства въ Россіи, съ другой — уроки культурнаго сельскаго хозяйства другихъ странъ.

Давая въ дальнѣйшемъ изложеніи краткій обзоръ тѣхъ фактическихъ данныхъ и мнѣній*), которыя мнѣ представлялись наиболѣе важными, я считалъ нужнымъ удѣлить особое вниманіе сужденіямъ представителей русской агрономической науки и практики, особенно поскольку они нашли себѣ то или иное коллективное выраженіе.

ГЛ. II. РУССКОЕ СЕЛЬСКОЕ ХОЗЯЙСТВО ВЪ КОНЦѢ ПЯТАГО ГОДА РЕВОЛЮЦІИ.

Распредѣленіе земли и типы земельныхъ хозяйствъ въ результатѣ революціи. Къ началу 1920 года, когда процессъ революціонной перестройки земельныхъ отношеній закончился,. общій характеръ измѣненій въ земледѣльческомъ хозяйствѣ въ отношеніи фактическаго пользованія землей, по сравненію съ 1917 годомъ, характеризуется слѣдующими данными, показывающими процентъ обрабатываемой земли, принадлежащей той или иной группѣ, къ общему ея количеству.

Земельныя хозяйства	По 32 губ. Совѣт. Рос.		По Украйнѣ	
	Въ 1922 г.	Въ 1917г.	Въ 1922г.	Въ 1917г.
Крестьянскія	96,3	76,3	96,0	55,4
Частновлад. и государст.	—	23,7	—	44,6
Коллективныя	0,5	—	0,8	—
Совѣтскія	2,7	—	3,2	—

Другими словами, за исключеніемъ 3,2% въ Совѣтской Россіи и 4% на Украйнѣ (общей площадью около 3,5 мил. десятинъ) вся остальная обрабатываемая земля перешла въ распоряженіе крестьянъ.

Цифровыя данныя совѣтской статистики объ общей площади удобныхъ сельско-хозяйственныхъ земель, количествѣ сельско-хозяйственнаго населенія и числѣ хозяйствъ, — особенно послѣ вымиранія и передвиженія населенія изъ голоднаго Поволжья, — мало удовлетворительна. Грубо приблизительно можно принять, что общая удобная сельско-хозяйственная площадь (за исключеніемъ лѣсовъ) въ Европейской Россіи равна 140 милліо-

*) Приводимыя въ дальнѣйшемъ данныя и сужденія взяты изъ значительнаго числа разнаго рода работъ и статей, появившихся въ Совѣтской Россіи, изъ докладовъ, постановленій и преній россійскихъ съѣздовъ сельско-хозяйственнаго характера, а равно изъ ряда извѣстныхъ иностранныхъ работъ въ разсматриваемой области. Во избѣжаніе загроможденія статьи ссылками, за исключеніемъ нѣсколькихъ отдѣльныхъ случаевъ, указанія на источники я опускаю.

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намъ десятинъ, земледѣльческое населеніе — 90 милл., при 15 милл. хозяйствъ съ шестью человѣками въ среднемъ на каждое. На одного ѣдока приходится, слѣдовательно, около полуторы десятины. Средній размѣръ отдѣльнаго крестьянскаго хозяйства опредѣлится приблизительно въ девять десятинъ, въ томъ числѣ семь десятинъ пашни и двѣ десятины выгоновъ и луговъ, не считая нѣкотораго количества лѣсныхъ площадей, также имѣющихъ большое сельско-хозяйственное значеніе въ хозяйствахъ, къ которымъ они прилегаютъ, въ качествѣ сѣнокосовъ и пастбищъ для скота.

Реальныя крестьянскія хозяйства значительно, однако, уклоняются отъ указанной средней, по различнымъ районамъ Россіи и внутри одного и того же района.

Процессъ подѣленія земли и измѣненія въ размѣрахъ землепользованія этихъ хозяйствъ во время революціи относительно мало смягчилъ это уклоненіе. Переходъ помѣщичьей земли къ крестьянамъ осуществился въ видѣ захвата однимъ или нѣсколькими сосѣдними селами совмѣстно земельныхъ площадей, прилегающихъ къ ихъ надѣламъ, съ подѣленіемъ ихъ только между собою, безъ допуска, по общему правилу, къ участію въ дѣлежѣ какихъ либо «чужаковъ». Дѣлежъ производился при этомъ обычно, по правиламъ совѣтской инструкціи, по ѣдокамъ (при этомъ мужчина принимался за единицу, женщина—0,8, подростки—0,75, дѣвочки—0,6, дѣти—0,5). Процессъ подѣленія помѣщичьей земли вовлекъ въ передѣлъ въ цѣломъ рядѣ губерній также и купленныя крестьянскія земли, хуторскіе и отрубные участки, а во многихъ мѣстахъ повелъ и къ общимъ передѣламъ надѣльныхъ земель, ожививъ тѣмъ общину даже въ тѣхъ деревняхъ, гдѣ она казалась давно умершей. Общій цифровой размѣръ площади, подвергшейся такимъ образомъ передѣлу во время революціи, не учтенъ, но несомнѣнно, онъ весьма значителенъ.

Въ результатѣ указаннаго процесса произошла сильнѣйшая нивелировка земельныхъ хозяйствъ внутри отдѣльныхъ общинъ, причемъ размѣръ отдѣльнаго хозяйства сталъ въ значительномъ большинствѣ случаевъ соотвѣтствовать размѣру семьи. Но, вмѣстѣ съ тѣмъ, въ полной мѣрѣ сохранилась существовавшая до революціи часто чрезвычайно значительная разница въ размѣрахъ земельнаго обезпеченія и величины хозяйствъ и по разнымъ районамъ Россіи, и даже между различными селеніями въ узкихъ границахъ одной и той же волости.

На основаніи сравнимыхъ между собою данныхъ по 24 губерніямъ Совѣтской Россіи, Центральное Статистическое Управленіе произошедшія измѣненія характеризуетъ такими цифрами:

Годы обслѣдованія	Общее число крестьян. двор	Въ томъ числѣ процентъ хозяйствъ			
		Безъ посѣва	Съ посѣвомъ		
			до 4 дес.	отъ 4 до 8	больше 8 д.
1916	6.034.114	11,4	59,1	21,6	7,9
1919	6.119.616	6,5	74,0	16,4	3,1

По различнымъ районамъ, однако, тѣ или другія группы хозяйствъ имѣютъ разное относительное значеніе, что можно видѣть изъ слѣдующей таблицы, дающей площадь посѣва отдѣльныхъ хозяйствъ по губерніямъ, взятымъ изъ различныхъ районовъ Совѣтской Россіи (для 1919 года):

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Губерніи	Съ посѣвомъ			
	Отъ 1,1 до 2 десят.	Отъ 2,1 до 4 десят.	Отъ 4,1 до 6 десят.	Отъ 6,1 до 8 десят.
Тульская	14,9	39,0	24,9	10,0
Оренбургская	11,2	21,6	19,3	12,9
Вятская	12,8	36,0	24,8	11,9
Витебская	49,2	31,3	4,7	0,8
Ярославская	27,8	26,2	5,6	1,2
Вологодская	43,3	27,5	3,4	0,5
Петербургская	24,4	14,7	2,2	0,2
Пензенская	15,9	35,2	21,4	9,5

Одновременно съ измѣненіемъ въ сторону нивелировки земельныхъ площадей, въ томъ же направленіи шли и измѣненія въ смыслѣ обезпеченія хозяйствъ скотомъ и инвентаремъ. Процентъ безлошадныхъ и безкоровныхъ крестьянъ, съ одной стороны, а съ другой — владѣющихъ тремя и болѣе коровами и лошадьми, рѣзко упалъ, замѣстившись соотвѣтствующимъ увеличеніемъ въ группахъ владѣльцевъ одной и двухъ лошалей и коровъ.

Описанный типъ хозяйствъ является характернымъ мелкимъ и среднимъ крестьянскимъ хозяйствомъ. На долю хозяйства сколько-нибудь крупнаго въ Россіи остались лишь указанные выше 3 ½ милл. десятинъ земли, которые не попали въ руки крестьянъ. Къ концу 1921 года на этой площади было образовано совѣтской властью 4316 такъ-называемыхъ «совѣтскихъ» и 15.121 «коллективныхъ» хозяйствъ. Слѣдующія данныя могутъ дать о нихъ нѣкоторое представленіе.

По переписи 2289 совѣтскихъ хозяйствъ, произведенной въ 21 г., по сѣверному району, средняя площадь совѣтскаго хозяйства была равна 210 десят., Вятско-Пермскому — 315, Центрально-Промышленному — 233, Петроградскому — 243, Западному — 364, Заволжскому — 2314, Приволжскому — 454, Центрально-Земледѣльческому — 245 и Юго-Восточному — 1784. Средній размѣръ совѣтскаго хозяйства по всей Россіи — 389 десятинъ. Пахотной земли въ составѣ совхозовъ было 48,2%. Засѣянная площадь въ 21 г. составляла 221.567 десятинъ.

Коллективныя хозяйства по всей Россіи въ 21 г. характеризовались такими цифрами:

Типъ хозяйствъ	Число хозяйствъ	Въ нихъ	
		Десят. земли	Дворовъ
Коммуны	2.242	342.300	138.420
Артели	11.440	896.932	729.888
Общественная обработка	1.439	54.994	63.295
Всего	15.121	1.133.326	931.404

Такимъ образомъ земли на коммуну приходилось въ среднемъ 152,6 десятинъ, на артель — 65,3 дес.; на одного работника коммуна имѣла 3,7 дес., артель — 2,1 дес.

Сколько-нибудь крупное сельское хозяйство въ Россіи исчезло. Совѣтскія и коллективныя хозяйства, съ тремя процентами земли въ ихъ владѣніи и полуторами процентами сельскохозяйственнаго населенія, могутъ въ будущемъ служить опытнымъ полемъ для всякаго рода сельскохозяйственныхъ экспериментовъ въ крупномъ масштабѣ, но въ экономическомъ отношеніи сколько-нибудь замѣтной величиной быть не могутъ.

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Россія окончательно стала страной мелкаго и средняго земледѣлія. Въ культурномъ подъемѣ именно этихъ типовъ хозяйства лежитъ ея будущее.

Общинное и участковое владѣніе (хутора и отруба). Для культурнаго земледѣльческаго хозяйства современнаго типа чрезвычайно важенъ вопрссъ, является ли земельная площадь, ему принадлежащая, совершенно отдѣльнымъ участкомъ (хуторского или отрубного типа), или она раздроблена на рядъ полосъ, перемѣшанныхъ съ чужими владѣніями. До 1905 года въ Россіи господствовалъ почти исключительно послѣдній типъ, не только въ общинахъ, но и при подворномъ владѣніи землей. Послѣ 1905 г. земельная политика стараго режима была твердо направлена по пути насажденія на Руси участковаго земледѣлія, причемъ использовались всякія мѣры (давленія, принужденія, финансированія и льготъ) затѣмъ, чтобы дѣлу образованія хуторовъ и отрубовъ на всякихъ земляхъ, въ томъ числѣ и на надѣльныхъ, придать возможно широкій размахъ. Какъ бы ни оцѣнивать самые правитебьственные методы, нельзя не признать, что результаты ихъ получились весьма значительные: за десятилѣтіе съ 1907 по 1916 годъ по Россіи образовалось 1.612.690 крестьянскихъ хозяйствъ хуторского и отрубного типа съ общей площадью земли въ 16.020.197 десятинъ. Эта цифра, въ связи съ многочисленными свидѣтельствами общественной агрономіи о крестьянскихъ настроеніяхъ дореволюціоннаго времени, должна почитаться несомнѣнно убѣдительнымъ доказательствомъ того, что хутора и отруба отнюдь не явились исключительно искусственнымъ продуктомъ правительственной политики, но находили себѣ значительную опору въ стремленіяхъ извѣстной части крестьянъ къ участковымъ формамъ хозяйства.

Какое отношеніе проявила къ этимъ для Россіи сравнительно новымъ формамъ хозяйства крестьянская масса, когда революція дала полную возможность проявиться ея свободной волѣ? На этотъ чрезвычайно интересный и важный вопросъ, къ сожалѣнію, нельзя отвѣтить цифрами, показывающими число уцѣлѣвшихъ и разрушенныхъ участковыхъ хозяйствъ по разнымъ районамъ. Но общій характеръ массоваго движенія достаточно, однако, ясенъ. Изслѣдовавшій этотъ вопросъ проф. Н. Першинъ приходитъ къ выводу, что массовое отношеніе къ участковому земледѣлію въ нечерноземномъ районѣ и на сѣверѣ и сѣверо-востокѣ — съ одной стороны, а съ другой — въ черноземной полосѣ, на югѣ и юго-западѣ было совершенно различно. Въ первомъ случаѣ, населеніе, за единичными исключеніями, не только не пошло войной на хутора и отруба, но, наоборотъ, всячески оберегало ихъ отъ покушеній совѣтской власти, носившейся тогда съ идеей замѣны всѣхъ единоличныхъ хозяйствъ коллективными, какъ наивысшей технически и соціально формой землепользованія. Напротивъ, крестьяне юга, юго-запада и чернозема отнеслись къ хуторскому и отрубному хозяйству крестьянскаго типа такъ же, какъ и къ помѣщичьему, т.е. почти совершенно его уничтожили. Авторъ приведеннаго вывода объясняетъ это различіе тѣмъ, что во второмъ случаѣ участковое хозяйство было исключительно выдѣломъ изъ общины домохозяевъ, желавшихъ закрѣпить за собою тѣ или иныя преимущества, которыя они могли бы утерять, продолжая оставаться въ общинѣ, или деревенскихъ богатѣевъ, стремившихся превратиться въ помѣщиковъ. Съ точки зрѣнія культурности, выдѣлявшіяся хозяйства ни въ чемъ не шли дальше общиннаго крестьянскаго хозяйства, и потому ничѣмъ не могли въ его глазахъ оправдать своего возникновенія. Между тѣмъ, на сѣверѣ, сѣверо-западѣ и въ центрѣ имѣлись многочисленные примѣры хуторскихъ и отрубныхъ хозяйствъ, на много превышавшихъ среднее крестьянское хозяй-

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ство данной мѣстности своей культурностью, интенсивностью и благосостояніемъ, при тѣхъ же размѣрахъ земли, какъ и въ общинахъ.

Это, естественно, внушало крестьянской массѣ довѣріе и уваженіе къ участковому хозяйству, и потому на его уничтоженіе рука крестьянства подняться не могла. Больше того, въ этой полосѣ Россіи въ настоящее время наблюдается чрезвычайное усиленіе тяги на хутора и отруба: отмѣчено не мало случаевъ, когда цѣлыя села и деревни разверстываются на отдѣльные участки. Пробужденная революціей иниціатива стремится, повидимому, найти себѣ исходъ въ этой формѣ хозяйства.

Землеустройство. Въ предыдущемъ изложеніи рѣчь шла о фактическихъ измѣненіяхъ, произошедшихъ въ теченіе пяти лѣтъ господства совѣтской власти. Нѣтъ надобности доказывать, что для всякихъ взаимоотношеній революціоннаго происхожденія, и особенно для отношеній земельныхъ, громадное значеніе имѣетъ то обстоятельство, чтобы фактъ былъ закрѣпленъ опредѣленной формой, которая создавала бы у фактическаго обладателя ясное представленіе объ объемѣ и границахъ его правъ и давало бы ему твердую увѣренность въ ихъ прочности. Въ области владѣнія или пользованія землей такого рода опредѣленными формами въ малой степени служатъ законодательные акты или распоряженія власти, господствующей въ теченіе какого-либо времени на той или иной территоріи. Русская революція знаетъ уже не мало торжественно провозглашенныхъ «навсегда и незыблемо» законовъ (въ томъ числѣ и о землѣ), которые оказались, однако, совершенно недѣйствительными черезъ самое короткое время. Несравненно важнѣе законодательства проведеніе его въ жизнь въ видѣ мѣропріятій, которыя создавали бы систему преградъ, не дающихъ возможности упразднить это законодательство безъ сложной и длительной предварительной подготовки, безъ сильнаго сопротивленія за этими преградами заинтересованныхъ въ ихъ сохраненіи лицъ. Въ земельной области такой мѣрою является доведенное до конца землеустройство, въ видѣ точнаго размежеванія земель отдѣльныхъ владѣльцевъ, съ составленіемъ соотвѣтствующихъ межевыхъ плановъ и съ производствомъ межеванія въ натурѣ. Эта работа — большая и серьезная — когда она произведена въ согласіи съ большинствомъ заинтересованныхъ въ ней группъ населенія, является уже чрезвычайно устойчивымъ фундаментомъ новыхъ отношеній, постройкой весьма прочной, разрушеніе которой можетъ быть лишь результатомъ новой революціи.

Землеустроительныя работы начались въ 1919 г., въ теченіе котораго было обмежевано въ натурѣ только 321 тыс. десятинъ. Но затѣмъ темпъ работъ сталъ быстро возрастать: въ 1920 г. размежевывается уже 3.034 тыс. дес.; въ 1921 году — 8.456 тыс. дес.; въ 1922 году цифра будетъ, вѣроятно, близка къ 10 милл. десятинъ. Приведенныя цифры касаются земель окончательно размежеванныхъ, съ составленіемъ и выполненіемъ въ натурѣ волостного и поселеннаго разверстанія — наиболѣе важныхъ типовъ государственнаго землеустройства. Чтобы довести это дѣло до конца потребуется еще пять-шесть лѣтъ работы, если темпъ ея не будетъ усиленъ. Существенныя къ тому препятствія — состояніе совѣтскихъ финансовъ и недостатокъ техниковъ-землеустроителей (штатъ которыхъ теперь равенъ 4 1/2 тыс. чел.) Трудно сказать, насколько совѣтская власть можетъ съ этими препятствіями справиться, если бы даже у нея и возникло желаніе закончить межеваніе въ самомъ ускоренномъ порядкѣ.

Такимъ образомъ, работа по государственному землеустройству идетъ если и не особенно быстро, то все же довольно удовлетворительно. и оставляетъ по себѣ крупный слѣдъ.

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Совсѣмъ иначе обстоитъ дѣло съ землеустройствомъ внутри-надѣльнымъ. Силы землеустроителей, занятыя всецѣло работой по общему межеванію, этой сторонѣ дѣла удѣляться почти совершенно не могутъ. Не только, поэтому, нѣтъ спеціальной пропаганды среди населенія различнаго рода внутринадѣльныхъ землеустроительныхъ мѣръ, могущихъ имѣть громадное значеніе для культурнаго земледѣлія, но и запросы, уже назрѣвшіе въ крестьянской средѣ, удовлетворяются въ совершенно недостаточной мѣрѣ.

Къ области землеустройства, наконецъ, нужно отнести вопросъ о составленіи земельнаго кадастра, — исчерпывающаго инвентаря сельскохозяйственныхъ земель, сколько нибудь точно учитывающаго ихъ, какъ съ количественной, такъ и съ качественной стороны. Несмотря на исключительно важное значеніе наличности такого кадастра для возможности устанавливать продовольственные налоги сколько-нибудь раціонально, голоса отдѣльныхъ лицъ, настойчиво поднимающихъ этотъ вопросъ, оставляются безъ всякаго вниманія.

Слишкомъ очевидно, повидимому, для соотвѣтствующихъ органовъ совѣтской власти, что осуществленіе этой задачи въ сколько-нибудь основательномъ видѣ въ ближайшіе годы для нихъ совершенно непосильно, отчасти по техническимъ, а главнымъ образомъ по финансовымъ причинамъ.

Скотоводство. Убыль въ Россіи скота со времени начала войны огромна. Г. Хрящева даетъ для Совѣтской Россіи и Украйны вмѣстѣ слѣдующія цифры скота въ 1916 и 1921 годъ, отмѣчая при этомъ, что цифры 1916 г. являются уже значительно уменьшенными по сравненію съ довоенными («Сел. Хоз.», № 1-2, 1922 г.):

	тысячи головъ				
	Раб. лошад	Волы	Коровы	Овцы	Свиньи
1916 годъ	24.221	3.445	22.280	79.726	19.456
1921 »	18.916	2.637	20.614	44.623	14.300

Страшный голодный годъ далъ новое громадное уменьшеніе скота. П. Мѣсяцевъ («*Эк. Жизнь*», № 252) даетъ для 1921 года цифру лошадей въ 18.283 тыс., и для 1922 г. — 14.031.

Перспективы ближайшаго будущаго въ области скотоводства еще болѣе грозны: состояніе племенныхъ производителей и молодняка таково, что не только не обѣщаетъ роста стадъ въ ближайшее время, но угрожаетъ дальнѣйшей ихъ убылью. Еще до голоднаго года Хрящева опредѣляла убыль племенныхъ быковъ въ 56% по сравненію съ 1916 г. Будущее коневодства Виттъ (въ «Эк. Ж.» ....2 - 22) рисуетъ въ самыхъ мрачныхъ краскахъ, указывая, что при общемъ сокращеніи лошадей на сорокъ процентовъ, Россія потеряла 85-90% жеребцовъ производителей на пунктахъ и 99% племеннаго состава конскихъ заводовъ. Теперь мы имѣемъ всего по случнымъ пунктамъ около 1.500 жеребцовъ, вмѣсто прежнихъ 9267, плюсъ частные и земскіе жеребцы, и по конскимъ заводамъ тысячу жеребцовъ и три тысячи кобылъ, вмѣсто 25 тыс. жеребцовъ и 300 тыс. кобылъ мирнаго времени. Уменьшеніе скота въ крестьянскомъ хозяйствѣ нужно признать одной изъ самыхъ главныхъ причинъ катастрофическаго состоянія, переживаемаго нашимъ крестьянскимъ хозяйствомъ.

Сельско-хозяйственный инвентарь. Русское сельское хозяйство ежегодно потребляло сельскохозяйственнаго инвентаря на сумму около 130 милліоновъ рублей. Одна половина его ввозилась изъ-за границы (въ 1912 г. на 59.447 тыс.

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зол. рублей, въ 1914 г. на 40.919 тыс.); другая производилась внутри Россіи (въ тѣ же годы на 52.695 тыс. и 54.917 тыс.). Война совершенно прекратила заграничный ввозъ и сильно уменьшила внутреннее производство. Къ 1920 г. революція разрушила внутреннее производство почти совершенно, и всѣ попытки ее возстановить сопровождаются слабымъ успѣхомъ. Даже въ области производства самыхъ простѣйшихъ орудій совѣтскія предпріятія далеко отстаютъ отъ довоенныхъ: такъ, 1921 годъ, по сравненію съ 1913, далъ лишь 776 тыс. косъ вмѣсто 1.135 тыс. (68,4%), 697 тыс. серповъ вмѣсто 2.531 тыс., 99 тыс. плуговъ вмѣсто 739 тыс. (13,4%). Съ машинами болѣе сложными дѣло обстояло совсѣмъ плохо: въ тѣ же годы молотилокъ было выработано 1.600 (1,5% по отношенію къ 1913 г.), вѣялокъ — 2.800 (3,4%), уборочныхъ машинъ — 10 (9%).

Импортъ сельскохозяйственныхъ орудій изъ-за границы, по возстановленіи сношеній съ нею, также не могъ принять сколько-нибудь значительныхъ размѣровъ, за отсутствіемъ средствъ на закупку: въ 1920 году с.х. орудій было ввезено на сумму около одного милліона зол. руб.. Въ два слѣдующіе года, въ немного большихъ количествахъ, точно неизвѣстныхъ. Въ итогѣ, образовавшійся недоборъ опредѣляется совѣтскими органами по вѣсу въ 90 милліоновъ пудовъ на сумму въ 540 милл. зол. рублей, и самая минимальная потребность настоящаго времени исчисляется въ суммѣ 50 милл. рублей золотомъ. (А. Стоклицкій: «Эк. Ж.» 22 г.).

Посѣвная площадь, урожайность и сборъ хлѣбовъ. Указанныя выше измѣненія имѣли своимъ общимъ итогомъ огромное сокращеніе посѣвной площади и значительное уменьшеніе урожайности хлѣбовъ, что повело къ огромному уменьшенію сбора хлѣбовъ. О размѣрахъ разрушеній, произведенныхъ въ этихъ областяхъ, можно судить по слѣдующимъ даннымъ, приводимымъ г. П. Мѣсяцевымъ, виднымъ вдохновителемъ и идеологомъ совѣтскихъ земельныхъ мѣропріятій. Посѣвная площадь уменьшилась съ 85,24 милл. дес. (средняя для 1911-1915 г.) до 43,81 милл. дес. въ 1922 — (54,6% предыдущей). Урожайность зерновыхъ хлѣбовъ упала со средней для 1911-1913 г.г. въ 43,6 пудовъ съ десятины до 30 пудовъ въ 1920 г. и 23,7 для голоднаго 1921 года.

ГЛ. III. ЦѢЛИ И ЗАДАЧИ РУССКАГО СЕЛЬСКАГО ХОЗЯЙСТВА.

Отъ разсмотрѣнія только что очерченной печальной русской дѣйствительности обратимся къ возможному будущему нашего сельскаго хозяйства. Попытаемся намѣтить нѣкоторыя основныя цѣли, цѣли чисто практическія, лишенныя характера утопическихъ мечтаній о томъ, что могло бы быть, если бы Россія дала невиданный еще въ мірѣ примѣръ максимально цѣлесообразной соціальной и технической организаціи сельскохозяйственнаго труда, въ электрофицированныхъ деревняхъ, съ идеальными размѣрами хозяйствъ и проч. п проч..

Никогда не слѣдуетъ забывать, что процессъ перехода отъ низшихъ къ высшимъ формамъ сельскохозяйственнаго производства, возможный теоретически по состоянію современной науки и техники, идетъ медленно, даже въ самыхъ передовыхъ земледѣльческихъ странахъ.. Мы же имѣемъ мелкое и только начинающее пріобщаться къ культурѣ крестьянское хозяйство.

Основная задача русскаго государственнаго и общественнаго строительства заключается въ томъ, чтобы поднять именно этотъ типъ хозяйства на возможно высокую для него ступень. Этотъ подъемъ долженъ протекать на фонѣ существующихъ міровыхъ экономическихъ взаимоотношеній и въ

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зависимости отъ нихъ, при данномъ состояніи земледѣльческой культуры и методовъ ея распространенія и усвоенія...

Чтобы намѣтить нѣкоторыя границы имѣющихся у Россіи при такихъ условіяхъ реальныхъ возможностей, посмотримъ, какія указанія въ этомъ отношеніи даетъ практическій опытъ культурныхъ хозяйствъ другихъ странъ, какими характерными чертами отличается оно, по сравненію съ хозяйствомъ русскимъ, и какіе выводы, полезные для насъ, можно было бы сдѣлать изъ этого сравненія.

Приведу, прежде всего, общія цифры, характеризующія состояніе полеводства и скотоводства культурныхъ странъ до того, какъ на нихъ сказалось воздѣйствіе временныхъ факторовъ военнаго періода (Данныя «Annuaire International de Statistique Agricole», 1915-1916):

Страны	Средній урожай 1907-1916 г. съ одного гектара въ пудахъ					Количество скота на тысячу гекторовъ удобной сельскохозяйственной площади:			
	Пшеница	Рожь	Ячмень	Овесъ	Картофель	Лошади	Рогат. скотъ	Овцы	Свин.
Россія Европ.	43	48	52	49	449	89	133	152	46
» Азіат.	40	40	40	43	343				
Франція	82	64	84	79	539	45	247	217	24
Германія	126	105	121	116	847	65	397	99	338
Соединен. Корол.	131	113	115	113	877	73	449	919	119
Бельгія	153	150	169	146	1098	103	715	72	546
Данія	187	98	135	112	857	140	623	69	540
Голландія	151	107	159	96	881	114	714	287	460
Канада	79	71	194	83	636	67	133	44	63
Соединен. Штаты	60	62	82	65	391	59	179	136	190
Японія	83	—	99	97	604	53	46	1	11
Аргентина	39	42	49	51	832	43	142	374	15

Данные приведенной таблицы ярко показываютъ, насколько отстало русское сельское хозяйство отъ однороднаго ему по типу хозяйства западноевропейскаго. Его обогнали уже даже страны экстенсивной американской культуры, за исключеніемъ Аргентины, остающейся пока позади насъ.

Является ли та значительная разница, которая существуетъ между различными странами, результатомъ причинъ по-преимуществу естественныхъ, различія климата, почвы? Достаточно бросить самый бѣглый взглядъ на исторію развитія сельскаго хозяйства разныхъ странъ, чтобы отвѣтить на послѣдній вопросъ отрицательно. Естественныя причины различной высоты производительности сельскаго хозяйства въ культурныхъ странахъ давно уже отступили на задній планъ по сравненію съ факторами, зависящими отъ человѣка. Экономическія условія развитія сельскаго хозяйства въ отношеніи къ міровому рынку, высота общаго и сельскохозяйственнаго образованія и плотность земледѣльческаго населенія, вотъ тѣ основныя причины, которыя пестрой комбинаціей своихъ деталей вызываютъ происхожденіе различій. Въ опредѣленіи различій между собой европейскихъ хозяйствъ, изъ этихъ причинъ на первомъ мѣстѣ стоитъ высота культуры, а затѣмъ бытовыя особенности историческаго происхожденія.

Въ XV-XVI вѣкахъ англійская почва давала урожай пшеницы, какъ теперешняя русская, лишь въ 35-45 пудовъ съ десятины, вмѣсто полутораста пудовъ настоящаго времени. Въ началѣ девятнадцатаго вѣка нѣмецкое земледѣліе было далеко позади по сравненію съ французскимъ, въ свою очередь сильно отставшимъ отъ англійскаго. А въ началѣ двадцатаго вѣка

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изъ этихъ трехъ странъ Германія заняла первое мѣсто, оставивъ Францію далеко за собой, а въ послѣднія три десятилѣтія обогнавъ и Англію. Вотъ цифры, характеризующія прогрессъ полеводства въ Германіи и Англіи за послѣднія десятилѣтія:

Средній годовый урожай съ акра земли:
(Акръ 0.37 десятины, бушель — 1.38 мѣры, центн. — 3.1 пуд.)

Культура	Англія		Германія	
	1885-89	1909-1913	1883-87	1909-1913
Пшеница (бушели)	29,5	31,2	19,8	31,6
Ячмень »	32,4	32,7	22,7	36,7
Овесъ »	38,8	39,0	25,7	44,6
Картофель (пуды)	365,8	384,4	210,8	334,8
Сѣно луговое (центн.)	26,1	23,1	22,5	33,7

Итакъ, въ теченіе тридцати лѣтъ Германія сумѣла увеличить урожайность своихъ полей почти въ полтора-два раза, въ то время какъ прогрессъ въ этомъ отношеніи Англіи былъ совершенно незначителенъ. То же было и въ другихъ странахъ сельскаго хозяйства. Авторъ приведеннаго сравненія (Middleton) резюмируетъ различіе интенсивности англійской и германской агрикультуры наканунѣ войны въ такихъ сопоставленіяхъ: «Съ каждыхъ ста акровъ обрабатываемой земли англійскій фермеръ кормитъ только 40-50 человѣкъ вмѣсто 70-75 чел., прокармливаемыхъ въ Германіи; производитъ 15 тоннъ хлѣбныхъ продуктовъ вмѣсто 33 тоннъ, 11 тоннъ картофеля вмѣсто 55 тоннъ, 4 тонны мяса вмѣсто 4 ½, 17 тоннъ молока вмѣсто 28 тоннъ, ничтожное количество сахара вмѣсто 2 ¾ тоннъ, производимыхъ въ Германіи».

Цифры французскія, какъ было указано, значительно ниже англійскихъ, и далеко сзади Франціи идетъ Россія.

Если мы обратимся къ литературѣ по агрикультурнымъ вопросамъ, чтобы найти отвѣтъ на вопросъ о ближайшихъ причинахъ отмѣченныхъ явленій, то отвѣтъ этотъ въ основныхъ чертахъ повсюду будетъ одинаковъ: постановка сельскохозяйственнаго образованія и уровень агрономическихъ знаній въ странѣ, высота сельскохозяйственной техники, постановка опытнаго дѣла, селекція сѣмянъ, улучшеніе скота и раціональное его кормленіе, примѣненіе искусственныхъ удобреній, организованный кредитъ для земледѣльца, — вотъ тѣ основы, на которыхъ строится современное культурное сельское хозяйство.

Прежде всего попытаемся отвѣтить, должно ли быть наше будущее — интенсивнымъ германскимъ или бельгійскимъ типомъ земледѣлія? Можетъ возникнуть вопросъ: а почему не сѣверо- или южно-американскій? Вѣдь, приведенныя выше цифры производительности въ этихъ странахъ далеко не такъ блестящи, какъ западно-европейскія. Между тѣмъ, культурность американскаго земледѣльца несомнѣнно ближе къ культурности бельгійскаго или германскаго, чѣмъ культурность русскаго. Очевидно, есть какія-то причины объективнаго порядка, которыя не позволяютъ интенсифицировать хозяйство въ Америкѣ такъ, какъ оно интенсифицировано въ Бельгіи и Германіи? Конечно, такія причины есть. Если взять нѣкоторыя изъ приведенныхъ выше странъ и вычислить отношеніе числа лицъ, занятыхъ работою въ сельскомъ хозяйствѣ, къ площади обрабатываемой земли и луговъ, то мы получимъ слѣдующій любопытный рядъ. На каждые сто акровъ приходится рабочей силы: въ Соединенныхъ Штатахъ — 2,7 человѣка; въ Англіи —

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4,5; въ Даніи — 7; во Франціи — 10, въ Германіи — 13, въ Бельгіи — 16 и въ Россіи — 10. Анализируя эти цифры дальше, можно убѣдиться, что для интенсивнаго использованія сельскохозяйственной площади нужна извѣстная плотность земледѣльческаго населенія. Если, въ силу тѣхъ или иныхъ причинъ, количество рабочихъ рукъ не велико, то это будетъ вести либо къ большому проценту земель, запускаемыхъ подъ луга, съ сосредоточеніемъ интенсивной культуры на небольшой относительно площади, либо культура должна носить экстенсивный характеръ, при которомъ недостатокъ рабочихъ рукъ, несмотря на усиленное введеніе машиннаго труда, будетъ выражаться въ значительно худшей обработкѣ земли (американскія страны). Притокъ рабочей силы въ сельское хозяйство, въ свою очередь, опредѣляется всей совокупностью экономическихъ условій данной страны. Если, положимъ, въ странѣ начинаетъ развиваться промышленнность и городская жизнь, оплачивающія трудъ выше, чѣмъ сельское хозяйство, начнется неудержимая тяга изъ деревни въ городъ до тѣхъ поръ, пока городъ перестанетъ давать работу этимъ новымъ пришельцамъ, или пока сельскій трудъ по своимъ условіямъ не уравняется съ промышленнымъ или городскимъ. Цвѣтущая промышленность и городская жизнь Англіи и Соединенныхъ Штатовъ все время ведетъ къ уменьшенію рабочей силы въ сельскомъ хозяйствѣ. Поэтому въ Англіи изъ ея 26 милл. акровъ удобной для полеводства хорошаго качества земли посѣвная площадь составляла (въ 1921 г.) только 11 милліоновъ. При этомъ до войны эта площадь уменьшалась съ каждымъ годомъ, и съ 1918 года процессъ уменьшенія возобновился снова, несмотря на всѣ усилія правительства его пріостановить.

Россія рабочей силой для весьма высокой интенсивной культуры земли снабжена въ достаточной мѣрѣ. Ея будущее — интенсивное западно-европейское земледѣліе.

Нужно отказаться, какъ отъ несомнѣнной утопіи, отъ мысли улучшить положеніе деревни, разрѣдивъ ея населеніе тѣми или иными разумными государственными мѣрами: индустріализаціей Россіи, колонизаціей ея незаселенныхъ областей и проч. Нѣтъ спора, что всѣ эти мѣры нужны; частично онѣ могутъ улучшить положеніе въ тѣхъ или иныхъ перенаселенныхъ районахъ. Но приблизить условія жизни и культуры въ русской деревнѣ къ условіямъ американскаго фермера онѣ не въ состояніи. Въ общероссійскомъ масштабѣ значеніе ихъ не можетъ быть велико. Россія могла бы считать себя счастливой, если бы города, промышленность и колонизація поглащали только естественный приростъ ея населенія

Можно ли уже сейчасъ указать возможную степень этой интенсификаціи? Интенсификація — вопросъ техническаго порядка, но въ еще большей степени это — вопросъ экономическій. Если скомбинировать всѣ научныя достиженія новѣйшей агрикультуры въ области обработки земли, примѣненія надлежащихъ сѣмянъ, естественныхъ и искусственныхъ удобреній и проч., то навѣрное въ любомъ уѣздѣ Россіи урожайность можетъ быть увеличена не меньше ,чѣмъ втрое, а въ нѣкоторыхъ мѣстахъ особо низкой культуры — въ четыре-пять разъ. Однако, экономика можетъ ставить интенсификаціи гораздо болѣе низкіе предѣлы. Эти предѣлы зависятъ отъ цѣнъ сельскохозяйственныхъ продуктовъ на міровомъ рынкѣ, инвентаря, удобреній, труда и прочихъ элементовъ производства, отъ разстоянія хозяйства до ближайшаго рынка закупки и сбыта, оборудованія страны путями сообщенія и стоимости транспорта. Разнообразныя сочетанія этихъ факторовъ будутъ требовать весьма различныхъ формъ и степени интенсификаціи для различныхъ районовъ Россіи. Общее правило: сельскій хозяинъ можетъ увеличи-

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вать интенсификацію хозяйства до тѣхъ поръ, пока приростъ его затратъ на улучшенія будетъ меньше стоимости прироста продукта.

Никому не дано предвидѣть на сколько-нибудь продолжительное время впередъ, какія условія для интенсификаціи русскаго сельскаго хозяйства будетъ создавать сложное сочетаніе этихъ факторовъ. Въ настоящее время можно говорить только объ общей тенденціи возможныхъ измѣненій. Если ростъ производительности русскаго сельскаго хозяйства пойдетъ сколько-нибудь быстро, если экспортныя его возможности начнутъ расти скорѣе, чѣмъ ростъ спроса возрастающаго населенія потребляющихъ странъ, — вѣроятно, почти несомнѣнно, паденіе цѣнъ на продукты сельскаго хозяйства, что будетъ вліять на интенсивность задерживающимъ образомъ. Но одновременно съ тѣмъ надо ожидать уменьшенія стоимости сельско-хозяйственныхъ орудій и удобреній — факторъ, содѣйствующій росту интенсификаціи. Насъ ставятъ въ чрезвычайно неблагопріятное положеніе въ отношеніи конкуренціи на міровыхъ рынкахъ наши разстоянія и пути сообщенія, чрезвычайно увеличивая накладные расходы на покупаемые и продаваемые товары сельскаго хозяйства. Очень крупный минусъ нашъ также — необходимость закупать заграницей сельско-хозяйственныя машины и удобренія, обходящіяся, поэтому, нашему хозяину значительно дороже, чѣмъ его конкуренту. Но за то наше огромное преимущество — дешевизна внутри страны, что, вмѣстѣ съ болѣе низкимъ уровнемъ жизни крестьянина, даетъ ему возможность вести сельскохозяйственную работу при несравненно меньшемъ вознагражденіи труда, чѣмъ на западѣ. Достаточно для примѣра указать, что англійскіе луга не могутъ быть обращены подъ зерновую культуру потому только, что англійское сельское хозяйство не можетъ имѣть рабочей силы съ оплатой ея по двадцать шиллинговъ въ недѣлю, несмотря на то, что въ Англіи въ теченіи уже двухъ лѣтъ количество безработныхъ держится на уровнѣ около двухъ милліоновъ человѣкъ.

Если позволить себѣ вступить на путь вѣроятнаго, то можно сказать, что экономическія границы возможной для Россіи интенсификаціи гдѣ-то еще очень далеко. Я не сомнѣваюсь, что міровой рынокъ безъ катастрофическаго паденія цѣнъ допустилъ бы увеличеніе производства въ Россіи хлѣбныхъ продуктовъ до размѣра, превышающаго болѣе, чѣмъ вдвое довоенную нашу продукцію. Для продуктовъ нашего скотоводческаго хозяйства повышеніе могло бы быть гораздо большимъ...

Цѣль, которую нужно было бы поставить русскому сельскому хозяйству, можно было бы формулировать, какъ подъемъ его производительности на максимальную ступень, допускаемую современнымъ состояніемъ земледѣльческой культуры въ связи съ состояніемъ мірового хозяйства.

ГЛ. IV. ПУТИ ПРОГРЕССИВНАГО РАЗВИТІЯ РУССКАГО СЕЛЬСКАГО ХОЗЯЙСТВА.

Пути эти можно раздѣлить на двѣ основныя группы: А) Мѣры законодательныя — созданіе правовыхъ нормъ, регулирующихъ различныя стороны сельскаго хозяйства; Б) Мѣры — государственныя и общественныя-экономическо-культурнаго порядка, имѣющія своей цѣлью, въ границахъ этого права, содѣйствовать успѣху сельскаго хозяйства.

Въ Совѣтской Россіи надлежитъ разсмотрѣть особо и третью область — методы проведенія властью своихъ идей въ жизнь. Эти методы играютъ столь большую роль въ современной русской дѣйствительности, устанавливаютъ такія необычайныя взаимоотношенія между государственнымъ принужде-

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ніемъ и общественной самодѣятельностью, что для того, кто не имѣетъ о нихъ самаго отчетливаго представленія, многое въ русской жизни вообще и въ жизни сельско-хозяйственной Россіи въ частности должно оставаться совершенно непонятнымъ.

А. АГРАРНОЕ ЗАКОНОДАТЕЛЬСТВО.

Совѣтское аграрное законодательство, создавшееся путемъ постепенныхъ наслоеній въ теченіе пяти лѣтъ господства совѣтской власти, недавно кодифицировано въ видѣ нѣкотораго освобожденнаго отъ внутреннихъ противорѣчій свода земельныхъ законовъ, утвержденнаго Центр. Исполн. Ком. Совѣтовъ 22 октября 1922 года подъ названіемъ: «Земельный Кодексъ Р.С.Ф.С.Р.». Совѣтскія узаконенія, касающіяся лѣсовъ, въ этотъ сводъ не вошли, и должны составить предметъ подготовляемаго къ утвержденію «Лѣсного Кодекса»

Я не стану заниматься подробнымъ анализомъ «Земельнаго Кодекса», въ которомъ существенное и важное соединено съ мелочами, не имѣющими значенія. Ограничусь установленіемъ и отстаиваніемъ тѣхъ положеній, которыя мнѣ представляются правовой основой, наиболѣе соотвѣтствующей интересамъ большинства русскаго населенія и обезпечивающей максимумъ благопріятныхъ условій для прогрессивнаго развитія нашего хозяйства. И затѣмъ кратко скажу, насколько эти положенія проведены въ «Земельномъ Кодексѣ».

Четыре положенія должны быть признаны безусловно обязательными въ области русскаго сельскаго хозяйства затѣмъ, чтобы оно могло выйти изъ состоянія постоянныхъ кризисовъ и неустойчивости и получить возможность двигаться впередъ: 1) Революція упразднила права прежнихъ земельныхъ собственниковъ, какъ на принадлежавшую имъ землю, постройки, живой и мертвый сельско-хозяйственный инвентарь и проч., такъ равно и на какую бы то ни было компенсацію за нихъ. 2) Права мелкихъ трудовыхъ земледѣльцевъ должны быть закрѣплены за ними въ томъ размѣрѣ, въ какомъ они ими пользуются. 3) Долженъ быть заботливо сохраненъ за государствомъ и обезпеченъ отъ всякихъ посягательствъ со стороны и прежнихъ собственниковъ, и теперешнихъ пользователей, земельный фондъ совѣтскихъ и коллективныхъ хозяйствъ (не крестьянскаго характера), какъ основныхъ площадей опытнаго, сѣмянного и племеннаго дѣла, широкая постановка которыхъ должна будетъ быть одной изъ существенныхъ задачъ будущей Россіи. Ненужный для этихъ дѣлъ значительный излишекъ указанныхъ земель долженъ быть обращенъ на нужды внутренней колонизаціи. 4) Лѣса и незаселенныя площади во всѣхъ районахъ Россіи должны остаться въ рукахъ государства, какъ для предоставленія ихъ въ пользованіе сельскохозяйственнаго населенія, такъ и для постановки на этихъ площадяхъ правильнаго и широко поставленнаго переселенія.

Проведеніе въ жизнь перваго положенія поканчиваетъ съ неправдой, созданной вѣками, сохраненіе которой не могло быть мотивировано ничѣмъ другимъ, кромѣ соображенія, что ея устраненіе будетъ стоить народу необычайно дорого, какъ это и оказалось на самомъ дѣлѣ.

Положеніе второе признаетъ необходимымъ узаконить другую историческую неправду: сравнительную земельную бѣдность крестьянства въ однѣхъ частяхъ Россіи, сравнительное богатство — въ другихъ. Узаконеніе это необходимо потому, что внѣ силъ какой бы то ни было власти перебросить милліоны безземельныхъ крестьянъ во владѣнія земельно обезпеченныхъ,

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заставить послѣднихъ по-братски подѣлиться землей съ первыми. Попытка такого рода передѣла потребовала бы новой гражданской войны, еще болѣе кровавой и страшной, чѣмъ та, которую мы пережили, и, все равно, окончилась бы безрезультатно.

Что касается до третьяго и четвертаго положенія, то предусматриваемая ими необходимость развитія опытнаго дѣла и запаснаго земельнаго фонда будетъ разсмотрѣна ниже.

Коллективное, общинное и участковое хозяйство. Можно ли съ категоричностью говорить сейчасъ о несомнѣнныхъ преимуществахъ какой-либо изъ этихъ формъ хозяйства, и должна ли власть силой закона и государственнаго принужденія содѣйствовать, поэтому, росту одной изъ нихъ и уничтоженію другихъ?.

Пятилѣтняя практика работы коллективныхъ хозяйствъ привела даже самыхъ горячихъ сторонниковъ ихъ къ тяжелому въ нихъ разочарованію. Хозяйства эти стремительно катились внизъ, часто даже опережая въ этомъ отношеніи крестьянскія. Причины неуспѣха: 1) хозяйства попали не въ руки коренныхъ земледѣльцевъ-крестьянъ, а въ руки желающихъ, но не умѣющихъ обрабатывать землю и ухаживать за скотомъ, фабричныхъ рабочихъ, городскихъ интеллигентовъ и т.д. 2) Современный человѣческій матеріалъ, вообще говоря, вѣроятно еще не годенъ для такого типа хозяйства. Несмотря на то, что крупный размѣръ хозяйствъ, болѣе близкій къ «оптимальному»,*) чѣмъ семейно-трудовое крестьянское хозяйство, давалъ теоретически надежду на успѣхъ, на практикѣ изъ коллективовъ ничего не выходитъ.

Трудность согласовать личную иниціативу съ коллективнымъ мнѣніемъ; различіе индивидуальныхъ знаній, умѣній и силы; невозможность, при весьма слабой механизаціи и трудностяхъ учета затраты силъ въ сельскомъ хозяйствѣ, опредѣлить сколько-нибудь объективно количество труда или продуктивность отдѣльныхъ сочленовъ и установить въ соотвѣтствіи съ этимъ принципы всѣхъ удовлетворяющаго раздѣленія получаемыхъ въ хозяйствѣ продуктовъ; желаніе однихъ — отдавать труду максимумъ времени и силъ, чтобы добиться максимальнаго матеріальнаго процвѣтанія хозяйства, въ то время, какъ другіе хотятъ работать возможный минимумъ, чтобы имѣть возможно больше досуга для личной жизни, — всѣ эти и тысячи иныхъ психологическихъ индивидуальныхъ отличій, въ сельскомъ хозяйствѣ сказывающихся рѣзче, чѣмъ въ какомъ бы то ни было другомъ дѣлѣ артельнаго типа и, повидимому, отодвигаютъ возможность развитія массовыхъ организацій подобнаго рода къ тому времени, когда люди будутъ несравненно насъ культурнѣе, терпимѣе и благожелательнѣе другъ къ другу, и когда, можетъ быть, благодаря дальнѣйшему прогрессу науки и техники, систематическій сельскохозяйственный трудъ не будетъ такъ тяжелъ, какъ теперь.

Пока людямъ «некуда податься» — коллективныя хозяйства будутъ держаться. Но какъ только начнутъ образовываться и развиваться въ Россіи возможности приложенія и надлежащей оплаты труда интеллигента и рабочаго, большая часть колхозовъ полетятъ, какъ карточные домики. Потому, я полагаю, что считать нынѣ сидящихъ въ колхозахъ людей имѣющими такое же право на эту землю, какъ крестьяне на свой надѣлъ, никакъ нельзя. Колхозы должны, пока, считаться государственнымъ земельнымъ фондомъ. Это не исключаетъ, конечно, возможности и цѣлесообразности, въ тѣхъ рѣдкихъ

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*) См. работу А. Чаянова и друг. «Оптимальные размѣры сельско-хозяйственныхъ предпріятій».

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случаяхъ, когда колхозомъ пользуются дѣйствительно трудовые земледѣльцы, способные единолично или коллективно вести раціональное земельное хозяйство, считать ихъ первыми кандидатами для окончательнаго закрѣпленія за ними изъ занимаемой ими площади нормальныхъ по мѣстнымъ условіямъ участковъ земли.

Если коллективное хозяйство есть высшая форма, до которой наше поколѣніе еще не доросло, то хозяйство общинное есть форма примитивная, которую мы въ Россіи стали уже перерастать. «Общинное землевладѣніе было главнымъ тормазомъ развитія производительныхъ силъ крестьянскаго хозяйства» — утверждалъ на агрономическомъ съѣздѣ проф. Бруцкусъ, приписывая въ своей аргументаціи общинѣ, на ряду съ дѣйствительными, и такія бѣды, въ которыхъ она врядъ ли была повинна.

Исторія прогресса земледѣлія на Западѣ даетъ этому утвержденію довольно прочную опору. Одинъ изъ видныхъ историковъ англійской агрикультуры, Куртлеръ, давая оцѣнку соотвѣтствующимъ явленіямъ на Западѣ, говоритъ, напримѣръ, что во всей аграрной исторіи націй Средней Европы нѣтъ болѣе важнаго событія, содѣйствовавшаго прогрессу земледѣлія, чѣмъ распаденіе прежней земельной общины и созданіе въ дѣлѣ обработки земли полной независимости одного человѣка отъ другого. Это мнѣніе раздѣляется за рѣдкими исключеніями, большинствомъ компетентныхъ историковъ агрикультуры разныхъ странъ (Прозеро, Гольцъ и проч.). Для нихъ конецъ общины — это конецъ трехполья, введеніе многопольныхъ сѣвооборотовъ, новыхъ культуръ, травосѣянія, увеличеніе скота, разумное его кормленіе и проч., и проч.

Доводы противъ общины повсюду были тѣ же, которые и нынѣ остаются въ силѣ для Россіи: какъ бы ни былъ культуренъ земледѣлецъ, какими бы ни былъ онъ проникнутъ передовыми идеями по части обработки земли, сѣвооборотовъ, введенія травъ и новыхъ культуръ, стойлового содержанія скота и раціональнаго его кормленія, — втиснутый въ рамки общиннаго земельнаго хозяйства, онъ можетъ только шагать вмѣстѣ со своей общиной. Лишь самостоятельное хозяйство даетъ просторъ культурной земледѣльческой иниціативѣ, которая въ русскихъ условіяхъ способна еще творить чудеса, и которая будетъ вести за собой все отсталое и косное, служа ему живымъ примѣромъ успѣшной работы.

Историческія и теоретическія соображенія приведеннаго порядка далеко не для всѣхъ, однако, убѣдительны. Какъ извѣстно, русское народничество было въ теченіе многихъ лѣтъ убѣжденнымъ защитникомъ общины и противникомъ хуторовъ. Относительный успѣхъ столыпинскаго землеустройства заставилъ народническое міровоззрѣніе въ этомъ пунктѣ дать сильную трещину. Хотя оффиціальная точка зрѣнія партіи въ этомъ вопросѣ не измѣнена, но отдѣльные члены ея заговаривали не разъ о необходимости ее пересмотрѣть.

Изъ сказаннаго въ пользу участковаго владѣнія и противъ общины я отнюдь не дѣлаю вывода, что нужно какимъ-либо единымъ декретомъ подѣлить всѣ русскія села и деревни на отрубные участки. Чтобы усвоить высшую хозяйственную форму всей своей массой, населеніе должно до нея дозрѣть. Извѣстно, что радикальная прусская реформа начала XIX вѣка, уничтожившая остатки общины принудительно-декретнымъ порядкомъ, или англійскія «огражденія», проводившіяся также съ большимъ нажимомъ на земельную общину, сопровождались чрезвычайно гибельными послѣдствіями для значительной части населенія, хотя потомъ, черезъ нѣсколько поколѣній, и привели въ концѣ концовъ къ благодѣтельнымъ результатамъ.

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Не нужно ни борьбы съ общиной, ни искусственнаго вскармливанія колхозовъ и хуторянъ. То, что требуется, правильно намѣчается резолюціей агрономическаго съѣзда: «Предоставленіе земледѣльческому населенію свободы выбора любыхъ порядковъ и формъ землепользованія, съ должнымъ обезпеченіемъ, при этомъ, какъ хозяйственныхъ интересовъ большинства, такъ и хозяйственной иниціативы меньшинства членовъ земельныхъ обществъ». Правда, формула эта, указывая правильную тенденцію, оставляетъ неяснымъ, гдѣ именно кончается «хозяйственный интересъ большинства» и начинается законное поле «иниціативы меньшинства.» Есть ли, положимъ, введенное при Столыпинѣ и сохраненное въ совѣтскомъ законодательствѣ право одной пятой части дворовъ въ общинахъ безъ передѣловъ въ любое время требовать выдѣленія ихъ на отруба, цѣлесообразный выходъ иниціативѣ, или его можно трактовать, какъ искусственное разрушеніе общины въ угоду меньшинству? Почему это меньшинство устанавливается въ 1 5, а не въ 1 /4 или 1 /3? Всякое рѣшеніе этихъ вопросовъ будетъ условно, и цѣлесообразность тѣхъ или другихъ формъ можетъ быть выяснена лишь на практикѣ ихъ примѣненія.

Итакъ, никакихъ привиллегій для общины, колхозовъ или участковыхъ формъ земледѣлія; и обезпеченіе возможности безпрепятственнаго развитія каждой изъ нихъ, — такова нелегкая задача въ этой области русскаго законодательства нашего времени.

Собственность и пользованіе. Соціализація и національзація. — На какомъ правѣ должна находиться земля въ распоряженіи крестьянства: должно ли это быть владѣніе, пользованіе или аренда? при какихъ условіяхъ система государственнаго земельнаго законодательства должна именоваться національзаціей, соціализаціей и частной собственностью или, лучше сказать, какое конкретное содержаніе должно заключаться въ этихъ терминахъ, ибо простымъ примѣненіемъ ихъ, въ виду ихъ достаточной неопредѣленности, дѣла не уяснишь?

Извѣстно, какое большое значеніе придается частью нашихъ общественныхъ дѣятелей тому, чтобы земля была передана крестьянству на правѣ «частной собственности», со всей совокупностью послѣдствій, отсюда вытекающихъ: т.е. правомъ свободно эту землю покупать и продавать, закладывать и брать въ залогъ.

Многіе склонны усматривать въ этомъ совершенно необходимое условіе пріостановки развала русскаго сельскаго хозяйства и начала его возрожденія. Любопытно, что въ этой защитѣ купли-продажи-залога земли сходится часть соціалистовъ разныхъ оттѣнковъ съ непримиримыми противниками соціализма. Крайне различны, поэтому, и конкретныя формы, въ которыхъ мыслится этими разными группами проведеніе общей имъ основной идеи въ жизнь и аргументы, выдвигаемые въ ея защиту. Оффиціальная русская соціалъ-демократія, считающая себя хранительницей ортодоксально-марксистскихъ принциповъ, стоитъ за неограниченную куплю-продажу, ибо эта послѣдняя — необходимое условіе созданія крупныхъ земельныхъ хозяйствъ, которыя только и могутъ обезпечить максимумъ развитія производительныхъ силъ и являются необходимымъ этапомъ на пути къ соціализму. То же требованіе — по инымъ мотивамъ — у противниковъ соціализма: ничѣмъ не ограниченная собственность любыхъ размѣровъ, ибо, вообще, частный интересъ всегда былъ и навсегда пребудетъ основнымъ стимуломъ экономическаго прогресса. Образцовыя крупныя, наиболѣе культурныя и производительныя хозяйства, могутъ быть созданы только при наличіи «хозяина», единой волей и энергіей котораго они будутъ лишь создаваться и развивать-

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ся. По серединѣ между этими крайностями — сторонники той же идеи, но съ различными ея ограниченіями и по разнообразнымъ мотивамъ. Здѣсь люди и народническаго уклона: — М. Осоргинъ, считающій, что право собственности для крестьянина «якорь спасенія отъ той посторонней воли, которая теперь въ любой моментъ можетъ пустить по вѣтру его многолѣтній трудъ и лишить его продукта этого труда», и соціалисты-марксисты ревизіонистскаго склада приходятъ къ защитѣ свободы мобилизаціи земельной собственности по соображеніямъ, что мелкое крестьянское карликовое хозяйство не жизнеспособно, и что нужно дать возможность образоваться частнымъ хозяйствамъ «оптимальнаго» размѣра. Таковыми будутъ хозяйства среднія и средне-крупныя, которыя должны имѣть наемный трудъ, обладать правомъ залога, какъ основного источника кредита и пр.. Отсутствіе права продавать землю, — для сторонниковъ этой точки зрѣнія, — есть искусственный способъ задержанія въ деревнѣ мелкихъ хозяевъ, обреченныхъ на нищету и непроизводительность, за невозможностью найти кредитъ и организовать хозяйство на своихъ скудныхъ клочкахъ земли. Это уменьшаетъ валовой доходъ сельскаго хозяйства, содѣйствуетъ перенаселенности сельскихъ округовъ, задерживаетъ притокъ рабочихъ рукъ въ промышленность.

Дальше идутъ всякихъ оттѣнковъ крестьянскіе идеологи, заявляющіе, что мужикъ хочетъ, чтобы земля была его безусловной собственностью, и что только тогда онъ вложитъ всю свою силу, энергію и разумъ въ ея обработку.

Я держусь того мнѣнія, что государственное законодательство, отрицающее принципъ купли-продажи-залога въ Россіи настоящаго и ближайшаго будущаго гораздо правильнѣе, чѣмъ законодательство, построенное на противоположныхъ началахъ. Разсмотримъ основные аргументы за «частную собственность» на землю.

Утвержденіе, что крупная собственность въ земледѣліи обезпечиваетъ максимумъ производительности, что поэтому она одерживаетъ и будетъ одерживать верхъ надъ мелкой, опровергается каждымъ новымъ цензомъ, каждымъ новымъ изслѣдованіемъ. Вѣрно, что хозяйства карликовыя бываютъ нерѣдко настолько переобременены непроизводительными расходами и настолько страдаютъ отъ недостатка капитала и малой производительности, что наблюдается процессъ ихъ вытѣсненія. Но хозяйства среднія, семейно-трудового типа, хозяйства отъ 2 до 10 и, особенно, отъ 10 до 20 гектаровъ, во Франціи, Англіи, Германіи, Бельгіи и пр., настолько уже доказали и свою устойчивость, и способность къ интенсификаціи и культурному прогрессу, и высокую производительность, особенно когда путемъ кооперації они начинаютъ использовать рядъ преимуществъ крупныхъ хозяйствъ, что ихъ смѣло можно ставить на ряду, а въ большинствѣ случаевъ и выше, хозяйствъ болѣе крупныхъ и считать прочной базой процвѣтающихъ земледѣльческихъ государствъ. Именно къ такому типу и будетъ относиться большинство русскихъ крестьянскихъ хозяйствъ со среднимъ размѣромъ ихъ, какъ было указано, въ 9 десятинъ.

Могутъ сказать: но если хозяйство русскаго крестьянскаго типа жизнеспособно само по себѣ, зачѣмъ защищать его искусственными мѣрами? Затѣмъ, что въ ближайшіе годы — кто можетъ предугадать, сколько ихъ еще предстоитъ — Россія будетъ проходить черезъ рядъ великихъ испытаній: владѣльцы участковъ, вполнѣ достаточныхъ, чтобы на нихъ поставить цвѣтущее хозяйство *впослѣдствіи*, быть можетъ, будутъ продолжать вымирать съ голоду *теперь*, сидя на этомъ участкѣ безъ скота, инвентаря и сѣмянъ.

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Умирающіе отъ голода вологжане за пудъ муки отдавали рабочую лошадь. Свободная продажа земли привлечетъ въ деревню рядъ международныхъ хищниковъ, если нужно, подъ русскими ярлыками, которые за гроши будутъ собирать въ своихъ рукахъ земли, — въ рукахъ единоличныхъ, если собственность будетъ неограничена, въ рукахъ подставныхъ лицъ, если участки не могутъ быть велики; въ видѣ ипотекъ на мелкія владѣнія, если будетъ установлена семейно-трудовая норма съ правомъ продажи и залога въ ея предѣлахъ. Ибо въ какія золотыя розсыпи можно будетъ въ ближайшее время выгоднѣе помѣстить иностранную валюту, чѣмъ въ русскую землю, такъ же, какъ помѣщается эта валюта теперь въ нѣмецкую недвижимость. Можно ли ручаться, что мужицкая тяга къ землѣ пронесетъ русскаго крестьянина черезъ всѣ эти испытанія, что землю—будущность дѣтей своихъ—онъ не будетъ продавать за чечевичную похлебку настоящаго? Но, если бы даже процессъ пошелъ и не такимъ путемъ, а путемъ скупки крѣпкими мужиками мелкихъ участковъ безлошадныхъ, безкоровныхъ и безпосѣвныхъ дворовъ, можно ли было бы это разсматривать, какъ благо. Я считаю, что нѣтъ: ни промышленность, ни города, ни наемная работа въ деревнѣ не въ состояніи поглотить пролетаризировавшихся такимъ образомъ крестьянъ, и вмѣсто тяжкой жизни, но все же жизни, на одной картошкѣ и скудномъ количествѣ хлѣба, имъ предстояло бы просто вымираніе. Пока крестьянское хозяйство не оправилось, мѣста въ Россіи для права купли-продажи-залога земли быть не должно. А когда оно оправится? Теперь это право было бы вредно. Тогда, я думаю, оно просто не будетъ нужно. По мѣрѣ развитія городской жизни и промышленности, по мѣрѣ того, какъ онѣ будутъ предоставлять крестьянамъ, сидящимъ на карликовыхъ надѣлахъ, лучшія условія жизни, чѣмъ эти ихъ надѣлы, они ихъ будутъ бросать и растекаться по городамъ. Процессъ консолидаціи мелкихъ хозяйствъ въ жизненныя среднія на арендномъ правѣ совершится столь же легко, какъ и на правѣ собственности.

Далѣе, право собственности на землю аргументируется какъ необходимость ее представить въ качествѣ обезпеченія при полученіи взаймы капитала.

Капиталъ, дѣйствительно,—необходимое условіе сколько-нибудь быстраго возстановленія русскаго сельскаго хозяйства. Но я позволю себѣ выставить тезисъ, что тотъ кредитъ, который нуженъ русскому сельскому хозяйству — долгосрочный и въ большомъ размѣрѣ, — придетъ въ Россію только какъ кредитъ государственный, или онъ совсѣмъ никогда не придетъ.

Что касается до кредита краткосрочнаго, то его базой является извѣстная хозяйственная устойчивость (обезпеченность рабочимъ скотомъ, инвентаремъ и т.д.). При нормальномъ положеніи вещей, правильная система кооперативныхъ учрежденій мелкаго кредита могла бы привлечь въ крестьянское хозяйство большія средства, совершенно не пользуясь землею, какъ источникомъ обезпеченія кредита.

Далѣе, сторонники права купли-продажи говорятъ, что отсутствіе его убиваетъ «личную иниціативу и заинтересованность владѣльца, внушая ему опасенія, что нѣкая посторонняя воля въ любой моментъ можетъ пустить по вѣтру его многолѣтній трудъ и лишить его продуктовъ этого труда.» (Осоргинъ). Мнѣ кажется, что этотъ аргументъ покоится на простомъ смѣшеніи понятій сосбственности и обезпеченности и полноты пользованія. Энергію и иниціативу убиваетъ теперь въ Россіи не то, что землю нельзя купить или продать, а то, что нѣтъ увѣренности, что результатъ труда на землѣ не попадетъ кому-нибудь другому. Нельзя лучше выразить этого основного мужицкаго горя, какъ въ извѣстныхъ сѣтованіяхъ, обращенныхъ къ вождямъ

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коммунизма на одномъ изъ съѣздовъ наканунѣ НЭПА: «Земля-то теперь наша, да хлѣбъ-то вашъ; луга-то наши, да сѣно-то ваше; лѣса-то наши, да дрова-то ваши.»

Совѣтскій земельный кодексъ формулируетъ право на землю такъ (стр. 11): «Право на землю, предоставленную въ трудовое пользованіе, безсрочно и можетъ быть прекращено только на основаніяхъ, указанныхъ въ законѣ.» Дальше слѣдуютъ основанія (стр.18), гарантирующія права крестьянской семьи на ея землю, пока хоть кто-нибудь изъ ея членовъ на ней работаетъ. Мнѣ кажется, что именно *это* для крестьянина суть, а остальное — въ томъ числѣ и вопросъ о куплѣ-продажѣ—для него не существенно.

Въ прошломъ, вѣдь, у крестьянства на большую часть его земель собственности въ томъ смыслѣ, въ какомъ это слово примѣняютъ теперь, вообще не было до самаго недавняго времени: надѣльныя крестьянскія земли ни продаваться, ни закладываться не могли. Только Столыпинское законодательство, предоставившее право укрѣплять надѣльную землю, дало одновременно право ее и продавать, и то ограничивъ его продажей только лицамъ «крестьянскаго сословія.»

Мнѣ кажется, что объективному формированію мнѣнія — слѣдуетъ ли предоставить землю въ собственность или въ обезпеченное и полное пользованіе — много мѣшаетъ путаница понятій, ассоціирующихся съ двумя терминами «націонализація» и «соціализація». «Обезпеченное и полное пользованіе» — всего правильнѣе характеризуется терминомъ «націонализація». Между тѣмъ, въ русской терминологіи очень часто націонализація понимается, какъ частичный соціализмъ.

Не-соціалистическіе круги русскаго общества, горя желаніемъ истребить всѣ остатки, напоминающіе законодательство соціалистическаго характера, не мыслятъ себѣ, какъ это для нихъ возможно помириться со строемъ, въ которомъ земля останется «собственностью государства.» Съ другой стороны, есть и соціалисты народническаго типа, которымъ начинаетъ казаться, что мужикъ, дѣйствительно, хочетъ собственности и что, можетъ быть, дѣйствительно нужно итти подъ знаменемъ, на которомъ будетъ стоять этотъ лозунгъ. Но ихъ удерживаетъ боязнь оказаться нарушителями «соціалистическихъ принциповъ», незамѣтно для себя уйти отъ соціализма. И тѣмъ, и другимъ нужно рѣшительно сказать, что страхи ихъ напрасны: націонализація земли — не соціализмъ. Въ Англіи и Америкѣ въ общества, провозглашающія націонализацію своимъ лозунгомъ, входитъ не мало крайнихъ консерваторовъ, непримиримыхъ противниковъ соціализма, равно какъ и сторонниковъ его.

Не мало путаницы понятій внесъ терминъ русскаго народничества «соціализація». Этому термину, помимо несущественной декларативной его части, по которой земля принадлежитъ не «государству», а «всему народу», — присущи, повидимому, два неотъемлемыхъ признака: уравнительное распредѣленіе земли и сохраненіе общины. По существу я уже высказывался раньше противъ обоихъ этихъ положеній. Съ точки же зрѣнія терминологической названіе нельзя не признать мало удачнымъ: соціализма при осуществленіи этой системы было бы такъ же мало, какъ и при націонализаціи, и потому терминъ, произведенный отъ слова «соціализмъ», подаетъ только поводъ къ излишней путаницѣ понятій.

Разсматривая чрезвычайно важный вопросъ, слѣдуетъ ли аграрное право строить на собственности или на пользованіи, я старался исходить изъ объективныхъ данныхъ и очистить разсужденіе отъ всякихъ предвзятостей.

Я высказываюсь за пользованіе. Это мое мнѣніе; я готовъ его защищать

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и доказывать соотвѣтствіе его крестьянскимъ интересамъ. Не только въ проблемѣ — собственность или пользованіе — но въ разсмотрѣніи основныхъ положеній аграрнаго законодательства я умышленно исключаю аргументацію, основанную на истолкованіи теперешнихъ крестьянскихъ настроеній. Разными наблюдателями эта крестьянская воля толкуется по разному, просто потому, что пока нѣтъ надлежащаго аппарата для ея выявленія.

Когда же крестьянство сможетъ свободно и организованно выразить свою волю, тогда, если она будетъ достаточно единодушна и ясна, передъ ней только нужно будетъ склониться, отстаивая свои мнѣнія путемъ убѣжденія, а не борьбы.

Земельный кодексъ 30.10.22 г., правда, мало разработанъ въ деталяхъ, часто плохо формулированъ, оставляетъ на вѣсу безъ отвѣта много существенно-важныхъ практическихъ вопросовъ или отсылаетъ по нимъ къ долженствующимъ послѣдовать инструкціямъ и распоряженіямъ Наркомзема. Но, при всѣхъ этихъ недостаткахъ, правильно намѣчена большая часть основныхъ линій законодательства — о правахъ на землю, трудовой арендѣ, наемномъ трудѣ, общинномъ, участковомъ и товарищескомъ порядкѣ землепользованія, передѣлахъ и выдѣлахъ, мѣрахъ противъ измельчанія хозяйствъ.

Самыя неудовлетворительныя части кодекса — пункты, касающіеся управленія создаваемыми земельными хозяйствами. На низшихъ ступеняхъ совѣтское законодательство сводитъ, въ сущности, совершенно на нѣтъ роль домохозяина: его мѣсто занимаютъ всѣ наличные участники двора мужского и женскаго пола безъ различія, не моложе 18 лѣтъ. За всѣми ими признается право требовать раздѣла, участвовать на земельномъ сходѣ и рѣшать всѣ дѣла общины и пр. Повидимому, указанный порядокъ является ставкой на молодежь, которую совѣтская власть считаетъ болѣе склонной ко всякимъ нововведеніямъ, чѣмъ стариковъ... Если въ низшей инстанціи къ управленію привлекаются всѣ, то за то въ высшіе органы совѣтская власть не желаетъ пропускать безъ тщательнаго контроля даже и «избранныхъ»: предсѣдатели назначаются, а избираемые члены волостныхъ и уѣздныхъ земельныхъ комиссій утверждаются высшими инстанціями. При этомъ, если снизу два раза представятъ неподходящихъ кандидатовъ, то назначается и весь составъ этихъ комиссій цѣликомъ. Словомъ, въ области земельнаго управленія, какъ и во всѣхъ областяхъ управленія вообще, дѣлается попытка выѣхать на демагогіи, а на случай, если она не поможетъ, застраховаться отъ дальнѣйшихъ непріятностей отсутствіемъ самоуправленія въ инстанціяхъ высшихъ ступеней.

Во всякомъ случаѣ, въ кодексѣ голосъ требованій жизни оказался сильнѣе какихъ-либо теоретическихъ схемъ: кодексъ взялъ за свое основаніе рядъ здоровыхъ народническихъ идей, отбросилъ рядъ утопическихъ народническихъ настроеній, имѣвшихъ мѣсто въ законѣ, принятомъ Учредительнымъ Собраніемъ, пріобрѣлъ конкретность и детальность отъ указаній практиковъ-агрономовъ, землеустроителей и крестьянъ, и представляетъ изъ себя въ общемъ фундаментъ, на которомъ — мнѣ кажется — будетъ строиться новая Россія, какой бы обликъ она ни пріобрѣла.

Нужно, однако, сказать, что-пока что кодексъ — лишь кабинетное творчество, въ главныхъ своихъ частяхъ совсѣмъ еще въ жизнь не начавшее входить: по его нормамъ крестьяне не передѣляются, не раздѣляются и не самоуправляются, творя пока на мѣстахъ свое «обычное право.»

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Б. ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКО-КУЛЬТУРНЫЯ МѢРОПРІЯТІЯ ДЛЯ ПОДЪЕМА СЕЛЬСКАГО ХОЗЯЙСТВА.

Осуществляются мѣропріятія культурно-экономическаго характера свободными организаціями земледѣльцевъ, мѣстными органами самоуправленія и органами государства. Ихъ цѣль — обезпечить правильную обработку почвы, выборъ и воспитаніе наиболѣе цѣнныхъ и производительныхъ растеній и животныхъ, въ соотвѣтствіи съ потребностями хозяйства, удобреніе земли и раціональное кормленіе животныхъ, и максимально цѣлесообразная организація хозяйствъ въ цѣломъ. Къ этому ведетъ длинный путь добыванія соотвѣтствующихъ агрономическихъ знаній, распространенія ихъ среди населенія, обезпеченіе нужныхъ сельскому хозяйству капиталовъ и созданія и развитія организацій, являющихся основными проводниками всей совокупности экономическо-культурныхъ мѣропріятій въ сельское хозяйство.

Обработка почвы. Съ увѣренностью можно сказать, что не великъ будетъ процентъ крестьянскихъ хозяйствъ, знакомыхъ съ рядовой сѣялкой или понимающихъ и практикующихъ ранній взметъ пара и проч., и проч. Только рядъ основныхъ раціональныхъ пріемовъ по обработкѣ почвы, если бы они захватили всю толщу русскаго крестьянскаго хозяйства, при ничтожныхъ затратахъ и небольшомъ сравнительно трудѣ, повысили бы, быть можетъ, урожайность крестьянскаго хозяйства на много процентовъ.

Изслѣдуя, напримѣръ, комбинированное вліяніе ранняго пара (конецъ апрѣля — начало мая) и рядового посѣва по Дмитровскому уѣзду, В. Алексѣевъ доказываетъ, что въ тѣхъ селеніяхъ, которыя въ началѣ десятыхъ годовъ перешли на ранній паръ и рядовой посѣвъ «урожаи въ самъ-15 не составляютъ исключительнаго явленія и могутъ почитаться средними». Средній валовой урожай зерна въ этихъ селеніяхъ равенъ 120 пуд. на десятину и превышаетъ средній урожай по волости на 40-50%, а въ одномъ случаѣ, при высѣвѣ — 7 пудовъ ржи на десятину — достигалъ даже 180 пудовъ.. Интересны и поучительны общіе выводы, къ которымъ приходитъ цитируемый авторъ: «Недостатокъ навознаго удобренія компенсируется обработкой. Примѣняя ранній паръ, земледѣлецъ достигаетъ при недостаткѣ навознаго удобренія тѣхъ же результатовъ, какіе достигаются при позднемъ пару почти при вдвое большемъ количествѣ навоза на десятину. Примѣняя ранній взметъ пара и рядовой посѣвъ, можно достигнуть урожаевъ, по высотѣ своей ничѣмъ не отличающихся отъ урожаевъ нашихъ лучшихъ хозяйствъ» (Вѣстникъ Сельск. Хоз. №3, 1920.). Категоричность утвержденій автора можетъ показаться излишне смѣлой и основанной на недостаточномъ числѣ наблюденій и по площади, и по времени, и по точности. Но вотъ ихъ авторитетное подтвержденіе проф. Дояренко по даннымъ опытнаго поля Петровской Академіи и по Московской губ. вообще: «Сравнивая различные пары, мы пришли къ убѣжденію, что чистый паръ, въ общемъ, повышаетъ урожай въ полтора раза. Такъ, на нашемъ опытномъ полѣ средній урожай поздняго пара — 112 пуд. съ десятины; средній урожай чистаго пара — 168 пуд. съ десятины, т.е. ровно въ полтора раза свыше. Въ этомъ году по раннему пару мы собрали 247 пуд.» («Сельская Жизнь» № 2).

Это—только случайные, правда, быть можетъ наиболѣе яркіе примѣры вліянія обработки на урожайность. Ихъ можно было бы увеличить во много разъ, прослѣживая значеніе вспашки на зябь на югѣ, лущенія жнива на сѣверѣ, методовъ сохраненія почвенной влаги и т.д.

Улучшенные съмена и скотъ. Быть можетъ, еще меньше пониманія и

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вниманія обнаруживала и наша крестьянская среда, и наши земскія и государственныя учрежденія къ дѣлу подбора сѣмянъ и скота, соотвѣтствующихъ условіямъ и потребностямъ хозяйства въ томъ или иномъ районѣ. Послѣдній десятокъ лѣтъ передъ войной вниманіе это, правда, начало значительно возрастать, но все же не стояло на уровнѣ серьезности этихъ задачъ. А между тѣмъ, значеніе научныхъ изысканій въ этой области съ ясно сознанными цѣлями и по отчетливо разработаннымъ методамъ — громадно Вотъ какъ оцѣнивается американскими авторами значеніе соотвѣтствующей науки и спеціальной обобщающей работы въ этой области: «Изъ всѣхъ наукъ, содѣйствующихъ успѣху того сложнаго цѣлаго, которое именуется агрикультурой, нѣтъ науки болѣе важной, чѣмъ генетика. Мы увѣренно утверждаемъ, что наукѣ, которая лежитъ въ основѣ улучшенія животныхъ и растеній для сельско-хозяйственныхъ цѣлей, предстоитъ привлекать все возрастающее вниманіе въ агрономическомъ образованіи и въ агрикультурной практикѣ... Генетика — наука еще молодая, но она покоится уже на твердомъ фундаментѣ и быстро идетъ впередъ»... (Babcock and Clausen. Genetics in relation to agriculture).

Россіи, съ ея разнообразіемъ климатическихъ и почвенныхъ условій, при плохихъ качествахъ ея рабочаго, молочнаго и мясного скота, больше, чѣмъ какой-либо другой странѣ, надлежитъ обратить вниманіе на спеціальную работу по созданію спеціальныхъ видовъ хлѣбовъ и скота, отвѣчающихъ ея нуждамъ.

Удобреніе почвы и раціональное кормленіе скота. — Раціональное удобреніе полей есть основа современнаго культурнаго интенсивнаго полеводства, и раціональное кормленіе животныхъ — основа культурнаго скотоводства. Какими сотыми или тысячными долями процента опредѣляется степень распространенія и примѣненія соотвѣтствующихъ знаній въ нашемъ крестьянскомъ быту? А между тѣмъ, гдѣ оказалась бы Германія съ своей сельско-хозяйственной культурой, если бы лишить ее искусственныхъ удобреній и концентрированныхъ кормовъ. Когда военныя событія уменьшили количество искусственныхъ удобреній въ Германіи въ 1918 году съ 273 тыс. тоннъ азотистыхъ веществъ до 153 тыс, тоннъ и съ 782 тыс. тоннъ фосфористыхъ удобреній до 220 тыс. тоннъ, полеводство реагировало на это огромнымъ паденіемъ урожайности: въ среднемъ урожайность понизилась около 40 процентовъ. Не менѣе ярки оказались измѣненія въ качествѣ скота: средній вѣсъ убойнаго скота, по сравненію съ довоеннымъ временемъ, къ третьей четверти 1918 года упалъ для рогатаго скота съ 250 кил. до 133, для телятъ — съ 40 до 31, овецъ съ 22 до 16 и свиней съ 85 до 59 килограммовъ. Цифры эти говорятъ сами за себя и съ очевидностью показываютъ, почему бѣдная почва Германіи можетъ давать тройные урожаи по сравненію съ нашими, особенно, если принять во вниманіе, что поташъ для удобренія Германія примѣняла даже больше, чѣмъ до войны (550 тыс. тоннъ противъ 536 тыс.). А какую роль при извѣстныхъ условіяхъ можетъ играть поташъ, можно иллюстрировать слѣдующими данными одной изъ французскихъ опытныхъ станцій: урожай пшеницы съ гектара при 15 килогр. поташа получился 820 килограммъ, при 30 — 930, при 50 — 1030, при 174 — 1480 и при 190 — 1900 килгр., т.е. однимъ добавленіемъ поташа урожай былъ увеличенъ въ 2 ½ раза.

Наши агрономы, даже изъ самыхъ видныхъ, не отрицая значенія минеральныхъ удобреній, не прочь часто высмѣять ихъ через-чуръ восторженныхъ поклонниковъ. Вотъ опыты англійской Ротчамстедской опытной станціи — одной изъ образцовыхъ міровыхъ станцій — за цѣлый рядъ десяти-

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лѣтій. При изслѣдованіи урожайности пшеницы при неизмѣнномъ посѣвѣ ея на одномъ и томъ же полѣ въ теченіе 61 года выяснилась роль различныхъ комбинацій удобренія. Возьму изъ нихъ только три группы: совершенно неудобренная земля, земля, получавшая ежегодно только полное навозное удобреніе (14 тоннъ навоза на акръ, т.е. 2300 пуд. на десятину), и земля, получавшая только полное минеральное удобреніе (совершенно безъ навоза).

	Ср. ур. за 61 г.	Среднее по періодамъ						
		1844-51	1852-61	1862-71	1872-81	1882-91	92 - 1901	902-911
Безъ удобренія..	12.6	17.2	15.9	14.5	10.4	12.6	12.3	10.9
Полное навозное удобреніе	35.2	28.0	34.2	37.5	28.7	38.2	39.2	35.1
Полное минерал. удобреніе	36.6	—	36.1	40.5	31.2	38.4	38.5	37.2

Не значитъ, конечно, что нужно недооцѣнивать роль навоза и переоцѣнивать роль минеральныхъ удобреній: навозъ въ собственномъ хозяйствѣ есть прежде всего самое дешевое удобреніе, и если бы онъ былъ въ неограниченномъ количествѣ, можетъ быть, минеральныхъ удобреній не потребовалось бы совсѣмъ. Но даже и при довоенномъ количествѣ скота на крестьянское хозяйство въ Россіи средній ежегодный вывозъ навоза на десятину рѣдко превышалъ 1000 пудовъ, понижаясь по многимъ районамъ до 500 пуд. Теперь, когда скотъ уменьшился численно и по качеству, количество навоза сократилось въ огромной степени. Между тѣмъ, нѣтъ ни одной культурной страны съ гораздо большимъ количествомъ скота, а, слѣдовательно, и удобренія, на единицу обрабатываемой площади, гдѣ искусственное удобреніе стало бы, поэтому излишнимъ. Комбинація навознаго и минеральнаго удобренія, съ большей или меньшей относительной ролью каждаго изъ нихъ въ зависимости отъ количества скота, — такова несомнѣнная тенденція въ постановкѣ дѣла удобренія почвы. При нашемъ обѣдненіи скотомъ, возможное расширеніе и удешевленіе внутренняго производства минеральныхъ удобреній и развитіе умѣнія ими пользоваться, — важнѣйшіе шаги на пути интенсификаціи нашего сельскаго хозяйства.

О важности раціональнаго кормленія скота, роли для этого концентрированныхъ кормовъ, необходимости въ собственномъ хозяйствѣ использовать жмыхи, отруби и пр. остатки сельскаго хозяйства и сельскохозяйственнаго производства для улучшенія своей мясной продукціи и качества скота, а не вывозить ихъ заграницу, говорить нѣтъ надобности: истины эти общепризнаны.

Общая организація хозяйства. — О раціональныхъ организаціонныхъ планахъ мелкихъ хозяйствъ у насъ не мало говорилось, писалось, но даже и теоретическая разработка этихъ вопросовъ подвинулась еще очень не далеко. А о практикѣ и говорить нечего. Сѣвообороты, количество выгонныхъ луговъ, паровъ, соотношеніе площадей подъ различными сельско-хозяйственными культурами, подъ зерновыми хлѣбами и промышленными растеніями, культивированіе тѣхъ или иныхъ промышленныхъ растеній, — все это пока есть не столько дѣло разума и учета, сколько фактъ историческаго происхожденія. Теперь, когда половина обрабатываемыхъ полей находится подъ залежью, можетъ быть, было бы особенно практично и важно приготовить хорошо обдуманные планы, которые помогли бы раціональной распашкѣ полей, развитію цѣлесообразныхъ въ томъ или иномъ районѣ культуръ. И во всей широтѣ и многосторонности, помимо вопросовъ полеводства

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и скотоводства, должны быть, кромѣ того, разработаны вопросы о второстепенныхъ отрасляхъ сельскаго хозяйства (птицеводство, пчеловодство, кролиководство и т.д.), вопросы о переработкѣ сельскохозяйственныхъ продуктовъ (маслодѣліе, сыровареніе, сушеніе овощей и пр.). Извѣстна огромная роль этихъ областей, сплошь и рядомъ позволяющихъ достигать даже хозяйствомъ карликоваго размѣра цвѣтущаго состоянія.

С.-х. образованіе и распространеніе с.-х. знаній. — Сельскохозяйственная работа безконечно еще далека отъ той степени механизаціи, когда рабочему нужно выполнять только несложные процессы обслуживанія машины, дѣлающей всю сложную работу. Чтобы стоять на высокой ступени сельскохозяйственнаго прогресса, страна должна сумѣть сдѣлать сельскохозяйственно-культурнымъ свой земледѣльческій классъ. Не легка эта задача. Жалобами на трудность ея разрѣшенія переполнена сельскохозяйственная литература всѣхъ странъ. Въ некультурности и косности французскаго крестьянина усматриваютъ обычно главную причину отсталости своей страны въ области земледѣлія французскіе писатели по аграрнымъ вопросамъ. Невѣжеству англійскаго рабочаго и фермера приписываетъ пріостановку прогресса англійскаго земледѣлія видный англійскій писатель по вопросамъ агрикультуры Вольфъ. На то же жалуются въ Америкѣ. И только на Германію всѣ эти страны взираютъ съ завистью и уваженіемъ: по общему признанію, ей удалось сдѣлать въ теченіе нѣсколькихъ десятилѣтій въ области просвѣщенія крестьянина такъ много, какъ никакой другой странѣ, и этому она, главнымъ образомъ, обязана тѣмъ, что стала нынѣ въ первомъ ряду странъ культурнаго земледѣлія.

Что сказать въ этомъ отношеніи о Россіи?

До войны с.-х. образованіе у насъ было поставлено крайне плохо: вся Россія имѣла лишь 10 высшихъ и 130 низшихъ сельско-хозяйственныхъ школъ. Теперь с.-х. образованіе пришло почти въ совершенное разрушеніе подъ вліяніемъ мѣръ совѣтской власти. Докладчикъ оффиціальнаго органа этой власти, Главпрофобра, Бушинскій, далъ на Всероссійскомъ Агрономическомъ Съѣздѣ такую картину исторіи и положенія сельскохозяйственной школы при совѣтскомъ режимѣ, которую послѣдующіе ораторы по справедливости называли «ужасной» и «жуткой». А профессора высшихъ агрономическихъ школъ нарисовали не менѣе жуткую картину постепеннаго разрушенія высшей с.-х. школы, сопровождавшагося, какъ выразился одинъ изъ нихъ, бездной жертвъ матеріальныхъ, персональныхъ и моральныхъ. И не потому только происходили разрушенія, что не было денегъ: школы гибли отъ перевода изъ одного вѣдомства въ другое и отъ проведенія реформъ «лицами, стоящими далеко отъ школъ.» На съѣздѣ констатируется, какъ всѣмъ извѣстный фактъ, что «сельскохозяйственная школа сломлена новымъ сельскохозяйственнымъ уставомъ,» по которому «жизнь школы отдана не въ руки руководителей этой школы.» Провинціалы на съѣздѣ выражаютъ радость по поводу своей отдаленности «отъ правящихъ и реформирующихъ сферъ,» потому что до провинціи новыя реформы «докатываются только тогда, когда онѣ уже начинаютъ пересматриваться и даже отмѣняться.»

И съѣздъ въ своихъ постановленіяхъ вынужденъ установить «совершенно катастрофическое положеніе сельскохозяйственныхъ школъ» и выставить длинный рядъ мѣръ для ихъ спасенія, мѣръ, большую часть которыхъ совѣтская власть не хотѣла или не смогла провести и до сихъ поръ.

Основной базой распространенія агрономическихъ знаній среди населенія Россіи была, какъ извѣстно, участковая агрономія; при теперешнихъ Россійскихъ условіяхъ на ея долю выпала особенно тяжелая и отвѣтственная

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задача. Агрономическій съѣздъ послѣ долгихъ преній призналъ подавляющимъ большинствомъ, что «институтъ участковой агрономіи, благодаря приближенности своей къ мѣстному населенію и его хозяйству, выдержалъ испытанія жизни, выявивъ примѣры устойчивости этой формы агрономическаго служенія», и постановилъ, «что участковая форма агрономической организаціи должна быть признана основой для дальнѣйшей мѣстной агрономической работы.» На ряду съ этимъ А. Мининымъ и А. Левицкимъ былъ указанъ рядъ слабыхъ сторонъ участсковой агрономіи: 1) требованіе отъ участковаго агронома универсальныхъ знаній и большой творческой иниціативы, которыхъ у средняго агронома нѣтъ и не можетъ быть, 2) недовольство населенія тѣмъ, что агрономъ много «знаетъ», но мало «умѣетъ» и проч. Проводимая ими точка зрѣнія — введеніе районной агрономіи и замѣна универсальнаго участковаго агронома рядомъ спеціалистовъ по отдѣльнымъ отраслямъ хозяйства. Мы видимъ, что въ области с.х. образованія и распространенія с.х. знаній въ Россіи надо сдѣлать громадную работу.

Научная и опытная работа. — Дѣло выработки методовъ улучшенія сельскаго хозяйства немыслимо безъ сѣти спеціальныхъ научныхъ институтовъ съ широко поставленнымъ опытнымъ дѣломъ.

Какіе размѣры принимаетъ это дѣло въ большихъ государствахъ, можно видѣть, напримѣръ, изъ того, что Соединенные Штаты, гдѣ оно поставлено относительно еще не очень блестяще, имѣли въ 1914 г. 64 опытныхъ станціи, израсходовавшія за годъ на свое содержаніе и работу 5.164 тыс. долларовъ.

Русское опытное дѣло въ до-революціонное время не стояло на должной высотѣ. Совѣтская власть обратила въ опытныя учрежденія цѣлый рядъ имѣній съ ихъ постройками и инвентаремъ. По даннымъ «Эк. Ж.» (19.II.22), число областныхъ станцій и опытныхъ учрежденій въ Россіи на 10.10.22 г. равнялось 154. Въ 108 была сосредоточена работа по улучшенію сѣменоводства, въ 23 — изученіе животноводства, въ 23 — посадочный матеріалъ. Персоналъ ихъ состоялъ изъ 3.447 научныхъ работниковъ, 1000 служащихъ и 6000 рабочихъ. Площадь — 36.600 дес..

Зная общія условія работы совѣтскихъ учрежденій въ 22 г., я врядъ ли однако, ошибусь, если скажу, что за немногими исключеніями, научной работы станціи эти вести не могли. Онѣ не могли располагать для того нужными средствами и, вѣроятно, были загружены тѣми или иными практическими заданіями или простымъ добываніемъ пропитанія для своего персонала.

Но если опытное дѣло не можетъ быть сколько нибудь правильно поставлено теперь, тѣмъ болѣе оно должно будетъ занять подобающее ему мѣсто въ Россіи въ будущемъ.

Кооперація. — Одно изъ важнѣйшихъ условій процвѣтанія мелкаго сельскаго хозяйства — образованіе и развитіе сѣти кооперативныхъ сельскохозяйственныхъ организацій, объединяющихъ мелкихъ земледѣльцевъ для достиженія общихъ имъ цѣлей. Значеніе сельско-хозяйственной кооперациі настолько многосторонне и велико, что можно сказать, что мелкое и среднее сельское хозяйство заняло свое выдающееся мѣсто во всѣхъ странахъ и стало могучимъ двигателемъ прогресса именно съ тѣхъ поръ, какъ подъ него сталъ подводиться кооперативный фундаментъ. Кооперація несетъ съ собой обширный арсеналъ сельскохозяйственнаго инвентаря, непосильнаго отдѣльному мелкому земледѣльцу, раціональное маслодѣліе и сыровареніе, консервированіе и переработку сельскохозяйственныхъ продуктовъ. Сельскохозяйственное просвѣщеніе всѣхъ видовъ всегда находитъ въ кооперациі своего перваго друга, и тамъ, гдѣ развита широкая сѣть кооперативовъ, про-

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ложена широкая дорога въ деревню сельскохозяйственнымъ знаніямъ культурѣ. Кооперація выгадываетъ крестьянину немалыя суммы при сбытѣ, экономитъ при закупкѣ, непрерывно усиливая тѣмъ дѣйствіе основныхъ факторовъ интенсификаціи хозяйства. Кооперація, наконецъ, есть для мелкаго крестьянства главный, если не единственный путь, привлечь въ мелкое хозяйство обширныя денежныя средства, распредѣлить ихъ на мелкіе ручейки, оплодотворяющіе отдѣльныя хозяйства, слѣдить за правильной работой этихъ средствъ въ хозяйствѣ и вести по нимъ сложные мелкіе разсчеты. Роль и значеніе кооперацiи настолько общепризнаны и безспорны, что нѣтъ надобности приводить какія-либо цифры и факты для доказательства этого положенія. Бельгійскій, голландскій и датскій крестьянинъ, благодаря образцовому кооперативному движенію, подняли хозяйство на своихъ мелкихъ участкахъ на первыя мѣста по урожайности хлѣбовъ и доходности скотоводства. Среднія хозяйства Ирландіи, Франціи и Германіи своимъ подъемомъ и крѣпостью также обязаны, главнымъ образомъ, кооперативному движенію. И даже сравнительно крупные фермеры Соединенныхъ Штатовъ и Канады въ послѣдніе годы быстро идутъ по пути кооперативнаго объединенія. Президентъ Гардингъ въ своихъ рѣчахъ указываетъ имъ на кооперацію, какъ на путь къ преодолѣнію стоящихъ передъ ними затрудненій. «Измѣнія, которыя произвела кооперація въ жизни цѣлаго ряда европейскихъ странъ, представляютъ собою почти настоящую революцію» — говоритъ проф. Руанъ, крупный авторитетъ въ экономическихъ вопросахъ въ Соединенныхъ Штатахъ. А H.W. Wolf, почтенный авторъ длиннаго ряда трудовъ по вопросамъ экономики, агрикультуры и кооперацiи, въ своей недавней работѣ о будущемъ агрикультуры, резюмируя свои 60 лѣтъ активной работы въ этихъ областяхъ, признаетъ кооперацію главной организающей силой въ сельскомъ хозяйствѣ всѣхъ странъ, и считаетъ одной изъ главныхъ причинъ англійскаго регресса въ земледѣліи ея недостаточное вниманіе къ вопросамъ содѣйствія кооперацiи, наряду съ недостаткомъ заботъ о сельскохозяйственномъ просвѣщеніи.

Въ Россіи съ началомъ кооперативнаго движенія мужикъ сталъ быстро итти впередъ повсюду, гдѣ кооперація успѣвала пустить прочные корни. Совѣтская власть, совершенно не терпѣвшая никакихъ слѣдовъ самостоятельности въ первые годы своего существованія, къ началу 1921 г. разрушила до основанія кооперативное движеніе въ деревнѣ и, наряду съ прочими своими мѣрами, не мало содѣйствовала тѣмъ развалу сельскаго хозяйства. Съ 1921 г. тяжкіе уроки жизни заставили ее отступить назадъ; кооперація въ деревнѣ начала постепенно оживать, и въ началѣ 1922 г. создавшееся положеніе я характеризовалъ, какъ «начало возрожденія кооперацiи въ Россіи.» Но дальше этого «начала» кооперація не можетъ пойти и до сихъ поръ. 1922 г. принесъ съ собою снова рядъ репрессивныхъ по отношенію къ ней мѣръ. Жалкая степень кооперативной самостоятельности, имѣвшая мѣсто въ началѣ года, свелась почти совершенно къ нулю къ его концу.

Государство и экономическо-культурныя мѣры. — Длинный рядъ разсмотрѣнныхъ мѣръ имѣетъ своимъ фокусомъ въ наше время государственную власть и государственные финансы. Даже въ этой области, принципъ которой «самодѣятельность» — въ области кооперацiи—должна быть обезпечена кооперирующемуся населенію государственная помощь, не только въ видѣ предоставленія полной свободы, но и въ видѣ активной и дѣятельной поддержки соприкасающимися съ нею государственными органами и, особенно, въ видѣ помощи кредитомъ. И ужъ цѣликомъ почти должна быть государственнымъ дѣломъ постановка сельскохозяйственнаго образованія, научнаго

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изслѣдованія, опытнаго дѣла и сложной системы государственныхъ органовъ, обслуживающихъ сельское хозяйство съ разныхъ другихъ сторонъ. Какъ типичный примѣръ неизбѣжнаго роста государственной дѣятельности въ области сельскаго хозяйства, можно привести Сѣверо-Американскіе Соединенные Штаты. Тамъ долго и упорно защищалось мнѣніе, что въ силу разности сельскохозяйственныхъ условій, и потому мѣстнаго характера сельскохозяйственнаго дѣла — о немъ должны заботиться отдѣльные Штаты, а не федеральное правительство. Но въ 1862 году эта точка зрѣнія покслебалась, и было учреждено Министерство Земледѣлія; шагъ за шагомъ оно захватывало въ свою область все большую и большую часть сельскохозяйственной работы по всѣмъ штатамъ. Передъ началомъ войны оно выросло уже въ мощную организацію съ 25 милл. долларовъ годового бюджета и 14.468 служащими; къ 1917 году (число) бюджетъ поднялся до 37 мил. и въ 1922 г. — до 120 милл. долларовъ.

Если дѣятельность отдѣльныхъ государствъ въ области сельскаго хозяйства опредѣлить количествомъ рублей, ассигнованныхъ по бюджету на тысячу гектаровъ площади сельскохозяйственной удобной земли, то цифры для нѣкоторыхъ изъ странъ будутъ въ золотыхъ рубляхъ круглымъ счетомъ таковы: Соединен.Шт. — 700 руб., Соед. Корол. — 1070 руб., Франція — 600 руб., Россія довоенная — 300 руд, Россія совѣтская — 120 рубл. (смѣта 1922 г.). Цифры эти лучше словъ показываютъ, какъ мало имѣла возможность дѣлать для сельскаго хозяйства власть царская, и насколько уменьшились эти возможности при власти совѣтской. Надо, вѣдь, еще принять во вниманіе, что цифру для послѣдней я беру изъ проекта смѣты на 1922 г.; выполненіе ея оказалось, несомнѣнно, много печальнѣе.

Капиталъ. — Не только интенсификація, но даже простое возстановленіе довоенной производственной базы въ сельскомъ хозяйствѣ зависитъ отъ возможности влить въ него капиталъ извнѣ. Чѣмъ больше и скорѣе удастся привлечь капитала, тѣмъ быстрѣе, продуктивнѣе, а вмѣстѣ съ тѣмъ и рентабильнѣе станетъ с.х. промыселъ въ Россіи. Изъ предыдущаго мы видимъ, что эту продуктивность можно повысить въ очень крупныхъ размѣрахъ. Такимъ образомъ, привлечь капиталъ въ сельское хозяйство — есть кардинальная задача возстановленія всего національнаго хозяйства Россіи.

Я не стану здѣсь останавливаться на способахъ финансированія с. хозяйства. Это-отдѣльный и большой вопросъ. Скажу коротко только о размѣрахъ капитала, нужнаго для культурнаго с. хозяйства.

Въ Англіи считается въ среднемъ нужной для оборудованія мелкаго хозяйства рабочимъ скотомъ и инвентаремъ затрата въ 10-11 фунт. стерл. на акръ, для расходовъ (не считая оплаты труда) въ годъ — 2-3 фунта стерл. на акръ. Исходя изъ этихъ цифръ на десятину мы должны были бы затратить 270-290 рублей основного и 20-30 рублей оборотного капитала, или на среднее (9 десятинъ) хозяйство — около 2500 тыс. основного и свыше 200 рубл. оборотнаго капитала. Какія бы скидки мы не сдѣлали на меньшую стоимость въ Россіи скота или инвентаря, мы все же получимъ, что для англійскаго стандарта капиталъ нашего хозяйства долженъ составить не менѣе 2000 рубл. на хозяйство или 220 на десятину. Нечего и говорить, что капиталъ нашего крестьянскаго хозяйства всегда былъ чрезвычайно далекъ отъ этихъ цифръ, а теперь, послѣ массовой гибели скота и изношенности инвентаря, дошелъ до совсѣмъ ничтожныхъ размѣровъ.

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В. ЦѢЛИ И МЕТОДЫ ДѢЙСТВІЯ СОВѢТСКОЙ ВЛАСТИ ВЪ ОТНОШЕНІИ КЪ ДЕРЕВНѢ.

Всероссійскій агрономическій съѣздъ (мартъ 1922 г.) провозгласилъ два положенія: 1) «Крестьянское хозяйство, руководимое хозяиномъ съ его разумомъ и волею, съ его понятіемъ о нуждахъ и техникѣ хозяйства, доступно воздѣйствію лишь черезъ населеніе, путемъ воздѣйствія на его волю и разумъ, путемъ приведенія его къ тому или иному рѣшенію не силою принужденія, а силой логики и убѣжденія, въ тѣсномъ союзѣ съ его волею и собственными распоряженіями въ хозяйствѣ». 2) «Крестьянское хозяйство имѣетъ ясно выраженный эволюціонный характеръ, опредѣляемый историческими устоями внѣшнихъ и внутреннихъ условій хозяйства и особой устойчивостью этого движенія, мало поддающемуся внѣшнему воздѣйствію, не идущему въ темпъ этого движенія.» Большая часть совѣтскихъ экономическо-культурныхъ мѣропріятій была и остается построенной на отрицаніи этихъ положеній. Идеалъ совѣтской власти, какъ въ политической, такъ и въ экономической областяхъ — «просвѣщенная олигархія»: надъ «темнымъ» крестьянствомъ— диктатура сравнительно «просвѣщеннаго» пролетаріата, надъ пролетаріатомъ — диктатура его «передового отряда» — коммунистической партіи, въ самой партіи — исключительно доминирующая роль узкаго «наиболѣе просвѣщеннаго» круга ея вождей. Въ отношеніи къ крестьянству эта идеологія претворялась въ стремленіе, во-первыхъ, сдѣлать его покорнымъ слугою совѣтской пролетарской и городской культуры, извлекая изъ него достаточно средствъ, чтобы явить міру необычайные примѣры процвѣтающей промышленности и благоденствующаго, какъ нигдѣ, пролетаріата, и, во-вторыхъ, внести въ деревню быстрыми и рѣшительными мѣрами распоряженія и приказа послѣднія достиженія земельной культуры и техники — коллективныя хозяйства, электрофикацію, максимально доступное при данныхъ условіяхъ совершенство обработки почвы и проч. и проч., чтобы въ результатѣ этого крестьянство не только не почувствовало тяжести содержанія своихъ просвѣщенныхъ диктаторовъ, но, наоборотъ, начало благословлять ихъ, какъ своихъ благодѣтелей, открывшихъ деревнѣ путь къ свѣту, къ культурѣ и благосостоянію.

Отсюда вытекаютъ и методы: никакого крестьянскаго самоуправленія ни въ какихъ сколько-нибудь существенныхъ областяхъ быть не должно. Въ своихъ деревняхъ и селахъ крестьяне, пожалуй, еще и могутъ самоуправляться, какъ хотятъ, но надъ волостными объединеніями (волостные исполкомы, волостныя земельныя комиссіи, кооперативы вторыхъ ступеней) должно уже быть бдительное коммунистическое око. Начиная съ уѣздныхъ объединеній, вожжи управленія должны крѣпко держаться въ коммунистическихъ рукахъ, тѣмъ болѣе твердыхъ, чѣмъ шире компетенція и важнѣе роль того или иного органа.*) Отсюда бутафорскій характеръ самоуправленія всѣхъ этихъ крестьянскихъ совѣтовъ, всероссійскихъ кооперативныхъ совѣтовъ и земельныхъ органовъ. Къ голосу деревни совѣтская власть начинаетъ прислушиваться только тогда, когда недовольство деревни принимаетъ явно

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*) Не слѣдуетъ обманываться тѣмъ обстоятельствомъ, что на верхахъ у власти стоятъ доподлинные мужики. Яковенко и Чекуновъ — легко доступны крестьянскимъ ходокамъ (не говорю о Калининѣ, «связь съ землею» котораго, кажется, очень слаба). Никакой дѣйствительной власти они не имѣютъ. Совѣтская власть держитъ ихъ на ихъ высокихъ и декоративныхъ постахъ только потому, что придаетъ большое значеніе внушенію крестьянству мысли, что у власти дѣйствительно находятся «его» люди.

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грозные для нея размѣры. Тогда она дѣлаетъ вынужденныя уступки народнымъ интересамъ и желаніямъ. Тогда совѣтское творчество носитъ положительный характеръ, какъ это имѣетъ мѣсто въ разсмотрѣнной выше области аграрнаго законодательства.

Во всѣхъ другихъ случаяхъ, мѣры совѣтской власти несутъ за собой безсмысленное разрушеніе, слѣды котораго не сгладятъ многіе годы, какъ это было въ области кооперації, сельскохозяйственнаго образованія, снабженія сельскаго хозяйства капиталомъ и въ рядѣ другихъ областей, связанныхъ съ крестьянскимъ хозяйствомъ.

Естественъ вопросъ: что можно сказать о судьбахъ сельскаго хозяйства при совѣтскомъ режимѣ?

Опытъ прошлаго показываетъ, что совѣтская власть не можетъ всѣми ея мѣрами не только двигать впередъ сельское хозяйство, но ей все еще пока не удается даже удержать его отъ продолжающагося распада. Изъ сказаннаго выше понятно, почему она не можетъ ни замѣнить кооперативныхъ организацій, ни возстановить снизу до верху крестьянское самоуправленіе, ни установить какія-то такія отношенія съ капиталистическими странами, при которыхъ крестьянству сталъ бы доступенъ міровой кредитъ. Коммунизмъ не можетъ всего этого сдѣлать, не переставъ быть самимъ собою.

И потому, пока не измѣнится система государственнаго управленія, Россія обречена на экономическое прозябаніе, частичныя голоданія и вымираніе отдѣльныхъ районовъ, страшную нищету повсюду и во всѣхъ отношеніяхъ. Болѣе чѣмъ сомнительно, чтобы мужикъ при такихъ условіяхъ былъ «вполнѣ доволенъ», какъ увѣрялъ въ недавней своей рѣчи Ленинъ.

Это еще не значитъ, съ моей точки зрѣнія, что крестьянское недовольство неизбѣжно вызоветъ скорое крушеніе или перерожденіе большевизма, хотя и то, и другое вполнѣ возможно. Возможно, однако, и долгое прозябаніе Россіи приблизительно въ томъ состояніи, въ какомъ она находится въ послѣдніе годы.

Коммунистическая власть, обладающая войскомъ, можетъ собирать съ населенія дань зерномъ и мясомъ, мѣхомъ и медомъ, какъ дѣлали это завоеватели въ покоренной странѣ. И дань эта не только будетъ достаточна для того, чтобы кормить власть и поддерживать ея чиновничій аппаратъ и вооруженную силу, — но и для того, чтобы иногда удивлять міръ постройками «Дворцовъ Труда» или электрификаціей тѣхъ или иныхъ районовъ. Сто милліоновъ крестьянъ, обращенныхъ коммунистами въ рабовъ, въ богатѣйшей странѣ — какъ бы жалки, нищи и убоги они ни были, какими бы массами они ни вымирали отъ засухи и эпидемій — все же огромная сила, способная голыми руками создавать роскошную жизнь своимъ владыкамъ и, по ихъ приказу, голодая и вымирая, воздвигать на память вѣкамъ, подобно египетскимъ пирамидамъ, грандіозные памятники своего рабскаго труда.

Конечно, съ исторической точки зрѣнія, устойчивымъ такой режимъ, особенно въ наше время, быть не можетъ. Онъ можетъ тянуться довольно длительное время, но непремѣнно долженъ кончиться.

ГЛ. V. ИТОГИ И ВЫВОДЫ.

Предыдущее изложеніе позволяетъ подвести нѣкоторый, хотя и весьма приблизительный, итогъ, какъ результатамъ революціи для сельскаго хозяйства, такъ и возможностямъ, имѣющимся у него для прогрессивнаго развитія въ дальнѣйшемъ.

Въ распоряженіе крестьянъ перешла помѣщичья земля, цѣнностью не меньше 5 милліардовъ золотыхъ рублей, помѣщичій инвентарь — на 1/2 милліарда. Уничтожена конфигурація полей, державшая въ кабалѣ у помѣ-

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щиковъ десятки тысячъ деревнь. Работы по государственному землеустройству, несомнѣнно, даютъ въ результатѣ значительно болѣе разумное и хозяйственно болѣе цѣлесообразное очертаніе земельнаго хозяйства отдѣльныхъ общинъ и хозяевъ. Это плюсы. Но получено все это крестьянствомъ далеко не задаромъ. За ту десятину съ небольшимъ пахотной земли, которая пришлась на долю каждаго крестьянскаго двора, онъ заплатилъ 1/3 своего скота, порчей половины инвентаря и такимъ общимъ обезсиленіемъ своего хозяйства, что, пока что, захваченная десятина лежитъ не использованной, и ему пришлось часть своей собственной земли оставить безъ обработки. И на этой же сторонѣ баланса лежитъ гибель сотенъ тысячъ крестьянъ и крестьянской молодежи и на разныхъ фронтахъ гражданской войны, и отъ голода; развалъ школы и грозящая безграмотность; общее разстройство всѣхъ отраслей государственной и общественной жизни, обслуживавшихъ крестьянъ, тяжкая дань на прокормленіе власти и ея органовъ. Есть еще одинъ плюсъ для крестьянства. Этотъ плюсъ громаденъ по своей величинѣ и громаденъ не только для одного крестьянства, но и для всей Россіи.

До революціи крестьянство было податнымъ сословіемъ въ Россіи. Его права политическія и экономическія были ниже правъ всего остальнаго населенія, составлявшаго по своей численности тонкую пленку надъ крестьянской толщей. Это создавало громадное соціальное недовольство и въ его результатѣ — вѣковую, глухую, но упорную борьбу крестьянства за свои права. Напомнимъ пророческія предупрежденія Герценштейна: «Страшенъ будетъ тотъ годъ, когда масса накопляемаго годами крестьянскаго раздраженія вырвется наружу. Волна народнаго мятежа, не разбирая праваго и виноватаго, все смететъ на своемъ пути, и не будетъ средствъ пріостановить ея теченія, разъ она хлынетъ изъ долго сдерживающихъ ее береговъ... Если мы будемъ дожидаться, когда насъ разбудитъ грозный крикъ бушующихъ крестьянскихъ массъ, все наше помѣстное земледѣліе и самихъ земледѣльцевъ надо признать обреченными на гибель.»

Въ результатѣ русской революціи неравенство разбито. Крестьянство получило одинаковыя политическія права и равныя экономическія возможности съ остальными гражданами Россіи. То рабство, въ которое оно теперь попало — одинаково и вмѣстѣ со всей остальной некоммунистической Россіей, — послѣднія догорающія головешки исторической неправды. Нельзя мыслить себѣ никакого будущаго послѣ большевиковъ, россійскаго режима, въ которомъ крестьянинъ не былъ бы полноправнымъ гражданиномъ.

Въ крестьянинѣ-гражданинѣ таятся громадныя возможности для возрожденія и его собственнаго сельскаго хозяйства, и всего россійскаго національнаго хозяйства.

Приближается время мирной созидательной работы въ Россіи. И великая помѣха для этой работы — счеты за прошлое. Безъ конца и безъ результата, въ частности, длятся споры о давно минувшемъ, о старыхъ аграрныхъ программахъ, старыхъ земельныхъ отношеніяхъ. Прошедшіе тяжкіе годы въ изобиліи даютъ горючій матеріалъ для поддержанія огня ненависти другъ къ другу различныхъ партій и группъ. Что было, то прошло. Надъ нимъ, долженъ быть поставленъ крестъ, и должно быть предоставлено безпристрастнымъ историкамъ когда-нибудь перелистывать его кровавыя страницы. Современникамъ нужно твердо стоять на почвѣ настоящаго и глядѣть въ будущее. Строить его программы и планы надо безъ боязни войти въ противорѣчіе съ тѣмъ, что говорилось годы тому назадъ. Перестроилась вся русская жизнь. Развѣ могутъ остаться приложимыми къ ней старыя программы? Темно это будущее, не легко намѣтить въ немъ пути общественной работы даже людямъ одного круга идей. Неизбѣжны и острыя разногласія, и острая

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борьба разнаго рода общественныхъ группировокъ. Но пусть они будутъ, по крайней мѣрѣ, разногласіями и борьбой за лучшее будущее, а не счетами за канувшее въ Лету прошлое...

Прогрессъ въ возстановленіи и развитіи россійскаго сельскаго хозяйства возможенъ тогда, когда онъ будетъ итти одновременно по всѣмъ тѣмъ направленіямъ, которыя были указаны выше, ибо всѣ они находятся между собою въ тѣсной связи и взаимодѣйствіи. Когда не удовлетворена одна какая-либо потребность хозяйства, пріостанавливается движеніе впередъ вообще. «Прогрессъ хозяйства подчиняется закону минимума, т.е. каждая группа хозяйствъ характеризуется извѣстными потребностями, стоящими на первой очереди (находящимися въ минимумѣ), и только воздѣйствіемъ на эти первоочередныя нужды мы можемъ вести хозяйство къ подъему» (резолюція агрономическаго съѣзда).

Факторы, находящіеся въ русскихъ крестьянскихъ хозяйствахъ въ минимумѣ, носятъ настолько мѣстно-районный, а нерѣдко даже индивидуальный харктеръ, что выносить ихъ за общероссійскую скобку можно лишь съ извѣстной условностью; но все же можно.

Три изъ такихъ факторовъ одновременно находятся въ Россіи въ минимумѣ: капиталъ, кооперація и просвѣщеніе. Въ наибольшемъ минимумѣ находится капиталъ, и его притокъ повелъ бы къ самому быстрому подъему хозяйства: въ однихъ мѣстахъ онъ долженъ былъ бы дать рабочую лошадь, въ другихъ — плугъ, сѣялку и жнейку, въ третьемъ — долженъ (опустошенное Поволжье) былъ бы произвести цѣлый рядъ сложныхъ работъ. Чтобы насытить самую минимальную потребность нашихъ хозяйствъ, чтобы вернуть ихъ только къ довоенному уровню, капиталъ исчисляется въ суммѣ 5-6 милліардовъ зол. рублей.

Нечего доказывать, что накопленіе нужныхъ средствъ въ собственномъ крестьянскомъ хозяйствѣ, если вообще оно и возможно при теперешнихъ условіяхъ, будетъ итти только чрезвычайно медленнымъ путемъ: десятилѣтія потребуются для возвращенія къ довоенному положенію.

Процессъ возрожденія, слѣдовательно, можетъ быть ускоренъ только, если для Россіи станетъ доступнымъ въ значительныхъ размѣрахъ міровой кредитъ. Возможно ли это? Поскольку мы отвлекаемся здѣсь отъ вопроса о внутреннемъ строѣ Россіи, и беремъ въ разсчетъ только потенціальныя ея возможности, отвѣтъ, безусловно, долженъ быть утвердительный. Государство, владѣющее такимъ огромнымъ количествомъ лѣсовъ и полей, какъ Россія, съ трудолюбивымъ земледѣльческимъ населеніемъ, нужное для всего міра, какъ производитель и, можетъ быть, еще больше, какъ потребитель, рано или поздно будетъ имѣть нужные ему кредиты. Но, конечно, капиталы эти придутъ не сразу.

Сперва какіе-нибудь болѣе смѣлые десятки милліоновъ начнутъ оплодотворять сельское хозяйство. Прогрессъ, какъ и развалъ, обладаетъ свойствомъ итти ускоряющимся темпомъ. Первый же успѣхъ въ с.х. повыситъ кредитъ дальнѣйшаго помѣщенія капиталовъ. За десятками прійдутъ сотни и тысячи милліоновъ.

Будетъ это тогда, когда Россія, наконецъ, вступитъ на путь единственно здоровый и возможный, на путь строенія государственной и общественной жизни черезъ посредство воли и разума всего народа. По этому пути будущей Россіи русскій крестьянинъ будетъ уже итти, какъ свободный гражданинъ. И чѣмъ скорѣе наступитъ это время, тѣмъ легче будетъ справляться Россіи съ внутренней разрухой, занять почетное мѣсто въ ряду великихъ державъ міра, и быстро и увѣренно пойти впередъ къ прогрессу.

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ПРЕНІЯ ПО ДОКЛАДУ А. С. ОРЛОВА.

Ю. А. Павловскій. — Привѣтствуя интересный и основательный докладъ А. С., позволю себѣ не согласиться съ нѣкоторыми его положеніями.

Прежде всего, мнѣ кажется, что изъ двухъ основныхъ факторовъ развитія сельскаго хозяйства — техники и экономики — А. С. недостаточно вниманія удѣляетъ вліянію послѣдняго, между тѣмъ какъ само техническое развитіе въ значительной степени зависитъ отъ экономической обстановки. Такъ, говоря о быстрыхъ успѣхахъ сельскаго хозяйства въ Германіи, А.С. всецѣло объясняетъ ихъ высокимъ уровнемъ техники германскаго земледѣлія, между тѣмъ какъ, въ дѣйствительности, этотъ техническій прогрессъ Германіи былъ обусловленъ экономическими причинами. Тѣмъ, что Германія оказалась въ состояніи быстро обогнать Францію и даже, отчасти, Англію, въ валовой производительности своего сельскаго хозяйства, она была, прежде всего, обязана тому, что ея стремительный промышленный прогрессъ обезпечилъ возможность интенсификаціи земледѣльческаго производства и отчасти сдѣлалъ ее необходимой. Въ данномъ случаѣ, техническій прогрессъ явился производнымъ явленіемъ отъ общаго развитія хозяйственной дѣятельности въ странѣ.

Интенсификація сел. хозяйства неизмѣнно сопровождается повышеніемъ себѣстоимости продукта, и потому зависитъ, прежде всего, отъ роста спроса на послѣдній. Емкость рынка и уровень цѣнъ, поэтому, устанавливаютъ ея предѣлы во всякой странѣ, вышедшей изъ стадіи натуральнаго хозяйства. Въ Россіи эти предѣлы зависятъ, прежде всего, отъ развитія внутренняго рынка, создаваемаго общимъ ростомъ всѣхъ отраслей ея хозяйства, и потому, говоря объ интенсификаціи нашего земледѣльческаго производства, необходимо разсматривать техническій прогрессъ не изолированно, а именно въ этой обще-хозяйственной перспективѣ. Яркимъ примѣромъ такой зависимости, на глазахъ нашего поколѣнія, явилась Сибирь, гдѣ эти предѣлы развитія сельскаго хозяйства выступили за послѣдніе годы до войны съ чрезвычайной ясностью.

Въ теченіе нѣсколькихъ послѣднихъ десятилѣтій, предѣлы, поставленные интенсификаціи чисто-экономической обстановкой, чрезвычайно сильно ощущались нашимъ крупнымъ и, въ частности, помѣстнымъ сельскимъ хозяйствомъ, связаннымъ извѣстною исторически сложившеюся столѣтіями конфигураціей хозяйственныхъ площадей, и потому не бывшимъ, сплошь и рядомъ, въ состояніи вести дешеваго экстенсивнаго хозяйства. Конфигурація владѣній толкала на интенсификацію; между тѣмъ, послѣдняя не могла окупиться при данныхъ условіяхъ рынка. Въ результатѣ, какъ общее правило, высокій техническій уровень такого помѣстнаго интенсивнаго хозяйства, вмѣсто того, чтобы приносить доходъ, держался за счетъ рентныхъ источниковъ — лѣсовъ, луговъ, арендныхъ площадей и т.д. и, такимъ образомъ, фактически былъ убыточенъ. Интенсивное сельское хозяйство нашего помѣщика, въ огромномъ большинствѣ случаевъ, было дѣломъ не коммерческимъ, а любительскимъ, и не по винѣ хозяина-помѣщика, а потому, что мѣшали экономическія условія, отъ него не зависѣвшія. Это и было, несомнѣнно, одною изъ причинъ быстрой ликвидаціи помѣстнаго землевладѣнія въ Россіи за послѣднія десятилѣтія. Въ районахъ болѣе поздней колонизаціи — на Югѣ, Юго-Востокѣ и, частью, въ Поволжьи, гдѣ коренного исторически сложившагося помѣстнаго землевладѣнія не было, крупные землевладѣльцы вели по преимуществу экстенсивное хозяйство, и тамъ условія складывались иначе. Тамъ экстенсивное хозяйство соединялось съ интенсивными методами

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обработки и, главнымъ образомъ, уборки при помощи машинъ и т.п., и, такимъ образомъ, окупалось. Въ этомъ отношеніи, русскія условія хозяйства напоминаютъ господствующія въ Америкѣ, британскихъ колоніяхъ и т.п. заморскихъ странахъ, формы экстенсивнаго земледѣлія.

Несомнѣнно, предѣлы возможности интенсификаціи крестьянскаго хозяйства, по самой его структурѣ, гораздо шире, нежели предѣлы, которые рынокъ ставитъ крупному сельскому хозяйству. Но, разсматривая вопросъ съ точки зрѣнія интересовъ русскаго народнаго хозяйства, какъ цѣлаго, и оставивъ въ сторонѣ предвзятыя положенія, вродѣ того, что въ будущемъ, во что бы то ни стало, Россія *должна* быть страною *исключительно* мелкаго крестьянскаго земледѣлія, нельзя не согласиться, что, по сравненію съ нѣкоторыми формами крупнаго экстенсивнаго хозяйства, крестьянское мелкое хозяйство представляется менѣе выгоднымъ. Это слѣдуетъ признать, безъ всякаго, разумѣется, покушенія на законные интересы крестьянства, на благосостояніи котораго будущая Россія только и можетъ быть построена, и безъ всякаго стремленія къ какой бы то ни было реставраціи старыхъ земельныхъ отношеній. Это тѣмъ болѣе такъ, что, если мы собираемся въ будущемъ возстановить и даже увеличить свой сельско-хозяйственный вывозъ, то развитіе нашего сельскаго хозяйства будетъ въ весьма значительной степени зависѣть отъ условій мірового рынка. Эту зависимость мы можемъ смягчить улучшеніемъ и удешевленіемъ внутренняго транспорта, расширеніемъ сѣти элеваторовъ и т.д., но существовать она будетъ. При этомъ, мы должны смотрѣть на вещи трезво и понимать, что со времени войны положеніе на міровомъ рынкѣ нами утрачено, и что возстановить его будетъ нелегко. Война привела къ большому расширенію посѣвныхъ площадей въ Америкѣ, Австраліи и др. заморскихъ странахъ, являющихся нашими конкурентами. Въ данномъ случаѣ, противъ насъ будетъ не только объемъ предложенія хлѣба на міровомъ рынкѣ, но и его качество, такъ какъ наше сельское хозяйство разрушено не только количественно. Намъ придется выступить на рынкѣ съ зерномъ худшаго качества, такъ какъ ранѣе лучшее давалось крупнымъ хозяйствомъ, а теперь и крестьянское-то очень пострадало, и не такъ просто возстановится, когда сѣютъ, чѣмъ Богъ послалъ.

Передъ нами стоитъ вопросъ, насколько Россія, при условіи полнаго уничтоженія въ будущемъ всякаго крупнаго хозяйства, опираясь на одно мелкое крестьянское, будетъ въ состояніи расширить свой вывозъ и дать рынку зерно такого качества, чтобы оно могло конкурировать съ заморскимъ?

Намъ приходится смотрѣть на будущую Россію не только съ точки зрѣнія осуществленія въ ней отвлеченныхъ принциповъ, но, преимущественно, съ точки зрѣнія ея національныхъ интересовъ, среди которыхъ одно изъ первыхъ мѣстъ занимаетъ увеличеніе производства во всѣхъ отрасляхъ народнаго труда. И вотъ, съ этой именно стороны, я категорически утверждаю, что, при абсолютной необходимости увеличенія нашего вывоза, крупное экстенсивное земледѣліе, съ современными методами механической обработки и уборки, намъ необходимо въ будущемъ, и что, кромѣ того, практическое его осуществленіе возможно въ полной мѣрѣ. Если для него нѣтъ мѣста въ областяхъ густо населенныхъ, то вездѣ, гдѣ существуютъ незанятыя свободныя площади, по удовлетвореніи потребностей въ землѣ мѣстнаго крестьянства, какъ это, несомнѣнно, имѣетъ мѣсто въ нѣкоторыхъ районахъ Юга, Дона, Юго-Востока и Поволжья, было бы совершенно нелѣпо, въ угоду отвлеченному принципу, обращать эти земли въ непроизводительный фондъ для обезпеченія землею, черезъ сто лѣтъ душъ еще не родившихся крестьянъ. Для этого у насъ есть еще чуть не десятая часть земного шара въ Азіи, а въ производ-

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ствѣ и въ валютѣ Россія будетъ нуждаться сейчасъ, и безъ нихъ не возстано, вится. Говоря такъ, я не руковожусь никакими «классовыми» или другими мотивами, кромѣ интересовъ русскаго хозяйства, и отнюдь не имѣю въ виду возстановленія помѣщичьяго хозяйства: я говорю о крупномъ капиталистическомъ фермерствѣ, кѣмъ бы и на какихъ бы основаніяхъ оно ни велось, при условіи, конечно, что оно будетъ въ русскихъ рукахъ. На тѣхъ же основаніяхъ желательно развитіе крупнаго скотоводческаго хозяйства въ болѣе отдаленныхъ мѣстностяхъ, напр., въ Сибири, гдѣ попытки такого рода уже предпринимались Переселенческимъ Управленіемъ еще до войны. Это много помогло бы возстановленію русскаго скотоводства, и было бы болѣе цѣлесообразно, чѣмъ ввозъ племеннаго скота изъ-за границы.

Въ заключеніе, нѣсколько словъ о націонализаціи. Совершенно согласенъ съ А.С., что она не имѣетъ ничего общаго съ соціализмомъ, если хозяйство остается при ней свободнымъ. Ея отецъ — Генри Джорджъ — во всемъ остальномъ — типъ «буржуазнаго» экономиста. Но мнѣ хотѣлось бы сдѣлать два замѣчанія. Прежде всего, мы обычно говоримъ о націонализаціи, какъ о чемъ-то для насъ совершенно новомъ и ультра-прогрессивномъ. Это — большая ошибка. Именно въ Россіи, въ отличіе отъ другихъ странъ, мы знали ее съ самыхъ древнихъ временъ — помѣстій и государственныхъ крестьянъ еще московскаго періода, и до нашего времени, вплоть до сего дня, въ Сибири, гдѣ, за исключеніемъ 2-3 милліоновъ десятинъ частновладѣльческихъ земель и офицерскихъ казачьихъ участковъ, вся земля принадлежитъ государству и находится въ наслѣдственномъ пользованіи крестьянъ. Система эта, однако, частью уже ранѣе умерла, частью на нашихъ глазахъ умирала естественною смертью. Какъ мы знаемъ по сибирской практикѣ, она отнюдь не препятствовала мобилизаціи участковъ и обезземеленію плохихъ или неудачливыхъ хозяевъ; съ другой стороны, она являлась существеннымъ препятствіемъ для развитія необходимой системы долгосрочнаго кредита. То же было бы и сейчасъ, если бы эта система была распространена на всю Россію. Какъ говоритъ самъ А.С., крестьянинъ долженъ былъ бы при этомъ опираться на кредитъ государственный; ну, а это — дѣло для хозяина пропащее, особенно при современномъ положеніи русскихъ финансовъ.

Кромѣ того, въ отношеніи доводовъ въ пользу націонализаціи, какъ средства охраны крестьянина отъ самого себя, я никакъ не могу понять одного. Какъ себѣ представляетъ А.С. и, думаю, большинство изъ насъ, Россія будетъ демократическимъ государствомъ, въ которомъ крестьянину будетъ принадлежать доля въ рѣшеніи государственныхъ вопросовъ; между тѣмъ, вручая мужику судьбы государства, А.С. боится довѣрить ему распоряженіе его собственнымъ клочкомъ земли. Но, либо крестьянинъ — ребенокъ, и тогда его нельзя допускать до государственныхъ дѣлъ, пока не подрастетъ; либо онъ — взрослый и отвѣтственный за свои поступки гражданинъ, и тогда подобная опека неумѣстна. Tertium non datur.

А. М. Ону. — Я имѣю скорѣе сомнѣнія, чѣмъ возраженія. Первое мое сомнѣніе: дѣйствительно ли по природнымъ условіямъ Россія — такая приспособленная къ земледѣлію страна, какъ она часто рисуется. Засухи и т.д. во многихъ случаяхъ говорятъ противъ. Я не сомнѣваюсь, конечно, что Россія всегда будетъ производить потребное для ея населенія количество хлѣба и кое-что экспортировать, но предопредѣленность Россіи быть міровой фабрикой зерна для меня сомнительна. Второе мое сомнѣніе касается вопроса: крупное или мелкое сельское хозяйство жизненно для Россіи? Въ этомъ вопросѣ я скорѣе становлюсь на сторону А.С. Орлова, чѣмъ Ю.А. Павловскаго. Процессъ мельчанія размѣровъ хозяйствъ въ Россіи шелъ неуклонно.

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Старые «Вишневые сады» были разорены и безъ революціи, вырублены и парцеллированы. Я думаю, что въ Россіи въ послѣднія, по крайней мѣрѣ, десятилѣтія существовало не крупное сельское хозяйство, а крупное землевладѣніе.

Общая картина до извѣстной степени и съ соотвѣтствующими ограниченіями напоминала, если хотите, Францію до Великой Революціи. Тамъ тоже было не крупное сельское хозяйство, а крупное землевладѣніе. Дальнѣйшая эволюція процесса была — парцелляція.

М. В. Брайкевичъ.—Я считаю докладъ А. С. Орлова чрезвычайно цѣннымъ. Здѣсь много труда, много фактическихъ данныхъ, много чрезвычайно интересныхъ сопоставленій, а главное—много любви къ сельскому хозяйству, которое А.С. хорошо знаетъ, и много стремленія къ объективности въ подходѣ къ ряду острыхъ вопросовъ.

За всѣмъ тѣмъ, у меня есть нѣсколько возраженій.

Собственность или пользованіе. Прежде всего я увѣренъ, что въ основу земельныхъ отношеній должна лечь и ляжетъ «собственность», а не «пользованіе». Націонализація не завершенная, при которой земля останется собственностью государства, даетъ слишкомъ большую власть государству надъ личностью. Я понимаю, что такая націонализація, проводимая коммунистами въ Земельномъ Кодексѣ, необходима коммунистическому государству. Разъ коммунистическій режимъ отказываетъ крестьянству въ политическихъ правахъ и, что безгранично важно, въ частности—въ бюджетномъ правѣ,—онъ, конечно, долженъ всѣми мѣрами маскировать проистекающую отсюда уродливость соціальныхъ отношеній. Уродливость въ томъ, что коммунисты декретируютъ помимо воли населенія непомѣрно тяжелый для земледѣльца налогъ, содержатъ весь свой управляющій государственный аппаратъ фактически за счетъ единственной въ сколько-нибудь серьезныхъ размѣрахъ производящей соціальной группы населенія. Опуская детали и менѣе важное, можно сказать: паразитирующій правительственный аппаратъ коммунистическій и паразитирующая коммунистическая государственная индустрія, беря за одну скобку — «городъ», живетъ при помощи политической диктатуры за счетъ «деревни».

Замаскировать фактъ безгранично высокаго «налога-дани» психологически и политически — нужно коммунистамъ. «Государственная собственность на землю» здѣсь приходитъ имъ на помощь. При ней въ сознаніи крестьянства продналогъ — не только налогъ, но и аренда за «государственную» землю. Острота недовольства высотой налога и исканіе разрѣшенія этого недовольства въ полученіи «бюджетнаго права» — такимъ способомъ ослабляется.

Для будущаго демократическаго и представительнаго строя, покоющагося на всеобщемъ избирательномъ правѣ — такіе методы воздѣйствія на психологію гражданъ будутъ просто излишни.

Пора освободить хозяйствующаго на землѣ отъ государственнаго чиновника, путающагося въ хозяйственную жизнь, безгранично самоувѣреннаго и самодовольнаго и очень мало, въ конечномъ счетѣ, въ этой жизни понимающаго.

Черезъ всю исторію русскихъ земельныхъ отношеній проходитъ красной нитью упорная борьба за обращеніе «принадлежащей государству земли, отданной имъ для пользованія»—въ «частную собственность» пользующагося. Въ стародавнія времена служилое сословіе стремилось обратить полученное помѣстье въ вотчину. Въ результатѣ борьбы помѣщикъ сдѣлался собственникомъ. Въ новыя времена крестьянство стремилось къ куску земли на «по-

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мѣщичьемъ правѣ.» Или покупало эту землю, или надѣлъ въ общинѣ обращало въ хуторъ.

Эта борьба меня интересуетъ въ одномъ, для теперешняго момента жизни Россіи безгранично важномъ отношеніи: Какое вліяніе исходъ этой борьбы оказывалъ на повышеніе доходности отъ с.-хозяйственнаго промысла? Характеръ этого вліянія, мнѣ кажется, трудно оспаривать. Въ стародавнія времена «собственность» дала національному хозяйству, какъ цѣлому, больше зерна, чѣмъ прежнее «помѣстье». Въ новыя времена «хуторъ» оказался болѣе продуктивной и высшей формой хозяйства, чѣмъ «надѣлъ въ общинѣ». Я склоненъ думать, что, вообще говоря, никакой демократизмъ, никакая политическая свобода не укрѣпятся прочно въ Россіи, пока не укрѣпится экономическая свобода отъ государственной власти хозяйствующаго на землѣ, въ самой базѣ его хозяйственной дѣятельности, т.е. въ собственности на землю. Этотъ «экономическій суверенитетъ», «экономическій habeas corpus» крестьянства абсолютно необходимъ для существованія самого Россійскаго государства.

Не только въ Россіи, во всѣхъ государствахъ культурно-экономическій уровень с. хозяйства на собственности выше, чѣмъ на пользованіи. Возьмите хотя бы очень интересное сравненіе этихъ двухъ уровней въ случаѣ «owner» и «tenant» въ U.S.A., приводимое проф. James Boyle.

Я не стану продолжать мотировку мою за собственность только потому, что я совершенно увѣренъ, что она утвердится. Вся возможная напряженность спора моего съ А.С. въ этомъ вопросѣ устранена имъ самимъ въ корнѣ и разъ навсегда. А.С. говоритъ, что окончательное рѣшеніе вопроса: «собственность» или «пользованіе» будетъ принадлежать волѣ крестьянства тогда, когда оно получитъ возможность быть организованно и свободно выраженной. Передъ этой волей А.С. приглашаетъ склониться безусловно. Такая постановка вопроса меня совершенно успокаиваетъ.

Въ результатѣ всякой революціи увеличиваются права соціальныхъ группъ, дѣлающихъ или поддерживающихъ революцію. Націонализація помѣщичьихъ земель, заканчивающаяся передачей ихъ крестьянству въ пользованіе, конечно, увеличиваетъ права крестьянства по сравненію съ его положеніемъ до революціи. Но не слѣдуетъ забывать, что при націонализаціи помѣщичьихъ земель одновременно націонализируется несравненно большій объемъ крестьянскихъ, въ томъ числѣ и надѣльныхъ, земель. Послѣднія почти полностью оплачены выкупными платежами и составляютъ неоспоримую *собственность* крестьянъ, общинную или личную — неважно.

Велика ли вѣроятность, что крестьянство откажется отъ этой своей «собственности», оплаченной путемъ урѣзываній его личнаго потребленія въ теченіе долгихъ лѣтъ, и передастъ ее въ «собственность государства», ограничившись только «пользованіемъ.»?

Обезпеченіе капитала, нужнаго для возстановленія сельскаго хозяйства, достигается гораздо легче при «собственности.» При «пользованіи» единственнымъ средствомъ притока такого занимаемаго за-границей капитала будетъ кредитъ государства. Можно съ увѣренностью сказать, что притокъ этимъ послѣднимъ путемъ будетъ чрезвычайно невеликъ и, во всякомъ случаѣ, медленъ. Въ этомъ вопросѣ слѣдуетъ считаться съ психологіей возможнаго денежнаго рынка, возможнаго инвестора, который, вообще говоря, охотнѣе вкладываетъ свои сбереженія въ индустріальныя дѣла, чѣмъ въ с.-хозяйственныя, въ акцію, чѣмъ въ ипотеку, въ займы частнымъ лицамъ и обществамъ, кооперативамъ и т. п. по сравненію съ государственными.

Между тѣмъ, именно въ быстротѣ вливанія свѣжаго капитала въ про-

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изводственную базу с. - х. лежитъ весь успѣхъ повышенія россійскаго національнаго дохода и возстановленія и хозяйственнаго, и государственнаго, Россіи. Для того, чтобы земледѣлецъ могъ производить въ достаточномъ для него и государства количествѣ, онъ долженъ имѣть не только землю, но и капиталъ для инвентаря, меліорацій и оборота. Голый кусокъ земли не рѣшаетъ задачи.

Гарантіи противъ вредныхъ сторонъ мобилизаціи и концентраціи земли. — Стремленіе сдѣлать землю государственной собственностью вызывается у А.С. главнымъ образомъ слѣдующимъ опасеніемъ. Крестьянство, особенно въ районахъ голода, хозяйственно чрезвычайно ослаблено. Оно можетъ, какъ этому есть много примѣровъ, за грошъ продавать свою землю и пауперизироваться. Отсюда—соціальная неустойчивость и новая аграрная революція. Я очень раздѣляю эти опасенія. Дѣйствительно, на фонѣ пониженной сопротивляемости крестьянства можетъ расцвѣсти банковская земельная спекуляція, при которой земля попадетъ не въ собственность земледѣльца съ болѣе или менѣе крупнымъ хозяйствомъ, а явится объектомъ нездоровой биржевой игры. На такой землѣ, пока эта игра не лопнетъ, будетъ сидѣть арендаторъ или номинальный собственникъ, закабаленный закладными и т.д., который не будетъ видѣть просвѣта въ своемъ положеніи, и который потому, естественно, будетъ терять бодрость и иниціативу въ хозяйствѣ.

Есть цѣлый рядъ практическихъ мѣръ уничтожить или чрезвычайно ослабить возможность возникновенія такой спекуляціи. Онѣ лежатъ въ ограниченіи «собственности». Напримѣръ, закладъ только для цѣлей увеличенія инвентаря или меліорацій. Продажа только односельчанамъ черезъ сельское общество или с.-хозяйственный кооперативъ, обнимающій большую часть земледѣльцевъ села, кредитующійся для возстановленія и меліораціи хозяйствъ своихъ сочленовъ и т.д.

Этотъ порядокъ будетъ имѣть опредѣленный психологическій, экономическій и политическій эффектъ, болѣе, какъ мнѣ кажется, плодотворный, чѣмъ «пользованіе.» При немъ крестьянинъ-земледѣлецъ, обладающій земельной собственностью — «экономическимъ суверенитетомъ», во всемъ сознаніи своихъ политическихъ и бюджетныхъ правъ ограничиваетъ себя въ объемѣ правъ этой собственности въ пользу государственной власти. Эта послѣдняя изъ «сюзерена» обращается въ болѣе скромнаго и современнаго «директора-распорядителя». Въ этой роли меньше уклоновъ въ сторону диктатуры и взлетовъ въ область бюрократической фантазіи.

Закрѣпленіе земельнаго фонда по волостямъ и селамъ и вознагражденіе прежнихъ владѣльцевъ. — Я совершенно согласенъ съ А.С., что никакого равенства и справедливости на всей территоріи Россіи въ размѣрѣ закрѣпляемаго за крестьяниномъ въ результатѣ революціи участка земли достигнуть практически невозможно. Равенство можетъ быть достигнуто въ предѣлѣ волости, даже въ предѣлѣ села, — не больше. Правосознаніемъ крестьянства, въ зависимости отъ цѣлаго ряда наслоеній и событій мѣстной исторіи земельныхъ отношеній, достаточно точно очерчены границы земельнаго фонда каждаго села. Въ зависимости отъ такого сельскаго земельнаго фонда земельное обезпеченіе на душу населенія даже въ двухъ сосѣднихъ селахъ часто значительно разнится.

Границы эти, однако, пользуются признаніемъ между сосѣдними селами теперь уже въ достаточной мѣрѣ. Въ этомъ признаніи — большой плюсъ. «Борьба за передѣлъ земли», вмѣсто всероссійскаго масштаба, ограничивается сельскимъ. Она локализируется, распыляется въ каждомъ отдѣльномъ случаѣ до относительно небольшой группы участниковъ, имѣющихъ передъ со-

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бою частную цѣль — земельный фондъ ихъ села. Тѣмъ самымъ, что безконечно важно для россійскаго національнаго хозяйства въ цѣломъ, она можетъ разрѣшиться *скорѣе*. Теперь эта борьба догораетъ. Границы земельныхъ участковъ внутри «сельскаго земельнаго фонда», соотвѣтствующія реальнымъ силамъ и правосознанію внутри «села», имѣютъ уже всѣ шансы быстро стать «реально стабильными». Процессъ перераспредѣленія кончается, рождаются возможности осуществлять жизненно необходимый процессъ производства. Для всякой государственной власти въ Россіи *единственный выходъ теперь* въ цѣляхъ не затягивать процесса русской революціи — это держаться политики «noli me tangere» земельныхъ перераспредѣленій внутри «села». Государственными мѣрами регулированіе земельныхъ отношеній можно было предпринимать *раньше*, когда у правительственной власти была дѣйствительная власть и авторитетъ. Этими мѣрами русская революція, вѣроятно, могла бы быть предотвращена. Теперь она — фактъ. Земельное перераспредѣленіе идетъ помимо государства. Больше того, государство и государственная власть *станутъ быть* только тогда, когда и если оно кончится и будетъ санкціонировано ими. Какъ видите, мое согласіе съ А.С. проистекаетъ изъ принципа, которому я отвожу во всей теперешней ситуаціи Россіи первое мѣсто. Этотъ принципъ: — «пустить въ ходъ нормальное, въ смыслѣ его объема (площадей посѣва и т.д.) производство въ с.-х. промыслѣ какъ можно скорѣе.»

На этомъ одномъ принципѣ нельзя успокоиться. Нуженъ и второй: «возможно большая производительность с. хозяйства въ Россіи въ цѣломъ.» Особенно бережно его надо культивировать въ первые годы возстановленія, когда повышеніе производительности, вообще говоря, будетъ достигаться съ большими усиліями. Интенсификація крестьянскаго хозяйства, которой, по всей справедливости, А.С. отводитъ такую громадную, рѣшающую роль, начнетъ давать свой благодѣтельный эффектъ на общій національный доходъ отъ с. хозяйства позже, т.е. черезъ 5-10 лѣтъ послѣ начала возстановленія с.х.

Исходя изъ этого второго принципа, я не могу согласиться съ А.С. по вопросу о «совхозахъ» и отчасти съ нимъ связанному вопросу о «вознагражденіи» прежнихъ собственниковъ. Заранѣе скажу: 1) Оба эти вопроса меня интересуютъ исключительно съ точки зрѣнія указанныхъ выше 2 принциповъ, т.е. максимализаціи по объему и повышенія производительности с.-х. промысла. 2) Я къ нимъ подхожу исключительно съ точки зрѣнія практическаго рѣшенія ихъ во всей будущей россійской реальности экономической и политической.

Экономически Россійское Государство, разоренное и очень сжатое въ своихъ кредитныхъ возможностяхъ, не будетъ просто въ состояніи вознаградить прежнихъ земельныхъ собственниковъ деньгами или даже денежными обязательствами. Время, когда государство *могло* платить за отчуждаемую для надѣленія крестьянъ землю «по справедливой оцѣнкѣ», на очень долгіе годы миновало. Крестьянство тоже разорено.

Я не считаю вѣроятнымъ наступленіе такой политической ситуаціи въ Россіи, при которой была бы сдѣлана даже попытка на такое вознагражденіе деньгами.

Такая ситуація могла бы явиться только въ случаѣ реставраціи прежняго правящаго помѣщичье-дворянскаго класса въ его привиллегированномъ и правящемъ положеніи.

Прежде всего, я не считаю возможной такую реставрацію, а затѣмъ, если бы даже она имѣла мѣсто, попытка быстро уперлась бы въ экономическую невозможность ея выполненія въ дѣйствительности.

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Коротко говоря, я думаю, что позиція прежняго земельнаго собственника, какъ обладателя земельной ренты или «рантье, ищущаго вознагражденія за убытки»— и экономически, и политически безнадежна.

У этихъ прежнихъ собственниковъ, если не у всѣхъ, то у значительной части ихъ, есть, однако, другая позиція. Они — опытные хозяева болѣе высокаго по производительности типа сельскаго хозяйства, болѣе совершенные производственники.

Съ этой ихъ ролью, имѣющей уже не только лично-эгоистическій, но и общественно-полезный характеръ, государство, стремящееся возстановить національный доходъ, конечно, будетъ считаться, ибо эта ихъ послѣдняя роль *выгодна* для демократіи въ цѣломъ, той демократіи, которая политически будетъ рѣшающей въ государствѣ и отвѣтственной за его успѣхъ

Она, какъ нѣкогда русскіе цари, не имѣя денегъ и стремясь для утвержденія новаго государственнаго строя накормить населеніе, будетъ, вѣроятно, давать втуне лежащія теперь земли на окраинахъ бывшему собственнику, если онъ потерялъ свою землю въ центрѣ Россіи и если онъ окажется способнымъ организовать доходное с. хозяйство на новыхъ земляхъ. Это хозяйство будетъ требовать большихъ организаторскихъ способностей и большаго капитала, чѣмъ мелкое крестьянское.

Такимъ образомъ, традиціонный россійскій процессъ — разселенія изъ центра на окраины — не остановитъ своего хода Только переселяющіеся измѣнятся въ своемъ соціально-экономическомъ составѣ. Раньше въ Сибирь и Туркестанъ шелъ мелкій земледѣлецъ-крестьянинъ. Теперь пойдетъ крупный. Впрочемъ, историческіе прецеденты переселенія и крупныхъ земледѣльцевъ тоже имѣлись въ Россіи. Именно послѣдними была колонизована, напримѣръ, вся Новороссія.

Съ точки зрѣнія хозяйственнаго успѣха, этотъ новый этапъ россійскаго традиціоннаго разселенія имѣетъ лучшія перспективы, чѣмъ крестьянское переселенческое хозяйство, ибо будущій колонизаторъ будетъ вооруженъ и капиталомъ, и знаніемъ для хозяйства въ новыхъ условіяхъ лучше, чѣмъ прежній.

Я думаю, что не всѣмъ прежнимъ земельнымъ собственникамъ придется выселяться изъ Европейской Россіи. Здѣсь я подхожу къ моему несогласію съ А С. относительно будущей судьбы совхозовъ. Въ короткихъ словахъ, моя мысль заключается въ слѣдующемъ.

Пусть государственная власть выдѣлитъ изъ совхозовъ, сколько надо для опытнаго дѣла. Это немного. Этимъ всѣ притязанія государства на совхозы должны быть ликвидированы. Затѣмъ пусть всякій совхозъ будетъ считаться входящимъ въ соотвѣтственный «сельскій земельный фондъ», относительно котораго, какъ я предлагалъ, государство должно держаться политики «noli me tangere».

Если прежній собственникъ земли даннаго совхоза, вслѣдствіе своихъ индивидуальныхъ качествъ производственника, общественно-полезнаго элемента, окажется желательнымъ для своихъ односельчанъ, какой-нибудь соціальный міръ они между собой заключатъ. Если не все, то часть своей бывшей земли такой собственникъ по этому міру получитъ. Стоитъ ему стать чѣмъ-то вродѣ хозяйственнаго лидера своего села, поставить интенсивное хозяйство, связанное, скажемъ, съ предпріятіемъ въ области аграрной индустріи, и т.д.— и его возвратъ для односельчанъ будетъ выгоденъ и желателенъ Этотъ процессъ уже теперь въ нѣкоторыхъ мѣстахъ Россіи намѣчается.

Роль государства — не накладывать руку на совхозъ, а быть доброжелательнымъ посредникомъ въ заключеніи соціальнаго мира въ борьбѣ за

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передѣлъ земли внутри границъ «сельского земельного фонда». Жизнь сама утрясетъ земельные споры по частямъ.

Мнѣ кажется, что такая земельная политика дастъ хорошіе результаты въ смыслѣ объема и нитенсивности суммарнаго по государству зернового производства.

Интенсификація. Внѣшній и внутренній индустріальный рынокъ для с. хозяйства. — Наконецъ, у меня есть еще одно не возраженіе, а замѣчаніе болѣе общаго характера. Слѣдуетъ сельскому хозяйству связывать свои надежды на возможно большую интенсификацію съ развитіемъ спроса на его продуктъ внѣшняго индустріальнаго рынка или внутренняго?

Въ Вашихъ, Александръ Семеновичъ, разсужденіяхъ о степени возможной интенсификаціи с.-х., Вы исходите изъ цѣнъ с.-х. продукта на міровомъ рынкѣ, т.е., въ конечномъ счетѣ, изъ предположеній, что Россія непремѣнно должна будетъ усиленно вывозить хлѣбъ для того, чтобы покрывать сальдо своего баланса по внѣшней торговлѣ по ввозу предметовъ индустріи. Пути экономическаго развитія нашего могутъ быть и другіе, дающіе болѣе широкіе предѣлы для интенсификаціи и болѣе радужныя перспективы общаго экономическаго прогресса. Это — развитіе внутренняго рынка вслѣдствіе усиленной индустріализаціи Россіи. Помимо сбереженія расходовъ на транспортъ хлѣба до мірового рынка и транспортъ предметовъ индустріи отъ мірового рынка до Россіи, развитіе внутренней Россійской индустріи увеличиваетъ предѣлы возможной интенсификаціи с.х. и по другимъ причинамъ.

Теперешняя стадія индустріализма характеризуется очень энергичнымъ развитіемъ массоваго производства, съ чрезвычайно сильнымъ пониженіемъ себѣ-стоимости на единицу продукта индустріи. Использовать эти громадныя преимущества теперешней стадіи развитія индустріализма Россія ,въ конечномъ счетѣ, можетъ только тогда, когда соотвѣтственная индустрія будетъ достаточно развита *внутри* границъ россійскаго національнаго хозяйства.

При такой схемѣ экономическаго развитія, цѣны на инвентарь, удобреніе и проч. предметы внутренняго индустріальнаго производства для хозяйственнаго и личнаго потребленія земледѣльца имѣютъ большую тенденцію къ пониженію, чѣмъ при соотвѣтственномъ обмѣнѣ съ внѣшнимъ рынкомъ. Насколько выгоденъ обмѣнъ для него, земледѣлецъ при этой схемѣ быстрѣе начинаетъ учитывать. Его экономическая сознательность, при противоположеніи интересовъ деревни и города въ ихъ обмѣнѣ, скорѣе кристаллизуется. Въ порядкѣ же принятія государственнаго бюджета (жел. дорожн. тарифы, налоги и пр.) земледѣлецъ легче можетъ вліять на измѣненіе этихъ отношеній въ обмѣнѣ въ свою пользу, конечно, до тѣхъ границъ, при которыхъ матеріальная база индустріальнаго производства продолжаетъ все-таки расти.

Успѣхъ интенсификаціи земледѣлія въ странѣ зависитъ отъ успѣха интенсификаціи индустріи. И обратно. Поступательное движеніе производственныхъ силъ возможно только при общемъ единомъ фронтѣ. Сельское хозяйство толкаетъ впередъ индустрію. Эта, въ свою очередь, толкаетъ с. хозяйство. Именно этому обязанъ бурный ростъ національнаго дохода С.Ш.А..

Я добавлю еще небольшое замѣчаніе: при центрированіи вниманія на развитіи внутренняго рынка для хлѣба устраняется опасность, о которой мы говорили, зависимости хозяйственнаго прогресса Россіи въ области с. хозяйства отъ роста населенія въ потребляющихъ чужихъ странахъ, т.е., въ странахъ индустріальныхъ, производящихъ хлѣбъ въ недостаточномъ для нихъ количествѣ.

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Всѣмъ этимъ я не хочу, конечно, сказать, что мы теперь-же могли бы сразу вступить на путь самоснабженія. До наступленія такого момента пройдетъ, можетъ быть, не одинъ десятокъ лѣтъ. Еще меньше хотѣлъ бы я сказать, что нашъ вывозъ мы могли бы свести къ нулю. Это невозможно уже по тому одному, что намъ надо будетъ уплатить крупныя деньги по внѣшнимъ старымъ и будущимъ (для возстановленія хозяйственной базы) долгамъ Россіи. Но до тѣхъ поръ, пока не сравняется міровая расцѣнка выработки человѣка, занятаго въ хозяйствѣ, съ таковой же въ индустріи, — мы должны стремиться къ гармоническому развитію вывоза и продуктовъ земледѣлія, и продуктовъ индустріи.

Вліяніе хлѣбныхъ цѣнъ внѣшняго рынка на интенсификацію русскаго с.-хозяйства при этомъ не устраняется, конечно, но очень сильно смягчается. Въ центрѣ нашего вниманія, такимъ образомъ, должно стоять всегда развитіе внутренняго рынка для нашего хлѣба. Къ этому идеалу мы будемъ приближаться по мѣрѣ того, какъ Россія будетъ богатѣть.

В. Ф. Брейтвейтъ. — Въ общемъ я раздѣляю положенія, проводимыя А.С.. Я не увѣренъ, однако, что эти положенія можно будетъ практически осуществить въ будущей политической, экономической и психологической россійской ситуаціи. Въ частности, я особенно присоединяюсь къ схемѣ финансированія возстановленія и меліораціи черезъ кредитъ государства и кооперацію. Перехожу къ отдѣльнымъ замѣчаніямъ.

Я не такъ боюсь, какъ М.В., банковской спекуляціи въ случаѣ усиленной земельной мобилизаціи.

Я согласенъ съ Ю.А. въ томъ, что было бы неправильно строить экономическіе разсчеты на превалированіи одной изъ двухъ главныхъ отраслей хозяйства. Можно разсчитывать на успѣхъ только при синхронномъ возстановленіи въ Россіи и с. хозяйства, и промышленности. Промышленность стимулируетъ с.-хозяйство и обратно.

Другой же тезисъ Ю.А. о сжатіи для нашего хлѣба внѣшняго рынка не представляется мнѣ правильнымъ. Въ № 9 Кейнсовской Хозяйственной Реконструкціи констатируется наблюдающееся теперь въ хлѣбопроизводящихъ странахъ сокращеніе запашекъ противъ ихъ размѣровъ въ военное время. Мотивировка: боятся появленія на міровомъ рынкѣ Россіи.

Ошибка нашего прошлаго была въ томъ, что мы спрашивали всегда, какое мѣсто на міровомъ хлѣбномъ рынкѣ намъ отведено, и отведеннымъ удовлетворялись, не дѣлая попытки расширять свои операціи по собственной иниціативѣ.

Обращаюсь къ прогнозамъ о вѣроятномъ будущемъ земельныхъ отношеній.

Будетъ ли въ Россіи собственность или пользованіе? Судя по настроеніямъ самаго послѣдняго времени въ крестьянской средѣ, настроеніямъ, о которыхъ мнѣ говорилъ только что пріѣхавшій изъ Россіи очень авторитетный кооператоръ N, какъ-разъ очень близкій къ крестьянству по роду своей спеціальности — собственность, самая обыкновенная собственность, имѣетъ шансы укрѣпиться въ наибольшемъ количествѣ мѣстъ Россіи.

Теперь относительно крупнаго хозяйства. Еще 1 1/2 - 2 года тому назадъ для меня, въ результатѣ моихъ личныхъ наблюденій надъ крестьянской психологіей, было безспорно, что помѣщика назадъ крестьяне не пустятъ. Теперь это для меня далеко не такъ безспорно. Въ нѣкоторыхъ случаяхъ пускаютъ. Кстати, нѣсколько дней тому назадъ я получилъ извѣстіе изъ Р. уѣзда о любопытномъ случаѣ. Во время работы моей въ этомъ уѣздѣ въ качествѣ инструктора кооперації я зналъ тамъ небольшого помѣщика. По

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прежней своей профессіи онъ былъ самоучка-землемѣръ. На сбереженія, собранныя путемъ невѣроятной личной экономіи и усилій, онъ купилъ въ этомъ уѣздѣ небольшую пустошь. Насмѣшкамъ надъ нимъ и его пустошью не было конца. И вотъ, упорнымъ трудомъ онъ обратилъ никому не нужную пустошь въ образцовое хозяйство. Пришла революція. Его выставили изъ имѣнія и обратили имѣніе въ колхозъ.

Черезъ нѣсколько времени онъ добился того, что его приняли участникомъ коллектива этого колхоза. Затѣмъ послѣдовала новая стадія отношеній. Онъ работалъ въ коллективѣ, какъ волъ, и этой своей работой, безъ всякой протекціи изъ центра или Москвы, мало по малу выжилъ остальныхъ участниковъ коллектива — коммунистовъ. Теперь, какъ мнѣ пишутъ, онъ остался единымъ обладателемъ и хозяиномъ своего имѣнія при полномъ сочувствіи окружающихъ крестьянъ. Резюмируя, я добавлю: я не очень удивлюсь, если будущее Россійское Учредительное Собраніе установитъ частную собственность на землю.

Заканчивая мои замѣчанія, я долженъ отмѣтить, что я считаю особенно цѣнной ту часть доклада, которую А.С. посвятилъ техникѣ с. хозяйства и цифровому матеріалу.

С. О. Л а т к и н ъ. — Я бы очень привѣтствовалъ рѣшеніе Учредит. Собранія, о которомъ только что говорилъ В.Ф. Всѣ мои наблюденія въ качествѣ практическаго дѣятеля въ области агрономіи убѣждаютъ меня въ томъ, что «частная собственность» всегда является факторомъ, облегчающимъ всякій прогрессъ хозяйства въ деревнѣ.

Совершенно естественно, что одного рѣшенія — «собственность» или «пользованіе» — для всѣхъ районовъ Россіи, можетъ быть, и не будетъ. На сѣверѣ, въ Сибири, въ Степномъ Краѣ еще до сихъ поръ живетъ въ народномъ сознаніи — «земля Божья». Но я думаю, что мелкое сельское хозяйство, построенное на принципѣ частнаго землевладѣнія, въ практическихъ условіяхъ жизни будетъ болѣе приспособленной, выживающей формой. Я не отрицаю, конечно, нѣкоторыхъ успѣховъ коллективнаго землепользованія, но не придаю этимъ успѣхамъ большого значенія. Я не видалъ, по крайней мѣрѣ, въ жизни примѣровъ, которые колебали-бы это мое убѣжденіе. Какъ агроному, мнѣ всегда было пріятнѣе работать тогда, когда я имѣлъ дѣло съ отрубами и хуторами, чѣмъ когда приходилось имѣть дѣло съ общиной. Результаты агрономической работы въ первомъ случаѣ разительно были лучше, чѣмъ во второмъ.

Крестьяне, вышедшіе на хутора, въ 2 года обратили ихъ въ рай. Грѣхъ на старыхъ землеустроительныхъ комиссіяхъ былъ, что онѣ недостаточно умѣло проводили политику выдѣла на хутора.

Собираніе полосокъ земли въ одинъ кусокъ давало возможность быстро переходить на всякія улучшенія въ хозяйствѣ.

Эти успѣхи быстро разрушали традиціонную приверженность къ общинѣ сосѣдей-общинниковъ. Нѣсколько примѣровъ изъ практики моей работы въ области кооперації. Приходилось работать и съ собственниками, и съ общинниками. Въ «с.-хозяйственныя общества» наиболѣе легко шли отрубники и хуторяне. То же самое наблюдалось съ прокатными и зерноочистительными станціями, потребительными лавками и т.п. Въ Пермской губ. удалось устроить кооперативную паровую мельницу. Первыми пошли на это дѣло хуторяне и отрубники, и затѣмъ сами уже стали убѣждать общинниковъ присоединиться. Психологія разная.

Еще примѣръ: въ Верхотурскомъ уѣздѣ одна общинная деревня плохо

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жила. Болото заѣло. Только и были луга хороши. Не побоялись передѣлиться. Въ результатѣ — кочки и убрали. Совсѣмъ другая жизнь пошла.

Я долженъ сказать еще нѣсколько словъ относительно опасеній, что банковская земельная спекуляція можетъ отнять у крестьянина землю. Я не раздѣляю этихъ опасеній. Очень деревня цѣпко за нее держится и никого «не своего» на нее не пускаетъ. Даже сельская интеллигенція, попытавшаяся сѣсть на землю въ первые годы революціи, не успѣла въ этомъ. Крестьяне не давали. Кромѣ того, дѣйствительно, въ очень большомъ количествѣ случаевъ крупное хозяйство не выдерживаетъ конкуренціи съ трудовымъ крестьянскимъ.

Всѣ эти обстоятельства чрезвычайно расхолодятъ всякую спекуляцію.

Я думаю поэтому, что ничего худого не выйдетъ, если законодательство предоставитъ крестьянину право свободнаго распоряженія землею. Въ конечномъ счетѣ, землей будетъ владѣть въ деревнѣ тотъ, кто умѣетъ на ней работать.

В. А. Богдановичъ не видитъ причинъ, почему бы «пользованіе», въ тѣхъ твердыхъ формахъ, которыя предложилъ А.С., мѣшало бы производительному хозяйственному распоряженію землей. Англійскія «leases». не мѣшаютъ сооружать на арендованныхъ участкахъ дорого стоющіе дома.

А. С. Орловъ.—Я попробую въ заключительномъ словѣ докладчика отвѣтить хотя на часть тѣхъ возражен-й, которыя мнѣ были сдѣланы. Ю.А. Павловскій, мнѣ кажется, несправедливо упрекаетъ меня въ пренебреженіи экономикой. Я говорилъ о кредитѣ для сельскаго хозяйства, именно государственномъ, и также о путяхъ, по которымъ этотъ кредитъ можетъ достигнуть отдѣльнаго хозяина — кооперація. Дальше, я говорилъ о міровой конъюнктурѣ зернового рынка и о тѣхъ границахъ, которыя кладетъ эта конъюктура возможной технически интенсификаціи.

Я не останавливался на этихъ вопросахъ болѣе подробно, потому что они слишкомъ гадательны. Рѣшать эти вопросы теперь нельзя: въ нихъ есть слишкомъ много неизвѣстныхъ. Я бы сослался въ этомъ отношеніи на работу проф. Чупрова о вліяніи урожая на хлѣбныя цѣны или попытки проф. Чаянова рѣшить, какъ будутъ мѣняться цѣны на ленъ на міровомъ рынкѣ въ зависимости отъ расширенія посѣвныхъ площадей въ Россіи.

Относительно міровой конъюнктуры попутно замѣчу, что вовсе не съ такимъ худымъ товаромъ мы выступимъ на міровомъ рынкѣ. Качество русскаго зерна всегда было хорошо. А по части уменьшенія засоренности именно въ послѣдніе годы произошло улучшеніе. Сортировка зерна въ Россіи сдѣлала громадный успѣхъ. Если элеваторная сѣть, сооруженная въ послѣдніе годы, получитъ дальнѣйшее развитіе, то положеніе еще болѣе улучшится.

Теперь возвращаюсь къ упреку въ пренебреженіи экономикой.

Техникѣ я, дѣйствительно удѣлилъ больше вниманія и сдѣлалъ это умышленно. Раньше ей удѣляли слишкомъ мало вниманія. Въ этомъ наша ошибка. Въ прежнее время во вниманіи всѣхъ дѣятелей въ области с. хозяйства экономика превалировала надъ техникой и интенсификаціей. Чѣмъ, напримѣръ, занимался до революціи агрономъ въ Московской губ.? Экономикой по преимуществу. Онъ искалъ выхода изъ бѣдности и низкой доходности крестьянскаго хозяйства главнымъ образомъ въ кооперація. А между тѣмъ, послѣднія цифры россійской практики говорятъ объ увеличеніи урожайности на 50% вслѣдствіе одного только ранняго взмета.

Не подлежитъ сомнѣнію, что эффектъ отъ опредѣленныхъ техническихъ улучшеній будетъ разниться въ зависимости отъ особенностей района. Но также не подлежитъ сомнѣнію, что для каждаго района можетъ быть най-

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дено индивидуальное и наивыгоднѣйшее рѣшеніе въ смыслѣ нужной ему техники.

Можно сказать, какъ общее правило, что техника русскаго земледѣлія плохо разработана. Есть очень немного вопросовъ, по которымъ бы уже не было споровъ даже въ средѣ агрономовъ.

Возьмите, хотя бы, насмѣшливое отношеніе Минина на послѣднемъ аграрномъ съѣздѣ къ минеральному удобренію. Это все — отзвуки стараго. Русская агрономія не установила четкихъ линій будущей интенсификаціи с. х.. А, между тѣмъ, нельзя не задуматься надъ тѣми чудодѣйственными результатами ея, о которыхъ, напр., свидѣтельствуетъ проф. Даяренко (с. Курово).

При свѣтѣ этихъ возможностей, можетъ быть, и вопросъ о кредитѣ потеряетъ въ значительной степени свою остроту.

Теперь, о крупныхъ хозяйствахъ. Весь вопросъ—чему равняется возможный земельный фондъ для такихъ хозяйствъ. По моему: 3 милл. совхозовъ плюсъ милліона 2-3 теперешнихъ свободныхъ необработанныхъ пустошей. Всего милліоновъ 6. На этомъ фондѣ не поставишь крупнаго хозяйства.

Вамъ кажется, что на Югѣ, Волгѣ, Дону есть много пустующей земли. Мнѣ кажется, что глазомѣръ здѣсь обманываетъ. Если Вы докажете, что можно набрать въ Европейской Россіи пустующей земли милліоновъ, скажемъ, 30, я не возражаю противъ возстановленія крупныхъ хозяйствъ, имѣющихъ характеръ фабрикъ зерна.

Основное наше расхожденіе съ М.В. Брайкевичемъ — «собственность» или «пользованіе». Ось вопроса—насколько допустима свободная мобилизація. Я думаю, что если бы на практикѣ М.В. осуществлялъ свою «ограниченную собственность», а я «твердое пользованіе» — очень большой разницы не было бы.

Я все-таки не думаю, чтобы инвесторъ былъ обезпеченъ только въ случаѣ частной собственности. Главнымъ, по моему, въ вопросѣ внѣшняго кредита является вѣра заграницей въ устойчивость даннаго государственнаго порядка. Пусть большевики декретируютъ сейчасъ частную собственность на самыхъ буржуазныхъ основахъ. Кредитъ, при неувѣренности въ самомъ режимѣ, и при частной собственности не пойдетъ. Пусть, съ другой стороны, установится въ Россіи представительный строй и начнетъ все больше и больше пріобрѣтать устойчивости—государство получитъ кредитъ для возстановленія с. хозяйства и при «пользованіи».

Далѣе, С.О. Латкинъ смѣшиваетъ два вопроса: 1) хуторское и общинное пользованіе землей и 2) «собственность» или «пользованіе».

Я уже указывалъ, что выдѣлъ изъ общины на хутора считаю чрезвычайно важнымъ. Но хуторъ можетъ и не быть собственностью. Отъ этого онъ не потеряетъ тѣхъ привлекательныхъ сторонъ, о которыхъ говоритъ С.О. Наконецъ, я отвѣчу В.Ф. Брейтвейту. Исходить теперь изъ того, какъ могутъ сложиться настроенія крестьянства въ будущемъ — это только осложнять тѣ свои положенія, которыя считаешь объективно правильными, и которыя нужно надлежащимъ образомъ аргументировать. Все равно, не угадаешь, какъ сложится эта крестьянская идеологія земельнаго законодательства. Мужикъ молчаливъ, хитеръ и практиченъ. Я не думаю, чтобы у него самого уже сложилась теперь его собственная идеологія. Но она близка къ тому, чтобы сложиться въ ближайшее время. Онъ подходитъ къ ней опытомъ.

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ОПЫТЫ СЪ ФРЕЗАМИ.

Проф. Н. Н. Саввинъ.

Докладъ, читанный въ Технич. Секціи Р. Э. О. 8-го марта, 1923 г.

Въ цѣляхъ установленія инструкцій по фрезерованію былъ произведенъ рядъ опытовъ съ новыми типами фрезъ. Работы дѣлались на вертикально-фрезерномъ станкѣ «Milwaukee» Cincinati № 2½ B и на горизонтальномъ продольно-фрезерномъ станкѣ J. E. Reinecker, Chemnitz-Gablenz № 3. Первый приводился въ движеніе электромоторомъ въ 6 HP, а второй электромоторомъ въ 13 HP. Оба станка были въ полной исправности. Обрабатывалась обыкновенная кованная сталь, идущая на постройку механизмовъ движенія локомотива, крѣпостью 50-55 kg/mm². Характерными особенностями фрезъ перваго типа были: сравнительно небольшое число зубцовъ — отъ 7 до 12 при діаметрахъ отъ 25 до 85 mm., уголъ рѣзанія 80° и уголъ подъема спирали 20°. Второй типъ испытывавшихся фрезъ былъ характерный обдирочный съ 5 зубцами при діаметрѣ 136 mm и съ подъемомъ спирали 52°. Измѣренія энергіи производились посредствомъ регистрирующаго ваттметра. Все время отмѣчалась степень чистоты получаемой поверхности и коллекціонировалась стружка, по виду которой, какъ извѣстно, можно судить о степени затупленія фрезы.

Такъ какъ на успѣшность работы фрезерованія существенное вліяніе оказываетъ толщина стружки и количество одновременно работающихъ зубцовъ фрезы, то при обработкѣ опытнаго матеріала исчислялись эти величины, для чего пришлось установить точную зависимость между діаметромъ фрезы, числомъ ея зубцовъ, угломъ подъема спирали, числомъ оборотовъ фрезы въ минуту, величиной подачи въ минуту, глубиной и шириной фрезеруемаго слоя матеріала.

На фиг. 1 изображена фреза перваго испытуемаго типа, съ внѣшнимъ діаметромъ 50 mm, съ 9 зубцами, угломъ рѣзанія 80° и угломъ подъема спирали 20°. Тутъ же показаны траекторіи движенія концовъ трехъ ея смежныхъ зубцовъ, при утрировано большой лодачѣ и при значительной глубинѣ фрезерованія. На фиг. 2 мы видимъ другую проекцію той же фрезы, а на фиг. 3 видъ ея зубцовъ, развернутыхъ на плоскость.

Примемъ слѣдующія обозначенія:

D_{mm} — внѣшній діаметръ фрезы
z — число ея зубцовъ
n — число ея оборотовъ въ минуту
γ — уголъ подъема спиральныхъ зубцовъ фрезы
h_{mm} — глубина снимаемаго слоя
b_{mm} — ширина » »
p_{mm} — подача въ минуту
p_{1mm} — подача за одинъ оборотъ фрезы
p_{zmm} — подача на одинъ зубецъ фрезы
s_{mm} — наибольшая толщина стружки
k — количество одновременно работающихъ зубцовъ

Имѣемъ:

$$p_1 = \frac{p}{n} \quad \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots \quad (1)$$

$$p_z = \frac{p_1}{z} = \frac{p}{nz} \quad \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots \quad (2)$$

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Fig. 1



Fig. 2



Fig. 3



Fig. 5



Fig. 4



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Изъ фиг. 1 слѣдуетъ, что

$$s = p_z \, Sn\alpha = \frac{p \, Sn \, \alpha}{nz}$$

Но $$Cs \, \alpha = 1 - \frac{2h}{D}$$

Слѣдовательно

$$s = \frac{p}{nz} \sqrt{1 - \left(1 - \frac{2h}{D}\right)^2} = \frac{2p}{nz} \sqrt{\frac{h}{D}\left(1 - \frac{h}{D}\right)} \quad \ldots \ldots \quad (3)$$

Что касается величины k, то она зависитъ, съ одной стороны, отъ угла α и числа зубцовъ фрезы z, а съ другой отъ ширины снимаемаго слоя b и угла подъема спиральныхъ зубцовъ γ.

Изъ фиг. 1 слѣдуетъ, что для фрезъ съ прямыми зубцами

$$k = \alpha : \frac{360}{z} = \frac{\alpha \, Z}{360,}$$

а изъ фиг. 2 и 3 видно, что въ случаѣ фрезъ со спиральными зубцами число это должно быть увеличено на величину отношенія ширины фрезируемаго слоя b къ разстоянію BC между зубцами въ осевомъ направленіи.

Но $$BC = AB \, ctg \, \gamma = \frac{\pi D}{z} \, ctg \, \gamma$$

Слѣдовательно, для фрезъ со спиральными зубцами

$$k = \frac{\alpha z}{360} + \frac{bZ}{\pi D \, ctg \, \gamma}$$

Или подробнѣе

$$k = z \left[\frac{arc \, Cs \left(1 - \frac{2h}{D}\right)}{360} + \frac{b}{\pi D \, ctg \, \gamma}\right] \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots \quad (4)$$

Для того, чтобы не было перерыва въ работѣ зубцовъ фрезы, необходимо, чтобы

$$k \geqslant 1$$

Опытъ показываетъ, что работа идетъ совершенно спокойно, когда

$$k = 2$$

Въ этомъ случаѣ для фрезы фиг. 1-3 имѣемъ:

$$\frac{arc \, Cs \left(1 - \frac{2h}{50}\right)}{360} + \frac{b}{\pi 50 \, ctg \, 20^0} > \frac{2}{9}$$

Для различныхъ глубинъ фрезерованія h получаемъ при этомъ соотвѣтственныя минимальныя ширины b

h_{mm}	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	12	14	16	18	20
b_{mm}	78	70	60	57,5	52,7	49	44	40,4	36,7	33	25,5	19,6	13,5	7,3	2,5

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На фиг. 4-5 представлена фреза второго типа, съ внѣшнимъ діаметромъ 136 mm, 5 зубцами и угломъ подъема спиральныхъ зубцовъ 52°. Для этой фрезы выполненіе условія k = 1 приводитъ къ слѣдующимъ соотношеніямъ между h и *в*:

h_{mm}	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	10.	12.	14.	16.	20.	24.	30.
b_{mm}	58.	54.	51.	48.	46.	44.4	42.5	41.	38.	35.	32.4	29.6	25.	20.	15.



6 Fig. Толщина стружки Thickness of shavings

a - a ф 85, v = 18.7 met/min, ω = 28×12 mm²
b - b ф 45, v = 15.8 " ω = 40×6 "
c - c ф 40, v = 8.8 " ω = 30×10 "
d - d ф 130, v = 33.1 " ω = 118×3 "
e - e ф 45 v = 15.8 " ω = 20×4 + 16×10 "

На фиг. 6 представлена діаграмма зависимости объема снятой стружки въ cm³ на 1kw/min энергіи netto отъ толщины стружки, при работѣ фрезъ перваго типа (фиг. 1-3) изъ быстрорѣжущей стали марки «Polldi maximum» съ 17-18% Wo и 3-5% Cr. Какъ показываетъ діаграмма, при скоростяхъ рѣзанія отъ 8,8 до 33,1 met/min и толщинахъ стружки отъ 0,02 до 0,24 mm, производительность фрезерованія увеличивается вмѣстѣ съ увеличеніемъ толщины стружки. Это отвѣчаетъ и здравому смыслу: чѣмъ мельче дробится матеріалъ, тѣмъ больше на это расходуется энергіи.

Какъ правило, можно сказать, что при работѣ фрезъ перваго типа на вертикально-фрезерныхъ станкахъ всегда выгодно получать тонкія стружки: станокъ не дрожитъ, а обрабатываемая поверхность бываетъ гладкая. Увеличивая подачу въ минуту, слѣдуетъ одновременно увеличивать и число оборотовъ фрезы, доводя ея окружную скорость до 30 met/min. Окрашиванія стружки, какъ это бываетъ при токарной и строгальной работѣ, вообще нужно избѣгать; если нельзя увеличить охлажденія, то приходится при этомъ уменьшить скорость рѣзанія. По числу зубцовъ и характеру производимой работы фрезы перваго типа занимаютъ срединное мѣсто между старыми шлихтовальными фрезами съ мелкими зубьями и новыми обдирочными съ малымъ числомъ зубцовъ. Фрезы перваго типа успѣшно разрѣшаютъ задачу такъ называемаго универсальнаго фрезерованія, т е. даютъ возможность одной фрезой успѣшно производить и обдирочную, и отдѣлочную работу. Раціонально примѣнять эти фрезы на станкахъ уже не новыхъ.

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Родъ фрезы	Родъ работы	Снимаемый слой		Матеріалъ								
				Машинный чугунъ			Машиноподѣл. сталь			Латунь и бронза		
		Ширина въ mm	Глубина въ mm	Окруж. скорость met /min	Подача P m /min	Объемъ струж. въ cm^3 на 1 HP въ min.	Окруж. скорость met /min	Подача P m /min	Объемъ струж. въ cm^3 на 1 HP въ min.	Окруж. скорость met /min	Подача P m /min	Объемъ струж. въ cm^3 на 1 HP въ min.
Концевая (Fingerfräse)	обдир.	до 100	3-8	16-18	30-100	5-7,5	20-30	30-100	5-7,5	35-50	60-200	10-15
	шлихт.	—	0-1	18-20	40-120	—	25-40	40-120	—	40-60	80-240	—
Цилиндрическая (Walzenfräse)	обдир.	до 120	4-2	16-18	30-120	6-9	20-30	30-120	6-9	35-50	60-200	12-18
	шлихт.	—	0-1	18-20	40-120	—	25-40	40-120	—	40-60	80-240	—
Фрезер. головка (Frâzkopf)	обдир.	до 200	3-6	20-25	60-120	8-13	25-30	50-100	7-12	40-50	100-240	15-24
	шлихт.	—	0-1	25-30	70-120	—	30-40	60-120	—	40-60	120-250	—

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Въ частности, на основаніи многочисленныхъ опытовъ съ фрезами перваго типа, можно привести слѣдующія практическія указанія:

1) Работа идетъ спокойнѣе, когда глубина h снимаемаго слоя равна 4-5 mm, а ширина въ 8-10 разъ больше глубины.

2) На вертикальныхъ станкахъ, обрабатывая кованную сталь крѣпостью около 50 kg, надлежитъ держаться окружныхъ скоростей 20-30 met/min. Пониженіе скорости до 10 met/min при полныхъ нагрузкахъ станка приводитъ къ опаснымъ дрожаніямъ станка.

3) Нормальной подачей при соблюденіи предыдущихъ пунктовъ должна считаться подача въ 60-100 mm въ минуту.

4) Подачу такъ называемую старую «американскую», т. е. въ направленіи одинаковомъ со стороной вращенія фрезы, раціонально примѣнять для обратнаго шлихтовальнаго прохода фрезы съ той же скоростью подачи, какъ и первый проходъ, но съ маленькой глубиной, напр. отъ 0 до 0,5 mm. При этомъ получится точная поверхность и устранятся послѣдствія деформаціи фрезы, имѣвшія мѣсто во время перваго обдирочнаго прохода.

5) Нормальнымъ временемъ фактической работы фрезы безъ переточки должно быть признано 4 часа. Экономически выгодно, чтобы все это время она работала при полной нагрузкѣ станка.

6) Коэффиціенты полезнаго дѣйствія фрезерныхъ станковъ:

при половинной нагрузкѣ станка	0,50 — 0,65
» полной » »	0,70 — 0,85

7) При равныхъ прочихъ условіяхъ фрезерная головка снимаетъ металла въ единицу времени приблизительно на 40-50% больше, чѣмъ обыкновенная концевая фреза.

На отдѣльной страницѣ дана таблица фрезерованія для фрезъ перваго типа.

Для пользованія въ мастерской цифрами этой таблицы была построена номограмма, обращеніе съ которой было такъ же просто, какъ и съ обычной логариѳмической линейкой. Задаваясь глубиной фрезерованія, по данной ширинѣ обрабатываемаго предмета находятъ по номограммѣ подачу въ mm/min на 1 конскую силу общей мощности станка. Для разныхъ металловъ имѣются разные логариѳмическіе масштабы. Номограмма построена примѣнительно къ использованію полной мощности фрезерныхъ станковъ и при повѣркѣ оказалась совершенно удовлетворительной, какъ для малыхъ, такъ и для крупныхъ станковъ.

Съ фрезами второго типа было произведено 3 серіи опытовъ:

Въ первой серіи мѣнялась лишь глубина снимаемаго слоя отъ 1 до 10 mm, всѣ же остальные элементы были неизмѣнны, а именно: фреза дѣлала 28 оборотовъ, что соотвѣтствуетъ окружной скорости ея 12 met/min, подача была 101 mm/min, а ширина слоя 70 mm.

Во второй серіи мѣнялись лишь подачи отъ 10 до 232 mm/min.

Въ третьей серіи опытовъ мѣнялись обороты фрезы отъ 11 до 56 въ минуту, или иначе говоря, отъ 4,7 met/min до 23,4 met/min окружной скорости фрезы.

На фиг. 7 — показано графически вліяніе окружной скорости рѣзанія на продуктивность фрезерованія. Какъ показываетъ діаграмма, при скоростяхъ 8-12 met/min объемъ стружки на 1 kw энергіи brutto примѣрно на 25% больше, чѣмъ при окружныхъ скоростя ъ 19-24 met/min, т. е. работа идетъ продуктивнѣй при меньшей скорости, когда толщина стружки больше.

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На фиг. 8 показано вліяніе подачи. Особенно бросается въ глаза разница въ количествѣ снятой стружки на 1 kw brutto при измѣненіи подачъ отъ 10 до 130 mm/min: продуктивность растетъ быстро вмѣстѣ съ увеличеніемъ подачи. Дальнѣйшее увеличеніе до 230 mm/min почти не отражается на продуктивности.

Fig. 7.



Fig. 8.



Fig. 9.



На фиг. 9 представлено вліяніе глубины фрезерованія. При измѣненіяхъ глубины отъ 1mm до 10 mm продуктивность работы неизмѣнно растетъ. Такъ напримѣръ, при глубинѣ слоя 1 mm, на 1 kw/min brutto приходилось 2,2 cm^3 стружки, при глубинѣ 3 mm — 4,4 cm^3, при глубинѣ 5 mm— 6,3 cm^3, а при глубинѣ 10 mm — 8,0 cm^3.

Такъ какъ въ концѣ концовъ всякое измѣненіе числа оборотовъ фрезы, или величины подачи, или глубины снимаемаго слоя непосредственно приводитъ къ измѣненію толщины стружки, то всѣ предыдущія діаграммы сведены на фиг. 10 къ одному параметру — толщинѣ фрезерной стружки. Какъ видно изъ этой фигуры, всѣ три кривыя имѣютъ опредѣленную тенденцію подниматься вверхъ вмѣстѣ съ увеличеніемъ толщины стружки, т.е. отчетливо подтверждаютъ старый, извѣстный для рѣзцовъ, законъ рѣзанія, по которому объемъ стружки, приходящійся въ единицу времени на единиц узатраченной энергіи, тѣмъ больше, чѣмъ толще стружка. При тонкихъ стружкахъ, напр. до 0,3 mm, измѣненіе продуктивности фрезерованія въ зависимости отъ толщины стружки идетъ быстрѣй, чѣмъ для болѣе толстыхъ. Свыше 0,4 mm продуктивность работы остается почти неизмѣнной.

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

Толщина стружки. Fig. 10. The thickness of shavings.

Такъ какъ во всѣхъ отмѣченныхъ упомянутыми выше діаграммами опытахъ никакихъ дрожаній въ станкѣ не замѣчалось, и такъ какъ по своей конструкціи фреза второго типа обдирочная, то наивыгоднѣйшими условіями работы надлежитъ считать тѣ, при которыхъ стружка удаляется съ наименьшей затратой энергіи. Таковыми будутъ условія, при коихъ толщина стружки не менѣе 0,3 mm. А этому будутъ соотвѣтствовать: окружныя скорости отъ 7 до 12 met/min, подачи отъ 100 до 200 mm/min и глубины фрезерованія не менѣе 6 mm. Получаемъ такимъ образомъ тѣ же экономическія скорости (10-12 met/min), которыя были установлены еще Тейлоромъ для обдирочныхъ токарныхъ рѣзцовъ. При только-что формулированныхъ условіяхъ фрезерованія производительность фрезы выражается приблизительно 8,5 cm³/min стружки (обыкновенной машиноподѣлочной стали въ 50-55 kg/mm²) на 1 kw израсходованной энергіи brutto или 6,25 cm³/min на 1 HP. Производительность эта въ общемъ та же, что и фрезъ перваго типа. Работа съ фрезами второго типа вообще идетъ спокойно.

Интересно отмѣтить здѣсь, что во время испытаній на станкѣ Reinecker нѣсколько разъ провѣрялась примѣнимость номограммы фрезерованія, построенной для фрезъ перваго типа. Оказалось, что номограмма эта даетъ хорошіе результаты и для обдирочной фрезы второго типа.

Въ заключеніе необходимо подчеркнуть здѣсь, что при нормальныхъ глубинахъ фрезерованія, напр. 5-8 mm, для полученія гладкой поверхности, не требующей дальнѣйшаго шлихтованія, нельзя при работѣ фрезы второго типа брать стружки толще 0,2 mm; лучше даже ограничиваться толщиной до 0,15 mm, конечно за счетъ продуктивности работы.

Вслѣдствіе большихъ вертикальныхъ усилій, особенно въ началѣ работы фрезы второго типа, обрабатываемое издѣліе должно быть прочно и солидно укрѣплено на столѣ. Самый станокъ долженъ быть сильнымъ. При длинныхъ оправкахъ, во избѣжаніе дрожаній, рекомендуется уменьшить обороты фрезы, одновременно увеличивая подачу до полной нагрузки станка.

Благодаря большимъ промежуткамъ между зубцами обдирочной фрезы второго типа и правильности формированія спиральныхъ стружекъ, послѣднія отходятъ отъ фрезы спокойно, не попадая подъ ея зубцы. Обстоятельство это очень важно, ибо затупленіе всякой фрезы обязано въ значительной мѣрѣ попаданію стружки подъ зубцы, отчего страдаетъ и самая обрабатываемая поверхность.

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ДОБЫЧА РАДІЯ ВЪ РОССІИ.

*С.С. Палашковскій.**) *Докладъ читанъ въ Р.Э.О. 8.3.23.*

Въ ряду задачъ использованія природныхъ богатствъ Россіи тотъ вопросъ, которому посвящена мною настоящая замѣтка, заслуживаетъ вниманія не по величинѣ капитала, въ который можетъ оцѣниваться добываемый въ Россіи радій и получаемые при его добычѣ побочные продукты. Стоимость того радія, который можно было бы добывать въ Россіи, по сравненію, скажемъ, со стоимостью добываемаго въ Россіи угля, конечно; небольшая величина.

Не слѣдуетъ, однако, забывать, что число мѣсторожденій радіактивныхъ рудъ, вообще, чрезвычайно ограничено на землѣ. При теперешнемъ объемѣ человѣческаго знанія можно говорить о 5-6 мѣсторожденіяхъ радія, которыя имѣютъ коммерческое значеніе. Русское мѣсторожденіе радія находится въ ихъ числѣ. Съ другой стороны, радій въ медицинѣ и, отчасти, въ нѣкоторыхъ отрасляхъ техники уже теперь играетъ очень большую и незамѣнимую роль. А между тѣмъ, количество добытаго до сихъ поръ человѣчествомъ радія измѣряется въ граммахъ.

Эта исключительная рѣдкость и исключительное значеніе радія дѣлаютъ интереснымъ вопросъ о размѣрахъ имѣющихся въ Россіи мѣсторожденіяхъ и о той стадіи, до которой была доведена обработка русской радіактивной руды въ заводскомъ масштабѣ.

Мѣсторожденіе находится въ Ферганской области, недалеко отъ станціи Федченко, Закаспійской ж.д., въ предгоріяхъ Алтайскаго хребта. Руда представляетъ изъ себя углеизвестковую породу, пропитанную, главнымъ образомъ, солями радія, ванадія, урана, мѣди, желѣза, кальція, барія и кремнезема. Нѣкоторые признаки указываютъ, что руда эта разрабатывалась кустарнымъ образомъ въ незапамятныя времена китайцами; вѣроятно, на мѣдь. Они подошли къ ней черезъ находящуюся вблизи отъ мѣсторожденія пещеру.

«Ферганскимъ Обществомъ для Добычи Рѣдкихъ Металловъ», которому принадлежитъ мѣсторожденіе, добыча велась черезъ пробитую имъ шахту, глубиною въ 27 саженъ. Началась разработка за нѣсколько лѣтъ до войны. Добыто руды около 60 тыс. пудовъ, изъ которыхъ около 42 тыс. пуд. было доставлено въ Петроградъ въ лабораторіи и опытный заводъ Общества, а около 18 тыс. пуд. оставалось на рудникѣ.

Опредѣлить точную величину имѣющихся запасовъ руды пока нельзя. Для этого еще нѣтъ достаточныхъ цифровыхъ данныхъ и полнаго представленія о характерѣ мѣсторожденія. Понятіе о томъ, что изъ себя представляетъ это мѣсторожденіе, можно имѣть по слѣдующимъ фактамъ. Пройденная на глубину 27 саженъ шахта была остановлена въ рудѣ. Эта шахта была соединена штольней съ пещерой, служившей выходомъ руды на земную поверхность и мѣстомъ ея первоначальной добычи китайцами. Пробитыя буровыя въ районѣ пещеры и шахты встрѣтили ту же руду. Общій характеръ мѣстности даетъ основаніе предполагать, что данное мѣсторожденіе, находящееся въ изверженныхъ породахъ по антиклинальной складкѣ, представляетъ собою только выходъ коренного мѣсторожденія. Другіе выходы слѣдуетъ искать по той же складкѣ по простиранію. Указанное количество руды въ 60 тыс. пуд. было добыто путемъ проходки нижней части шахты и соединительной штольни.

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*) Директоръ Ферганскаго Общества для Добычи Рѣдкихъ Металловъ.

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Буровыя скважины показали, что рудѣ почти всегда предшествуютъ желѣзистыя прослойки. Это показаніе интересно, такъ какъ по сосѣдству съ даннымъ мѣсторожденіемъ имѣются пещеры, заполненныя желѣзистыми солями. Онѣ представляютъ собою какъ бы желѣзныя шапки.

Коренное мѣсторожденіе надо искать на болѣе глубокомъ горизонтѣ. Разрабатываемый выходъ мѣсторожденія находится на 100 саж. выше грунтовыхъ водъ. Можно, потому, быть почти увѣреннымъ, что всѣ выходы въ части своей выше этого горизонта грунтовыхъ водъ будутъ имѣть руду, по своему характеру аналогичную съ добытой. Только ниже этихъ 100 саж. руда можетъ измѣнить свой углекислый характеръ и перейти въ какую-нибудь иную.

Вблизи мѣсторожденія имѣется источникъ водной силы. Тѣмъ не менѣе, было признано практичнымъ перерабатывать руду въ Петроградѣ до тѣхъ поръ, пока заводской процессъ ея переработки не выйдетъ изъ стадіи естественныхъ во всякомъ новомъ дѣлѣ ошибокъ и не будетъ установленъ въ окончательной формѣ.

Богатство возможностей и химическаго персонала въ Петроградѣ,—гдѣ можно было пользоваться услугами не только приглашенныхъ для постоянной службы на заводъ химиковъ, но и консультировать по отдѣльнымъ случаямъ особыхъ затрудненій знатоковъ различныхъ областей химическихъ производствъ, — показало впослѣдствіи всю практичность только что указаннаго плана работъ.

Вопросъ установленія наилучшаго метода переработки руды представлялся весьма важнымъ. Дѣло въ томъ, что найденная въ урочищѣ «Тюя-Муюнь» (такъ называется это мѣсторожденіе) руда не была по своему составу похожа на другія радіактивныя руды, заводской способъ переработки коихъ уже былъ разработанъ. Она требовала новаго, собственнаго метода и представляла значительныя техническія трудности процесса, которыя удавалось преодолѣвать впослѣдствіи только мало-по-малу, изобрѣтая рядъ практическихъ пріемовъ. Въ переработанныхъ на Петроградскомъ заводѣ 42 тыс. пуд. руды было: радія, какъ я объ этомъ буду говорить подробнѣе ниже, всего изъ разсчета на бромистый радій — 4 грамма, металлическаго ванадія — 4%, окиси урана (въ соединеніи U_3O_8) — 1%, металлической мѣди около 5%.

Опуская практическія детали производства, выработка которыхъ намъ правда, доставила очень много хлопотъ, но которыя интересны только для спеціалиста, я дамъ схему производства въ общихъ чертахъ. Она состояла въ слѣдующемъ:

1) Руда растворялась въ технической соляной кислотѣ. Весь радій, кремнеземъ, большая часть желѣза и барія, частью кальцій и остатки другихъ элементовъ, оставались въ остаткѣ, не растворившемся въ соляной кислотѣ. Ванадій, уранъ, мѣдь и друг. элементы переходили въ растворъ. Растореніе велось при нагрѣвѣ.

2) Энергичнымъ окисленіемъ полученнаго раствора достигалось выдѣленіе въ осадокъ части ванадія въ видѣ ванадіевой кислоты.

3) Въ растворъ добавлялось хлористое желѣзо, и при нейтрализаціи раствора въ осадокъ выпадали соли ванадія въ видѣ феррованадата.

4) Растворъ, заключающій въ себѣ уранъ и мѣдь, обрабатывался металлическимъ желѣзомъ, отъ дѣйствія котораго высаживалась металлическая мѣдь и закись урана. Уранъ отдѣлялся отъ мѣди дѣйствіемъ соды: уранъ переходилъ въ растворъ, а мѣдь оставалась въ осадкѣ. Затѣмъ выдѣлялся уранъ въ осадокъ нейтрализаціей раствора.

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Уже указанныя четыре главныхъ реакціи для установленія методовъ ихъ веденія въ заводскомъ масштабѣ потребовали много труда и изобрѣтательности отъ химиковъ завода. Еще болѣе сложнымъ и интереснымъ, не сразу дающимся, оказался путь выработки способа выдѣленія радія. Потребовались продолжительные предварительные опыты въ лабораторіи завода, прежде чѣмъ былъ найденъ способъ отдѣленія заводскимъ путемъ радія отъ кремнезема, окиси желѣза и другихъ элементовъ и переведенія его въ растворъ, изъ котораго онъ уже легко можетъ извлекаться извѣстными пріемами, примѣняемыми г-жей Кюри и, вообще, заводами, изготовляющими препараты радія для медицинскихъ цѣлей. Трудность отдѣленія радія отъ кремнезема и пр. состояла въ томъ, что надо было найти способъ не только пригодный для заводского масштаба, но и экономный. Въ этомъ отношеніи мы пришли, наконецъ, къ благопріятнымъ результатамъ.

Этимъ проблема добычи русскаго радія можетъ считаться въ основныхъ чертахъ рѣшенной. Новая, не извѣстная техническому міру, русская руда получила свой методъ заводской обработки, и тѣмъ пріобщена къ міровой сокровищницѣ радія. Сдѣлано это усиліями исключительно русскихъ химиковъ, ибо, кромѣ все время вѣдавшихъ этимъ дѣломъ на заводѣ С.В. Терпугова и пишущаго эти строки, а равно нашихъ ближайшихъ помощниковъ, тоже русскихъ химиковъ, авторитетныя указанія и консультаціи время отъ времени давали проф. А.А. Яковкинъ и Акад. В.И. Вернадскій.

Самымъ возникновеніемъ своимъ дѣло добычи русскаго радія обязано также русскимъ инженерамъ: горн. инж. Антоновичу и инж. путей сообщ., С.Е. Палашковскому.

Возвращаюсь теперь къ исторіи полученія радія. Заводской методъ отдѣленія радія отъ кремнезема и желѣза и перевода его въ растворъ былъ установленъ въ 1917 г. Пустить заводское производство радія, къ сожалѣнію, мы не успѣли. Главнѣйшая часть его осталась въ остаткѣ, который, въ виду угрозы овладѣнія Петроградомъ со стороны нѣмецкихъ войскъ, былъ эвакуированъ правительственной властью на Каму. Впослѣдствіи, заводъ, какъ и все прочее, былъ націонализированъ. Сотрудники разъѣхались въ разныя страны. Затѣмъ, при коммунистическомъ управленіи, *) дѣло какъ кажется ограничилось небольшими лабораторными работами.

Интересъ къ выдѣленію бромистаго радія изъ остатковъ, полученныхъ нами послѣ обработки руды соляной кислотой, былъ очень великъ среди русскихъ ученыхъ. Между прочимъ, нами было предоставлено около 20 пуд. остатковъ Одесскому Отдѣленію Русскаго Техническаго Общества для его Радіологической Лабораторіи. Надъ ними работалъ, насколько мнѣ извѣстно, завѣдующій этой лабораторіей, молодой ученый Е.С. Буркеръ. Я не знаю, изъ-за всѣхъ передрягъ послѣднихъ годовъ, пришелъ ли онъ къ другому способу, отличному отъ нашего. Схема переработки руды, при семъ прилагаемая, даетъ достаточно ясное представленіе о процессѣ.

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*) Въ послѣднихъ газетахъ изъ Россіи («Эк. Ж.» 24. 3. 23) имѣется интервью съ проф. Хлопинымъ. Онъ сообщаетъ, что на Бондюжскомъ комбинатѣ приспособленъ заводъ для изготовленія радія. Проф. Хлопинъ состоитъ консультантомъ этого завода. Заводъ будетъ пущенъ въ ходъ немедленно по отпускѣ НКФ оборотныхъ средствъ . Требуется въ годъ 400 тыс. руб. золотомъ. Производительность завода разсчитана на 1.8 грамма радія въ первый годъ и до 3 граммъ въ слѣдующій. Сдѣланныя изслѣдованія Петровскимъ радіевымъ институтомъ показали, что русскій радій «отличается особой чистотой, что ставитъ его на ряду съ найболѣе цѣннымъ чехо-словацкимъ.» *Ред.*

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

Теперь нѣсколько словъ о томъ, въ какомъ видѣ получался нами продуктъ, и сколько его было получено.

Степень законченности получаемаго продукта зависѣла отъ коммерческой стороны дѣла. Для разработки радіактивной руды было образовано акціонерное общество, а именно, указанное мною выше «Ферганское Общество Добычи Рѣдкихъ Металловъ». Совершенно естественно, что до тѣхъ поръ, пока не былъ выработанъ экономическій, заводской способъ переработки руды, все это предпріятіе имѣло въ себѣ значительный рискъ. По однимъ лабораторнымъ опытамъ нельзя было, конечно, быть увѣреннымъ въ полученіи радія, ванадія и проч. попутныхъ продуктовъ въ заводскомъ масштабѣ и по достаточно низкимъ, для возможности обезпеченнаго сбыта, цѣнамъ. Совершенно понятно также, что акціонеръ стремился сдѣлать свой рискъ возможно меньшимъ, впредь до того времени, когда проблема заводского способа производства окончательно была бы рѣшена въ отношеніи этой новой руды.

Потому все дѣло такъ планировалось, чтобы расходы по лабораторнымъ и заводскимъ опытамъ установленія способа переработки руды покрывались если не полностью, то въ очень значительной части получаемымъ продуктомъ въ части производства, способъ котораго можно было считать въ достаточной мѣрѣ установленнымъ. При этомъ продуктъ не доводился до окончательной формы, если доведеніе требовало крупныхъ расходовъ на новыя обзаведенія для этой окончательной формы, и если технически не было сомнѣній, что полученная промежуточная форма продукта легко можетъ быть переведена въ окончательную при этомъ дополнительномъ обзаведеніи. Вопросъ о немъ откладывался на будущее время. Такъ, получаемый ванадій продавался въ видѣ ванадіевой кислоты и желѣзистой соли ванадіевой кислоты, вмѣсто сплава феробанадата, болѣе ходкаго и выгоднаго на рынкѣ сбыта.

Уранъ также продавался въ видѣ ураната натрія съ содержаніемъ U_3O_8 около 35%. Всего урана изъ разсчета U_3O_8 было продано 6090 килогр., что на 42.000 пуд. руды составляетъ 0,9%. Ванадій продавался,*) какъ уже

*) Уранъ и ванадій продавались исключительно въ Германію, мѣдь—въ Россію.

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сказано, въ видѣ ванадіевой кислоты съ содержаніемъ металлическаго ванадія въ 45-50% или въ видѣ желѣзистой соли ванадіевой кислоты съ содержаніемъ металлическаго ванадія около 24%. Было бы, конечно, выгоднѣе продавать ванадій непосредственно для металлургическихъ процессовъ въ видѣ ферро-ванадата сплава FeVa, какъ это дѣлаетъ, напр., Американское О-во Standart Alloys Co, Pittsburg Pa, U.S.A., являющееся крупнѣйшимъ европейскимъ поставщикомъ (руда изъ Перу) и устанавливающее на европейскомъ рынкѣ цѣну на ванадій. Мы вели, между прочимъ, переговоры съ двумя нѣмецкими заводами — «Маркъ» и «Голдшмитъ», занимавшимися сплавомъ ванадія. Послѣдній заводъ совсѣмъ отказался сообщить секретъ своего производства, а заводъ «Маркъ» потребовалъ 500.000 марокъ за патентъ и обученіе. Мы рѣшили подождать съ установкой сплавовъ до развитія нашего дѣла, благо ванадій находилъ сбытъ на рынкѣ и въ нашей формѣ. Всего ванадія изъ разсчета на металлическій было продано 21200 килограммовъ или около 3% отъ 42.000 пудовъ.

Не хватающее до указанныхъ выше процентныхъ содержаній (1% и 4%) количество урана и ванадія оставалось еще въ недообработанной рудѣ.

Радій, какъ указано было выше, послѣ обработки руды соляной кислотой оставался въ нерастворившемся осадкѣ, вмѣстѣ съ кремнеземомъ, желѣзомъ и съ солями II группы (Ca, Ba). Въ зависимости отъ полноты растворенія руды содержаніе радія въ остаткахъ колебалось отъ 0,022 гр. до 0,077 мгр. въ килограммѣ остатковъ изъ разсчета на бромистый радій. Провѣрочные анализы, по нашему порученію, были сдѣланы д-ромъ Рудольфи, Schmidt, О-вомъ Радіогенъ, Dr Bennewitz, Mme Curie, Рамзаемъ, Banque du Radium, Armet-de-Lysle. Всего радія по этимъ анализамъ въ 42.000 пуд. руды, переработанной нами въ остатки, содержалось свыше 4 граммовъ изъ разсчета на бромистый. Остатковъ такихъ было получено около 6.000 пуд. Часть такихъ остатковъ (около 14.000 килограммовъ) было продано нами въ Германію и Францію по относительно низкимъ цѣнамъ. Насъ интересовала не такъ цѣна, какъ возбужденіе интереса къ этому новому виду руды, и мы расчитывали, что, можетъ быть, французскіе и нѣмецкіе заводы, покупавшіе наши остатки для полученія изъ нихъ радія, скорѣе нашего выработаютъ заводской экономическій способъ ихъ дальнѣйшей переработки. Въ этомъ мы ошиблись, и оттого прекратили дальнѣйшую продажу остатковъ, расчитывая ихъ сразу переработать по установленіи нами окончательно собственнаго способа.

Добавлю еще, что параллельно съ установленіемъ способа переработки руды, мы очень интересовались энергичнымъ ея обогащеніемъ. Намъ удалось разработать способъ обогащенія руды вполнѣ экономичный по мѣстнымъ условіямъ мѣсторожденія. Очень возможно, что, примѣняя этотъ способъ, можно будетъ ограничиться постановкой въ Тюя-Муюнь только добычи и обогащенія руды, заводъ же переработки устроить въ крупномъ промышленномъ центрѣ.

Такъ обстояло дѣло съ добычей русскаго радія. Я не сомнѣваюсь, что оно станетъ на прочныя ноги, какъ только въ Россіи общія условія будутъ допускать возможность веденія какого бы то ни было промышленнаго предпріятія.

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ИНСТИТУТЪ ТРАНСПОРТА И ПРАКТИЧЕСКОЙ ЭКОНОМИКИ.

Владиславъ Л. Богдановичъ.

Докладъ,*) читанный въ Р.Э.О. 18 - I - 23.

Личный факторъ въ современной хозяйственной системѣ съ каждымъ днемъ начинаетъ играть все большую роль.

Современное хозяйство есть уже хозяйство большой экономики. Прежнія единоличныя предпріятія относительно скромныхъ размѣровъ, расширившись до крупныхъ акціонерныхъ формъ, не останавливаются на этомъ — они аммальгамируются въ громадные торговые и промышленные корабли: тресты, вертикальныя объединенія и, наконецъ, національныя хозяйства.

Масштабъ современныхъ хозяйствъ не допускаетъ ни въ руководителяхъ, ни въ обслуживающемъ ихъ персоналѣ «отсебятины», но требуетъ большой предварительной эрудиціи для безошибочнаго направленія и для отчетливаго выполненія.

Поэтому въ современной цивилизаціи одно изъ важнѣйшихъ мѣстъ отводится вопросамъ: 1) подготовки людей къ ихъ профессіональной дѣятельности въ различныхъ отрасляхъ хозяйства и 2) практической экономики.

Можно съ увѣренностью сказать, что безъ широкаго и практическаго знанія экономики своего дѣла въ масштабѣ національнаго и мірового хозяйства уже не можетъ обойтись ни инженеръ, какъ бы высока ни была его чисто техническая квалификація, ни всякій другой хозяинъ.

Въ предстоящемъ возстановленіи Россійскаго хозяйства, однимъ изъ главнѣйшихъ вопросовъ и притомъ, вѣроятно, на нѣсколько десятилѣтій, будетъ вопросъ дешеваго и хорошо налаженнаго транспорта. Громадныя Россійскія разстоянія, еще не побѣжденныя надлежащей сѣтью транспорта, дѣлаютъ втуне лежащими богатые природные рессурсы отдѣльныхъ районовъ страны, какъ Сибирь, Сѣверъ Европейской Россіи, Закаспійскій Край и т.п. Хорошо организованный и сильно развитый транспортъ будетъ возбудителемъ самыхъ широкихъ и богатыхъ хозяйственныхъ возможностей въ Россіи и предпосылкой, обусловливающей эксплоатацію природныхъ богатствъ на протяженіи всего послѣдующаго процесса національнаго развитія.

Технически дѣло транспорта было поставлено въ Россіи высоко. Что же касается до коммерческой стороны транспорта, — разумѣя требованія будущаго хозяйства Россіи, хозяйства экономически большого масштаба, — то дѣло только начинало становиться на правильный путь. Этимъ послѣднимъ обусловливалась и отъ этого зависѣла скудость притока капитала для развитія транспортной Россійской сѣти. Проблеммы стальныхъ путей большого транзита и мѣстныхъ сообщеній, вопросы головныхъ портовъ, рѣчныхъ артерій, связи транспорта, торговли и промышленности и т.п., съ точки зрѣнія экономики, требуютъ самаго широкаго вниманія и облегченія для русскихъ сравнительнаго изученія постановки этого рода дѣлъ въ Россіи и передовыхъ индустріальныхъ странахъ.

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*) Докладъ этотъ печатается съ тѣми измѣненіями, которыя были сдѣланы въ немъ докладчикомъ, послѣ обсужденія доклада въ Р. Э. О.

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Вотъ почему я постоянно возвращаюсь мыслью къ вопросу учрежденія въ Россіи «Института Транспорта и Практической Экономики», и почему этотъ вопросъ я рѣшаюсь сдѣлать темой настоящаго доклада Русскому Экономическому Обществу.

ГЛ. I.

Прежде чѣмъ перейти къ болѣе частному вопросу объ основныхъ линіяхъ Института Транспорта и Практической Экономики въ Россіи, я остановлюсь сперва кратко на постановкѣ профессіональнаго, техническаго и экономическаго образованія заграницей и въ Россіи.

Профессіональное образованіе въ Англіи. — Англія — страна традиціи и практическаго опыта. Здѣсь профессіональное образованіе получается двумя путями. Первый путь, по которому идетъ большинство, это—путь практическій. Люди начинаютъ свою дѣловую карьеру въ раннемъ юношескомъ возрастѣ либо простыми рабочими на фабрикахъ, либо мальчиками въ конторахъ. Попутно съ этимъ они свое профессіональное и общее образованіе пополняютъ въ различныхъ и весьма многочисленныхъ вечернихъ и воскресныхъ школахъ.*) Работая практически на фабрикахъ, въ чертежной, въ конторѣ и т.п. и получая теоретическую профессіональную подготовку въ вечернихъ классахъ,—они въ теченіе нѣсколькихъ лѣтъ; въ зависимости отъ индивидуальнаго интереса и способностей, настолько знакомятся съ рутиной дѣла, что могутъ вступать въ одно изъ отвѣчающихъ ихъ спеціальности профессіональныхъ обществъ, которыя здѣсь обычно именуются «Институтами». **)

Этого рода «институты» являются чисто профессіональными ассоціаціями, которыя поощряютъ и содѣйствуютъ своимъ членамъ въ повышеніи ихъ профессіональной квалификаціи, но отнюдь не ставятъ своею прямою цѣлью систематическую теоретическую и профессіональную подготовку молодыхъ поколѣній при посредствѣ школьныхъ методовъ обученія. Поэтому, ихъ не слѣдуетъ смѣшивать съ учебными заведеніями, иногда также именуемыми институтами. Эти «институты» приносятъ громадную пользу своимъ сочленамъ.

Вступленіе въ эти «институты», обычно, обусловливается требованіями возраста, количества лѣтъ практики и исполненія отвѣтственныхъ работъ, а также положеніемъ, занимаемымъ въ торгово-промышленномъ предпріятіи и т.п. Можно стать, отвѣчая въ большей или меньшей степени этимъ требованіямъ, или членомъ такого общества («Member») или быть его участникомъ («Associate»). Нѣкоторые «институты» въ самое послѣднее время стали допускать еще участіе въ качествѣ «Graduates» или «Students». Во всѣхъ случаяхъ обычно требуется рекомендація или поручительство наличныхъ членовъ ассоціаціи. Иногда, помимо практическаго стажа, требуется еще вступительный экзаменъ. Эти «институты» иногда выдаютъ своимъ членамъ дипломы, служащіе какъ бы сертификатами опредѣленной профессіональной квалификаціи. Почти всѣ институты имѣютъ у себя спеціальныя библіотеки для пользованія членовъ и устраиваютъ различнаго рода доклады и

*) Въ одномъ Лондонѣ въ вѣдѣніи London County Council такихъ вечернихъ школъ свыше 150.

**) Institute of Civil Engineers», «Institute of Naval Architects», «Institute of Bankers», «Institute of Chartered Accountants», «Institute of Chartered Shipbrokers», «Institute of Directors», «Institute of London Underwriters», «Institute of Industrial Administration», «Institute of Transport», «Institution of Professional Civil Servants» и т.д. и т.п.

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лекціи. Въ жизни такихъ институтовъ весьма популярны спеціальныя сообщенія, которыя дѣлаются членами Общества по различнымъ вопросамъ ихъ собственной практики, наблюденій или соображеній, а затѣмъ собесѣдованія и пренія по этому поводу.

Второй путь полученія образованія похожъ на обще-европейскій — оно пріобрѣтается окончаніемъ курса въ одномъ изъ учебныхъ заведеній. Чаще всего школы эти не строятся на принципѣ единой для всѣхъ учащихся программы, а предоставляютъ изъ ряда предметовъ, относящихся къ циклу опредѣленныхъ знаній и преподаваемыхъ въ школѣ, учащимся самимъ выбирать и комбинировать для себя программу. Окончаніе курса и полученіе диплома особыхъ правъ не даетъ, и этимъ объясняется, что англійскія, какъ техническія, такъ и коммерческія силы выходятъ преимущественно изъ практиковъ.

Характернымъ для такого образованія еще не такъ давно въ Англіи было то, что школьное обученіе не задавалось цѣлью созданія или расширенія кругозора учащихся за предѣлами рутины ихъ дѣла. Сейчасъ, однако, широкое коммерческое и обще-экономическое школьное образованіе начинаетъ находить къ себѣ несравненно большее вниманіе, ибо растущая съ каждымъ днемъ напряженность хозяйственнаго оборота показала, что одного практическаго опыта, неподкрѣпленнаго спеціальными теоретическими и научными познаніями, уже недостаточно теперь.

Наиболѣе солидной и интересной системой является система, проведенная въ «The London School of Economics and Political Science» при Лондонскомъ Университетѣ, являющейся нынѣ центромъ экономическаго и высшаго коммерческаго образованія для всей Англіи. Эта Школа основана въ 1895 г., но работа, сдѣланная ею въ относительно короткій срокъ ея существованія, громадна.

Профессіональное образованіе въ Европѣ и Америкѣ. — Историческія и экономическія условія другихъ народовъ Европы складывались иначе и менѣе благопріятно. Въ жизни этихъ народовъ назрѣвали рѣзко и подчасъ какъ бы внезапно такіе моменты, когда созданіе въ странѣ личнаго фактора для тѣхъ или иныхъ отраслей хозяйственной дѣятельности становилось для нихъ неотложной національной проблеммой. Разрѣшенія этихъ проблеммъ искали въ разумно поставленной теоретической и практической школьной подготовкѣ персонала. Такъ, въ Германіи вслѣдъ за Франко-Германской войной 1970-71 гг. выдвинулся рядъ проблеммъ новаго хозяйственнаго устроенія страны. Въ этотъ періодъ тамъ мы встрѣчаемся съ цѣлымъ рядомъ съѣздовъ, посвященныхъ пересмотру постановки въ странѣ техническаго образованія и школьнаго дѣла вообще. За техническое образованіе взялось правительство на основѣ принциповъ, принятыхъ на съѣздахъ. Что же касается коммерческаго образованія, то въ этой области наиболѣе активное и значительное участіе проявила общественность, мѣстныя и городскія самоуправленія и сами дѣятели торговли и промышленности. Систематическая и упорная работа по созданію личнаго фактора въ области техники и коммерціи, въ конечномъ итогѣ, создали Германіи то мѣсто, которое она заняла среди другихъ народовъ.

Во Франціи національныя проблеммы въ области организаціи труда и производства возникли тотчасъ вслѣдъ за революціей. Въ народныхъ массахъ тогда явился спросъ на различнаго рода прикладныя, практическія знанія. Какъ отвѣтъ на запросы времени, въ 1794 г. была учреждена «Школа Общественныхъ Работъ» («Ecole Centrale des Travaux Publics»), которая въ

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слѣдующемъ году была переименована въ «Ecole Politechnique», и подъ этимъ именемъ существуетъ до сихъ поръ.

Въ остальныхъ индустріальныхъ европейскихъ странахъ исторія профессіональнаго образованія не въ меньшей степени связана съ національными проблеммами промышленнаго или обще-хозяйственнаго развитія или реконструкціи страны.

Въ каждой изъ странъ не трудно отмѣтить, что ея экономическій прогрессъ пропорціоналенъ росту въ ней какъ техническаго, такъ и экономическаго образованія. Эти двѣ стороны дѣла идутъ всегда рядомъ. Если проблеммы экономическаго развитія вызываютъ массовую потребность въ людяхъ технической квалификаціи, то созданіе этихъ послѣднихъ путемъ спеціальной подготовки въ свою очередь даетъ толчекъ экономическому преуспѣянію страны.

Крупную роль въ насажденіи и развитіи коммерческаго образованія въ этихъ странахъ, какъ и въ Германіи, сыграли частная иниціатива, муниципалитеты, мѣстныя самоуправленія и торгово-промышленный классъ.

Система коммерческаго образованія во всѣхъ европейскихъ странахъ болѣе или менѣе однотипна и не особенно отличается отъ соотвѣтственныхъ русскихъ школъ, существовавшихъ до революціи. Въ общемъ же все коммерческое образованіе въ Европѣ носитъ скорѣе академическій характеръ, чѣмъ утилитарно-практическій.

Америка представляетъ особенность. Тамъ обращено особенное вниманіе на то, чтобы въ самой школѣ уже достичь равновѣсія между теоретической и практической подготовкой.

Если на первыхъ шагахъ Америка начала свою хозяйственную жизнь, базируясь на личномъ факторѣ, созданномъ за счетъ европейской культуры и школы, то уже по мѣрѣ того, какъ эта страна стала складываться въ самодовлѣющую хозяйственную и, вмѣстѣ съ тѣмъ, политическую единицу, вопросъ созданія своего собственнаго американскаго типа школы явился одной изъ національныхъ проблеммъ. Теперь тамъ имѣется громадная сѣть всякаго рода школъ общаго и спеціальнаго характера, и американская школа во многихъ случаяхъ даетъ практическіе результаты болѣе совершенные, чѣмъ европейская. Для насъ особенный интересъ представляютъ тѣ спеціальные экономическіе, коммерческіе, финансовые и т.п. колледжи, что созданы сравнительно недавно при главныхъ университетахъ Америки.*) Въ связи съ послѣ-военными проблеммами реконструкціи хозяйственныхъ отношеній тамъ, эти школы находятъ въ сегодняшній день къ себѣ особенное вниманіе и заботу.

Что бросается въ глаза во всякой американской школѣ, — это выработка въ ученикахъ привычки выражать свои мысли на словахъ и на бумагѣ точно, ясно и кратко.

Коммерческое и экономическое образованіе въ Россіи. — Классъ профес-

*) The Wharton School of Finance and Commerce при the University of Pesylvania; School of Commerce and Finance при St Louis University; College of Business Administration of Syracuse University; School of Business при Columbia University; College of Business Administration при University of Boston; School of Business and Public Administration при the University of Missouri; College of Commerce and Business Administration и School of Railway Engineering and Administration при the University of Illinois; College of Commerce and Jurnalism при Ohio State University; Courses of Instructions in Government, Social Ethics and Economics при Harvard University; School of Commerce при Northwestern University въ Chicago; School of Commerce при the University of Georgia, и многіе другіе.

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сіональныхъ коммерсантовъ и промышленниковъ въ той формѣ и смыслѣ, какъ онъ существуетъ въ Западной Европѣ, у насъ началъ формироваться довольно поздно. Однако, мысль о спеціальной коммерческой школѣ въ Россіи возникла въ то время, когда въ Западной Европѣ еще не было ни одной школы этого типа. Въ 1772 г. П.А. Демидовъ пожертвовалъ 205.000 р. на устройство «Коммерческаго Воспитательнаго Училища», которое и было учреждено въ Москвѣ при Воспитательномъ Домѣ. Въ 1799 г. это училище было переведено въ Петроградъ. Въ 1804 г. московскимъ купечествомъ было создано 2 новыхъ коммерческихъ училища. Вплоть до событій послѣдняго времени въ Россіи образованная часть русскаго купечества Москвы, Кіева, Одессы и т.д., проявляла, подобно западно-европейскому, самое доброжелательное отношеніе, а подчасъ и принимала непосредственное участіе въ учрежденіи и дѣятельности различнаго рода разсадниковъ коммерческихъ и хозяйственныхъ знаній. Такъ, напримѣръ, въ началѣ этого столѣтія въ Москвѣ исключительно попеченіемъ московскаго купечества и трудами ряда профессоровъ Университета была создана высшая коммерческая школа — «Московскій Коммерческій Институтъ». Аналогичный Институтъ былъ созданъ въ Кіевѣ. Оба они съумѣли широко поставить дѣло преподаванія, привлечь массу серьезнаго студенчества и войти въ тѣсный контактъ съ торгово-промышленной жизнью и ея интересами. При Петроградскомъ, Рижскомъ, Одесскомъ Политехникумахъ существовали свои Экономическія Отдѣленія. Помимо перечисленныхъ высшихъ школъ, цѣлый рядъ среднихъ коммерческихъ школъ имѣлся въ различныхъ провинціальныхъ центрахъ, какъ Одесса, Екатеринославъ, Харьковъ, Ростовъ и т.д. Въ общемъ, уровень коммерческаго и экономическаго образованія въ этихъ школахъ былъ не только не ниже, но подчасъ и выше многихъ школъ этого типа въ Западной Европѣ.

Теперь отъ прошлаго Россіи обратимся къ ея будущему.

ГЛ. II.

Пути и задачи Россіи. — Россія — страна будущаго. Среди россійскихъ гражданъ и оставшихся внутри Россіи, и разсѣявшихся по разнымъ странамъ, дозрѣваетъ теперь сознаніе неотложной необходимости новаго, творческаго созданія независимаго Россійскаго національнаго хозяйства. Этотъ процессъ настолько глубокъ, важенъ и потенціально продуктивенъ, что онъ, вѣроятно, положитъ начало новой эпохѣ русской жизни.

Всякій будущій государственный правопорядокъ столкнется, прежде всего, съ вопросами *хозяйственнаго* устроенія страны, съ вопросами добычи, производства и обмѣна, съ вопросомъ усиленія производительности народнаго труда. Вопросы *національнаго хозяйства и народной самодѣятельности* станутъ координатами всякаго соціальнаго и политическаго строительства. Въ нихъ лежитъ ключъ къ успѣху рѣшенія, какъ внутреннихъ проблеммъ страны, такъ и проблеммъ ея отношеній къ внѣшнему міру.

Въ связи съ этой проблеммой новаго хозяйственнаго строительства и поднятія производительныхъ силъ, — передъ нами естественно встаетъ вопросъ о «человѣкѣ».

Россія сейчасъ болѣе, чѣмъ когда-либо ранѣе, нуждается въ человѣкѣ-творцѣ ея новой экономической жизни. Такой человѣкъ можетъ выявляться только тогда, когда онъ непрерывно провѣряетъ и совершенствуетъ свой личный дѣловой опытъ въ атмосферѣ научной постановки и изученія техническихъ и экономическихъ проблеммъ Россіи, и когда новая школа гармонично сочетаетъ въ учащемся теорію съ практикой его будущей профессіи. —

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«Институтъ Транспорта и Практической Экономики». — Эти два, только что указанные принципа мы и постараемся сдѣлать фундаментомъ нашего Института Транспорта.

Особая важность транспортнаго дѣла и громадная зависимость отъ него всѣхъ другихъ видовъ хозяйства потребовала спеціальнаго изученія его принциповъ, элементовъ и особенностей и сейчасъ уже во многихъ университетахъ и экономическихъ школахъ Америки, Англіи, Германіи. Въ Англіи и Америкѣ успѣла уже создаться богатѣйшая литература по различнымъ отраслямъ знанія транспортнаго дѣла. Прекрасно поставленные отдѣльные курсы транспортнаго дѣла можно найти почти во всѣхъ крупныхъ университетахъ этихъ странъ. Потребности все рѣзче и рѣзче проникали въ сознаніе. Въ результатѣ этого процесса въ Америкѣ было организовано особое Bureau of Railway Economics, являющееся національнымъ центромъ по вопросамъ желѣзнодорожнаго хозяйства и транспорта. Въ Англіи спеціальный институтъ, посвященный транспорту, былъ учрежденъ въ 1919 г. въ видѣ общества «Institute of Transport», которое ставитъ своею цѣлью развитіе и распространеніе знаній относительно путей и средствъ сообщенія, искусства ихъ эксплоатаціи и пользованія ими въ торговлѣ и промышленности. Организаторы и руководители этого Института намѣрены заняться издательствомъ и распространеніемъ въ печатной формѣ какъ докладовъ, читанныхъ въ Обществѣ, такъ и различнаго рода спеціальныхъ свѣдѣній и руководствъ, справочниковъ, статистическихъ сборниковъ и т.п. Съ цѣлью наглядной иллюстраціи приложенія началъ науки и искусства къ дѣлу транспорта, они имѣютъ въ виду устройство выставокъ всякаго рода приспособленій, аппаратовъ, моделей и т.п. Формируется спеціальная библіотека по транспорту. Лицамъ, выполняющимъ тѣ или иныя работы, отвѣчающія цѣлямъ и интересамъ Института, оказывается содѣйствіе, какъ въ видѣ денежныхъ пособій, такъ и въ смыслѣ снабженія такихъ лицъ потребными для ихъ работъ книгами, инструментами, аппаратами, приспособленіями и т.д.

Стоитъ этому Институту взять на себя организацію систематическихъ лекцій и занятій для студентовъ, и это будетъ великолѣпный разсадникъ знаній по транспортному дѣлу и для школы, связывающій въ тѣсномъ контактѣ практическихъ дѣятелей транспорта и его жизненные интересы съ молодымъ поколѣніемъ.

Россійскій транспортъ, если говорить только о желѣзнодорожномъ и внутреннемъ водномъ, предъявляетъ задачи несравненно болѣе крупнаго масштаба, болѣе сложныя по своимъ условіямъ и болѣе богатыя по количеству возможныхъ рѣшеній, чѣмъ транспортъ англійскій. Надобность для Россіи, поэтому, въ Транспортномъ Институтѣ несравненно болѣе велика, чѣмъ въ Англіи. Дѣло идетъ не о надуманномъ теоретическомъ предпріятіи. Вопросъ — въ лучшей организаціи, дополненіи, большемъ расширеніи и радикальномъ перестроеніи того, что на практикѣ, правда въ несовершенной формѣ, уже существовало въ Россіи, для удовлетворенія сложнѣйшихъ требованій страны въ транспортномъ дѣлѣ, помимо болѣе узкихъ рамокъ отдѣльныхъ транспортныхъ хозяйствъ, отдѣльной ж.дороги, порта и т.д.

Для удовлетворенія этихъ требованій въ масштабѣ національнаго хозяйства существовалъ въ Россіи рядъ учрежденій, организацій и учебныхъ заведеній, работавшихъ часто параллельно, безъ надлежащей взаимной связи, не поднимавшихся надъ своимъ относительно узкимъ спеціальнымъ или вѣдомственнымъ горизонтомъ, и потому затрачивавшихъ излишній трудъ и дававшихъ менѣе продуктивные, чѣмъ то было нужно, результаты.

Наряду съ указанными только что недостатками въ работѣ, надо отмѣ-

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тить и большіе успѣхи, иногда тонкое провидѣніе будущаго, громадную профессіональную любовь къ дѣлу и почти виртуозную изобрѣтательность въ разрѣшеніи большихъ заданій при очень ограниченныхъ матеріальныхъ средствахъ.

Указанныя мною учрежденія и организаціи имѣли правительственный, общественный, частный, кооперативно-профессіональный и смѣшанный характеръ, имѣли существованіе постоянное, или временное для разрѣшенія одного какого-нибудь, очень остраго для данной эпохи развитія транспорта, вопроса. Я укажу хотя бы на Отдѣлъ по Новымъ Дорогамъ II Департамента Государственнаго Совѣта, вѣдавшаго обсужденіемъ экономической цѣлесообразности и утвержденіемъ концессій на новыя ж.-д. линіи, тарифные съѣзды и Комитетъ, порайонные комитеты, Комитетъ по сооруженію Великой Сибирской Дороги, постоянные съѣзды дѣятелей по воднымъ и шоссейнымъ путямъ, рядъ сыгравшихъ такую рѣшающую роль въ Россіиской транспортной политикѣ Комиссій: Барановскую, Н.П. Петрова, И.К. Борисова, наконецъ, комиссій отдѣльныхъ биржевыхъ комитетовъ, земскихъ и городскихъ самоуправленій по проектированію новыхъ ж.-д. путей въ ихъ районѣ и т.д.. Въ конечномъ счетѣ, всѣ эти учрежденія и организаціи занимались въ масштабѣ національнаго хозяйства двумя основными вопросами: 1) улучшеніемъ въ экономическомъ и техническомъ отношеніи обслуживанія существующимъ транспортомъ обмѣна страны и 2) направленіемъ, въ которомъ долженъ развиваться транспортъ въ зависимости отъ предполагаемаго или желаемаго развитія россійскихъ производительныхъ силъ.

Нужная для указанныхъ двухъ цѣлей техническая подготовка персонала, обслуживающаго транспортъ, выполнялась существующимъ свыше 100 лѣтъ однимъ изъ старѣйшихъ высшихъ учебныхъ заведеній Россіи, Институтомъ Инженеровъ Путей Сообщенія, Механическими Отдѣленіями Технологическихъ и Политехническихъ Институтовъ, Московскимъ Инженернымъ Училищемъ, наконецъ, цѣлымъ рядомъ среднихъ техническихъ училищъ по желѣзнодорожнымъ и воднымъ сообщеніямъ.

Несравненно хуже обстояло дѣло съ экономической подготовкой персонала, въ частности, по службѣ движенія и коммерческой. Профессіональную тренировку этотъ персоналъ получалъ на самой практикѣ, имѣя до этого общее, только теоретическое образованіе, мало приспособленное для его дѣятельности. Только въ самое послѣднее время можно было говорить, и то въ очень ограниченномъ размѣрѣ, о пополненіи службы движенія и коммерческой изъ воспитанниковъ экономическихъ отдѣленій Политехникумовъ и Коммерческихъ Институтовъ. Даже очень крупные инженеры, руководители Россійскаго транспорта, всегда ощущали недостатокъ такого мѣста, гдѣ они быстро могли бы ознакомиться съ современными практическими и экономическими рѣшеніями той или другой транспортной проблеммы. Имъ приходилось самимъ рыться въ массѣ источниковъ или поручать это людямъ, не прошедшимъ надлежащей школы практической экономики транспорта.

Бѣдность и несовершенство источниковъ «практической экономики транспорта», снабжающихъ Россійскій транспортъ нужными свѣдѣніями, были наиболѣе слабымъ его мѣстомъ. Проектируемый «Институтъ Транспорта и Практической Экономики» долженъ, въ числѣ всѣхъ прочихъ задачъ, устранить только что указанный недостатокъ въ полной мѣрѣ.

Проектируемый институтъ Транспорта и Практической Экономики развиваетъ свою дѣятельность въ 3-хъ направленіяхъ: 1) улучшенія обслуживанія существующимъ транспортомъ обмѣна страны, 2) выработки плановъ

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расширенія транспортной сѣти для развитія производительныхъ силъ Россіи и 3) подготовки техническаго и экономическаго персонала для транспорта. Институтъ объединяетъ учрежденія, организаціи и отдѣльныхъ спеціалистовъ, если они занимаются указанными выше 3 основными задачами транспорта и имѣютъ соотвѣтственную квалификацію. Физическія лица, спеціалисты въ тѣхъ или другихъ областяхъ транспорта, состоятъ членами Института. Учрежденія или организаціи, а также общества Россійскія, а въ нѣкоторыхъ случаяхъ и иностранныя, могутъ состоять либо членами, либо связывать свою дѣятельность болѣе тѣсной связью съ дѣятельностью Транспортнаго Института. Связь эта (association) можетъ имѣть гибкую форму, выработанную для каждаго конкретнаго случая. Напримѣръ: сотрудничество и распредѣленіе работы по общей программѣ, скажемъ, разработки опредѣленнаго вопроса транспорта, взаимное пользованіе библіотекой, музеемъ и т.д., оказаніе Институтомъ или Институту денежнаго содѣйствія, и т. д.

Институтъ является учрежденіемъ: 1) ученымъ, 2) учебнымъ, 3) изслѣдующимъ и разрабатывающимъ различныя транспортныя проблеммы и 4) консультирующимъ по вопросамъ транспорта.

Онъ долженъ быть построенъ на принципѣ частнаго общества, въ которомъ правительственныя, промышленныя, торговыя, городскія, земскія, кооперативныя и биржевыя организаціи и учрежденія принимали бы, какъ assotiates, участіе, и плодами работъ котораго пользовались бы. Ни на какое законодательствованіе или администрированіе Институтъ Транспорта, конечно, не можетъ претендовать. Но при надлежащей авторитетности, тактѣ и объективности руководителя онъ быстро сдѣлается тѣмъ умственнымъ центромъ, гдѣ будетъ рождаться, развиваться и оцѣниваться всякая живая и творческая транспортная мысль. Этотъ центръ станетъ экспертомъ, съ мнѣніемъ котораго будетъ считаться правительственная власть при своемъ транспортномъ законодательствѣ, тарифной политикѣ, развитіи новой сѣти путей и т.д. Часть подготовительной и изслѣдовательской работы, которую дѣлали указанныя выше многочисленныя учрежденія и организаціи, естественно перейдетъ къ Институту. Вся предлагаемая система: 1) объединитъ работу, 2) удешевитъ ее, 3) сдѣлаетъ ее авторитетнѣе, а, главное, 4) сблизитъ и сдѣлаетъ взаимно болѣе понятными и согласуемыми требованія а) техники и экономики транспорта, б) транспортнаго аппарата въ цѣломъ и его потребителя.

Институтъ управляется Совѣтомъ, избираемымъ членами Института и его Assotiates. Совѣтъ возглавляется предсѣдателемъ Института и нѣсколькими его товарищами, стоящими во главѣ отдѣловъ и главныхъ учрежденій Института.

Кромѣ членовъ Института , въ немъ имѣются 1) сотрудники (graduates), работающіе при помощи институтскихъ библіотекъ и прочихъ рессурсовъ надъ отдѣльными вопросами транспорта, 2) студенты, проходящіе институтскую высшую школу и, наконецъ, 3) слушатели отдѣльныхъ практическихъ курсовъ (относительно кратковременныхъ) для дѣятелей различныхъ отраслей транспорта.

Институтъ Транспорта имѣетъ пять основныхъ отдѣловъ, на которые дѣлятся члены его (и техники, и экономисты): 1) желѣзнодорожный, 2) внутренній водный, 3) грунтовый, 4) морской и 5) воздушный.

Дѣятельность Института состоитъ въ 1) устройствѣ докладовъ въ собраніяхъ по отдѣламъ и общихъ, 2) въ періодическихъ съѣздахъ дѣятелей по отдѣльнымъ отраслямъ транспорта, 3) экскурсіяхъ для осмотра постановки

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транспортнаго дѣла заграницей, 4) всероссійскихъ конкурсовъ по отдѣльнымъ вопросамъ транспорта съ награжденіемъ преміями и медалями; 5) изданіи сочиненій и періодическихъ журналовъ по вопросамъ транспорта, 6) содержаніи высшей школы для подготовки работниковъ транспорта, 7) курсовъ для повышенія квалификаціи наличнаго персонала транспорта въ различныхъ отрасляхъ, 8) отдѣла изслѣдованій и улучшеній транспортныхъ проблеммъ и отдѣла разработки методовъ и послѣдовательности возстановленія транспорта (временный впредь до окончанія возстановленія); 9) библіотеки, статистическаго кабинета и музея по транспорту.

Излишне было бы загромождать мысль о необходимости устройства Института Транспорта и Практической Экономики излишней детализаціей. Неписанные статуты, а практическая работа наполняетъ содержаніемъ и дѣлаетъ полезными учрежденія. Я остановлюсь, однако, по возможности кратко на нѣкоторыхъ изъ перечисленныхъ задачахъ дѣятельности, отчасти затѣмъ, чтобы точнѣе пояснить идею Института, отчасти, чтобы дать практическія свѣдѣнія о дѣятельности аналогичныхъ заграничныхъ учрежденій.

Гл. III.

Періодическіе съѣзды дѣятелей транспорта имѣютъ свою долголѣтнюю и плодотворную исторію въ Россіи. Съѣзды эти обычно собирались ежегодно (напр., по водному и шоссейному транспорту). Обмѣнъ мнѣній людей, съѣхавшихся съ разныхъ концовъ обширной Россіи, работавшихъ въ разнообразныхъ условіяхъ и дѣлившихся другъ съ другомъ результатами своихъ достиженій по всему выдающемуся, что пережилъ въ этотъ годъ транспортъ и намѣчавшихъ программы предстоящихъ работъ — всегда былъ хорошимъ стимуломъ для индивидуальной активности и прогресса. Успѣшную практику съѣздовъ слѣдуетъ распространить на рядъ новыхъ отраслей транспорта.

Высшая школа для профессіональной подготовки работниковъ транспорта. — Какъ я уже говорилъ, подготовка инженеровъ и техниковъ различныхъ спеціальностей для транспорта поставлена въ Россіи, по сравненію даже съ самыми передовыми странами, очень высоко. Можетъ быть, нашъ инженеръ даже слишкомъ энциклопедиченъ. Въ этомъ отношеніи можетъ, быть, слѣдовало бы пересмотрѣть учебные планы въ смыслѣ нѣкоторой детализаціи спеціальности за счетъ уменьшенія энциклопедичности. Сказанное особенно относится къ подготовкѣ инженеровъ для службы тяги, рекрутируемыхъ, главнымъ образомъ, изъ окончившихъ механическія отдѣленія Технологическихъ Институтовъ.

Существующими и, въ послѣдніе годы до войны, очень увеличившимися въ своемъ числѣ техническими учебными заведеніями, особенно высшими, потребность въ техническомъ персоналѣ удовлетворена. Требуется нѣкоторый пересмотръ, объединеніе и, можетъ быть, нѣсколько болѣе узкая спеціализація учебныхъ плановъ для тѣхъ абитурьентовъ этихъ школъ (предполагаю associates съ Институтомъ Транспорта), которые рѣшаютъ себя посвятить транспорту.

Что касается до подготовки персонала транспорта въ области экономической и болѣе узко коммерческой, тутъ просто необходима высшая школа практической экономики транспорта съ двумя отдѣленіями: 1) по обслуживанію обмѣна, для достиженія наивыгоднѣйшихъ результатовъ для національнаго хозяйства, какъ цѣлаго, въ эксплоатаціи уже существующаго транспорта и 2) по развитію будущей сѣти транспорта и производственныхъ силъ Россіи. Новые пути транспорта вызываютъ новыя производственныя силы и, въ свою очередь, питаются и растутъ за счетъ вызванныхъ въ странѣ къ

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жизни этихъ новыхъ производственныхъ силъ. Нигдѣ это положеніе не демонстрировалось такъ ярко, какъ въ развитіи ж.д. сѣти С.Ш.А. и въ сооруженіи Великой Сибирской ж.д. въ Россіи.

Задача школы практической экономики транспорта — не только въ томъ, чтобы дать транспорту хорошаго начальника, скажемъ, коммерческой службы ж.д., практичнаго знатока тарифнаго дѣла или главу морского транспортнаго дѣла. Она также должна предоставить всѣ возможности инженеру, когда онъ отъ узко-техническихъ должностей поднимается до мѣстъ начальника дороги, начальника изысканій и т.д., дополнять свой техническій опытъ всестороннимъ ознакомленіемъ съ цикломъ экономическихъ знаній, нужныхъ ему для достаточной широты горизонта и правильныхъ перспективъ въ его новомъ положеніи.

Лекціи школы практической экономики посѣщаются студентами, проходящими систематическій курсъ, а равно желающими изъ числа членовъ и сотрудниковъ Института Транспорта.

Перейдемъ теперь къ учебнымъ планамъ школы практической экономики. Научныя дисциплины, создающія должный кругозоръ, помогающій разбираться во всемъ сложномъ комплексѣ и взаимодѣйствіи явленій экономической жизни, — должны составить такъ называемый «основной циклъ» общій обоимъ отдѣленіямъ. Въ этомъ циклѣ могутъ быть предметы общеобязательные, обязательные только для проходящихъ опредѣленный спеціальный курсъ и рекомендуемые.

Я не стану останавливаться на перечисленіи дисциплинъ, входящихъ въ «основной циклъ»; укажу только, что въ Западной Европѣ и въ Америкѣ въ него входятъ такія знанія: прикладная математика; физика; химія; генетика и эволюція; элементы практической соціологіи, гражданская и дѣловая этика, общая политическая экономія; соціальная психологія; исторія хозяйственнаго быта, экономическихъ ученій и общей цивилизаціи; экономическая географія и исторія общая и отдѣльныхъ народовъ; статистика; бухгалтерія; общее правовѣдѣніе; современныя соціальныя реформы и прогрессъ; современный націонализмъ; государственное устройство и т.п. Прохожденіе общеобразовательнаго цикла пріурочивается къ первымъ двумъ годамъ, причемъ во второмъ году проходятся курсы, служащіе какъ бы введеніемъ и переходомъ къ школьной спеціализаціи. Эти курсы съ особой тщательностью конструируются въ смыслѣ полноты, точности, ясности и краткости, дабы съэкономить время для спеціальныхъ курсовъ.

По прохожденіи «основного курса» идетъ бифуркація на 2 указанныхъ выше отдѣленія, которые требуютъ тоже около 2 лѣтъ времени прохожденія курса. Первое отдѣленіе должно имѣть дѣло съ дисциплинами по преимуществу связанными съ торговлей. Второе — съ производствомъ, съ различными промыслами Россіи.

А) *Первое отдѣленіе.* Нѣкоторая простота и патріархальность русской торговли, не выходившей обычно за предѣлы простѣйшихъ операцій, — достаточно извѣстны и намъ самимъ, и всѣмъ тѣмъ за-границей, кто этимъ интересовался. Такъ, напримѣръ, Юліусъ Бёмъ, который незадолго передъ войной былъ командированъ Вѣнскимъ Торговымъ Музеемъ въ Россію со спеціальнымъ порученіемъ изучить особенности русской торговли внутри самой страны, — въ своемъ обширномъ отчетѣ подробно останавливается на различнаго рода «диковинкахъ» и особенностяхъ въ пріемахъ торговли и въ психикѣ ея дѣятелей, и среди прочаго совершенно опредѣленно подчеркиваетъ, что «русскій коммерсантъ и не подозрѣваетъ, сколько долженъ учить-

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ся и какъ много обязанъ знать купецъ въ Европѣ, чтобы удовлетворить своимъ задачамъ въ обществѣ».

Первое отдѣленіе должно будетъ дать всѣ потребныя знанія въ области торговлевѣдѣнія и торговлеведенія, посколько торговля связана и обслуживается эксплоатируемымъ транспортомъ, и экономики эксплоатируемаго транспорта.

Примѣрный циклъ знаній: 1) *По внутренней торговлѣ* — торговлевѣдѣніе, торгово-промышленная географія Россіи, товаровѣдѣніе, организація торговой предпріимчивости, кооперація, финансы и кредитъ въ торговлѣ, банковое дѣло и практика, страховое дѣло, торговое и вексельное право, методы торговой статистики, личный факторъ въ хозяйствѣ и коммерціи, организація и техника оптовой и розничной торговли, торговая политика, упаковка товаровъ, товаро-складочное дѣло, курсъ коммерческихъ вычисленій, практическій курсъ торговой техники, составленіе договоровъ въ торговлѣ, государственное регулированіе, контроль и обложеніе торговли, бухгалтерія и счетоводство, коммерческая корреспонденція, анализъ рыночныхъ цѣнъ; 2) *По внѣшней торговлѣ:* міровое хозяйство и международный обмѣнъ, международная экономика и политика, финансы и кредитъ въ международной торговлѣ, государственный контроль и регулированія, торговые договоры и таможенные тарифы, внѣшняя торговля Россіи и ея проблеммы въ системѣ національнаго хозяйства и на внѣшнихъ рынкахъ, морской транспортъ въ международной торговлѣ и фрахтовое дѣло, практика иностранныхъ банковъ, иностранная торговая техника и обычаи, организація и техника міровой торговли зерномъ и участіе Россіи въ ней, то же относительно торговли лѣсомъ, углемъ, нефтью и другими товарами, имѣющими міровое значеніе или спеціальное для Россіи, экономическая географія міра и отдѣльныхъ странъ; ихъ финансовая, торговая и промышленная исторія и политика, иностранные языки и корреспонденція и т.п. Интересная программа разработана Департаментомъ Коммерціи въ Америкѣ — «Training for foreign trade», опубликованная въ 1919 году.

Въ Германіи вопросамъ организаціи международнаго обмѣна и морскому транспорту, какъ фактору этого обмѣна, посвященъ самостоятельный Институтъ — «Das Instituts Weltwirtschaft und Seeverkehr», вопросамъ же организаціи и техники торговли вообще тамъ посвященъ другой самостоятельный Институтъ — «Institut für Verkehrslehre» въ Кельнѣ.

3) *По транспорту въ обмѣнѣ.* — Сѣть эксплоатируемыхъ путей въ желѣзнодорожномъ, внутреннемъ, водномъ, морскомъ, грунтовомъ и воздушномъ сообщеніи. Экономика эксплоатаціи этихъ родовъ транспорта. Система ж.-д. тарифовъ, морскихъ и рѣчныхъ фронтовъ. Экономика предпріятій по храненію товаровъ. Экономика погрузки, выгрузки и перегрузки. Экономика подъѣздныхъ путей рельсовыхъ и грунтовыхъ. Экономика трамвайнаго, автобуснаго и грузового автомобильнаго сообщенія въ городахъ.

Б) *Второе отдѣленіе.* — Чрезвычайно разростающійся и усложняющійся въ своей экономикѣ и техникѣ производственный процессъ пришелъ къ тому, что теперь въ Западной Европѣ и въ особенности въ Америкѣ много труда и вниманія удѣляется вопросамъ экономики, организаціи и веденія различнаго рода производственныхъ предпріятій. Тамъ сейчасъ почти въ каждой коммерческой школѣ и въ университетахъ можно встрѣтить обширныя системы курсовъ, трактующихъ эти вопросы въ приложеніи не только къ такимъ относительно простымъ формамъ хозяйства, какъ фермерство, лѣсопромышленность, рыбопромышленность и т.п., но и къ самымъ сложнымъ видамъ фабрично-заводской и добывающей промышленности.

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Какъ я уже сказалъ, успѣхъ транспорта зависитъ отъ успѣха въ развитіи производственныхъ силъ въ странѣ. И обратно, проложеніе новыхъ путей транспорта вызываетъ къ жизни производственныя силы въ тѣхъ районахъ страны, гдѣ онѣ до проложенія этихъ путей спали или не имѣли объективныхъ возможностей къ развитію. Второе отдѣленіе должно будетъ дать потребныя знанія въ области экономики и организаціи производства и роли транспорта, какъ возбудителя производственныхъ силъ страны.

Примѣрный циклъ знаній: — Природные рессурсы Россіи. Общая исторія развитія производства въ Россіи. Сельское хозяйство: а) зерновое, б) техническія и трудоемкія культуры, в) огородничество и садоводство, г) молочное и масляное хозяйство, д) мясное хозяйство, е) птицеводство, ж) сахаръ и др. отрасли аграрной индустріи. Сырьевые промыслы: а) уголь, б) нефть, в) лѣсъ, г) рудное дѣло, д) скотоводство, е) рыболовство, ж) строительные матеріалы.

Индустріальные промыслы: а) металлургія желѣза и стали, б) цвѣтные и бѣлыые металлы, в) металлообрабатывающая промышленность, г) текстиль, д) бензолъ и его производные, е) переработка нефтяныхъ продуктовъ, ж) разныя химическія производства, з) средняя и мелкая индустрія.

Сравнительная экономика доходности отдѣльныхъ промысловъ. Личное потребленіе (стандарты жизни) и капиталообразованіе въ каждомъ изъ нихъ. Національное богатство и динамика національнаго дохода Россіи въ сравненіи съ другими странами. Научная организація предпріятій производства. Зависимость развитія промысловъ Россіи отъ развитія транспортной сѣти. Особенности транспорта въ зависимости отъ рода грузовъ: навалочный, массовый, дорогой, скоропортящійся. Тарифная система и предѣльно-низкая поощрительная тарификація для перевозокъ по новымъ транспортнымъ путямъ въ первые годы ихъ эксплоатаціи.

Направленіе путей мірового обмѣна и ихъ динамика. Линіи большого транзита внутри Россіи. Линіи внутренняго обмѣна Россіи. Основные грузовые потоки обмѣна между различными по хозяйственному типу районами Россіи. Возможныя перспективы производственнаго развитія новыхъ районовъ Россіи. Вновь проектируемая транспортная сѣть Россіи и очереди ея осуществленія.

Міровое капиталообразованіе и рынки капитала. Финансированіе вновь сооружаемой транспортной сѣти. Возможная ея рентабильность.

Курсы повышенія квалификаціи устраиваются для служащаго персонала транспорта по отдѣльнымъ отраслямъ ихъ практической дѣятельности. Курсы продолжаются отъ 6 недѣль до 2-хъ мѣсяцевъ. Устраиваются или въ помѣщеніи Института, или въ другихъ городахъ разъѣзжающими лекторами Института. Слушатели ихъ во время занятій на нихъ получаютъ отпуска съ мѣстъ своей службы. Выдержавшіе надлежащіе экзамены по циклу изъ нѣсколькихъ прослушанныхъ курсовъ получаютъ преимущественное право на продвиженіе въ должностяхъ.

Отдѣлъ изслѣдованій и улучшеній. — Во многихъ высшихъ профессіональныхъ школахъ Америки и Англіи, помимо общеобразовательныхъ и спеціальныхъ, курсовъ имѣется еще спеціальный такъ называемый «Research Department», гдѣ лица, прошедшія спеціальные курсы и въ должной мѣрѣ уже компетентныя, самостоятельно производятъ работы въ области различнаго рода экономическихъ изысканій и изслѣдованій. Въ нѣкоторыхъ школахъ работа въ этомъ отдѣлѣ является для студентовъ обязательной и обуславливающей полученіе диплома. Такъ, напримѣръ, въ Америкѣ, вмѣсто выпускныхъ теоретическихъ экзаменовъ, отъ студента часто требуется

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прохожденіе опредѣленнаго практическаго стажа въ школѣ и въ коммерческомъ предпріятіи, отчетъ о своихъ работахъ тамъ и представленіе самостоятельно разработаннаго вопроса изъ той или иной отрасли торговли или промышленности.

«The Research Department» при «The London School of Economics and Political Science» можетъ служить образцомъ. Этотъ отдѣлъ въ очень короткое время привлекъ къ себѣ большой интересъ и показалъ полную жизненность. Онъ скоро сдѣлался вообще центромъ спеціализаціи для лицъ какъ окончившихъ эту школу, такъ и вообще получившихъ соотвѣтствующее образованіе въ другихъ школахъ Англіи.

Въ нѣкоторыхъ случаяхъ «Research Department» устраиваются какъ отдѣльные Институты, внѣ непосредственной связи съ высшей школой. Такой именно характеръ долженъ носить Отдѣлъ Изслѣдованій и Улучшеній Транспортнаго Института. Его задачи будутъ въ высшей степени облегчены наличіемъ школы практической экономики. Тѣмъ спеціалистамъ, которымъ будетъ поручено чтеніе тѣхъ или другихъ курсовъ, берущихъ у нихъ два-три часа времени въ недѣлю, могли бы быть поручены изслѣдованія опредѣленныхъ вопросовъ транспорта. Благодаря такой комбинаціи, вѣроятно, часто удастся съ большей легкостью достигнуть привлеченія желательныхъ выдающихся спеціалистовъ. Тѣмъ не менѣе отдѣлъ, изслѣдованій долженъ быть отдѣльнымъ учрежденіемъ, преслѣдующимъ свои особыя цѣли. Его задачей является объективное, тщательное и научное изученіе недостатковъ транспорта, выработка практическихъ способовъ устраненія ихъ и, вообще, удешевленія и улучшенія экономики и техники эксплоатируемаго транспорта, а затѣмъ схемы развитія производительныхъ силъ разныхъ районовъ Россіи и, въ связи съ этимъ, развитія будущаго строительства и расширенія транспортной сѣти. Помимо лицъ, которымъ будутъ поручены тѣ или другія работы въ этой области, въ Отдѣлѣ можетъ работать всякій индивидуальный членъ или сотрудникъ Института, а равно учрежденіе или организація надъ вопросомъ по ихъ выбору.

Всѣ работы, сдѣланныя въ Отдѣлѣ Изслѣдованій, докладываются и обсуждаются въ собраніяхъ Института по отдѣламъ или общихъ. Студенты школы практической экономики могутъ работать въ Отдѣлѣ изслѣдованій въ качествѣ помощниковъ. Для нихъ такая работа дастъ больше, чѣмъ лучшій семинарій обычнаго школьнаго типа.

Для меня не представляетъ сомнѣній, что для всякаго человѣка, работавшаго уже практически въ дѣлѣ транспорта и попавшаго потомъ въ Отдѣлъ Изслѣдованій Института, гдѣ практическій опытъ приходитъ въ гармоническое единеніе съ научнымъ и теоретическимъ освѣщеніемъ вопроса — его работа въ отдѣлѣ изслѣдованій явится прекраснымъ средствомъ и толчкомъ къ расширенію кругозора.

Я думаю, что эти работы въ Отдѣлѣ Изслѣдованій будутъ въ большой степени способствовать прогрессу транспортнаго дѣла и выработкѣ крупныхъ индивидуальностей изъ того человѣческаго матеріала, который пройдетъ черезъ нихъ.

Библіотека. — Одной изъ первыхъ заботъ должно явиться составленіе спеціальной и наивозможно обширной библіотеки по транспорту. Очень большая и старая библіотека по теоретической сторонѣ дѣла имѣется въ Институтѣ Инженеровъ Путей Сообщенія. Заботиться почти исключительно, поэтому придется о библіотекѣ по экономикѣ транспорта, особенно о собираніи всей той новѣйшей литературы, которая въ обиліи появилась, главнымъ образомъ на англійскомъ языкѣ, въ послѣдніе годы.

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Для нашего случая могутъ быть интересны и поучительны, какъ характеръ библіотеки, что создана при «The London School of Economics and Political Science», такъ и тотъ трудъ и пути, коими она достигла своего нынѣшняго объема и практическаго значенія. Эта библіотека была учреждена въ 1896 г. путемъ общественной подписки, и въ настоящее время она состоитъ уже болѣе, чѣмъ изъ полумилліона томовъ спеціальной литературы. Она заключаетъ въ себѣ положительно всѣ стандартныя работы общаго и спеціальнаго содержанія на англійскомъ и другихъ языкахъ по вопросамъ экономики, соціологіи общей и прикладной, политико-экономическимъ, финансамъ, географіи, транспорту, торговлѣ, промышленности и знаніямъ, соприкасающимся съ ними.

Въ коллекцію этой библіотеки были сдѣланы цѣлымъ рядомъ правительствъ различныхъ странъ весьма интересные и цѣнные вклады оффиціальныхъ документовъ, отчетовъ, статистическихъ сборниковъ и, вообще, всякаго рода правительственныхъ изданій. Такъ, напримѣръ, Правительство Соединенныхъ Штатовъ Америки презентовало коллекцію своихъ изданій, начиная съ 1873 г., и все время пополняетъ эту коллекцію новыми изданіями. То же самое сдѣлано правительствами Австраліи, Канады, Индіи, Южной Африки и др.. Болѣе 300 муниципальныхъ самоуправленій Англіи, Франціи, Германіи, Америки, Австріи, Голландіи, Бельгіи, Италіи и др. странъ презентовали и продолжаютъ присылать этой библіотекѣ массу интересныхъ работъ и изданій касательно муниципальнаго хозяйства и управленія. Надо отмѣтить, что эта послѣдняя коллекція книгъ касательно муниципальныхъ проблемъ является, пожалуй, единственной, и никакая другая библіотека, какъ Англіи, такъ и другихъ странъ, ничего подобнаго не имѣетъ. Громаднымъ отдѣломъ библіотеки является коллекція парламентскихъ документовъ различныхъ странъ, документы различныхъ конференцій, съѣздовъ и т.п. Затѣмъ, въ эту библіотеку были пожертвованы многія частныя библіотеки и спеціальныя коллекціи книгъ, что собирались различнаго рода ассоціаціями или частными лицами, посвящавшими свой интересъ и дѣятельность тѣмъ или инымъ спеціальнымъ вопросамъ и проблеммамъ. Среди этого рода коллекцій, пожертвованныхъ въ библіотеку Школы, отмѣтимъ библіотеку Mr W. M. Acworth'a по вопросамъ транспорта. Эта коллекція была основана на средства фонда, составленнаго съ этой цѣлью желѣзнодорожными компаніями Англіи, и состояла изъ свыше 5.000 томовъ спеціальной литературы. Коллекція эта все время пополняется новыми изданіями за счетъ тѣхъ же источниковъ. Въ организацію этой библіотеки вложенъ громадный интересъ и трудъ лицъ, ею завѣдующихъ, всего преподавательскаго персонала Школы, самого студенчества и общества.

Образованіе библіотеки приблизительно такого масштаба должно быть работой будущаго Института Транспорта. Мы всѣ, интересующіеся дѣломъ россійскаго транспорта, уже теперь, за-границей, должны дѣлать все возможное, чтобы собрать и обезпечить для этой будущей библіотеки какъ можно больше изданій.

Библіотека Института должна быть доступна для всѣхъ тѣхъ лицъ, чья дѣятельность посвящена практической работѣ въ транспортныхъ, торговыхъ и промышленныхъ предпріятіяхъ, въ городскихъ и земскихъ самоуправленіяхъ на государственной и общественной службѣ.

Такого рода публичность библіотеки нашего Института должна повлечь организацію при ней спеціальнаго читальнаго зала достаточной вмѣстимости и удобствъ для занятій тамъ. Читальный залъ долженъ имѣть спеціальный отдѣлъ энциклопедій, справочниковъ, атласовъ, адресъ-календарей,

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картъ, глобусовъ и т.п., а также отдѣлъ спеціальной періодической печати по вопросамъ текущей жизни и хозяйственнаго быта Россіи и другихъ странъ. Весьма интереснымъ и полезнымъ пособіемъ можетъ явиться спеціальный отдѣлъ каталоговъ, торговыхъ проспектовъ, бюллетеней и т.п. Образцомъ системы классификаціи этихъ послѣднихъ, какъ и періодической литературы, можетъ служить система, принятая въ библіотекѣ при «H.M. Patent Office» въ Лондонѣ.

Затѣмъ, весьма интереснымъ и цѣннымъ отдѣломъ библіотеки явился бы спеціальный отдѣлъ различнаго рода монографій и докладовъ, читанныхъ въ различныхъ обществахъ, ассоціяціяхъ или клубахъ по вопросамъ всякаго рода мѣстныхъ нуждъ, проблемъ, интересовъ, рессурсовъ, экономическихъ возможностей и т.д. Этотъ отдѣлъ окажетъ громадную услугу установленію связи между работой нашего Института, съ одной стороны, и жизнью, нуждами и интересами на мѣстахъ и окраинахъ Россіи, съ другой; это пріобщитъ мѣстные вопросы и нужды къ центру и, несомнѣнно, будетъ во многомъ содѣйствовать нахожденію на нихъ практическаго отвѣта.

При биліотекѣ нужно организовать библіографическій отдѣлъ, который слѣдилъ бы за транспортной и экономической литературой различныхъ странъ и выдавалъ бы справки на личные и письменные запросы.

Музей. — Техническая сторона русскаго транспорта превосходно представлена музеями Института Путей Сообщенія, а также Министерства Путей Сообщенія, зарегистрировавшими больше чѣмъ за сто лѣтъ исторію и прогрессъ транспорта. Въ Россіи не хватаетъ музея экономики транспорта и связанныхъ съ нею торговли и производительныхъ силъ. Именно такой музей было бы чрезвычайно полезно имѣть Институту Транспорта.

Въ Америкѣ при многихъ университетахъ и школахъ организованы соціально-экономическіе музеи. Здѣсь мы отмѣтимъ только два изъ нихъ: «Social Museum» при Harvard University, который наглядно иллюстрируетъ многое въ области индустріальныхъ и муниципальныхъ проблемъ, и «Commercial Museum», организованный Бостонскимъ Университетомъ при «The College of Business Administration».

Въ музеѣ Института должны быть представлены производственные процессы страны и естественныя богатства отдѣльныхъ ея районовъ. Съ особой тщательностью должно отмѣчаться новѣйшее и лучшее въ техникѣ, организаціи и управленіи производствами. Товарные образцы для удобства обозрѣванія ихъ производственниками здѣсь слѣдуетъ классифицировать въ порядкѣ добычи, обработки, переработки и т.д. вплоть до того вида, въ какомъ продуктъ поступаетъ къ потребителю. Таблицы и діаграммы должны давать размѣры производства и потребленія въ различныхъ районахъ и Россіи и разныхъ странъ, свѣдѣнія о рынкахъ для товара, о способахъ упаковки, перевозки, цѣнахъ, таможенныхъ тарифахъ и т.д.. Заслуживаетъ подражанія система показанія образцовъ и методовъ упаковки, проводимая въ своей дѣятельности Торговымъ Музеемъ въ Брюсселѣ.

Импортъ и экспортъ Россіи должны быть исчерпывающе представлены въ образцахъ и діаграммахъ.

Гл. IV.

На этомъ я покончу съ изложеніемъ соображеній объ устройствѣ Россійскаго Института Транспорта и Практической Экономики. Детализировать и конкретизировать теперь схему этого института было бы преждевременно. Осуіествлять ее или что-нибудь близкое къ ней, я вѣрю, навѣрное придется, какъ только Россія отъ теперешняго хозяйственнаго хаоса комму-

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нистическаго режима перейдетъ къ представительному строю и начаткамъ здороваго хозяйства.

Что мы можемъ дѣлать теперь? Пропагандировать идею Института Транспорта, изучать и заводить связи съ аналогичными учрежденіями иностранными, а также съ тѣми кругами за-границей, которые были бы заинтересованы помочь въ этомъ, на мой взглядъ, важномъ для Россійскаго національнаго хозяйства дѣлѣ; наконецъ, собирать всяческіе матеріалы для будущаго Института.

Я хотѣлъ сдѣлать еще одно замѣчаніе. Я жду, во всякомъ случаѣ, одного возраженія. Такой инстиутъ будетъ дорого стоить. Въ грубыхъ цифрахъ, его содержаніе будетъ стоить раза въ два больше, чѣмъ содержаніе, скажемъ, Петроградскаго Политехническаго Института.

Я думаю, что эта стоимость не должна была бы препятствовать осуществленію Института въ жизни. При практичной постановкѣ всего этого дѣла, реальная, ясно ощутимая польза отъ него будетъ очень велика. А тогда, потребная денежная помощь различныхъ правительственныхъ, промышленныхъ, торговыхъ учрежденій и организацій, большихъ транспортныхъ предпріятій и т.п. будетъ болѣе, чѣмъ вѣроятна. По сравненію съ тѣмъ, что эти Associated Members получатъ отъ Института, она имъ, будетъ болѣе чѣмъ компенсирована.

ДВА МУЖИКА.

А. Б. Петрищевъ. Читанъ въ Р. Э. О. 12.IУ. 1923.

Какъ это ни странно, но и послѣ Глѣба Успенскаго наша публика не научилась различать два основныхъ крестьянскихъ типа. Одно дѣло «земледѣлецъ милостью Божіею», пріемлющій тяжкую «власть земли» по влеченію, переживающій въ земледѣльческомъ трудѣ, во всѣхъ повседневныхъ мелочахъ земледѣльческаго обихода, муки и восторги своеобразнаго творчества; и совсѣмъ другое дѣло — мужикъ поневолѣ, по несчастью, который иногда даже физически — по слабосилію — не можетъ пріять власть земли, а вообще подчиняется этой власти лишь по необходимости, видитъ въ земледѣліи неблагодарный, безпросвѣтный, изнурительный и грязный трудъ.

Въ каждой крестьянской семьѣ отлично различаютъ эти два типа. Различаютъ уже ради практической надобности опредѣлить склонности своихъ дѣтей:

— Вотъ Петька будетъ хозяинъ... Настоящій будетъ мужикъ. По всему видать, — какъ къ коровѣ подходитъ, какъ съ ягнятами обращается, какъ съ батькой на покосъ ѣздитъ...

— А вотъ Мишка хозяиномъ не будетъ... Глаза не тѣ... Мишку непремѣнно надо мастерству обучить, пустить въ городъ или на фабрику. Иначе — пропадетъ малый.

— Смотри, какъ у Марьи грабли играютъ... Будто не работаетъ, а забавляется. Золотая дѣвка... будетъ мужу жена, въ домѣ хозяйка.

— А Дарья не то... Придется въ прислуги къ господамъ опредѣлить или еще куда... по чистой части. Дѣвка хорошая, послушная. А къ нашему крестьянскому дѣлу неподходящая...

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Деревенскіе отцы старательно различаютъ это, и въ мѣру разумѣнія и возможности направляютъ своихъ дѣтей по тѣмъ или инымъ дорогамъ жизни. Отлично различала эти типы и наша литература. Въ свое время ихъ подвергъ и художественному, и публицистическому обслѣдованію Г.И. Успенскій. Тѣмъ не менѣе, политическая и экономическая практика до сихъ поръ не уловила различія между ними. Мужикъ, «приверженный къ землѣ», «хозяйственный», въ земледѣльческомъ смыслѣ этого слова, смѣшивается — въ представленіяхъ политиковъ и экономистовъ — съ мужикомъ «нехозяйственнымъ», въ томъ же смыслѣ. Качественное различіе между ними попросту игнорируется. Не принимается въ разсчетъ органическая склонность однихъ улучшать и укрѣплять земледѣльческое хозяйство и столь же органическая тяга другихъ, при первой возможности, оставить нелюбимое земледѣліе и перейти къ другимъ занятіямъ, которыя кажутся болѣе привлекательными, болѣе выгодными или менѣе грязными и менѣе трудными.

До сихъ поръ и политическая и экономическая практика улавливаетъ между мужиками лишь качественныя различія — по степени зажиточности. При этомъ многими апріорно считается, что «хозяйственный» мужикъ — это мужикъ зажиточный, богатый, «кулакъ», «міроѣдъ», а нехозяйственный мужикъ — это мужикъ бѣдный, вѣчно обиженный кулаками и міроѣдами. Въ опредѣленныхъ кругахъ установилось даже принципіально непріязненное отношеніе къ «хозяйственному мужику» и слезливо-жалостливое — къ мужику нехозяйственному.

Въ дѣйствительности, качественныя различія (въ предѣлахъ отношеній къ земледѣльческому труду) не всегда совпадаютъ съ различіями количественными (по размѣрамъ богатства). Человѣкъ, не способный по своимъ природнымъ даннымъ стать хозяиномъ-земледѣльцемъ, часто очень способенъ къ торговлѣ, къ инымъ промысламъ, весьма выгоднымъ, но свободнымъ отъ «власти земли». «Никакой земледѣлецъ» можетъ завести солидное торговое, «кулацкое» хозяйство. И, наоборотъ, еще Глѣбъ Успенскій объяснялъ, что хозяинъ-земледѣлецъ всѣ свои мысли, чувства, заботы отдаетъ землѣ; ему некогда заниматься посторонними землѣ дѣлами; не лежитъ у него къ нимъ сердце; и съ его точки зрѣнія уйти, напр., въ торговлю или въ кулацкій промыселъ значитъ измѣнить любимому дѣлу. Въ среднемъ и общемъ хозяйственный мужикъ, по сравненію съ массовымъ нехозяйственнымъ мужикомъ живетъ устойчивѣе, прочнѣе обезпеченъ самымъ необходимымъ. Но по части денежныхъ капиталовъ иной оборотливый и удачливый нехозяйственный мужикъ часто значительно богаче своего хозяйственнаго сосѣда.

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Въ условіяхъ свободнаго труда, безпрепятственнаго перехода отъ одной профессіи къ другой, такое смѣшеніе разнородныхъ типовъ практически несущественно. Никто насильственно не связанъ съ землей. Кому не нравится сельско-хозяйственный трудъ, тому ничто не мѣшаетъ найти себѣ другое занятіе. При этомъ условіи число земледѣльцевъ по несчастью едва ли составляетъ значительную долю среди земледѣльцевъ по склонности или призванію. А главное, — нехозяйственный мужикъ, если даже онъ есть, не мѣшаетъ хозяйственнымъ мужикамъ жить и работать такъ, какъ они желаютъ.

Иное въ Россіи. При крѣпостномъ правѣ и хозяйственные и нехозяйственные мужики одинаково были собственностью помѣщика. Владѣлецъ

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душъ ради собственной выгоды обычно старался различать эти типы. Болѣе способныхъ онъ сажалъ на тягло, малоспособныхъ или вовсе неспособныхъ опредѣлялъ въ дворню, заставляя учиться ремесламъ, отправлялъ въ оброчные заработки. Былъ грубый, насильственный, жестокій, но не вовсе лишенный цѣлесообразности порядокъ распредѣленія людей по способностямъ и склонностямъ.

Реформа 19-го февраля 1861 года освободила и хозяйственныхъ, и нехозяйственныхъ мужиковъ отъ крѣпостной зависимости, послала ихъ въ общій «крестьянскій міръ», связанный не только единствомъ обязанностей (административныхъ, податныхъ и т.д.), но и нераздѣльными правами на такъ называемую надѣльную землю. И такимъ образомъ нехозяйственный мужикъ сталъ полноправнымъ участникомъ въ рѣшеніи всѣхъ вопросовъ, — а въ частности и тѣхъ, отъ которыхъ зависитъ, гдѣ хозяйственный мужикъ пользуется землей, какъ пользуется и даже когда приступаетъ къ тѣмъ или инымъ работамъ на своемъ участкѣ.

А такъ какъ число «полноправныхъ сельскихъ обывателей», не склонныхъ къ земледѣльческому труду, весьма значительно, то вскорѣ послѣ отмѣны крѣпостной зависимости начались жалобы:

— Права стали несравнимо лучше, а порядокъ хуже.

Припомните, какъ объяснялъ эти жалобы тотъ же, напр., Глѣбъ Успенскій: — Порядокъ, дѣйствительно, сталъ хуже, потому что нехозяйственный мужикъ «не прибранъ къ сторонкѣ», впутывается въ дѣла мужика хозяйственнаго.

Общеизвѣстныя болѣе конкретныя жалобы: — Мужику, какъ бы онъ ни любилъ свой трудъ, нѣтъ смысла надлежаще удобрять свой участокъ, осушить заболоченный клинъ, выкорчевать пни на полосѣ, отведенной изъ-подъ вырубленнаго лѣса. Нѣтъ смысла, ибо если онъ это сдѣлаетъ, то его трудами воспользуются однообщественники, не желающіе или неспособные производить такія же работы на своихъ участкахъ, а самъ онъ останется лишь при обидномъ сознаніи о безполезно потраченныхъ средствахъ и трудахъ.

Къ этому общеизвѣстному положенію не лишни, быть можетъ, небольшія цифровыя справки. Лѣтомъ 1918 года мнѣ пришлось — въ кооперативно-инструкторскомъ порядкѣ — произвести обслѣдованіе въ деревнѣ Федоровкѣ, Брянскаго уѣзда. По разнымъ причинамъ, о которыхъ рѣчь ниже, въ основу обслѣдованія были положены признаки хозяйственнаго и нехозяйственнаго отношенія къ земледѣльческому труду. Изъ 20 домохозяевъ только 8 оказались хозяйственниками, — мужиками пріемлющими «власть земли». Болѣе поздніе (1919 г.) аналогичныя обслѣдованія двухъ селъ того же Брянскаго уѣзда и одного Трубчевскаго дали приблизительно ту же цифру хозяйственниковъ: 40-45%. И наконецъ, въ двухъ обслѣдованныхъ селахъ Карачевскаго уѣзда обѣ группы — хозяйственная и нехозяйственная — оказались количественно равносильными. Какъ извѣстно, названные три уѣзда лежатъ въ полосѣ полу-земледѣльческой, полу-промышленной. Быть можетъ, въ чисто земледѣльческихъ, менѣе затронутыхъ индустріальными вліяніями, районахъ процентъ хозяйственныхъ крестьянъ выше, въ чисто промышленныхъ — ниже. Во всякомъ случаѣ, полученныя мною цифры довольно случайны. Но они иллюстрируютъ общее глазомѣрное впечатлѣніе: — Число безхозяйственныхъ мужиковъ въ деревенскихъ «мірахъ» очень значительно.

И не только въ количественномъ смыслѣ эта группа сильна. Къ ней принадлежатъ, повторяю, во многихъ случаяхъ деревенскіе торговцы и такъ называемые кулаки, обладающіе немалыми организаторскими спо-

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собностями. И, сверхъ того, безхозяйственные мужики менѣе зависимы отъ власти земли, не столько связаны чисто земледѣльческими заботами и увлеченіями, а потому и болѣе подвижны въ смыслѣ защиты и нападенія. При такомъ устройствѣ крестьянскаго міра, поставившемъ хозяйственные интересы земледѣльца въ зависимость отъ сильной группы безхозяйственнаго крестьянства, само собою понятно, исключалась возможность сколько-нибудь значительныхъ агрикультурныхъ успѣховъ. Если не считать отдѣльныхъ счастливыхъ исключеній, въ общемъ и цѣломъ крестьянское земледѣліе въ Россіи за первые 50 лѣтъ послѣ 19 февраля 1861 г. не далеко ушло отъ дореформеннаго уровня.

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Конечно, жизнь вносила поправки въ созданную государственными законами хозяйственную зависимость земледѣльца отъ неземледѣльца. Развитіе фабрично-заводской промышленности до нѣкоторой степени помогло «прибрать» нехозяйственныхъ мужиковъ изъ деревни: всѣ, кому тяжела, невыносима или просто не по душѣ сельская «чернота», получали сравнительно легкую возможность устраиваться въ городахъ, при тѣхъ или иныхъ предпріятіяхъ. Движеніе изъ деревень на заработки нѣсколько ослабляло повседневное вліяніе нехозяйственной группы на хозяйственное дѣло. Но лишь нѣсколько и условно. Ушедшіе на заработки оставались полноправными совладѣльцами надѣльныхъ земель, въ любую минуту могли вернуться и перестроить порядокъ землевладѣнія по своему.

А затѣмъ, — не одни нехозяйственные мужики уходили «на заработки». Хозяйственный мужикъ, лишенный возможности такъ трудиться на землѣ, какъ бы онъ хотѣлъ, раззорялся, падалъ, нищалъ; разбитая на полоски и поневолѣ малоудобряемая земля «выпахивалась», тощала, плохо оправдывала трудъ. Все это вынуждало искать побочныхъ, часто совершенно постороннихъ земледѣлію заработковъ — и, между прочимъ, уходить на тѣ же фабрики и заводы.

Смѣшеніе разнородныхъ элементовъ въ крестьянскомъ міру своеобразно отражалось и въ фабрично-заводской средѣ. Здѣсь тоже возникло два основныхъ типа. Одни интимно порывали связь съ деревней, о возможности вернуться туда думали безъ всякаго удовольствія или даже съ ужасомъ; проникались «пролетарской психологіей», душевно сростались съ далекой отъ земледѣлія работой. Другіе, наоборотъ, и во снѣ, и на яву мечтали объ одномъ, — какъ бы поскорѣй уйти съ постылой фабрики, отъ ненавистныхъ заводовъ назадъ въ милую деревню, сѣсть тамъ — и возможно прочнѣе сѣсть — на любимую кормилицу-землю. Завѣтною мечтою многихъ такихъ рабочихъ по неволѣ и по несчастью было скопить деньжонокъ, купить «участокъ» и на этомъ своемъ участкѣ получить независимость отъ «дурака-міра», пріобрѣсти такимъ образомъ необходимую для земледѣлія свободу труда.

Заработать столько денегъ на русскихъ фабрикахъ и заводахъ было невозможно. И вотъ, напр., въ Черниговской губерніи — возникаетъ характерное движеніе земледѣльцевъ въ Америку. Тамъ плата хорошая. И если питаться по-русски, — преимущественно хлѣбомъ и водой, — то можно въ 3-4 года скопить нѣсколько тысячъ рублей, — сумма достаточная, чтобы вернуться на родину, купить земельки и освободиться отъ «горлопановъ» деревенскаго міра. И счатливцы, которымъ удавалось выполнить эту программу — напр., въ Новозыбковскомъ уѣздѣ — вызывали восхи-

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щеніе у односельчанъ, зависть. Ихъ примѣру старались подражать и слѣдовать.

Такъ завязывались узлы россійской неразберихи. Деревня не могла освободиться отъ мужиковъ, психологически чуждыхъ земледѣлію. А индустрія русская засорялась психологически чуждыми ея, интимно враждебными къ ней рабочими. Между прочимъ, въ значительной мѣрѣ на этой почвѣ сложилось распредѣленіе рабочихъ по соціалистическимъ партіямъ. Рабочему изъ крестьянъ мало интересна земля, — и онъ шелъ за соціалъ-демократами. Для крестьянина изъ рабочихъ все въ землѣ, — и ему, конечно, милѣе соціалисты-революціонеры.

Сколько извѣстно, роковую силу мужицко-рабочихъ узловъ въ предреволюціонное время сумѣлъ до нѣкоторой степени понять гр. Витте. Онъ собирался развязать ихъ. Изъ министровъ послѣднихъ двухъ царствованій это былъ едва ли не единственный человѣкъ, способный подойти къ вопросу съ дѣловой, хозяйственной стороны. Но дорогу ему загораживала старая идея самодержавія, — всячески удерживалась связь мужика съ землей, ибо въ противномъ случаѣ образуется однородная масса «пролетаріата», что недопустимо по соображеніямъ полицейско-политическаго порядка. Гр. Витте, столкнувшись съ этой идеей, не пошелъ дальше замысловъ и предварительныхъ разговоровъ со спеціалистами, знатоками русской деревни. По внѣшности болѣе удачливымъ оказался Столыпинъ. Онъ сумѣлъ подойти къ «проклятому вопросу» не столько съ дѣловой и хозяйственной, сколько съ полицейско-политической стороны. Быть можетъ, лишь поэтому ему и удалось провести свой знаменитый «указъ 9 ноября». Но можно утверждать, что именно поэтому столыпинское «землеустройство» не разрубило узловъ и не распутало ихъ, а кое въ чемъ даже еще больше запутало. По крайней мѣрѣ, во многихъ мѣстахъ и случаяхъ закрѣплять по «столыпинскимъ правамъ» участки общинныхъ земель принялись прежде всего люди нехозяйственные и даже давно порвавшіе физическую связь съ деревней. Процедура проведенія указа 9 ноября позволяла выхватывать при этомъ изъ общаго надѣльнаго фонда лучшіе, наиболѣе удобные куски. И тамъ, гдѣ это было, трудъ и благосостояніе хозяйственнаго мужика попали въ еще горшую зависимость отъ нехозяйственныхъ хищниковъ. Мысль, сама по себѣ резонная и нужная, была подрѣзана полицейско-политическимъ подходомъ къ ней, привела къ ожесточенной деревенской усобицѣ. И во время войны — «для спокойствія на фронтахъ» — «реформу Столыпина» пришлось пріостановить. И такимъ образомъ хозяйственная деревенская неурядица перешла по наслѣдству отъ самодержавія къ революціи.

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Революція обрушила на голову хозяйственнаго мужика декларативные декреты, какъ условный плюсъ, и очень дѣловыя реальности, какъ безусловный минусъ.

Говорю: «условный плюсъ», ибо въ декретированной націонализаціи земли хозяйственный мужикъ, если и нуждался, то въ силу причинъ не столько экономическаго существа, сколько историческаго порядка. На пространствахъ Россіи хозяйственный мужикъ, будь онъ независимъ отъ «нехозяйственныхъ сельскихъ обывателей», могъ бы устроиться сносно безъ чрезмѣрныхъ аграрныхъ потрясеній. Но хозяйственная подчиненность не позволяла повышать качество обработки. И застарѣлое, вслѣдствіе этого, худосочіе оставалось лѣчить количествомъ запашки. По крайней мѣрѣ, была надежда на это лѣкарство. И оно представлялось единственно воз-

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вожнымъ и, во всякомъ случаѣ, полезнымъ. А тому хозяйственному мужику, который былъ раззоренъ и выброшенъ нуждой изъ деревни на фабрику, это лѣкарство казалось жизненно необходимымъ. И формально декреты дали его: — вся земля всему народу.

Реально же совершилось въ теченіе очень немногихъ мѣсяцевъ великое переселеніе въ деревню изъ заголодавшихъ городовъ и замирающихъ фабрикъ и заводовъ. Переселялись назадъ въ деревню тѣ, кто принадлежалъ ей по мѣсту рожденія и паспортной припискѣ. Переселялись и тѣ, которые даже по паспорту деревнѣ чужды. Переселялись интимно жаждущіе сѣсть на землю и дѣйствительно способные къ земледѣльческому труду. Переселялись и тѣ, кто лишь издали романтически мечталъ о земледѣліи, но не имѣлъ для этого занятія ни силъ, ни способностей. Были и такіе переселенцы, которые питали къ земледѣльческому труду отвращеніе, но ринулись въ деревню лишь потому, что въ ней и только въ ней можно найти «какой ни на есть кусокъ хлѣба». И всѣ эти пришельцы имѣли безспорное право на точномъ основаніи декретовъ требовать земли. И, конечно, требовали.

Какой земли? Безъ инвентаря, безъ привычки къ земледѣльческому труду, безъ самыхъ элементарныхъ знаній, съ кое-какими лишь смутными представленіями о посадкѣ картошки — на земляхъ плохихъ и даже среднихъ дѣлать нечего. Значительной массѣ пришельцевъ имѣло смыслъ получить лишь хорошую землю, участокъ высокой меліораціи. Для завоеванія этихъ участковъ пришельцы обладали не деревенской, а городской подвижностью, ловкостью, связями съ совершенно новой для коренного землероба властью и умѣньемъ вліять на эту власть. На помощь пришельцамъ скоро пришелъ декретъ о комитетахъ бѣдноты. Этотъ декретъ фактически передалъ «всю полноту» деревенской власти въ руки нехозяйственныхъ деревенскихъ жителей. И помогъ этимъ жителямъ, во-первыхъ, «вытурить» хозяйственнаго мужика на худшія земли, а во-вторыхъ, экспропріировать у него значительную часть живого и мертваго инвентаря.

Характерная деталь: совѣтская оффиціальная пресса довольно быстро обнаружила, что во главѣ «волкомбѣдовъ» сплошь и рядомъ оказались «кулаки», сельскіе торговцы, — т.е. тѣ самые «міроѣды», которые и при самодержавіи руководили «горлопанами», крикливой шумной толпой нехозяйственныхъ мужиковъ. Это «открытіе» и послужило однимъ изъ мотивовъ, чтобы юридически упразднить комитеты. Фактически же значительная доля ихъ власти перешла къ волостнымъ организаціямъ «коммунистической партіи», — «волкомпартамъ», переименованнымъ впослѣдствіи въ «волкомячейки». Само собою понятно, что хозяйственному мужику трудно участвовать въ этихъ суетливыхъ организаціяхъ, занятыхъ по преимуществу «политикой» и исполненіемъ всевозможныхъ циркуляровъ, получаемыхъ изъ «партійныхъ центровъ». Участіе въ комячейкахъ даетъ большія выгоды, но несовмѣстимо съ настоящимъ, поглощающимъ всего человѣка, подчиненіемъ «власти земли». И донынѣ комячейки закрѣпляютъ власть нехозяйственнаго мужика надъ мужикомъ хозяйственнымъ.

Въ первые моменты эта власть — волкомбѣдовъ, волкомпартовъ, волкомячеекъ — сказалась въ перераспредѣленіи земель, скота, инвентаря. Достаточно напомнить, что въ средней полосѣ Россіи у хозяйственныхъ мужиковъ мѣстами отбирали, напр., коноплянники и отдавали «ловкачамъ». «Ловкачъ» пахалъ исключительно жирную землю отобранной у хозяйственника сохой на отобранной у него же, хозяйственника, лошади, и засаживалъ «національзированной» у хозяйственниковъ же картошкою.

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Урожая, разумѣется, не получалось. А къ осени приказъ: выполнить «продразверстку». Съ кого взять назначенное на село или деревню количество? У нехозяйственниковъ, сплошь и рядомъ, ничего нѣтъ,—они на землѣ и себя то прокормить не могутъ. «Избытки» — какъ общее правило, изъ котораго бываютъ разныя исключенія — могутъ быть лишь у хозяйственнаго мужика. Очевидно, у него ихъ и надо взять, — другого способа выполнить продразверстку нѣтъ. Въ «лучшую пору» комбѣдовъ и компартовъ у хозяйственнаго мужика брали не только для государства, но и на пропитаніе односельчанъ, которые хотя и забрали себѣ хорошую землю, но безъ «секвестра» чужихъ урожаевъ уже въ 1918 и 1919 г.г. погибли бы отъ голода. Именно въ эту «лучшую пору совѣтского коммунизма» постороннихъ наблюдателей сбивали съ толку противорѣчивые отзывы мужиковъ. Одинъ мужикъ говорилъ, что «теперешній порядокъ — лучше требовать нельзя». А по мнѣнію другого, — вернулось рабство, худшее, чѣмъ при крѣпостномъ правѣ.

Хозяйственному мужику ничего не оставалось, какъ сжимать посѣвы до крайней потребительской нормы. Онъ началъ сознательно и планомѣрно «освобождаться» отъ самой возможности избытковъ. Какъ извѣстно, это и послужило однимъ изъ мотивовъ къ замѣнѣ продразверстки продналогомъ и къ разрѣшенію имѣть избытки и продавать ихъ. Юридически продналогъ устранялъ платежи имущими за неимущихъ. Новыми декретами вводилось обязательное правило: каждый платитъ за себя и въ мѣру предоставленнаго ему участка удобной земли. Мелiоративныя затраты поощряются и даютъ право пользоваться налоговыми льготами. Вмѣстѣ съ тѣмъ хозяину предоставляются нѣкоторыя гарантіи, что земля, обрабатываемая имъ, не будетъ отъ него отобрана другими раньше опредѣленнаго срока и безъ достаточныхъ, обусловленныхъ закономъ, основаній.

Дѣйствительность, однако, не позволила строго держаться ни смысла закона, ни даже буквы его. Въ рукахъ власти нѣтъ точныхъ списковъ плательщиковъ, нѣтъ правильнаго учета ихъ земель, нѣтъ и достаточно грамотнаго, юридически подготовленнаго налогового аппарата. Взысканіе продналога пошло тѣми же путями, какими производилась продразверстка. Центръ назначаетъ общую сумму, руководствуясь фактически не учетомъ урожая, а своими нуждами. Глазомѣрно общая сумма распредѣляется между губерніями. Въ губернскихъ городахъ назначенная «Москвою» цифра распредѣляется между уѣздами. Уѣздные города распредѣляютъ, сколько приказано, между волостями; волости — между селеніями. Село получаетъ приказъ: собрать и представить столько-то пудовъ. Собрать же эти пуды можно лишь съ тѣхъ, у кого они есть, — т.е., опять таки «въ отвѣтѣ» оказывается хозяйственный мужикъ. Затѣмъ, собранное надо доставить на мѣсто пріемки продналога. Рабочій скотъ во времена «комбѣдовъ» подвергся «уравнительному распредѣленію». Но въ неумѣлыхъ и небрежныхъ рукахъ онъ быстро пропалъ. Сохранился лишь у наиболѣе крѣпкихъ и внимательныхъ хозяевъ. На нихъ, по необходимости, и падаетъ обязанность доставить собранное къ пріемному пункту. Между прочимъ, на нихъ, въ силу той же необходимости, ложится всею тяжестью вообще гужевая и подводная повинность. Продналогъ принесъ, однако, хозяйственному мужику и облегченіе: сдалъ «подати», получилъ квитанцію, — и «живи спокойно». Правда, мѣстами понынѣ у имущихъ насильственно отбираются избытки въ пользу тѣхъ односельчанъ, кто не умѣетъ или не можетъ получить съ земли необходимаго для жизни. Но это уже формальное преступленіе передъ закономъ. Да и вообще система продналога дала хозяйственному мужику кое-какія опорныя точки въ его борьбѣ противъ нехозяйственнаго мужика.

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Лично мнѣ къ нынѣшней — такъ сказать «революціонной» — борьбѣ между хозяйственными и нехозяйственными мужиками довелось подойти съ нѣсколько неожиданной стороны. Начиная съ лѣта 1918 г. въ бывшій Брянскій — районный и смѣшанный — союзъ кооперативовъ, въ жизни котораго я принималъ нѣкоторое участіе, — изъ разныхъ мѣстъ отъ крестьянъ стали поступать просьбы о помощи организоваться на кооперативныхъ началахъ. Первое же обслѣдованіе, вызванное этими просьбами, вскрыло такую картину.

Деревня. 20 дворовъ. Изъ нихъ сплотиться въ кооперативную организацію хотятъ только 8 дворовъ,— остальные 12 дворовъ рѣшительно противъ. И споръ между «восьмеркой» и «дюжиной» вовсе не такъ простъ, чтобы его можно было разрѣшить въ порядкѣ кооперативномъ. «Восьмерка», прежде всего, желаетъ административно отдѣлиться отъ деревни, — образовать независимый отъ нея поселокъ.

— Вы живите сами по себѣ, а мы — сами по себѣ, у васъ чтобъ свой сходъ, а у насъ — свой.

Изъ этого основного желанія вытекаетъ все прочее. Конечно, нельзя отдѣлиться административно безъ выдѣленія земельнаго. «Восьмерка» старается устранить всякіе споры о качествѣ земли. Она согласна отказаться отъ усадебныхъ земель, отъ лучшихъ клочковъ пашни, предлагаетъ дать ей по мѣстной «нормѣ» худшія земли, но только, чтобъ врозь:

— Вы оставайтесь на своей землѣ и устраивайтесь на ней, какъ хотите, а мы выселимся на свою землю и будемъ устраиваться, какъ намъ желательно. Другъ другу помѣхой не будемъ.

И уже въ третьей очереди, дополнительно къ основному вопросу о выселеніи и выдѣленіи, — стояла просьба къ инструкторскому отдѣлу союза кооперативовъ.

— Помогите намъ устроить сельскохозяйственный кооперативъ на новомъ мѣстѣ, если оно будетъ отведено.

Вотъ въ этомъ-то «если» и оказалась главнѣйшая трудность. Восемь дворовъ предлагали остальнымъ двѣнадцати, какъ будто, безобидную и даже выгодную сдѣлку. Но двѣнадцать дворовъ кричали, «какъ одинъ»:

— Нѣтъ нашего согласія. Не позволимъ. Какъ это можно, — общество сломать.

— Но вѣдь вамъ уступаютъ лучшую землю...

— Знаемъ мы, что къ чему... Не хотимъ.

Черезъ три года, уже въ гораздо болѣе сѣверныхъ мѣстахъ — въ Новгородской губерніи — мнѣ пришлось столкнуться съ тѣми же самыми вопросами и съ такими же точно спорами, только они къ 1921 году стали болѣе откровенными. Отпали всякаго рода второстепенные доводы — затруднительность новаго передѣла, необходимаго, если «полъ деревни вдругъ уйдетъ»; относительное значеніе тѣхъ земель, которыя надо выдѣлить уходящимъ, и т.п.. Шумѣли объ основномъ и вполнѣ откровенно:

— Да вамъ, извѣстно, лишь бы уйти... А потомъ кто будетъ платить?

— Налоги каждый за себя... Вы свое платите, а мы будемъ свое...

— Ага, свое?.. А ежели у меня нѣту?

— Такъ что же, — я за тебя цѣлый вѣкъ буду платить?

— А ты думаешь какъ? И плати... Теперь такой законъ...

Постепенно этотъ пунктъ о платежѣ налоговъ выпятился на первый планъ, пріобрѣлъ особенную остроту. Но, самъ по себѣ, онъ все-таки — частность. Важно вообще отдѣлиться, получить хозяйственную независи-

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мость. И любопытная при этомъ черта, которую я первоначально замѣтилъ въ Брянскомъ уѣздѣ еще въ 1918 г.: отдѣлиться часто хотѣли тѣ крестьяне, которые при Столыпинѣ рѣшительно сопротивлялись выдѣламъ. Сколько я могъ понять, это наблюдалось тамъ, гдѣ, пользуясь столыпинскимъ «указомъ», укрѣпленія и выдѣла земель требовали «пришлые люди», —приписанные къ данному обществу, но давно ушедшіе изъ него. Тогда хозяйственный мужикъ берегъ землю. Теперь беречь землю стало незачѣмъ, — за то явилась крайняя нужда обезпечить возможность трудиться на землѣ. Революція принесла хозяйственному мужику бѣдствія и тяготы, небывалыя даже при крѣпостномъ правѣ. Но тѣмъ самымъ она побудила хозяйственнаго мужика выступить болѣе активно, чѣмъ прежде, рѣзко отграничить себя отъ мужика нехозяйственнаго. Произошелъ небывало рѣзкій расколъ крестьянства на два враждующихъ стана. Ближайшимъ политическимъ послѣдствіемъ этого раскола было безсиліе деревни вліять на ходъ общенаціональныхъ событій. Ея потенціально огромная мощь ушла въ междоусобную склоку, на преодолѣніе внутреннихъ треній. Неопредѣленное и неустойчивое равновѣсіе дѣйствительныхъ силъ позволило господствовать наиболѣе гибко лавирующимъ безсиліемъ. Въ этомъ, между прочимъ, одинъ изъ секретовъ ленинской власти и ея безсмѣнности.

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Крайне знаменателенъ для борьбы хозяйственнаго мужика за самое свое существованіе стихійный поворотъ къ столыпинскому «указу 9 ноября». Формальное подтвержденіе основныхъ началъ этого указа произошло лишь въ 1922 г., — и это было крупной побѣдой именно хозяйственнаго мужика, признакомъ его усиливающагося вліянія на правительственную мысль. Но фактически старый, пріостановленный еще самодержавною властью, «законъ Столыпина» сталъ потихоньку примѣняться провинціальными отдѣлами уже въ 1918 году.

Отчасти, тутъ сыграли роль чисто идейные мотивы. Въ «большевистскихъ» земотдѣлахъ работаютъ старые земскіе агрономы и чиновники прежнихъ землеустроительныхъ комиссій. Среди нихъ вообще было довольно сильное сочувствіе къ существу «столыпинской реформы». Противъ нея вооружало собственно побочное обстоятельство: предоставленная Столыпинымъ нехозяйственному мужику возможность захватывать цѣнные участки общинной земли и закрѣплять за собою для продажи. Это «разбазариваніе» крестьянскихъ земель революція устранила. Нехозяйственный мужикъ уже не имѣлъ никакихъ резоновъ «выдѣляться»: что ему дѣлать на отрубѣ или на хуторѣ? Теперь онъ сталъ рѣшительно противъ выдѣловъ. Такимъ образомъ, отрицательныя стороны прежней казенной «хутороманіи» отпали. А положительныя тѣмъ болѣе заставляли вспомнить о себѣ, что не было иного способа спасти хозяйственнаго мужика отъ нехозяйственной стихіи, — а это значитъ, что не было иного способа спасти и самое земледѣліе.

И вотъ, подъ шумъ всякихъ событій стали примѣнять законъ, несмотря на его «контръ-революціонную» славу. Примѣнять, однако, съ значительными измѣненіями. Выдѣлы отдѣльныхъ хозяевъ, по крайней мѣрѣ въ первое время, не практиковались. Да и какой смыслъ отдѣльному хозяину *теперь* выдѣляться? Каждый понималъ, что его, если онъ отдѣлиться отъ всѣхъ, попросту раззорятъ и уничтожатъ. Чего-либо достигнуть и защититься при нынѣшнихъ условіяхъ можно только сплоченной группой. И въ этой буквально физической необходимости «хорового начала» крѣпла тяга хозяйственныхъ мужиковъ въ сторону кооперированія.

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Самое примѣненіе «страшнаго закона» пошло по двумъ основнымъ путямъ: отводъ земель группамъ безуставнымъ и отводъ земель группамъ уставнымъ. Въ первомъ слуаѣ было необходимо формальное согласіе схода на выдѣлъ. Если согласіе — правдами или неправдами — добыто, надо еще нажать пружины въ сельсовѣтъ, чтобы отъ имени всего общества пошла просьба о присылкѣ землемѣра. Потомъ надо нажать кнопки въ волостномъ земельномъ отдѣлѣ, чтобъ не тормозилъ. Надо нажать пружины въ уѣздномъ земельномъ отдѣлѣ, чтобы прислалъ землемѣра. Все это стоитъ огромныхъ трудовъ, расходовъ, — и въ послѣднюю минуту можетъ сорваться. Нерѣдко бывало такъ: землемѣръ пріѣхалъ, даже приступилъ къ работѣ, — нехозяйственники, замѣтя это, вооружаются кольями, хозяйственники также берутся за колья... Землемѣръ убѣгаетъ, спасая свои инструменты, да и самого себя. И «спецы земотдѣловъ», какъ бы они ни сочувствовали выдѣламъ, въ этихъ случаяхъ ничѣмъ не могутъ помочь. Во главѣ земотдѣловъ стоятъ коммунисты; къ счастью, они не понимаютъ, что такое «столыпинскій законъ»; и пока этотъ «законъ» считался контръреволюціоннымъ жупеломъ — упорствовать въ его примѣненіи, не останавливаясь передъ принудительными мѣрами, было бы крайне опасно и нецѣлесообразно.

Вѣрнѣе къ цѣли велъ второй комбинированный способъ. Желающіе выдѣлиться объявляли себя коммуной или артелью. Въ томъ и другомъ случаѣ они связывали себя договорами на поставку продуктовъ съ такъ называемыми «хозорганами», — т.е., съ продовольственными комиссаріатами, земельными отдѣлами и т. п.. Не лишнее, пожалуй, отмѣтить интересную деталь: приступая къ этому дѣлу, степенные, хозяйственные мужики часто старались залучить въ свою кампанію «мало-мальски подходящаго чекиста». «Сосетъ» «подходящій чекистъ» изрядно. Ублаготворять его стоитъ не дешево. Зато съ нимъ выходитъ скорѣе и прочнѣе. Эти и разныя другія военныя хитрости обезпечивали поддержку начальства, помогали отдѣлиться отъ прежняго разномастнаго «общества», создать свое, болѣе однородное. Возникало прикрытіе, за которымъ можно накоплять силы. Но до хозяйственной свободы было еще далеко.

Жить надо въ обстановкѣ крайней враждебности со стороны сосѣдей, — вчерашнихъ однообщинниковъ; дѣйствовать подъ градомъ доносовъ. Уже одно это вынуждаетъ сообразоваться съ указаніями «коммунистическаго» начальства. Это значитъ, что необходимо вести хозяйство групповое, а не единоличное: съ общими зачатками, съ общими посѣвами, и со сборомъ урожая въ общій котелъ. Жизнь быстро вскрываетъ отрицательныя стороны этого «коммунистическаго идеала». Въ работѣ, согласно этому «идеалу» приходится равняться по слабѣйшему. Иной бы и радъ выѣхать въ поле до свѣту, — да нельзя, надо же подождать, пока Иванъ Петровичъ напьется чаю, — ужъ онъ такой, утромъ до чаю работать не можетъ. Въ планѣ хозяйства нужно равняться по наименѣе изобрѣтательному и талантиливому. Иной и много бы кой-чего новаго и хорошаго завелъ, да другіе съ нимъ несогласны, не понимаютъ, склонны дѣйствовать «по старинкѣ» и просто неспособны вдругъ сразу и рѣзко свернуть съ привычныхъ путей.

Лично я уже въ 1920 г. сталъ замѣчать приспособленіе групповыхъ хозяйствъ къ требованіямъ здраваго смысла. По внѣшности «коммуна»: общій планъ, общая работа, урожай «въ общій котелъ». Но каждый дворъ работаетъ на опредѣленномъ, отведенномъ ему «покамѣстъ» участкѣ, и плоды его трудовъ попадаютъ «въ общій котелъ» счетомъ и мѣрою.

Прошелъ еще годъ, и явилось новое приспособленіе: каждый дворъ

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работаетъ на своемъ участкѣ по своему плану. Общій же планъ получается на бумагѣ въ порядкѣ чисто механической сводки индивидуальныхъ плановъ.

Оставалось еще больное мѣсто: какъ примирить затраты на мелiорацію своего участка съ неувѣренностью, что этотъ участокъ и въ будущемъ останется моимъ, а не перейдетъ къ кому-либо другому. Тутъ подоспѣлъ на помощь декретъ, возстановившій столыпинское землеустройство. И какъ только декретъ появился, — немедленно посыпались просьбы «о внутри-групповомъ размежеваніи». Каждый участникъ закрѣпляетъ за собою опредѣленную полосу земли. Группа при этомъ, однако, не распадается. Ее берегутъ сами хозяева. Она продолжаетъ объединять, но уже не все, а лишь отдѣльные хозяйственные элементы своихъ членовъ, получающихъ полную автономію. Оффиціальныя московскія «Извѣстія» (4.2.23) такъ характеризуютъ этотъ процессъ:

«Старыя коммуны и артели, насаждаемыя большею частью въ порядкѣ протекціонизма, постепенно исчезаютъ. Ихъ мѣсто начинаютъ занимать сельскохозяйственные кооперативы, товарищества, разнаго рода артели».

И еще одна характерная черта. Послѣ изданія землеустроительныхъ декретовъ стало сравнительно легко и просто «освободиться — какъ выражаются «Извѣстія» — отъ всякихъ совѣтскихъ тяготъ». Однако, судя по отчетамъ и докладамъ совѣтскихъ землеустроителей, первое мѣсто по размѣрамъ работъ и теперь занимаютъ *групповыя*, а не единоличныя выдѣленія изъ общины. Очевидно, выдѣленцы продолжаютъ высоко цѣнить «хоровое начало». И, только отбившись группой отъ стараго «общества», они приступаютъ къ внутри-групповому размежеванію на отруба и хутора. Для сужденія о темпѣ, съ какимъ происходитъ эта работа, не излишенъ слѣдующій отзывъ «Извѣстій» (4.2.23) относительно Смоленской губерніи:

— Здѣсь «въ теченіе прошлаго (1922) года образовано 25000 хуторовъ и отрубовъ на площади около 300.000 десятинъ. Между тѣмъ въ той же Смоленской губерніи за 10 лѣтъ столыпинскаго землеустройства было устроено всего 44000 хуторовъ и отрубовъ на площади въ 500000 десятинъ. При такомъ темпѣ черезъ 10 лѣтъ губернія будетъ вся хуторская».

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Изъ затяжной борьбы хозяйственный мужикъ выходитъ съ страшной убылью скота, съ огромнымъ изъяномъ по части мертваго инвентаря и почти безъ оборотнаго капитала. До свободы земледѣльческаго труда все еще далеко. Она невозможна безъ правоохранной государственности. Но отъ нехозяйственныхъ сосѣдей хозяйственный мужикъ освобождается. Онъ заводитъ свою деревню. Въ ней, конечно, будутъ рождаться люди, несклонные или неспособные къ земледѣлчьескому труду. Но эта новая, исключительно хозяйственная деревня строиться на принципѣ единоличнаго формальнаго землепользованія, а фактически — землевладѣнія. И, стало быть, кто, въ земледѣльческомъ смыслѣ слова, не хозяинъ, тотъ въ этой новой деревнѣ и не жилецъ. Его будетъ «прибирать» отсюда неумолимый экономическій законъ частно-правовой борьбы за существованіе.

По внѣшности, побѣдителемъ выходитъ нехозяйственный мужикъ. Онъ удержалъ въ своихъ рукахъ старую деревню съ ея усадьбами, постройками, школами, церквами. Но онъ, неспособный и несклонный къ земледѣльческому труду, долженъ здѣсь, на землѣ, кормить себя и—уже за свой, а не чужой счетъ — выполнять всѣ государственныя повинности: задача, для него непосильная. Ясно, что это не побѣда, а западня. Еще нѣсколько

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лѣтъ, и тотъ же неумолимый экономическій законъ «приберетъ» нехозяйственнаго мужика изъ старой деревни, а самую эту деревню возвратитъ въ томъ или иномъ видѣ-хозяйственному мужику.

«Приберетъ..» Но куда? Общеизвѣстный отвѣтъ: въ города, на фабрики, на заводы, — теперь едва ли годится. Индустрія убита, агонизируетъ. На мѣстѣ органической государственной власти — капризъ безсилія, завѣдомо неспособнаго рѣшить такой огромный вопросъ, какъ устройство судьбы милліоновъ, осѣвшихъ на землю, но неспособныхъ вести на ней хозяйство. Вопросъ и не рѣшается въ государственномъ порядкѣ. Точнѣе сказать: онъ обостряется правительствомъ. Государственная власть вынуждена «свертывать» и тѣ остатки промышленныхъ предпріятій, которыя она кое-какъ поддерживала. А это значитъ: десятки и сотни тысячъ людей гонятся все въ ту же старую деревню. Власть безсильна. Но именно поэтому всесильна стихія...

Кажется, ни для кого не секретъ, что въ нынѣшнихъ самыхъ голодныхъ мѣстахъ голодъ не сплошной: одни не имѣютъ даже лебеды и сосновой коры, другіе — въ томъ же селѣ — питаются хлѣбомъ, хотя и не слишкомъ обильно; одни бѣгутъ изъ деревень, куда глаза глядятъ, чтобы спастись отъ голода, другіе остаются и — какъ это ни трудно — продолжаютъ вести хозяйство. Теперь объ этомъ много пишетъ совѣтская пресса. Но такъ оно было и во время прошлогодняго голода.

Конечно, такія бѣдствія, какъ засуха, градобитіе, саранча, не щадятъ никого. Прекрасно обработанное поле хозяйственнаго мужика такъ же подвергается опустошенію, какъ и плохое поле мужика нехозяйственнаго. но въ общемъ и среднемъ, если не абсолютно, то относительно, меньше страдаетъ тотъ, кто наиболѣе одаренъ для даннаго труда и наилучше приспособляется къ случайностямъ стихіи. Хозяйственнаго мужика повалить не такъ легко. Мужикъ нехозяйственный и въ хорошіе-то годы еле-еле кормится отъ земли. Въ плохіе годы не надо валить его — онъ самъ валится. Эти апріорныя соображенія можно бы подтвердить фактическимъ матеріаломъ. Но не знаю, нужно ли это дѣлать въ данной краткой характеристикѣ основныхъ деревенскихъ разслоеній по признаку приспособленности къ земледѣльческому труду. Доказывать, что въ деревнѣ отъ голода погибаютъ въ большинствѣ наименѣе приспособленные къ этому труду, значило бы, пожалуй, ломиться въ открытую дверь.

Сложившееся положеніе говоритъ само за себя: нехозяйственнаго массоваго мужика начинаетъ «прибирать» изъ деревень голодъ. Но прибираетъ, къ несчастью, въ могилу. Больше-то, выходитъ, некуда.

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ХОЗЯЙСТВЕННОЕ ПРЕДВИДѢНІЕ, КАКЪ ПРОБЛЕМА СТАТИСТИКИ.

Ю. А. Павловскій.

Докладъ, читанный въ Р. Э . О. 1-3-23.

Много томовъ въ экономической литературѣ посвящено вопросу о хозяйственныхъ кризисахъ и вызывающихъ ихъ причинахъ. Но, несмотря на все обиліе теорій, промышленный и торговый міръ и сейчасъ стоитъ передъ неразрѣшеннымъ вопросомъ о томъ, чего ждать отъ завтрашняго дня, и всякій новый переломъ въ условіяхъ рынка застаетъ хозяйство врасплохъ, нанося ему тяжелыя потери. Естественно возникаетъ мысль о томъ, нельзя ли по тѣмъ или инымъ объективнымъ признакамъ предусмотрѣть наступленіе перелома въ конъюнктурѣ и обезпечить себѣ возможность сообразовать свою хозяйственную дѣятельность съ измѣнчивыми условіями рынка, избѣгая тяжелыхъ потрясеній во всемъ ходѣ экономической жизни.

Эта практическая потребность въ хозяйственномъ предвидѣніи и породила вопросъ о «показателяхъ конъюнктуры» или «коммерческихъ барометрахъ» (business barometers). Разрѣшенія проблемы стали искать въ тщательномъ статистическомъ изученіи самаго теченія прошедшихъ хозяйственныхъ цикловъ. Наблюденіе, какъ будто, опредѣленно указывало на то, что существуетъ цѣлый рядъ элементовъ хозяйства, обнаруживающихъ особенную чувствительность къ общимъ условіямъ рынка и могущихъ, такимъ образомъ, въ своихъ колебаніяхъ представлять извѣстные симптоматическіе признаки отдѣльныхъ моментовъ прохожденія всякаго хозяйственнаго цикла. И вотъ, изучая статистическимъ путемъ эволюцію этихъ симптоматическихъ элементовъ хозяйства на протяженіи возможно длиннаго ряда прошедшихъ цикловъ, стали пытаться, на основаніи наблюдавшейся въ нихъ закономѣрности, примѣняя основныя положенія теоріи вѣроятностей, выводить извѣстныя заключенія относительно будущихъ измѣненій хозяйственной конъюнктуры.

Послѣ американскаго кризиса 1907 г., Французское Правительство назначило спеціальную комиссію изъ свѣдущихъ лицъ, возложивъ на нее разработку вопроса о мѣропріятіяхъ, могущихъ смягчить безработицу, вызываемую періодическими кризисами. Изучая вопросъ, комиссія подошла и къ тому, по какимъ признакамъ можно было бы заранѣе предусмотрѣть наступленіе перелома въ конъюнктурѣ. Она признала, что такіе признаки существуютъ, и что для Франціи симптоматическими элементами ея хозяйства въ этомъ отношеній являются: 1) ссуды и учетныя операціи Banque de France; 2) кассовая наличность этого банка; 3) цѣны сырья, продовольствія и др. товаровъ; 4) внѣшняя торговля Франціи; 5) потребленіе каменнаго угля; 6) цѣны на чугунъ; 7) перевозки по желѣзнымъ дорогамъ и 8) количество безработныхъ. По мнѣнію комиссіи, одни изъ этихъ элементовъ въ своихъ колебаніяхъ слѣдуютъ за кризисомъ или сопровождаютъ его, другіе же предшествуютъ ему и предупреждаютъ о предстоящемъ общемъ переломѣ конъюнктуры. Далѣе такихъ общихъ указаній комиссія въ своей работѣ не пошла: практическихъ выводовъ или построеній ею сдѣлано не было.

Вопросъ снова поднялся въ Америкѣ, гдѣ его поставили на чисто-практическую почву, а затѣмъ подвергли и нѣкоторой научной разработкѣ. Такая

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постановка была естественнымъ результатомъ свойственнаго американцамъ стремленія, съ одной стороны — осознать и раціонализировать хозяйственную дѣятельность, а съ другой — дать практическое примѣненіе всякому новому достиженію въ области научнаго изслѣдованія. Вопросъ о хозяйственныхъ циклахъ въ ихъ отношеніи какъ къ отдѣльному предпріятію *), такъ и ко всему народному и міровому хозяйству въ цѣломъ, привлекъ серьезное вниманіе американскихъ теоретиковъ и практическихъ дѣятелей.

Проблема «коммерческаго барометра» въ подробно разработанномъ видѣ впервые была выдвинута R.W. Babson'омъ въ 1910 году **). Пожалуй, вопросъ былъ поставленъ имъ нѣсколько рекламно, и это значительно вредитъ впечатлѣнію отъ его работы. Едва ли, съ научной точки зрѣнія, осторожно и допустимо, какъ это дѣлаетъ Babson, съ самаго приступа къ изслѣдованію сложнаго вопроса о томъ, что можно назвать «симптоматологіей конъюнктуры», опредѣленно утверждать, что изученіе сообщаемыхъ имъ статистическихъ данныхъ «устраняетъ всякую гадательность и неопредѣленность въ отношеніи колебаній рынка товаровъ и биржевыхъ цѣнностей». Еще болѣе странное впечатлѣніе производитъ дальнѣйшее утвержденіе автора, что «барыши, которые можетъ дать изученіе этихъ статистическихъ данныхъ, ограничены лишь размѣрами вложеннаго въ дѣло капитала и продолжительностью самаго изученія», и двѣ отдѣльныя главы, цѣликомъ посвященныя расчету прибылей, какія оно обѣщаетъ купцу или биржевому спекулянту. Академически настроенный читатель способенъ съ ужасомъ отвернуться отъ такого «труда»; но такая чрезмѣрная чувствительность была бы неумѣстна, такъ какъ, наряду съ подобными странностями въ работѣ Babson'а заключается много интереснаго и цѣннаго.

Babson основываетъ свой «барометръ» на изученіи колебаній въ 12 группахъ элементовъ хозяйства, признаваемыхъ имъ симптоматическими для конъюнктуры ***) и на нихъ строитъ свой «composite plot», т.е. собственно «барометръ», графически представляющій прохожденіе хозяйственныхъ цикловъ, поскольку таковые находятъ свое отраженіе въ этихъ элементахъ.

Нѣсколько иначе, исходя изъ другого подбора симптоматическихъ элементовъ, ставитъ свой показатель Экономическое Бюро Brookmire, которое, наряду съ Babson'омъ, является въ Америкѣ однимъ изъ піонеровъ статистическаго изученія конъюнктуры. Но на этихъ раннихъ попыткахъ, такъ же, какъ на крупномъ трудѣ W.C. Mitchell'я ****), посвященномъ статистическому изученію цикловъ, и потому имѣющемъ близкое отношеніе къ нашему вопросу, и на взглядахъ и предложеніяхъ проф. Copeland'а, касающихся принциповъ построенія коммерческаго барометра *****), мы здѣсь останавливаться не можемъ.

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*) См. H.S. Dennyson. «Management and the Business Cycle», Journal of the Amer. Stat. Association, March. 1922.

**) R.W. Babson. «Business Barometers used in forecasting Trade and Security Prices». 1910.

***) Эти 12 группъ, въ составъ которыхъ вошли въ общемъ 24 элемента, слѣдующія: 1) Постройки и недвижимость; 2) Расчетныя операціи банковъ; 3) Банкротства; 4) Рабочій рынокъ; 5) Денежный рынокъ; 6) Внѣшняя торговля; 7) Движеніе золота; 8) Движеніе товарныхъ цѣнъ; 9) Рынокъ капитала; 10) Состояніе урожая; 11) Выручка желѣзныхъ дорогъ; 12) Соціальныя и политическія условія.

****) W.C. Mitchell. «Business Cycles», 1912. См. также разборъ этой работы въ статьѣ B.W. King «A study of Mitchell's inquiries into prices». Quart. Journal of Economics, 1916-1917.

*****) M.T. Copeland: «Business Statistics», 1917.

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Въ Англіи до послѣдняго времени автору настоящаго очерка была извѣстна лишь одна попытка построенія «коммерческаго барометра», сдѣланная J. Kitchin'омъ, опубликовавшимъ свою «Trade Chart» въ 1919 г. Теперь же поборникомъ этой идеи выступилъ Директоръ London School of Economics, профессоръ Sir William Beveridge, заявившій на собраніи дѣловыхъ людей въ Манчестерѣ въ ноябрѣ 1922 г. о намѣреніи London School of Economics, совмѣстно съ Кэмбриджскимъ Университетомъ, разрабатывать и издавать «trade chart», на которую «можно было бы смотрѣть съ такимъ же довѣріемъ, какъ на барометръ или термометръ» *). Въ настоящее время попытка такого рода дѣлается, на основаніи ограниченнаго матеріала по движенію цѣнъ спеціально подобранныхъ предметовъ, журналомъ «The Economic Review» **).

Задача настоящаго очерка—разсмотрѣть методологическую постановку данной проблемы, какъ статистической задачи, и объективно разобраться въ томъ, что даетъ, и что можетъ дать «коммерческій барометръ» въ примѣненіи къ практическимъ вопросамъ хозяйственной дѣятельности. Для этой цѣли необходимо, прежде всего, выяснить самую постановку проблема; затѣмъ посмотрѣть, что сдѣлано въ этой области авторомъ, изслѣдовавшимъ ее наиболѣе научно и обстоятельно, а именно — профессоромъ Гарвардскаго университета W.M. Persons'омъ, и, наконецъ, установить нашу собственную точку зрѣнія на этотъ вопросъ. Такимъ образомъ, предлагаемая статья отнюдь не имѣетъ цѣлью дать исчерпывающую картину того, что сдѣлано и дѣлается въ этой области; многія изъ производящихся сейчасъ работъ и недоступны постороннему глазу. Насъ интересуетъ принципіальный вопросъ о томъ, насколько поставленная проблема доступна разрѣшенію статистическими методами.

ПОСТАНОВКА ПРОБЛЕМЫ.

Въ чемъ заключается наша задача? За нами, въ прошломъ, лежитъ рядъ закончившихся хозяйственныхъ цикловъ, въ которыхъ болѣе или менѣе правильные по продолжительности періоды подъема смѣнялись столь же неизбѣжными періодами упадка: кривая конъюнктуры достигала извѣстныхъ максимумовъ, чтобы затѣмъ рѣзко измѣнить направленіе и, дошедши до минимума, снова начать подниматься. Точки максимумовъ знаменовали собою моменты наступленія кризисовъ, и если бы, путемъ статистическаго изученія всего теченія прошедшихъ цикловъ, удалось установить признаки, неизмѣнно указывающіе на приближеніе перелома, задача хозяйственнаго предвидѣнія въ этой важнѣйшей области была бы разрѣшена.

Къ рѣшенію ея на практикѣ можно подходить двумя путями, и эти пути опредѣляютъ двоякую постановку самой проблемы.

Съ одной стороны, изучая измѣненія въ конъюнктурѣ за извѣстный, по возможности долгій, періодъ, продолжительность котораго, однако, непремѣнно ограничена условіемъ однородности на его протяженіи самаго строенія хозяйства и его основныхъ элементовъ, можно стремиться опредѣлить циклическія колебанія въ конъюнктурѣ и моменты, въ какіе въ ней, на основаніи экстраполяціи изъ опыта прошлаго, нужно, съ тою или иною степенью вѣроятности, ожидать наступленія переломовъ. Такова была бы наиболѣе трудная, но и наиболѣе плодотворная по своимъ результатамъ, постановка вопроса. Помимо того, такая постановка находилась бы въ самой тѣсной

*) См. «The Times», 21. XI.1922.
**) См. «The Economic Review», Dec. 15, 1922.

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связи съ распространенной теоріей періодичности кризисовъ. Въ основѣ ея лежало бы опредѣленное механическое представленіе о хозяйствѣ, какъ объектѣ, подчиняющемся извѣстной системѣ причинныхъ зависимостей, подъ вліяніемъ которыхъ, съ тѣми или другими случайными отклоненіями, оно протекаетъ. Иными словами, такая постановка покоилась бы на представленіи о наличіи въ хозяйственной жизни «законовъ» въ физическомъ смыслѣ этого слова. Поставивъ вопросъ на такую почву, мы должны были бы, получивъ извѣстный характеризующій конъюнктуру рядъ изъ синхронныхъ величинъ принятыхъ нами за показательные для общихъ условій хозяйства элементовъ или построенную изъ нихъ кривую, изслѣдовать ихъ съ точки зрѣнія наличія въ нихъ опредѣленныхъ періодовъ. Полученная путемъ сложенія нѣсколькихъ элементарныхъ кривыхъ составная кривая конъюнктуры могла бы обнаружить опредѣленную періодичность въ своихъ колебаніяхъ. Тогда, въ зависимости отъ постоянства этой періодичности въ прошломъ, и отъ числа изученныхъ нами завершившихся цикловъ, мы имѣли бы возможность, съ большей или меньшей вѣроятностью, заранѣе установить моменты предстоящихъ въ будущемъ переломовъ.

Это давало бы, по существу, идеальное рѣшеніе вопроса. Но на пути такой постановки, помимо ея чисто механическаго характера, стоятъ огромныя практическія затрудненія, главнымъ образомъ, въ видѣ крайней недостаточности матеріала для установленія періодовъ. Принимая во вниманіе необходимую предпосылку однородности экономическихъ условій въ предѣлахъ времени, подлежащаго изученію, мы могли бы получить лишь очень ограниченное, почти ничтожное, количество завершившихся цикловъ, и величина вѣроятнаго отклоненія, соотвѣтственно, была бы настолько большою, что лишала бы вычисленія и построенія всякаго практическаго значенія. Такимъ образомъ, указанная нами идеальная, съ теоретической точки зрѣнія, постановка вопроса представляется практически неосуществимой.

Остается другая постановка. При ней мы оставляемъ въ сторонѣ вопросъ о періодичности цикловъ и подходимъ къ разрѣшенію проблемы хозяйственнаго предвидѣнія съ точки зрѣнія исключительно симптоматологической. Мы не ищемъ опредѣленія самыхъ моментовъ перелома a priori, а пытаемся лишь, путемъ самаго тщательнаго изученія того, какъ протекали прошедшіе хозяйственные циклы, принадлежащіе къ *однородному* по своимъ условіямъ періоду, установить, какъ именно и въ какой хронологической послѣдовательности реагировали на перемѣны въ общей конъюнктурѣ или предупреждали эти перемѣны опредѣленныя колебанія въ рядѣ симптоматическихъ элементовъ хозяйства данной страны. Допустимъ, что изученіе прошедшихъ цикловъ показываетъ, что данные элементы хозяйства, отражающіе общія условія рынка, съ минимальными отклоненіями, подвергаются извѣстнымъ критическимъ измѣненіямъ въ направленіи своего движенія въ опредѣленные моменты каждаго хозяйственнаго цикла, — въ самый моментъ перелома или за извѣстный, остающійся постояннымъ, промежутокъ времени до него. Тогда, — въ первомъ случаѣ — мы получаемъ элементы для построенія самаго «барометра конъюнктуры», а во второмъ — возможность, съ теоретически опредѣленною степенью вѣроятности, ожидать заранѣе, что въ данномъ циклѣ, по наступленіи этихъ симптомовъ, общій переломъ конъюнктуры послѣдуетъ въ теченіе опредѣленнаго промежутка времени $\pm e$ или установленное изученіемъ прежнихъ цикловъ вѣроятное отклоненіе.

Вѣроятность того, что въ данномъ $(n+1)$-мъ циклѣ, послѣ появленія установленныхъ опытомъ симптомовъ, переломъ конъюнктуры произойдетъ

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въ теченіе опредѣленнаго промежутка времени $m \pm e$, теоретически выразится дробью

$$P_m = \frac{(n-k)+1}{n+2.}$$

гдѣ n — количество изученныхъ цикловъ и k — число случаевъ, въ которыхъ въ прошломъ закономѣрность была нарушена. Ясно, что величина P_m, т.е. вѣроятность вывода, будетъ тѣмъ ближе къ 1 или достовѣрности, чѣмъ больше n и чѣмъ меньше k.

Рѣшеніе задачи въ такой постановкѣ, правда, не дало бы возможности построенія, путемъ математической экстраполяціи, приближенной кривой колебаній конъюнктуры на будущее время, какъ это было бы, если бы удалось рѣшить задачу въ первой постановкѣ; но, зато, оно дало бы рядъ объективныхъ симптомовъ для предвидѣнія предстоящихъ въ хозяйственныхъ условіяхъ перемѣнъ и позволило бы заблаговременно къ нимъ подготовляться и смягчать ихъ тяжелыя послѣдствія.

Въ этой именно плоскости разсматриваетъ вопросъ и проф. W.M. Persons, на работѣ котораго намъ здѣсь придется остановиться.

«КОММЕРЧЕСКІЙ БАРОМЕТРЪ» ПРОФЕССОРА W.M. PERSONS'a.

Наиболѣе научно, какъ уже было указано, вопросъ о построеніи показателя конъюнктуры былъ поставленъ профессоромъ статистики Гарвардскаго Университета, Warren M. Persons'омъ, опубликовавшимъ свою работу въ концѣ 1916 г.*)

Онъ подвергъ изученію американскій рынокъ за періодъ съ 1879 г. по 1913 г., т.е. за 35 лѣтъ, въ теченіе которыхъ, по его мнѣнію, условія хозяйства были достаточно однородными, чтобы допустить сравненіе относящихся къ нимъ цикловъ. Въ составъ «барометра», при этомъ, онъ совершенно основательно считалъ необходимымъ включать лишь такіе симптоматическіе элементы, колебанія въ которыхъ являются синхронными и однозначными — условіе, не всегда соблюдавшееся его предшественниками — Babson'омъ и Brookmire'омъ. Работу свою онъ велъ, пользуясь наиболѣе совершенными пріемами современной статистической техники.

Онъ подвергъ изслѣдованію цѣлый рядъ факторовъ, болѣе или менѣе показательныхъ для общихъ условій хозяйства, а именно: 1) движеніе оптовыхъ цѣнъ товаровъ; 2) валовую выручку желѣзныхъ дорогъ; 3) чистую выручку желѣзныхъ дорогъ; 4) производство угля; 5) вывозъ изъ С. Штатовъ; 6) ввозъ въ С. Штаты; 7) производство чугуна; 8) цѣны на чугунъ 9) иммиграцію; 10) реализацію акцій на Нью-Іоркской биржѣ; 11) курсы этихъ акцій; 12) расчетныя операціи банковъ; 13) отношеніе объема расчетныхъ операцій къ товарнымъ цѣнамъ; 14) постройки новыхъ ж.д. линій; 15) количество банкротствъ; 16) суммы банкротствъ; 17) торговый балансъ С. Штатовъ; 18) показатели сбора девяти главныхъ хлѣбовъ и растеній съ акра; 19) отношеніе активныхъ операцій банковъ къ пассивнымъ; 20) отношеніе кассовой наличности банковъ къ обязательствамъ по вкладамъ; 21) избыточные резервы Нью-Іоркскихъ Объединенныхъ Банковъ. Всѣ эти данныя были изучены за весь періодъ съ 1879 по 1913 г.

Кромѣ того, съ 1890 г. по 1911 г. были изслѣдованы данныя проф. W.C. Mitchell'я по слѣдующимъ вопросамъ:

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*) W.M. Persons. «Construction of a Business Barometer based on annual data». American Economic Review; December, 1916.

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1) средній % по десяти желѣзнодорожнымъ займамъ.
2) « « « 4-6 мѣс. коммерческимъ векселямъ,
2) « « « 2-3 « « «
4) « « « ссудамъ до востребованія въ НьюІоркѣ.

Общее направленіе работы проф. Persons'a, въ отношеніи отбора симптоматическихъ элементовъ и самаго построенія «коммерческаго барометра» было таково.

1) Прежде всего, онъ остановился на «первомъ приближеніи» къ барометру, съ колебаніями въ которомъ подлежали сравненію, въ отношеніи синхронности и однозначности, измѣненія въ другихъ элементахъ. Такимъ приближеніемъ были признаны показатели движенія цѣнъ, какъ наиболѣе отчетливо отражающіе общее направленіе конъюнктуры. Въ основаніе сравненія проф. Persons положилъ index numbers U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics съ 1890 г. по 1913 г., взявъ для болѣе ранняго періода показатели Aldrich Report, которые онъ приравнялъ къ первымъ путемъ ихъ помноженія на коэффиціентъ 112.9/92.3, выражающій отношеніе показателя Bureau of Labor Statistics къ взятому изъ Aldrich Report за 1890 г.

2) Слѣдующимъ шагомъ было устраненіе, какъ въ рядѣ показателей цѣнъ, такъ и во всѣхъ сопоставлявшихся съ ними элементахъ, вліянія постояннаго роста, что было необходимо для облегченія сравнимости рядовъ и дальнѣйшей ихъ обработки при помощи метода корреляціи. Такъ какъ всѣ изслѣдовавшіеся проф. Persons'омъ элементы обнаруживали стремленіе къ возрастанію съ теченіемъ времени, въ зависимости отъ естественнаго развитія хозяйственной дѣятельности, то линія нормальныхъ величинъ, отъ которой приходилось измѣрять отклоненія, какъ отъ средней, представлялась не горизонтальной, а восходящей прямой или кривой. Въ отличіе отъ своихъ предшественниковъ, шедшихъ въ дѣлѣ устраненія постояннаго роста болѣе или менѣе произвольными путями, проф. Persons отмѣтилъ огромное вліяніе, какое имѣетъ при этомъ полная объективность и отсутствіе какихъ бы то ни было предвзятыхъ допущеній. Къ числу такихъ допущеній у болѣе раннихъ изслѣдователей — Brookmire'a и проф. Copeland'a, напримѣръ, относится признаніе a priori, что циклы имѣютъ нормальную продолжительность въ 10 лѣтъ; только при такомъ произвольномъ допущеніи ихъ методы находятъ оправданіе. Между тѣмъ, какъ совершенно правильно замѣчаетъ проф. Persons, изучая явленіе цикловъ, мы никакъ не можемъ заранѣе задаваться опредѣленною ихъ продолжительностью. Поэтому, вмѣсто распространеннаго метода «подвижной средней», проф. Persons въ своей работѣ прибѣгаетъ къ способу объективно-математическаго установленія линіи или кривой постояннаго роста, какъ функціи времени, интерполируя величины эмпирическихъ рядовъ своеобразнымъ приложеніемъ метода наименьшихъ квадратовъ, путемъ установленія регрессій каждаго изслѣдуемаго ряда по времени. *)

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*) Для этой цѣли Persons пользуется формулами:
$m = r.\ б_y/б_x$; $b = y' - mx'$ и $y = mx + b$,
гдѣ m — коэффиціентъ регрессіи эмпирическаго ряда по времени (y по x); r — коэффиціентъ корреляціи рядовъ x и y; x' — средній (въ данномъ случаѣ — 18-ый) годъ; отъ котораго считаются отклоненія во времени; y' — ариѳметическая средняя даннаго ряда y; x и y — величины сопоставляемыхъ рядовъ; $б_x$ и $б_y$ — среднія квадратическія отклоненія рядовъ x и y, и b — постоянный членъ уравненія регрессіи y по x. Этотъ методъ опредѣленія постояннаго роста онъ примѣнялъ, какъ повѣрочный, въ большинствѣ случаевъ просто пользуясь послѣднимъ уравненіемъ $y = mx + b$ и находя величины m и b по *методу моментовъ*, путемъ рѣшенія для m и b системы уравненій

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Найденная такимъ образомъ линія постояннаго роста, напримѣръ, для оптовыхъ цѣнъ, принимаетъ видъ прямой $y=0.1475x+112.87$, для расчетныхъ операцій — показательной кривой $y=80.63\ (1.0536)^x$, и т.д. Вычитая величину y для каждаго даннаго x (года) изъ соотвѣтствующей величины эмпирическаго ряда, мы получаемъ размѣръ отклоненія эмпирической величины отъ объективно установленной линіи постояннаго роста, и такимъ образомъ элиминируемъ его вліяніе. Отклоненія, опредѣленныя этимъ способомъ, являются совершенно аналогичными отклоненіямъ отъ обыкновенной неподвижной арифметической средней и могутъ быть разсматриваемы какъ таковыя при всѣхъ приложеніяхъ. Въ данномъ случаѣ, такой пріемъ является безусловно необходимымъ для дальнѣйшей разработки матеріала методомъ корреляціи, какъ это дѣлаетъ проф. Persons.

3) Слѣдующимъ шагомъ является установленіе степени параллелизма въ колебаніяхъ каждаго изъ изслѣдуемыхъ элементовъ съ колебаніями въ уровнѣ оптовыхъ цѣнъ, путемъ примѣненія метода корреляціи. **)

$\Sigma y = m\Sigma x + 35b$
и $\Sigma xy = m\Sigma x^2 + \Sigma xb$,
въ которыхъ значенія x и y подставлялись непосредственно изъ данныхъ эмпирическихъ рядовъ.

При этомъ, въ случаѣ линейной зависимости между перемѣнными x и y, уравненіе $y = mx + b$ рѣшается для самой величины y, а въ случаѣ зависимости болѣе сложной, когда $y = f(x)$ является показательной функціей типа $y = AB^x$ — для логарифма этой величины, такъ что оно принимаетъ видъ
$\log y = \log A + x \log B$.

**) Схематически, операціи представляются въ слѣдующемъ видѣ. Имѣется рядъ показателей движенія цѣнъ, который, по времени, т.е. по послѣдовательнымъ годамъ, мы обозначимъ величинами $a, a_1, a_2 \ldots\ldots a_{35}$, и рядъ соотвѣтствующихъ величинъ другой перемѣнной, скажемъ, выручки желѣзныхъ дорогъ — $b, b_1, b_2 \ldots\ldots b_{35}$. Вліяніе постояннаго роста въ томъ и другомъ ряду устраняется путемъ вычитанія изъ каждаго члена ряда соотвѣтствующей величины даваемыхъ уравненіями регрессіи по времени ординатъ, и затѣмъ вычисляются изъ преобразованныхъ такимъ способомъ рядовъ ихъ арифметическія средніе M_a и M_b и отклоненія отъ этихъ среднихъ. Отклоненія эти для ряда a обозначимъ величинами $x, x_1, x_2 \ldots\ldots x_{35}$, а для ряда b — величинами $y, y_1, y_2 \ldots\ldots y_{35}$. Вычисляемъ среднія квадратическія отклоненія по формуламъ

$$\sigma_x = \sqrt{\frac{\Sigma x^2}{n}} \quad \text{и} \quad \sigma_y = \sqrt{\frac{\Sigma y^2}{n}}$$

для каждаго ряда.

Тогда коэффиціентъ корреляціи для этихъ двухъ рядовъ вычисляется по общей формулѣ

$$r = \frac{\Sigma xy}{n.\sigma_x.\sigma_y},$$

гдѣ n — число членовъ сравниваемыхъ рядовъ, въ нашемъ случаѣ — 35, по числу лѣтъ, а числитель представляетъ алгебраическую сумму произведеній соотвѣтствующихъ паръ отклоненій каждаго ряда. Ясно, что при этомъ числитель, а съ нимъ и значеніе коэффиціента, выражающаго степень связанности изучаемыхъ рядовъ, растетъ, когда оба перемножаемыхъ отклоненія x и y однозначны, и уменьшается, если знаки y нихъ разные, т.е. если колебанія рядовъ въ томъ или иномъ случаѣ не согласуются въ направленіи. Ясно также, что абсолютная величина коэффиціента можетъ расти и въ томъ случаѣ, если колебанія рядовъ въ общемъ противоположны другъ другу, но что при этомъ алгебраическая сумма въ числителѣ, а слѣдовательно, и самъ коэффиціентъ, будутъ отрицательными величинами. Величина коэффиціента можетъ колебаться въ предѣлахъ отъ $+1$ до -1, причемъ $+1$ обозначаетъ полный параллелизмъ въ колебаніяхъ и, такимъ образомъ, полную прямую связанность въ движеніи рядовъ; -1 — такую же полную связанность, но обратную, когда увеличенію одной перемѣнной соотвѣтствуетъ уменьшеніе другой; къ нулю онъ стремится при полномъ отсутствіи связи между перемѣнными.

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Изслѣдуя такимъ образомъ связь между колебаніями цѣнъ и каждаго изъ другихъ элементовъ, перечисленныхъ нами ранѣе, Persons выдѣляетъ тѣ изъ нихъ, которые даютъ высокій коэфиціентъ корреляціи съ цѣнами (r), т.е. тѣсно связаны съ колебаніями послѣднихъ во времени.

Подобное же изслѣдованіе онъ производитъ надъ тѣми же рядами, сопоставляя колебанія въ цѣнахъ въ данномъ году съ колебаніями въ другихъ элементахъ за одинъ-два предыдущіе и послѣдующіе года, и если коэффиціенты корреляціи оказываются при этомъ выше, нежели при сопоставленіи синхронныхъ колебаній, онъ отказывается отъ введенія такихъ элементовъ въ барометръ, используя ихъ, какъ увидимъ далѣе, для другихъ цѣлей. Въ составъ барометра онъ вводитъ лишь элементы, обнаруживающіе безусловно максимальную связанность одновременныхъ колебаній.

4) Проф. Persons призналъ невозможнымъ, однако, остановиться на такомъ отборѣ и пошелъ далѣе. Имѣя въ виду, что величина коэффиціента корреляціи не зависитъ отъ порядка, въ какомъ расположены слагаемыя въ суммѣ Σxy, и что расположеніе членовъ рядовъ по величинѣ въ данномъ случаѣ имѣетъ значеніе, какъ указывающее на измѣненіе въ направленіи движенія, онъ перешелъ къ опредѣленію степени связанности между послѣдовательными разностями рядовъ, доводя дифференцированіе въ отдѣльныхъ случаяхъ до шестыхъ разностей. Практически, однако, онъ удовлетворился разностями перваго порядка, примѣнивъ къ нимъ методъ вычисленія коэффиціентовъ корреляціи первыхъ разностей.

Изслѣдованіе этимъ способомъ всѣхъ элементовъ, какъ на синхронность колебаній, такъ и на различные сроки упрежденія и отставанія, по сравненію съ показателями движенія цѣнъ, подтвердило выводы, къ которымъ Persons пришелъ путемъ изученія степени корреляціи между самими рядами. Изъ числа изученныхъ факторовъ, девять давали наивысшіе коэффиціенты для синхронныхъ колебаній, и ихъ проф. Persons нашелъ возможнымъ включить въ самый барометръ. Элементы эти, съ соотвѣтствующими коэффиціентами корреляціи съ показателями цѣнъ, какъ для рядовъ, такъ и для первыхъ разностей, указаны въ слѣдующей табличкѣ.

Элементы «барометра».	Коэффиціенты корреляціи.	
	Рядовъ.	Первыхъ разностей
1. Показатели движ. оптов. цѣнъ	1.000	1.000
2. Валовая выручка жел. дорогъ	0.945	0.660
3. Чистая « « «	0.862	0.546
4. Производство каменнаго угля	0.931	0.545
5. Вывозъ изъ Соед. Штатовъ	0.783	0.456
6. Ввозъ въ Соедин. Штаты	0.861	0.621
7. Производство чугуна	0.756	0.408
8. Цѣны на чугунъ	0.763	0.713
9. Иммиграція	0.789	0.615

5) Для самаго построенія «коммерческаго барометра» изъ этихъ девяти симптоматическихъ элементовъ Persons прибѣгъ къ слѣдующему методу. Такъ какъ ряды выражены въ различныхъ единицахъ, то для сведенія ихъ въ общій показатель необходимо было обратить ихъ изъ абсолютныхъ въ относительныя числа, и только тогда можно было вычислить ихъ среднія величины за соотвѣтствующіе годы. Пользуясь пріемомъ, примѣняемымъ при опредѣленіи коэффиціентовъ корреляціи между перемѣнными, выражен-

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ными въ различныхъ единицахъ, Persons раздѣлилъ каждый изъ девяти составляющихъ рядовъ почленно на соотвѣтствующее ряду среднее квадратическое отклоненіе (6), и затѣмъ вычислилъ среднія для каждаго года изъ девяти такимъ образомъ преобразованныхъ величинъ.

Такимъ образомъ, на основаніи этихъ девяти симптоматическихъ элементовъ хозяйства, проф. Persons построилъ свой «коммерческій барометръ», представляющій колебанія конъюнктуры американскаго рынка за 35 лѣтъ съ 1879 по 1913 г. Графически барометръ нанесенъ на прилагаемой діаграммѣ сплошными линіями.



6) Полученный «показатель конъюнктуры» или «барометръ» Persons еще разъ подвергъ тщательной провѣркѣ при помощи того же метода корреляціи, вычисливъ коэффиціенты корреляціи между самимъ барометромъ и каждымъ изъ отдѣльныхъ его элементовъ, какъ для самихъ рядовъ, такъ и для первыхъ разностей. Полученные имъ при этомъ коэффиціенты даны въ слѣдующей табличкѣ:

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Элементы, сопоставляемые съ барометромъ.	Коэффиціенты корреляціи	
	Рядовъ.	Первыхъ разностей
1. Показатели оптовыхъ цѣнъ	0.945	0.782
2. Валовая выручка жел. дорогъ	0.939	0.795
3. Чистая « « «	0.885	0.781
4. Производство каменнаго угля	0.951	0.847
5. Вывозъ изъ Соедин. Штатовъ	0.800	0.516
6. Ввозъ въ Соединен.-Штаты	0.877	0.830
7. Производство чугуна	0.865	0.828
8. Цѣны на чугунъ	0.785	0.698
9. Иммиграція	0.835	0.778

Сравнивая только что приведенную табличку съ первою, мы видимъ, что коэффиціенты корреляціи въ ней, какъ для самихъ рядовъ, такъ и для разностей, значительно выше, нежели соотвѣтствующіе коэффиціенты отдѣльныхъ элементовъ съ показателями цѣнъ. Причина этого ясна: сравнивая колебанія элементовъ барометра съ самимъ барометромъ, приходится имѣть дѣло съ искусственнымъ повышеніемъ коэффиціентовъ (spurious correlation) такъ какъ сопоставляемые ряды сами входятъ въ составъ барометра и, такимъ образомъ, въ извѣстной степени опредѣляютъ колебанія полѣдняго.

7) Построивъ «коммерческій барометръ» изъ синхронныхъ по колебаніямъ элементовъ, Persons используетъ элементы, давшіе наибольшіе коэффиціенты корреляціи съ цѣнами при упрежденіи на одинъ годъ, для построенія изъ нихъ «*предсказателя конъюнктуры*» (one-year forecaster). При построеніи его онъ пользуется тѣми же пріемами, что и для самаго барометра. По существу «предсказатель» и долженъ играть главную роль въ разрѣшеніи проблемы предвидѣнія конъюнктуры: соединяя въ себѣ элементы, колебанія въ которыхъ приблизительно на годъ предшествуютъ переломамъ въ общей конъюнктурѣ, онъ долженъ давать первое предупрежденіе о предстоящемъ кризисѣ или подъемѣ. Вошедшіе въ его составъ элементы, вмѣстѣ съ относящимся къ нимъ коэффиціентомъ корреляціи, при годичномъ упрежденіи, указаны въ слѣдующей табличкѣ:

Элементы «предсказателя».	Коэффиціенты корреляціи.			
	Съ цѣнами.		Съ барометромъ.	
	Рядовъ	△	Рядовъ	△
1. Реализація акцій Н.-І. биржей	0.470	0.518	0.400	0.521
2. Средніе курсы этихъ акцій	0.826	0.571	0.766	0.504
3. Расчетныя операціи банковъ	0.852	0.661	0.795	0.524
4. Длина новыхъ жел.-дор.линій	0.572	0.463	0.525	0.224
5. Процентъ банкротствъ	0.653	0.615	0.775	0.308

Самъ полученный изъ этихъ пяти элементовъ «предсказатель», нанесенный на діаграмму пунктиромъ, даетъ высокіе коэффиціенты корреляціи съ барометромъ (+0.860 для самихъ рядовъ и +0.510 для первыхъ разностей). Такимъ образомъ, съ точки зрѣнія общаго параллелизма, онъ представляется, повидимому, достаточно удовлетворительнымъ. Persons, однако, выдѣляетъ три первые элемента «предсказателя», а именно — реализацію акцій, средніе ихъ курсы и показатель расчетныхъ операцій, дающіе наи-

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высшіе коэффиціенты корреляціи для первыхъ разностей, и изъ нихъ составляетъ дополнительный «предсказатель», наиболѣе точно отражающій перемѣны въ барометрѣ.

Въ заключеніе своей работы, проф. Persons указываетъ, что къ несомнѣнно лучшимъ результатамъ привело бы изслѣдованіе данныхъ, относящихся къ болѣе короткимъ промежуткамъ времени — четвертямъ года или даже мѣсяцамъ, при 9, 6 и 3-хъ мѣсячномъ упражненіи.

Остановившись здѣсь на работѣ проф. Persons'a, чтобы дать болѣе ясное представленіе о томъ, какъ строится «коммерческій барометръ» въ современной его постановкѣ, въ дальнѣйшемъ мы постараемся разобраться въ томъ, что дали изслѣдованія проф. Persons'a, и что вообще можетъ дать примѣненіе статистическихъ методовъ къ разрѣшенію нашей проблемы.

ЧТО ДАЕТЪ «КОММЕРЧЕСКІЙ БАРОМЕТРЪ» И ЧТО ОНЪ МОЖЕТЪ ДАТЬ.

Изъ предшествующаго мы видимъ, съ какою добросовѣстностью отнесся проф. W.M. Persons къ своей задачѣ. Вмѣстѣ съ тѣмъ, краткая характеристика примѣняемыхъ имъ методовъ должна была бросить нѣкоторый свѣтъ на технику составленія показателей конъюнктуры. Какъ уже приходилось указывать, предшественники проф. Persons'a — R.W. Babson, Brookmire и проф. Copeland—шли нѣсколько другими путями, но, технически, работа Persons'a представляетъ безусловный шагъ впередъ по сравненію съ этими первыми попытками, почему именно на ней мы и остановились.

Сейчасъ передъ нами стоитъ вопросъ о томъ, что же дала работа W.M. Persons'a, и насколько ему удалось разрѣшить проблему хозяйственнаго предвидѣнія.

Что касается собственно «барометра», въ отличіе отъ «предсказателя» конъюнктуры, то, по нашему мнѣнію, работа проф. Persons'a въ значительной степени доказала, что вмѣсто того, чтобы спеціально строить «коммерческій барометръ», можно вполнѣ удовлетвориться хорошею системою чиселъ-показателей движенія оптовыхъ цѣнъ, которые самъ проф. Persons признаетъ наилучшимъ «первымъ приближеніемъ» къ барометру и полагаетъ въ его основаніе. Мы видѣли, что критерій, избранный проф. Persons'омъ для сужденія о пригодности къ включенію въ барометръ другихъ элементовъ, есть степень корреляціи въ колебаніяхъ этихъ элементовъ съ колебаніями показателей цѣнъ; если эта корреляція синхронныхъ колебаній выражается высокимъ коэффиціентомъ, данный элементъ признается подлежащимъ включенію. Но такое сопоставленіе можно, не менѣе логично, разсматривать и съ другой стороны, а именно — насколько измѣненія въ уровнѣ цѣнъ, выражающіяся въ показателѣ, соотвѣтствуютъ измѣненіямъ въ другихъ существенныхъ элементахъ хозяйства, наиболѣе чувствительныхъ къ общей конъюнктурѣ. Изслѣдованія проф. Persons'a показываютъ, что связь представляется чрезвычайно тѣсной. Естественно возникаетъ вопросъ: что же тогда — нужно ли, какъ дѣлаетъ проф. Persons, строить спеціальный барометръ, или можно считать, что таковымъ являются показатели цѣнъ. Съ нашей точки зрѣнія выводъ ясенъ: изслѣдованіе доказало законность притязанія чиселъ-показателей движенія цѣнъ на званіе коммерческаго барометра, и въ построеніи другого барометра надобности не встрѣчается. Нечего уже и говорить о томъ, что, въ концѣ концовъ, измѣненія въ конъюнктурѣ всегда находятъ свое выраженіе въ цѣнахъ, и что такое

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выраженіе гораздо конкретнѣе и осязательнѣе, нежели отвлеченная математическая величина данной ординаты «барометра», составленнаго на основаніи ряда разнородныхъ элементовъ.

Но, самъ по себѣ, «барометръ» въ схемѣ проф. Persons'a, какъ намъ она представляется, поскольку дѣло касается проблемы хозяйственнаго предвидѣнія, играетъ второстепенную роль. Онъ даетъ картину измѣненій въ конъюнктурѣ въ прошломъ, но относительно будущаго изъ него можно было бы выводить заключенія лишь при осуществленіи первой изъ двухъ указанныхъ нами постановокъ задачи, т.е. математическаго опредѣленія періодизаціи кривой барометра, для чего матеріала мы не имѣемъ: подвергнутый изученію періодъ слишкомъ коротокъ, и даже тенденцій къ опредѣленной періодичности кривая не обнаруживаетъ. Съ точки зрѣнія второй изъ указанныхъ нами въ началѣ этого очерка постановокъ, особенный интересъ представляетъ не барометръ, а «предсказатель»конъюнктуры (one - year forecaster), на основаніи котораго, по наступленіи извѣстныхъ критическихъ моментовъ въ «предсказателѣ», мы можемъ, съ болѣе или менѣе опредѣленной вѣроятностью, ожидать общаго перелома въ конъюнктурѣ. Что же даетъ работа проф. Persons'a въ этомъ отношеніи? Мы видѣли, что «предсказатель», при упрежденіи на годъ, даетъ высокій коэффиціентъ корреляціи съ барометромъ; проф. Persons замѣчаетъ, что корреляція была бы, по нѣкоторымъ признакамъ, значительно выше, если бы можно было пользоваться данными не за годъ, а за четверти или мѣсяцы, такъ какъ, повидимому, большинство элементовъ предсказателя предупреждаетъ переломъ не собственно за годъ, а за меньшій періодъ. Что же касается составленнаго имъ предсказателя изъ 5 элементовъ, нанесеннаго на нашей діаграммѣ пунктиромъ, то мы видимъ слѣдующее. Діаграмма ясно показываетъ, что фактическое совпаденіе «предсказателя» съ «барометромъ», съ упрежденіемъ на одинъ годъ, дающее высокій коэффиціентъ корреляціи (+0.860), далеко не является общимъ правиломъ. Изъ 19 случаевъ болѣе или менѣе рѣзкихъ колебаній въ конъюнктурѣ, отмѣченныхъ барометромъ, только въ 6 случаяхъ перемѣна въ направленіи кривой «предсказателя» предшествуетъ перелому въ барометрѣ на одинъ годъ; въ остальныхъ тринадцати случаяхъ совпаденія не наблюдается. Это обстоятельство имѣетъ огромное значеніе, такъ какъ именно отъ постоянства совпаденія въ колебаніяхъ кривыхъ зависитъ разрѣшеніе проблемы предвидѣнія наступающихъ измѣненій въ конъюнктурѣ. Напомнимъ, что вѣроятность нашего заключенія о моментѣ наступленія перелома, опирающаяся на эмпирическій матеріалъ, будетъ, какъ мы указывали, равна дроби

$$P = \frac{(n - k) + 1}{n + 2}.$$

Въ данномъ случаѣ, за 35 лѣтъ мы наблюдали 19 переломовъ, изъ коихъ въ 6 совпаденіе было, а въ 13 его не наблюдалось. Отсюда, вѣроятность того, что измѣненіе направленія въ кривой «предсказателя» будетъ предшествовать слѣдующему общему перелому на годъ $\pm e$ (эмпирически данная величина вѣроятнаго отклоненія), выразится дробью

$$P = \frac{19 - 13 + 1}{19 + 2} = {}^{1}/_{3}.$$

Иными словами, количество шансовъ за то, что переломъ, дѣйствительно, произойдетъ, вдвое меньше, нежели количество шансовъ за то, что «предсказатель» ошибется. Результаты, какъ будто, нѣсколько неожиданные, принимая во вниманіе высокіе коэффиціенты корреляціи между рядами ба-

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рометра и предсказателя, устанавливающіе тѣсную связь между ихъ колебаніями. На дѣлѣ, удивительнаго въ этомъ нѣтъ ничего: это видимое противорѣчіе легко объясняется свойствами самого примѣняемаго метода. Фактически *коэффиціентъ корреляціи даетъ мѣру связанности между рядами въ цѣломъ, а не въ частныхъ случаяхъ*, подпадающихъ подъ общее правило случайныхъ отклоненій и исчезающихъ подъ вліяніемъ общей преобладающей тенденціи. Фактъ, математически доказанный методомъ корреляціи и ясно выступающій въ нашей діаграммѣ, — тотъ, что на всемъ протяженіи 35-лѣтняго періода рядъ величинъ «предсказателя» за предыдущіе годы обнаруживаетъ значительную степень параллелизма съ рядомъ «барометра», и что этотъ параллелизмъ при такой комбинаціи выше, нежели при синхронности или любой другой комбинаціи во времени. Такимъ образомъ, установленъ критерій для параллелизма *въ общемъ*, но не въ частностяхъ. При этомъ, какъ мы видѣли, коэффиціенты корреляціи для самихъ рядовъ, какъ правило, выше таковыхъ для разностей перваго порядка. Послѣднее обстоятельство характерно потому, что въ первомъ случаѣ не оказываютъ соотвѣтствующаго вліянія тѣ колебанія въ кривыхъ, при которыхъ мѣняется знакъ производной, но сама кривая не переходитъ за линію средней и, такимъ образомъ, отклоненіе отъ средней, входящее въ числитель коэффиціента, какъ одинъ изъ множителей въ слагаемыхъ Σxy, не мѣняетъ знака. Именно по этой причинѣ при такомъ анализѣ приходится пользоваться *методомъ корреляціи разностей*, что и дѣлаетъ проф. Persons. При переходѣ къ установленію степени корреляціи между разностями перваго порядка положеніе мѣняется, такъ какъ знакъ производной получаетъ *нѣкоторое* вліяніе на коэффиціентъ и потому, въ данномъ случаѣ, при несовпаденіи колебаній по направленію, коэффиціенты корреляціи значительно понижаются. Но вліяніе это все же не абсолютное, и роль играютъ лишь такія отклоненія отъ средней разности, которыя черезъ нее переходятъ, остальныя же скрадываются. Это заставляетъ переходить къ приложенію «метода послѣдовательныхъ разностей» (variate differences method), устанавливая корреляцію между разностями послѣдовательныхъ порядковъ до тѣхъ поръ, пока $(n+1)$ая и n-ая разности не дадутъ одинаковыхъ коэффиціентовъ. Методъ этотъ былъ примѣненъ Persons'омъ къ элементамъ «барометра», но не «предсказателя», для котораго онъ остановился на первыхъ разностяхъ; между тѣмъ, значительное пониженіе коэффиціентовъ корреляціи между разностями, по сравненію съ таковыми между рядами, въ двухъ случаяхъ дающее вообще незначительныя величины, является безусловнымъ указаніемъ на наличіе въ рядахъ второстепенныхъ по величинѣ, но крайне важныхъ по моменту и направленію колебаній. Этимъ и объясняется то, что дающіе такіе высокіе коэффиціенты ряды такъ сильно расходятся въ частностяхъ, и что «предсказатель» на дѣлѣ ничего не предсказываетъ. Такъ же мало даетъ и второй — отборный — «предсказатель», составленный Persons'омъ изъ элементовъ, давшихъ наивысшіе коэффиціенты корреляціи для первыхъ разностей.

Проф. Persons думаетъ улучшить свой «предсказатель», положивъ въ основаніе четвертныя или мѣсячны данныя, вмѣсто годовыхъ. Намъ кажется, однако, что это дѣлу поможетъ мало, такъ какъ, если пойти на такую мелкую дифференціацію матеріала по времени, и «предсказатель» удастся раздробить на элементы съ различными упрежденіями, то тогда, съ уменьшеніемъ и такъ небольшого числа входящихъ въ него факторовъ, вліяніе индивидуальныхъ причинъ окажется настолько сильнымъ, что закономѣрность установить едва ли удастся.

То, что авторъ настоящаго очерка не имѣлъ возможности ознакомиться съ позднѣйшими работами проф. Persons'а въ связи съ Harvard Uni-

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versity Economic Service, заставляетъ ограничиться этими краткими замѣчаніями и не входить въ болѣе подробный разборъ достигнутыхъ результатовъ.

Данное здѣсь краткое описаніе примѣняемыхъ профессоромъ Persons'омъ методовъ, которыхъ, въ общихъ чертахъ, держатся и въ позднѣйшихъ изслѣдованіяхъ, имѣетъ въ виду обрисовку современной постановки задачи. Между прочимъ, въ основаніи позднѣйшихъ изслѣдованій лежитъ тотъ-же критерій—коэффиціентъ корреляціи, почему мы и нашли умѣстнымъ остановиться здѣсь вкратцѣ на результатахъ примѣненія этого метода. Намъ кажется, что именно въ данномъ случаѣ коэффиціентъ корреляціи, какъ критерій параллелизма рядовъ, оказывается въ значительной степени несостоятельнымъ и способенъ привести къ ложному заключенію.

Таковы выводы, которые можно сдѣлать изъ работы Persons'a въ частностяхъ. Построить «барометръ» и «предсказатель», оказывается, не такъ трудно, какъ рѣшить при помощи ихъ основной вопросъ — проблему хозяйственнаго предвидѣнія, поставленную намъ жизнью.

Какъ ни желательно было бы рѣшить эту важную задачу современнаго хозяйства, приходится, по нашему мнѣнію, признать, что научно она едва ли разрѣшима, и что статистикѣ въ этомъ отношеніи ставится непосильная задача.

Главный вопросъ здѣсь не въ методологическихъ трудностяхъ, а въ самой сущности дѣла, въ томъ, что еще Гераклитъ характеризовалъ словами *πάντα ῥεῖ*, и что сейчасъ называютъ словомъ *эволюція*.

При рѣшеніи проблемы хозяйственнаго предвидѣнія, намъ приходится имѣть дѣло съ экстраполяціей, особенно опасной въ области сложныхъ соціальныхъ и экономическихъ явленій, и притомъ основывающейся на крайне ограниченномъ эмпирическомъ матеріалѣ. Хозяйство — безконечно сложное и постоянно мѣняющееся явленіе. Передъ нимъ мы стоимъ, какъ передъ урной съ разноцвѣтными шарами, въ которой передъ каждымъ извлеченіемъ количество и отношеніе шаровъ мѣняются, и вѣроятность появленія при тиражѣ шара даннаго цвѣта на основаніи прошлыхъ опытовъ заранѣе опредѣлить невозможно. Сознаніе этой невозможности и заставляетъ подчеркивать, какъ то дѣлаетъ Persons, значеніе *однородности* хозяйственныхъ условій въ предѣлахъ изучаемаго періода. Иными словами, вводится допущеніе, что теоретически мы имѣемъ для даннаго періода, скажемъ, въ 35 лѣтъ, дѣло съ урной, содержащей постоянную пропорцію шаровъ различнаго цвѣта, изъ которой мы дѣлаемъ 35 послѣдовательныхъ извлеченій, возвращая, послѣ каждаго извлеченія, вынутый шаръ въ урну и, такимъ образомъ, сохраняя величину математической вѣроятности неизмѣнной. Совершенно ясно, что это лишь произвольное допущеніе, необходимое для того, чтобы можно было извѣстнымъ образомъ поставить задачу. Ясно также и то, что выводы дѣйствительны только въ предѣлахъ періода, въ которомъ хозяйственныя условія остаются однородными съ прежними. На дѣлѣ, хозяйство растетъ и измѣняется въ своемъ строеніи изъ года въ годъ. Для періода въ 35 лѣтъ, изученнаго, напримѣръ, Persons'омъ, и охватывающаго эпоху наиболѣе бурнаго роста американскаго хозяйства и измѣненій въ его организаціи (напр., развитіе трестовъ), трудно было бы вообще допустить «однородный характеръ» на всемъ его протяженіи. Въ частности, за этотъ періодъ, несомнѣнно, сильно измѣнился въ своей показательности для конъюнктуры въ общемъ цѣлый рядъ элементовъ, вводимыхъ проф. Persons'омъ въ его «барометръ». Такъ, значеніе производства каменнаго угля въ послѣднія десятилѣтія даннаго періода, съ развитіемъ примѣненія нефти и электричества въ промышлен-

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ности, транспортѣ и частномъ хозяйствѣ, существенно измѣнилось. Въ нѣкоторые моменты цикловъ, изслѣдованныхъ Persons'омъ, напримѣръ, паденіе въ производствѣ угля могло компенсироваться усиленіемъ использованія нефти или электричества. Таково же положеніе съ выручкой желѣзныхъ дорогъ, которыя въ теченіе первыхъ двухъ-трехъ десятилѣтій не встрѣчали конкурентовъ, а съ третьяго десятилѣтія все болѣе и болѣе страдаютъ отъ соперничества механическаго транспорта. То же съ постройкою новыхъ желѣзнодорожныхъ линій. Всѣ эти отрасли, несомнѣнно, обнаруживаютъ опредѣленный ростъ во времени, но относительное ихъ значеніе въ хозяйствѣ постоянно мѣняется. Показательность величины расчетныхъ операцій относительна потому, что объемъ ихъ зависитъ не только отъ конъюнктуры, но и отъ увеличенія числа отдѣльныхъ банковъ или, наоборотъ, отъ ихъ амальгамаціи. Такъ же несомнѣнно и то, что и въ другихъ элементахъ такія измѣненія происходятъ постоянно, и что говорить объ однородности хозяйственной обстановки, даже помимо вторгающихся въ экономическую жизнь страны постороннихъ политическихъ и другихъ факторовъ, можно лишь условно, какъ объ опредѣленной фикціи. Между тѣмъ, на этой именно фикціи покоится все рѣшительно построеніе, такъ какъ только она даетъ возможность внести хоть нѣкоторую опредѣленность въ вѣроятный характеръ заключеній относительно будущаго.

Въ современной обстановкѣ вопросъ о предвидѣніи конъюнктуры сдѣлался положительно моднымъ. Между тѣмъ, говорить о немъ теперь особенно трудно. Война такъ перевернула все міровое хозяйство, что объ однородности до-военной и послѣ-военной экономической обстановки говорить совершенно не приходится, и заключенія, выведенныя изъ перваго періода, неприложимы ко второму. Поэтому, возможность научно-обоснованнаго хозяйственнаго предвидѣнія въ настоящихъ условіяхъ представляется мнѣ совершенно исключенной, несмотря на то, что противнаго мнѣнія, повидимому, держится такой авторитетный экономистъ, какъ проф. Sir W. Beveridge. Тѣмъ болѣе это такъ, что факторы, принимавшіеся до войны за величины постоянныя и не имѣвшіе сколько-нибудь существеннаго вліянія на ходъ экономической жизни, какъ напр., курсы различныхъ національныхъ валютъ, сейчасъ нерѣдко являются рѣшающими причинами нарушеній въ хозяйственномъ равновѣсіи, какъ международномъ, такъ и внутри отдѣльныхъ странъ. О политическихъ и соціальныхъ факторахъ, отражающихся на хозяйствѣ, и говорить не приходится. Изъ чего исходить, въ такомъ положеніи, для разрѣшенія проблемы хозяйственнаго предвидѣнія? До-военный опытъ, поставлявшій хоть какой-нибудь матеріалъ для опредѣленія эмпирической вѣроятности нашихъ заключеній на будущее, явно использованъ быть не можетъ, вслѣдствіе полнаго разрыва между до-военными и послѣ-военными условіями. Новый нужно еще копить десятилѣтіями, и копить, въ данное время, при постоянно мѣняющейся обстановкѣ, заранѣе зная, что необходимой однородности среды не существуетъ

Къ прошлому обращаться не приходится. Тѣ урны, изъ которыхъ мы извлекали шары ранѣе, уничтожены; каковъ составъ урны, теперь стоящей передъ нами — мы не знаемъ, такъ какъ не закончили и первой серіи тиражей — не пережили еще ни одного полнаго цикла.

Съ нѣкоторою вѣроятностью говорить о предвидѣніи, какъ это дѣлали ранѣе Persons и другіе, послѣ нѣсколькихъ десятковъ тиражей, будутъ въ состояніи наши внуки; они снова, если не разочаруются въ результатахъ, будутъ строить «барометры» на основаніи завершившихся цикловъ, опираясь на ту же фикцію однородности. Тогда, быть можетъ, снова разразится міровая катастрофа, и снова досужіе статистики начнутъ копить опытъ на

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будущее, и т.д., и т.д. А условія хозяйства, даже помимо міровыхъ катастрофъ, будутъ постоянно мѣняться и подсыпать въ урну, не считая, новые и новые шары.

Значитъ ли это, что хозяйственное предвидѣніе вообще невозможно, и что умъ человѣческій совершенно не въ силахъ предусмотрѣть перемѣны въ конъюнктурѣ? Разумѣется, нѣтъ. Невозможность разрѣшенія проблемы хозяйственнаго предвидѣнія *статистическимъ путемъ*, т.е. предсказанія конъюнктуры на будущее, опирающагося на положенія теоріи вѣроятностей, значитъ лишь, что къ задачѣ нельзя подходить съ *механической* точки зрѣнія. Изъ этого нельзя выводить, что человѣкъ, обладающій коммерческимъ чутьемъ и способный оцѣнить симптомы даннаго хозяйственнаго момента и, на основаніи ихъ, сдѣлать выводъ относительно вѣроятнѣйшаго теченія конъюнктуры въ ближайшемъ будущемъ, не можетъ сознательно направлять свою дѣятельность, руководясь этими данными. Но это дается хозяйственнымъ чутьемъ обстановки, подобнымъ тому военному чутью, какимъ Наполеонъ выигривалъ свои сраженія. Ни для Наполеона, ни для коммерческаго «вождя», обладающаго чутьемъ обстановки, немыслимо было бы опираться на схоластическія построенія, основанныя на перенесеніи въ область постоянно мѣняющихся явленій, съ которыми имъ приходится имѣть дѣло, упрощенныхъ механическихъ схемъ, изъ военныхъ примѣровъ скорѣе всего напоминающихъ знаменитыя диспозиціи австрійскаго командованія, неизмѣнно терпѣвшаго пораженія отъ Наполеона.

Всѣ построенія, подобныя разобранному «барометру» проф. Persons'a, страдаютъ именно этой схоластической механизаціей безконечно сложныхъ и разнообразныхъ явленій хозяйственной жизни. Примѣняя наиболѣе совершенные методы математической статистики, авторы такихъ построеній часто забываютъ, что, помимо методовъ, существуетъ еще и самый *предметъ* изслѣдованія, часто не допускающій ихъ приложенія или ограничивающій значеніе дѣлаемыхъ изъ математическаго анализа выводовъ, и *статистическій матеріалъ*, на которомъ выводы основываются, и который необходимо тщательно анализировать, чтобы, отцѣдивъ черезъ математическое сито комара, не проглотить верблюда.

Оцѣнка конъюнктуры и предвидѣніе хозяйственнаго будущаго остаются дѣломъ таланта и личнаго чутья руководителей хозяйственной дѣятельности. Дѣло статистики — не строить на пескѣ механическіе «барометры» для ихъ руководства, а дать имъ достаточно доброкачественный и полный матеріалъ для оцѣнки существующей обстановки и лучшаго пониманія взаимной зависимости между отдѣльными факторами хозяйства. Сами работы Persons'a и другихъ цѣнны постольку, поскольку, независимо отъ разрѣшенія ими, по нашему мнѣнію, неразрѣшимой проблемы, онѣ попутно выясняютъ отдѣльныя зависимости между этими факторами. Въ области изученія этихъ зависимостей, въ идіографическомъ изученіи хозяйства, сдѣлано еще очень и очень мало; между тѣмъ, именно здѣсь — широкое поле для плодотворнаго примѣненія современныхъ методовъ математической статистики, способной открыть новые горизонты экономической наукѣ. А пока не изучена въ достаточной мѣрѣ даже хозяйственная дѣятельность, пока мы не знаемъ точно, эмпирически, изъ чего слагается хозяйственное сегодня, которое мы разумѣемъ подъ словомъ «конъюнктура», какъ можемъ мы говорить о предсказаніи на завтрашній день? Вѣдь, то что завтра *будетъ*, прежде всего и больше всего зависитъ отъ того, что сегодня *есть*, а въ этомъ для насъ еще безконечно много неизвѣстныхъ величинъ.

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РАЗЛОЖЕНІЕ НЭП-А.
КОММУНИСТИЧЕСКОЕ ХОЗЯЙСТВО ВЪ 1922 Г.

М. В. Брайкевичъ. Докладъ читанъ въ Р.Э.О. 26.4.23.

Имѣются ли объективныя основанія для того, чтобы считать, что НЭП окажется для Россіи средствомъ выбраться изъ теперешняго хозяйственнаго развала путемъ эволюціи, однако, твердымъ и относительно быстрымъ шагомъ къ возстановленію положительнаго воспроизводственнаго процесса и доведенію стандартовъ жизни до того уровня, когда прекратится массовое вымираніе и дегенерація Россійскаго населенія отъ физическаго истощенія?

Объективный и правильный отвѣтъ на этотъ вопросъ имѣетъ громадное практическое значеніе.

Допустимъ, что вы достаточно сильны духомъ, чтобы въ виду громаднаго несчастія Россіи вырвать изъ своей души съ корнемъ все личное, всякій интересъ классовый и дѣйствовать, руководясь, прежде всего, интересомъ общественнымъ и національнымъ.

Если, въ такомъ случаѣ, вы отвѣчаете на поставленный мною вопросъ — *положительно* — вы должны дойти до логическаго конца, т. е. смириться предъ совѣтской властью и приложить на НЭП-овскихъ путяхъ весь пафосъ вашихъ личныхъ усилій. Революція — всегда вещь дорогая. Интересъ государства требуетъ избѣгнуть ея, если для этого есть малѣйшая возможность.

Если, наоборотъ, вы отвѣчаете на поставленный мною вопросъ — *отрицательно* — вашъ гражданскій долгъ, несмотря на всѣ матеріальныя лишенія, съ выполненіемъ его связанныя, объективно и упорно критиковать Совѣтскую власть и НЭП, отдать весь вашъ пафосъ на то, чтобы НЭП какъ можно скорѣе кончился, чтобы разрушать иллюзіи НЭП-а, которыми Совѣтская власть дурманитъ сознаніе и сѣетъ рознь между отдѣльными соціальными группами Россіи. Вѣдь всякое промедленіе, всякій лишній день НЭП-а — это новое и вредное обезкровленіе Россіи.

Только такимъ радикальнымъ и жертвеннымъ подходомъ къ вопросу о томъ, спасаетъ ли или губитъ НЭП Россію,—можетъ Россійская политическая эмиграція сохранить живую и дѣйственную связь съ тѣми, кто остался и страдаетъ въ Россіи.

Первый этапъ къ этому подходу — это найти объективный и правильный отвѣтъ на поставленный въ началѣ доклада вопросъ.

Мой отвѣтъ въ результатѣ анализа, которому я еще разъ подвергаю НЭП и который предлагаю въ настоящемъ докладѣ вашему вниманію — отрицательный.

Если въ этомъ анализѣ вы найдете ошибки, больше того, если онъ возбудитъ въ васъ малѣйшія сомнѣнія, обсудимъ ихъ съ величайшей объективностью и тщательностью, ибо, повторяю, предъ каждымъ изъ насъ стоитъ одна и та же огромная проблема, которую мы должны рѣшить во всемъ сознаніи совѣсти и политической отвѣтственности.

Въ концѣ 1922 г. результаты дѣйствія НЭП-а на хозяйство Россіи уже настолько опредѣленно выявились, что говорить теперь о пригодности НЭП-а, какъ хозяйственной системы, о его шансахъ на долговѣчную жизнь

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или скорую смерть — можно съ совершенной увѣренностью. Не только за предѣлами досягаемости Совѣтской власти, но и внутри Россіи приблизительно съ Ноября 1922 г., даже въ средѣ нэпмановъ и коммунистовъ все больше и больше стало брать верхъ скептическое отношеніе къ итогамъ НЭП-а, высказываться сомнѣніе въ возможности вести успѣшно при НЭП-ѣ и дальше тѣ или другія отрасли хозяйства.

Что НЭП долженъ былъ въ конечномъ счетѣ окончиться крахомъ для меня было ясно еще ранней весной 1922 г. Обнаружившіеся уже тогда первые признаки кризиса перепроизводства не оставляли въ этомъ никакихъ сомнѣній. Теперь, годъ спустя, НЭП потерялъ или кончаетъ терять свой авторитетъ и въ глазахъ коммунистовъ.

Мы должны, однако, признаться откровенно и искренне: что, что въ предвидѣніи крушенія НЭП-а оказались въ конечномъ счетѣ правы мы, а не творцы НЭП-а и его барды — наемные или искренніе, все равно — радуетъ насъ мало. Напротивъ, мы полны жуткой тревоги за ближайшее будущее Россіи и вотъ почему.

НЭП произвелъ громадныя измѣненія въ хозяйственномъ и политическомъ строѣ Россіи, и мы подошли къ тому времени, когда эти измѣненія должны оказать свое рѣшительное вліяніе на дальнѣйшія судьбы страны.

Дѣло въ томъ, что за эпоху НЭП-а Россія усиленно даже по сравненію съ эпохой военнаго коммунизма проѣдала остатки основного капитала, свою матеріальную воспроизводственную базу. Можно сказать, что въ отношеніи этого основного капитала НЭП жегъ свѣчку съ обоихъ концовъ. Въ этомъ громадный минусъ НЭП-а. Минусъ, однако, не только для долголѣтія Коммунистическаго Правительства. Всякому и послѣкоммунистическому режиму въ Россіи прійдется чрезвычайно тяжело вслѣдствіе этого совершившагося ускореннаго и усиленнаго проѣданія и разбазариванія капитала во время НЭП-а.

Но НЭП далъ и громадный по своему размѣру плюсъ. Онъ произвелъ огромныя измѣненія въ массовой психологіи Россіи, въ бытѣ населенія, уяснивъ для его сознанія, съ остротой и ясностью необыкновенной, существо его экономическаго и политическаго положенія, подкормивъ истощенныхъ спецовъ и давъ зерна надежды и вѣры въ будущее давно ихъ потерявшимъ.

Наконецъ, НЭП вбилъ клинъ, который уже нельзя вытащить, въ единую до него коммунистическую партію и разбилъ ее на два лагеря, которые уже никогда не смогутъ соединиться — на хозяйственниковъ и политиковъ.

Произведенные НЭП-омъ измѣненія и сдвиги настолько значущи и матеріально и психологически, что Коммунистическое Правительство при теперешнемъ разрушеніи и разложеніи НЭП-а не имѣетъ никогда реальной возможности возвратиться на старыя до-нэповскія позиціи военнаго коммунизма и единаго соціалистическаго плана. Вся матеріальная и психологическая коньюнктура толкаетъ Россію дальше къ новому и громадному кризису. Передъ нею распутье и отъ него ведутъ два пути. Въ зависимости отъ того, какой изъ результатовъ НЭП-а окажется сильнѣе, дѣйственнѣе — громадный плюсъ или громадный минусъ — Россія пойдетъ по одному или по другому изъ этихъ двухъ возможныхъ новыхъ путей.

Въ первомъ случаѣ быстро смѣнится олигархическій и коммунистическій режимъ на демократическій и капиталистическій. На этомъ пути независимо отъ того, каковы при введеніи НЭП-а были истинныя намѣренія Ленина, НЭП въ конечномъ счетѣ окажется благодѣтельнымъ факто-

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ромъ, ускоряющимъ это лучшее будущее Россіи. Раны національнаго хозяйства, нанесенныя ему уничтоженіемъ основного капитала, затянутся сравнительно скоро.

Во второмъ случаѣ наступитъ громадный даже по сравненію со всѣми бывшими уже при коммунистическомъ режимѣ кризисъ производства, почти полная остановка государственной (крупной) промышленности и транспорта и затѣмъ на долгое время прострація всего національнаго хозяйства Россіи. Въ этомъ второмъ случаѣ всѣ до-извѣстной степени ожившіе при НЭП-ѣ спецы, квалифицированные рабочіе, торговцы и т.д., беря за скобку — весь городъ — переживутъ, вѣрнѣе перемрутъ, въ такую мрачную эпоху, по сравненію съ которой даже зима 1920 года покажется благополучіемъ. На этомъ второмъ пути НЭП окажется факторомъ лишь ускорившимъ приближеніе трагическаго момента сведенія послѣдняго и окончательнаго баланса коммунистической системы.

Отсюда наша жуткая тревога.

Я очень вѣрю въ жизнь и живучесть Россійскаго національнаго организма и оттого думаю, что Россія пойдетъ по первому пути. Но я хорошо понимаю, что сдѣлать такое предсказаніе съ совершенной увѣренностью, никто не вправѣ.

Обращаясь отъ области будущаго и вѣроятнаго къ области настоящаго и достовѣрнаго, можно уже теперь сказать совершенно доказательно, что Коммунистическое Правительство не имѣетъ никакихъ возможностей удержаться на сегодняшнихъ НЭП-овскихъ позиціяхъ. Онѣ прорваны въ цѣломъ рядѣ мѣстъ, НЭП-овскій фронтъ разрушенъ и разлагается. Чрезвычайно показательнымъ является то обстоятельство, что даже въ средѣ тѣхъ, кто, казалось бы, долженъ былъ бы защищать его — въ средѣ коммунистовъ — у него нѣтъ поклонниковъ и защитниковъ.

Оба образовавшіеся, благодаря НЭП-у, лагеря коммунистовъ — хозяйственники и политики — перестали возлагать на НЭП надежды, имъ удовлетворяться.

Въ такихъ основныхъ линіяхъ обозначается коммунистическое хозяйство теперь, т.е., весной 1923 г. спустя 2 года по введеніи НЭП-а.

ГЛАВА I-ая « TO MAKE A CORNER ».

Я постараюсь при помощи фактическаго матеріала показать ниже, что этотъ мною только что намѣченный рисунокъ намѣченъ вѣрно.

Вводя НЭП, Ленинъ, какъ извѣстно, хотѣлъ сдѣлать сложную и довольно рискованную работу подведенія экономическаго и соціальнаго фундамента подъ повисшую въ итогѣ военнаго коммунизма въ воздухѣ политическую надстройку-диктатуру компартіи. Сама идея НЭП-а и ея дальнѣйшее практическое выполненіе по существу является тонкимъ плагіатомъ *) со стороны Ленина, пріема, извѣстнаго въ мірѣ биржевой спекуляціи подъ терминомъ «to make a corner» — «дѣлать уголъ».

Пріемъ, какъ извѣстно, заключается въ томъ, что спекулирующая на какомъ-нибудь продуктѣ биржевая группа устраиваетъ для себя монопольное обладаніе имъ: она дѣлаетъ уголъ для потребителя. Если уголъ

*) Желая оставаться справедливымъ, я не утверждаю, что Ленинъ просто и грубо сплагіировалъ у міра биржевой спекуляціи. Для меня, однако, несомнѣнно, что, если Ленинъ и придумалъ НЭП совершенно самостоятельно, — его мысль шла по тѣмъ же темнымъ и грязноватымъ путямъ, какъ и мысль биржевого спекулянта, дѣлающаго свой капиталистическій «corner».

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крѣпокъ, она удержитъ въ немъ потребителя. Тогда рано или поздно онъ уплатитъ по очень вздутымъ цѣнамъ, и за продукты, и за всѣ расходы по дѣланію « corner'a ». Спекулирующая группа крупно наживетъ. Если уголъ будетъ прорванъ, спекулирующая группа жестоко поплатится и потерпитъ крахъ.

Въ основѣ НЭП-а лежитъ тотъ же биржевой пріемъ: — «загнать въ уголъ». Въ НЭП-ѣ есть, однако, и нѣчто новое — спеціально отъ Ленина. Новое въ томъ, что пріемъ осуществленъ въ громадномъ масштабѣ — въ масштабѣ всего Россійскаго Національнаго Хозяйства — и при планомѣрной помощи всего аппарата Правительственной власти, при могущественнѣйшемъ средствѣ — коммунистической, государственной монополіи во внѣшней и внутренней торговлѣ.

Дѣлала главный «уголъ» коммунистическая государственная промышленность. Въ него улавливался россійскій крестьянинъ. Меньшіе и маленькіе «углы» дѣлаютъ *) попутно синдикаты и тресты другъ другу. Въ томъ, что главный смыслъ НЭП-а лежитъ въ этомъ «corner-ѣ» для мужика, дѣлаемомъ ему при помощи государственной коммунистической промышленности, въ обкладываніи мужика, какъ обкладываютъ на облавѣ медвѣдя, убѣдиться очень легко. Мнѣ приходилось еще при самомъ началѣ НЭП-а указывать именно на эту цѣль НЭП-а, ставшую ясной уже тогда **) изъ рѣчей Ленина и статей Курчева.

Тогда, т.е. Мартъ-Августъ 1921 г. по плану Ленина цѣпь загонщиковъ не должна была, однако, безпокоить крестьянина: его надо было пріохотить къ увеличенію посѣвной площади.

Въ Сентябрѣ 1922 г. крестьянинъ чуть-чуть оброслъ жирком, собравъ хорошій по теперешнему уровню с.-х. культуры урожай, и Коммунистическое Правительство стало выгонять его изъ берлоги на линію стрѣлковъ облавы.

Именно въ Сентябрѣ 1921 г. Коммунистическое Правительство попыталось реализовать выгоды отъ «corner-a», зажать въ немъ деревню. Зажимало съ двухъ концовъ. Съ одной стороны въ С.Т.О. было при Особо Уполномоченномъ образовано совѣщаніе ***) по нормированію хлѣбныхъ цѣнъ при реализаціи урожая. Практически говоря, аппаратъ для депрессіи хлѣбныхъ цѣнъ при помощи стачки правительственнаго покупателя, игры на расширеніи и суженіи кредита Государственнаго Банка для хлѣбныхъ заготовокъ и фактической монополіи во внутренней торговлѣ. ****)

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*) Я не стану ниже разбирать эти меньшіе и маленькіе «corners», какъ значительно менѣе, конечно, важные по ихъ эффекту на НЭП-овское хозяйство. Отмѣчу здѣсь только попутно, что при НЭП-ѣ и они имѣютъ мѣсто и дѣлаются довольно цинично. Въ качествѣ примѣра укажу на «уголъ», устроенный не безъ «талантливости» Штеровскимъ Динамитнымъ заводомъ всей угольной промышленности Донбасса. Подробности этой операціи можно найти въ ст. Л. Рысина «Коммерческій разсчетъ» (Эк. Ж. 9.12. 22).

**) См. докладъ Р.Э.О. — «Соціалъ Предательство», «Russ. Econ.», стр. 1353 и 1132.

***) Совѣщаніе имѣло мѣсто въ Сентябрѣ 22 г.; подробно о немъ см. Russ. Econ., стр. 2604 и 2974.

****) Я склоненъ думать, что Коммунистическое Правительство въ оффиціальной своей статистикѣ умышленно преувеличивало цыфры фактическаго сбора хлѣбовъ въ 22 г. на 650-850 милл. (см. Russ. Econ., стр. 2967 и 2596), не столько затѣмъ, чтобы блэффировать въ Гаагѣ иностранцевъ, сколько затѣмъ, чтобы создать депрессію настроенія у производителей хлѣба въ Россіи на время реализаціи его излишковъ.

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Съ другой стороны, съ Августа 22 г. синдикаты и тресты Коммунистической Государственной Промышленности стали вздувать цѣны на предметы индустріи, практикуя, какъ осторожно говоритъ А. Кактынь *), «нѣкоторыя злоупотребленія тѣмъ монопольнымъ положеніемъ на рынкѣ, какимъ въ сущности обладаетъ наша крупная промышленность».

Какой результатъ въ цифрахъ эта политика имѣла? Хлѣбъ удалось уронить чрезвычайно. На всероссійскомъ Продовольственномъ Совѣщаніи докладчикъ тов. Пригожинъ, говоря о затрудненіяхъ въ операціяхъ Хлѣбпродукта, сообщаетъ (Эк. Ж. 6.3.23) — «Въ Сентябрѣ пудъ хлѣба въ золотѣ стоилъ 1 р. 05 к., а къ Декабрю цѣны понизились до 41 коп.» Одновременно цѣны на продуктъ индустріи увеличивались такъ, что въ индустріальномъ товарѣ крестьянскій хлѣбъ сталъ оплачиваться еще хуже, чѣмъ въ золотѣ. «За аршинъ ситцу», говоритъ Г. Круминъ **), «до войны давали около 5,5 фунт. ржаной муки; къ 1.1.22 — 3.8 фунт.; въ Октябрѣ 1922 г. — 9.4 фун.; 1.12.22 — 13 1/2 ф.; 15.12.22 — 15 ф.; 1.1.23 — отъ 17-18 фун. Соль: если за фунтъ соли давали до войны 0.4 фунта ржаной муки, то 1.10.22 — 0.7 ф.; 1.12.22 — 0.9 ф.; 1.1.23 — уже 1.2 ф.. Подобное движеніе и соотношеніе съ цѣнами на продукты с. хозяйства мы наблюдаемъ въ обшемъ по всему фронту промышленнаго производства».

Не менѣе любопытна приводимая ***) Я. Яковлевымъ слѣдующая таблица теперешней (весна 1923 г.) стоимости разныхъ продуктовъ промышленности въ хлѣбѣ параллельно со стоимостью ихъ же въ до-коммунистическій періодъ:

Названіе товара:	Теперешняя средняя цѣна въ хлѣбѣ	До-военная цѣна:	
		въ деньгахъ	въ хлѣбѣ
Ситецъ 1 аршинъ	1 п. 10 ф.	14 коп.	8 ф.
Соль 1 пудъ	3 п. —	35 коп.	20 ф.
Чугунъ 1 пудъ	15 п. —	1 р. 60 коп.	2 п. 11 ф.
Керосинъ 1 пудъ	6 п. 20 ф.	1 р. 40 коп.	2 п. —
Сельди 1 пудъ	10 п. —	2 р. 25 коп.	3 п. 10 ф.
Гвозди мелкіе 1 пудъ	7 п. —	2 р. 25 коп.	3 п. 9 ф.
Желѣзо сортов. и шинное 1 пудъ	4 п. 20 ф.	2 р. — коп.	2 п. 34 ф.

И въ капиталистическую эпоху Россійскаго хозяйства цѣны на хлѣбъ въ періодъ реализаціи урожая нѣсколько понижались по сравненію съ остальнымъ временемъ года, но это пониженіе было совершенно ничтожной величиной по сравненію съ теперешнимъ пониженіемъ въ 3-6 разъ по отношенію къ предметамъ личнаго потребленія (ситецъ, солъ и т.д.) и 1.5-2 раза — хозяйственнаго (гвозди, желѣзо).

Такое раздѣваніе деревни въ пользу Государственной Коммунистической Промышленности, какое имѣетъ мѣсто теперь, возможно только при хладнокровно и планомѣрно проводимомъ самимъ Правительствомъ «corner-ѣ».

Какъ этотъ «corner» все больше и больше пытался стянуть петлю на шеѣ крестьянской Россіи, видно изъ даваемой г. Круминымъ (Эк.Ж. 9.2.23) діаграммы (діагр. №1) движенія розничныхъ цѣнъ, на которой показаны: общій индексъ, индексъ цѣнъ на продукты сельского хозяйства и индексъ цѣнъ на продукты промышленности за время 1.1.22 по 1.1.23. На этой діаграммѣ №1 до середины Іюля кривая роста цѣнъ на продукты с. хозяй-

*) См. А. Кактынь «Къ итогамъ и Перспективамъ НЭП-а», Эк. Ж. 23. 2. 23.

**) Эк. Ж. 9.2. 23. — «Основной Вопросъ Смычки».

***) Правда 30.3. 23.

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ства (I) немного опережаетъ такую же кривую для продуктовъ промышленности (III). Съ августа, наоборотъ, кривая (III) чрезвычайно рѣзко растетъ по сравненію съ кривой (I), опережая эту послѣднюю вдвое.

Говоря, что «соотношеніе цѣнъ на продукты этихъ двухъ крупныхъ раздѣловъ народнаго хозяйства — промышленность и с. хозяйство — принимаетъ въ своемъ развитіи явно угрожающія съ народно-хозяйственной точки зрѣнія формы», Круминъ дѣлаетъ робкую и даже смѣшную попытку замазать истинныя причины измѣненія этого «*соотношенія*» указаніемъ на неурожай 1921 г. и склонность крестьянства выбрасывать съ Мая 1922 г. запасы хлѣба въ виду надеждъ на новый урожай 1922 г. — на нѣчто вродѣ паденія цѣнъ въ зависимости отъ спроса и предложенія при свободномъ рынкѣ.

Мы очень хорошо понимаемъ, что истинная причина гораздо ближе и гораздо проще. Она — въ «corner-ѣ», который сдѣлало Коммунистическое Правительство крестьянству при помощи указанныхъ выше 2-хъ мѣръ, т.е. 1) комиссіи по нормированію хлѣбныхъ цѣнъ при закупкѣ зерна и одновременно 2) вздуваніи цѣнъ Коммунистической Государственной Промышленностью.

За всѣмъ этимъ «corner», какъ я покажу ниже, не удался. Эта неудача имѣетъ громаднѣйшее для будущаго Россіи значеніе. Если бы «corner» удался, то Ленинъ успѣлъ бы въ созданіи изъ коммунистовъ — хозяйственниковъ, спецовъ, нэпмановъ и квалифицированныхъ рабочихъ *аппарата* для веденія индустріи *). Этотъ аппаратъ находился бы у обратившей Россійское Національное достояніе въ партійный фондъ Компартіи, попросту говоря на веревочкѣ вслѣдствіе отсутствія «собственности» на промышленныя предпріятія у главъ трестовъ и синдикатовъ, эти предпріятія ведущихъ, онъ долженъ былъ бы послушно по указанію политиковъ-коммунистовъ выжимать соки изъ крестьянской Россіи

При помощи этого пресса были бы обезпечены средства на содержаніе всего государственнаго механизма коммунистической диктатуры и самое ея существованіе въ Россіи на неопредѣленно долгій срокъ.

Надо замѣтить, что въ первые годы по изобрѣтеніи спекуляція на «дѣланіе угла» велась обыкновенно очень бурно, съ громадной разницей единичныхъ цѣнъ продукта до и во время «угла», и принадлежала къ разряду очень трудныхъ и азартныхъ. На ея родинѣ, на биржахъ капиталистическихъ странъ, удавалась она въ ту пору относительно рѣдко, главнымъ образомъ потому, что противъ людей, дѣлающихъ «corner», какъ только они начинали поражать интересы широкихъ массъ потребителя, всегда должно было быть Правительство, отвѣтственное передъ избирателемъ, и законъ. Оттого пріемъ «to make a corner» сравнительно скоро выродился въ странахъ демократическихъ и капиталистическихъ изъ былого крупнаго азарта въ теперешнюю относительно скромную спекуляцію, особенно не потрясающую биржу, а тѣмъ болѣе національное хозяйство.

При наличіи коммунистическаго режима въ Россіи затрудненіе для «дѣланія угла» со стороны Правительства отпадаетъ: послѣднее само дѣлаетъ его, не имѣя сдержки въ широкомъ избирательномъ правѣ, защищающемъ интересы массъ потребителя. Зато очень рѣзко обозначилось другое затрудненіе, которое капиталистическій рынокъ относительно мало знаетъ: потребитель (въ нашемъ случаѣ — крестьянинъ), загоняемый въ «уголъ», оказался фактически почти лишеннымъ покупательной способности.

*) Попытка создать такой аппаратъ изъ Главковъ и Центровъ въ эпоху военнаго коммунизма и единаго соціалистическаго фронта, какъ извѣстно, не удалась Ленину.

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Это обстоятельство главнѣйшимъ образомъ и рѣшило вопросъ о прорывѣ «угла» и теперешнемъ крахѣ всей НЭП-овской системы. По своему существу всякій «corner», — и капиталистическій, и коммунистическій, безразлично — есть въ большей или меньшей мѣрѣ экспропріація. Первое условіе того, чтобы экспропріація удалась или даже того, чтобы ею вообще «стоило» заниматься, есть наличіе значительныхъ цѣнностей у экспропріируемаго. У крестьянства ихъ теперь нѣтъ.

Кромѣ этой главной причины крушеніе НЭП-а было обусловлено и двумя другими причинами, тоже очень важными. Эти причины: — 1) несовмѣстимое съ экономичностью и хозяйственностью нездоровые принципы и порядки въ веденіи Коммунистической Государственной Индустріи при НЭП-ѣ и 2) алчность Коммунистическаго Правительства при обложеніи налогами НЭП-овской промышленности. Эти послѣднія причины ускорили крушеніе НЭП-а, добивали и добиваютъ НЭП при прорывѣ угла.

Проанализируемъ всѣ эти причины въ отдѣльности.

ГЛАВА II. БАЛАНСЪ ОБМѢНА МЕЖДУ С.-ХОЗЯЙСТВЕННОЙ И ИНДУСТРІАЛЬНОЙ ПРОМЫШЛЕННОСТЬЮ при НЭП-ѣ.

Посмотримъ теперь, сколько именно могло Коммунистическое Правительство взять при помощи «corner-а» Государственной Коммунистической Промышленности съ крестьянина.

Громадное уменьшеніе по сравненію съ до-коммунистическимъ временемъ покупательной способности с.-хозяйственнаго рынка въ эпоху НЭП-а впервые выявилось еще ранней весной 1922 г. Оно явилось неизбѣжнымъ результатомъ сокращенія національнаго дохода отъ с.-хозяйственнаго промысла. Каковы размѣры этого уменьшенія? Напомнимъ, что б. Нач. Центр. Стат. Управл. — Поповъ *) считалъ, что деревня могла купить индустріальныхъ продуктовъ въ 1920 г. — на 335 милліоновъ рублей золотыхъ, въ 1921 г. — 200 милл. Для 1922 г. эта покупательная способность исчисляется Поповымъ **) въ 356 милл. рублей. Въ до-коммунистическій періодъ Россіи покупательная способность с.-хозяйственнаго рынка исчислялась за 1912 г. въ 2000 милл. зол. рублей, т. е. въ 6 разъ больше теперешней (въ 22 г.) ея величины.

Мнѣ приходилось уже не разъ отмѣчать «оффиціальную оптимистичность» подсчетовъ Попова. Если судить по тому, что сообщаетъ коммунистическая пресса о теперешней покупательной способности деревни въ отдѣльныхъ районахъ, то придется думать, что общая по всей Россіи покупательная способность деревни въ 1922 г., пожалуй, ниже исчисленной Поповымъ величины въ 356 милл. зол. рублей. Такъ, напримѣръ, «Петроградская Правда» (10.3.23.) даетъ о крестьянскомъ хозяйствѣ Рыбинскаго уѣзда слѣдующія свѣдѣнія: личный составъ семьи — 4 взрослыхъ, 5 дѣтей; земли — 9 десятинъ; скотъ — 1 лошадь, 3 коровы, 1 нетель и 3 овцы; сборъ хлѣба — 70 пудовъ ржи, 40 пудовъ овса, ячменя и пшеницы. Налоги: продовольственный 34 п. 20 ф., мѣстный поземельный — 11 р.50 к., подворный — 15 р., гражданскій (2 р. съ домохозяина и по 1 р. съ членовъ семьи) — 10 руб.. Всего 390 р. 50 к., а въ переводѣ на рожь 39 пуд. и приходитъ къ слѣдующему заключенію: «Норма потребленія самой семьи равняется 81 пуду (9х9), но принимая во вниманіе картофель и другіе про-

*) Стр. 2367 и стр.....

**) 9% всего дохода с.-хозяйственнаго промысла въ 22 г. (3955 милл. зол. руб.), см. ст. П.П. Попова — «Промышленность Р.С.Ф.С.Р. 1912-1922 и Народно-хозяйственная Связь Сельскаго Хозяйства съ Промышленностью» — сборникъ «На Новыхъ Путяхъ» — цитирую Эк. Ж. 23.2. 23.

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дукты сельскаго хозяйства, потребляемые крестьянской семьей, понизимъ эту норму до 5 пуд. на душу, т.е., до 45 пудовъ. Прибавимъ 20 пуд. на засѣвъ озимаго и ярового клина и, такимъ образомъ, получимъ «излишекъ» въ размѣрѣ 6 пудовъ. Съ такими излишками не выѣдешь на рынокъ, тутъ выручить можетъ только скотъ, а главное — приработокъ на сторонѣ. Можно продать одну овцу. Больше не разойдешься, будетъ ущербъ самому хозяйству».

Въ Томской губерніи Земельный отдѣлъ (мѣстный органъ комиссаріата земледѣлія) произвелъ подсчетъ доходности въ 22 г. индивидуальнаго крестьянскаго хозяйства и пришелъ къ выводу, что чистый доходъ хозяйства уменьшился второе сравнительно съ 17 г. и не покрываетъ «элементарныхъ потребностей» крестьянскаго двора (Эк. Ж. 14.3. 23).

Возвратимся теперь къ вопросу о томъ, сколько Коммунистическое Правительство могло взять съ сельскаго хозяйства за индустріальный товаръ.

При опредѣленіи этой величины А. Кактынь (Эк. Ж. 23.2. 23) въ согласіи съ П. Поповымъ къ указаннымъ выше 356 милл. зол. рублей, съ которыми крестьянинъ можетъ выйти на рынокъ и купить на нихъ индустріальнаго товара, прибавляетъ еще 330 милл. зол. рублей, взимаемыхъ съ крестьянства въ видѣ продналога. Такимъ образомъ, изъ общей продукціи с.-х. промысла за 1922 г. въ 3955 милл. зол. рублей передается промышленности 686 милл.. Этой послѣдней цифрой и опредѣляется вся емкость с.-хозяйственнаго рынка для промышленнаго товара.

Прибавленіе 330 милл. налоговъ является довольно странной комбинаціей. Это прибавленіе становится нѣсколько болѣе понятнымъ, если мы обратимся къ обслѣдованію Комиссіей С.Т.О. по задолженности за время НЭП-а Трестовъ Казнѣ (Эк. Ж. 3.3. 23). Тамъ мы читаемъ: «Задолженность трестовъ и другихъ государственныхъ предпріятій по всей Россіи, получившихъ въ свое время ссуды отъ казны и до сихъ поръ ихъ не погасившихъ, опредѣляется по предварительнымъ даннымъ въ 300 милл. зол. руб. Количество предпріятій задолженныхъ — 600. Валютное Управленіе Н. К.Ф. предполагаетъ получить въ этомъ году около 20 милл. зол. руб. по ранѣе выданнымъ казною ссудамъ».

Возможно, что безнадежность обратнаго полученія этой суммы, пошедшей не на возстановленіе постояннаго капитала, а непосредственно на производство, но до сихъ поръ не списанной, а равно и существованіе другихъ расходовъ по промышленности, покрытыхъ изъ казенныхъ средствъ, но не вошедшихъ въ исчисленіе себѣстоимости товара, выпущеннаго въ 1922 г., побуждаютъ П. Попова, а затѣмъ и А. Кактыня отнести на дебетъ коммунистической промышленности за отпущенные ею для деревни товары не только то, что деревня могла уплатить за нихъ на рынкѣ при покупкѣ, но и то, что она внесла Государству, какъ продналогъ Во всякомъ случаѣ, довольно любопытнымъ сваливаніемъ въ одну кучу поступленій отъ фиска и поступленій отъ товарооборота П. Поповъ и А. Кактынь повышаютъ *довольно условно* покупательную способность с.-хозяйственной продукціи до 686 милл. зол. руб.

Здѣсь слѣдуетъ попутно отмѣтить одно чрезвычайно важное обстоятельство. Помимо того, что эта съ такими натяжками исчисленная цифра покупательной способности всетаки очень мала и совершенно не покрываетъ, какъ мы увидимъ ниже, городской продукціи при теперешнихъ цѣнахъ послѣдней, она *крайне неустойчива* на ближайшее время. Ея существованіе, а вмѣстѣ съ нимъ, и существованіе всей промышленности зависитъ отъ исключительно счастливаго выпаденія дождей. Хорошимъ своимъ

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урожаемъ 1922 годъ былъ обязанъ только имъ. Сборъ хлѣбовъ 1922 г. превосходилъ сборъ 1920 г., который можно считать для коммунистическаго уровня с.-хозяйственной культуры за средній по урожайности и по валовому сбору, на 700 милл. пуд. Отбросьте это исключительное плодородіе 1922 г., оцѣниваемое по теперешнимъ цѣнамъ въ 350 милл. зол. рублей, — и почти вся покупательная способность деревни полностью испаряется.

Но это вопросъ динамики покупательной способности и болѣе отдаленнаго будущаго положенія хозяйствъ. Возвратимся къ ея статикѣ и нашему балансу. Посмотримъ, на сколько же произвела въ 22 г. и должна продать товаровъ промышленность. П. Поповъ и А. Кактынь (Эк. Ж. 23.2. 23) даютъ слѣдующія цифры: Крупная и средняя, (въ подавляющемъ числѣ случаевъ, Государственная Коммунистическая Промышленность) произвела въ 22 г. на 705 милл. зол. руб. Ремесленная и Кустарная (исключительно частная) промышленность — на 395 милл. зол. руб., а всего на 1100 милл. зол. рублей.

Изъ сказаннаго съ очевидностью вытекаетъ, что у промышленности при теперешнихъ цѣнахъ должно оставаться непроданнымъ товару по П. Попову на 1100 — 686 = 414 милл. руб., а по моему — еще больше.

Какъ этотъ непроданный на 414 милл. зол. рублей товаръ распредѣляется между Государственной Коммунистической Промышленностью и ремесленно-кустарной частной? A priori можно не сомнѣваться, что въ % -номъ отношеніи больше непроданнаго товара остается на рукахъ *) у первой, чѣмъ у второй.

Таковъ балансъ обмѣна. Уже по одному этому «corner» не удался. Государственная Коммунистическая Промышленность стоитъ передъ еще большей, чѣмъ до НЭП-а катастрофой. Реализація крестьянами урожая 22 г. только нѣсколько отложила кризисъ сбыта, обнаружившійся ранней весной. Къ началу зимы 22 г. кризисъ сталъ снова вступать въ свои права и къ веснѣ 23 г. былъ уже въ полной силѣ. НЭП-омъ и разными «corner-ами» кризису такому не поможешь. Кризисъ этотъ устраняется только тогда, когда возстанавливается балансъ обмѣна. А послѣдній можетъ быть возстановленъ только двумя средствами: первое — это возстановленіе с. -хозяйственной продукціи, а за нею и въ пропорціи съ нею продукціи индустріальной до уровня до-коммунистическаго времени; второе — болѣе или менѣе быстрое деклассированіе или вымираніе городского и индустріальнаго населенія до размѣровъ, потребныхъ для обслуживанія индустріи, отвѣчающей теперешней покупательной силѣ крестьянства. Теперешній кризисъ сбыта поражаетъ, и легкую, и тяжелую индустрію. Съ отраслей промышленности, работающихъ на личное и производственное потребленіе деревни, онъ естественно перебросился на отрасли промышленности, непосредственно на деревню не работающія, но связанныя съ первыми. Онъ сдѣлался общимъ для всего россійскаго рынка.

О характерѣ явленія даетъ понятіе анкета В.С.Н.Х.. о состояніи рынка сбыта. Она даетъ слѣдующія свѣдѣнія по различнымъ отраслямъ промышленности:

Спичечная: «Съ января 23 г. начались затрудненія въ сбытѣ, продолжавшіяся въ февралѣ и понынѣ. Предложеніе неизмѣнно превышало спросъ» (Эк. Ж. 6.3. 23).

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*) А. Кактынь (Эк.Ж. 23.2. 23) говоритъ: «усилилась доля передаваемой с.-хоз. продукціи ремесленно-кустарной промышленности, развившейся за этотъ годъ не въ примѣръ продукціи крупной и средней индустріи, до 50 слишкомъ процентовъ отъ до-военныхъ своихъ размѣровъ».

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Махорка: «Затрудненія въ сбытѣ махорочный синдикатъ испытываетъ усиленнымъ образомъ съ Января. Затрудненія объясняются тѣмъ, что, хотя выработка фабричной махорки значительно ниже потребности, но паденіе покупательной способности населенія и потребленіе дешевой безакцизной махорки вызываетъ сокращеніе спроса на доброкачественныя фабричныя издѣлія» (Эк. Ж. 9.3. 23).

Съверопатока: «подтверждаетъ испытываемыя ею затрудненія въ сбытѣ въ Ноябрѣ, Январѣ, Февралѣ. Эти затрудненія коснулись, главнымъ образомъ слѣдующихъ продуктовъ: сухкрахмала, патоки и химическихъ продуктовъ» (Эк. Ж. 9.3. 23).

Кожевенная Промышленность: «Кожевенный Синдикатъ констатируетъ затрудненія въ сбытѣ, начиная съ Октября, въ части кожевенно-обувного производства. Затрудненія въ сбытѣ пока продолжаются, главнымъ образомъ, гражданской обуви и шорныхъ издѣлій. Спросъ на нихъ неестественно пониженъ въ связи съ недостаткомъ денежныхъ рессурсовъ».

Химическая Промышленность: Бондюжскіе Заводы «констатируютъ, что затрудненія въ сбытѣ замѣчаются въ послѣднее время въ отношеніи хромовыхъ солей, какъ-то: квасцовъ хромо-каліевыхъ, хромо-натровыхъ, хромика натроваго, идущихъ, главнымъ образомъ, для нуждъ кожевенной промышленности, которая изъ-за недостатка сырья начинаетъ, повидимому, свертываться».

Керамиковая Промышленность: «Боркомбинатъ указываетъ, что за Сентябрь-Октябрь у него работали: два завода огнеупорнаго кирпича, цехъ химической кислотоупорной посуды и глиняныя копи. Затрудненія въ сбытѣ Боркомбинатомъ испытываются, начиная съ конца Декабря, когда жел. дороги, тяжелая индустрія, военная промышленность, морвѣдъ, текстильная промышленность, химическая и друг. за неимѣніемъ средствъ прекратили или сократили заказы».

«Сила затрудненій въ сбытѣ характеризуется тѣмъ, что потребность въ огнеупорныхъ матеріалахъ приблизительно въ три раза превышаетъ то количество, которое промышленность и жел. дорожн. транспортъ въ состояніи пріобрѣтать». (Эк. Ж. 3.3. 23).

Госпромцвѣтметъ: «Въ мѣднообрабатывающей промышленности частный рынокъ базируется, главнымъ образомъ, на работѣ кустаря: однако, эта работа развивается крайне медленно; самоварныя фабрики Тулы — главные потребители мѣди — стоятъ. Кромѣ того, на сбытъ вліяютъ крайне низкія цѣны металла на рынкѣ. Подъ вліяніемъ сохраненія до сихъ поръ на рынкѣ старыхъ запасовъ и выбрасыванія государственными учрежденіями въ значительномъ количествѣ всякаго рода лома, цѣны на металлъ, при незначительной потребности, дошли до курьезно малой величины. Частный рынокъ утилизируетъ металлъ путемъ переработки на частныхъ арендованныхъ заводахъ и тѣмъ не даетъ возможности сбыта по нормальнымъ возстановительнымъ цѣнамъ. Разница цѣнъ рыночныхъ и правильныхъ, основанныхъ на цѣнахъ возстановительныхъ, доходитъ до соотношенія 1 : 6» (Эк. Ж. 9.3. 23)

Электросталь: «Едва ли не единственный въ своемъ родѣ въ Россіи заводъ спеціальной и инструментальной стали — «Электросталь» — и тотъ испытываетъ затрудненія въ сбытѣ. Эти затрудненія, правда, чувствовались, главнымъ образомъ, въ Октябрѣ. Сейчасъ онѣ не замѣчаются, что естественно при ограниченности данной продукціи. Однако, и здѣсь предложеніе превышаетъ спросъ» (Эк. Ж. 6.3. 23).

Резиновая промышленность: «Наблюдается съ 4-ой четверти 22 г. за-

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трудненіе въ сбытѣ, главнымъ образомъ, калошъ, пневматиковъ и техники... Обороты резинотреста за эти мѣсяцы, какъ это явствуетъ изъ пересчета на золотой и товарный рубль, шли неуклонно на уменьшеніе» (Эк. Ж. 6.3. 23).

Мы ограничимся приведенными примѣрами сокращенія рынка сбыта. Ихъ можно было бы умножить перечисленіемъ почти всѣхъ отраслей производства: острыя затрудненія въ сбытѣ испытываетъ металлообрабатывающая промышленность, текстильная, сахарная, даже соляная. Потребитель загнанъ въ уголъ, но самъ процессъ загона его въ уголъ оказался безплоднымъ занятіемъ, ибо у загнаннаго въ уголъ потребителя нечего было взять.

ГЛАВА III. ОБЩЕЕ СОСТОЯНІЕ ХОЗЯЙСТВА ИНДУСТРІАЛЬНЫХЪ ПРОМЫСЛОВЪ.

«Corner» не удался не только потому, что оказался хозяйственно несостоятельнымъ тотъ, у кого хотѣла взять Коммунистическая Власть, т.е. крестьянство, но и потому, что оказался хозяйственно слабымъ тотъ, при посредствѣ котораго она намѣревалась взять — т.е. Государственная Коммунистическая Промышленность.

Помотримъ теперь, была ли эта промышленность дѣйствительно слабой при НЭП-ѣ.

Прежде всего, слѣдуетъ отмѣтить, что, судя по внѣшности, Государственная Коммунистическая Промышленность въ 22 г. какъ будто процвѣтала. Ея производительность была въ 22 г. выше и въ нѣкоторыхъ случаяхъ значительно выше производительности 21 г.

Производительность. Привлеченіе квалифицированныхъ спеціалистовъ въ вновь образованные тресты, тотъ авторитетъ, которымъ они снова стали пользоваться въ производствѣ, переходъ на хозяйственный расчетъ, та, хотя небольшая, но все таки большая, чѣмъ въ эпоху главкизма, хозяйственная автономія, которой сталъ пользоваться директоръ завода при НЭП-ѣ, — все это подняло настроеніе персонала, обслуживающаго промышленныя предпріятія, и повело къ значительному улучшенію въ техническомъ и хозяйственномъ веденіи дѣла. Это, въ свою очередь, въ большомъ количествѣ случаевъ создало тенденцію къ потенціальному повышенію производительности. Въ нѣкоторыхъ случаяхъ эта тенденція перешла въ фактическое повышеніе.

Съ точки зрѣнія самочувствія. такъ сказать, психологіи хозяйственнаго процесса, повышеніе это — большой и положительный факторъ. Съ точки зрѣнія матеріальной, повышеніе производительности въ 22 г. не имѣетъ сколько-нибудь серьезнаго значенія, ибо достигнутый успѣхъ — 1) количественно очень небольшая, почти пренебрегаемая по сравненію съ до-коммунистической производительностью, величина и 2) крайне непрочная и неустойчивая во времени вещь. Успѣхъ не имѣетъ прочныхъ корней и очень быстро выдыхается. Общимъ для всѣхъ отраслей промышленности можно считать слѣдующее положеніе:

1) производительность за весь 22 г. нѣсколько, а для нѣкоторыхъ отраслей, значительно выше производительности 21 г., 2) производительность за 2-ое полугодіе 22 г. равна или меньше производительности за 1-ое полугодіе того же 22 г., 3) это уменьшеніе для нѣкоторыхъ отраслей (напр. уголь), настолько значительно, что производительность только за 2-ую половину 22 г. не только ниже производительности за 2-ую половину 21 г., но приближается къ самымъ тяжелымъ временамъ коммунисти-

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ческаго хозяйства, а именно ко второй половинѣ 19 г. и, наконецъ, 4) производительность въ отрасляхъ, работающихъ на личное потребленіе выше, чѣмъ въ отрасляхъ, работающихъ на хозяйственное потребленіе или возсозданіе орудій производства.

Это положеніе станетъ яснымъ изъ разсмотрѣнія цифрового матеріала «Коммунистическая Промышленность за 2-ую половину 22 г. въ цифрахъ» *)

Наибольшаго изъ всѣхъ остальныхъ производствъ повышенія производительности по сравненію съ предшествующими годами коммунистическаго хозяйства достигла сахарная промышленность. Сахара въ милл. пуд. было получено: въ 22 г. — 12,5; въ 21 г. — 3,6; въ 20 г. — 5,4 и въ 19 г. — 4,7. Выработанные въ 22 г. 12,5 милл. пуд. — очень большое количество по сравненію съ 21 г. и очень небольшое по сравненію съ до-военнымъ временемъ, составляя около 13% до-военной выработки. Насколько неблагополучно положеніе сахарной промышленности, несмотря на развитую въ 22 г. производительность, мы увидимъ ниже.

На второе мѣсто по повышенію производительности послѣ сахарной промышленности слѣдуетъ поставить текстиль, о которомъ въ настоящемъ № Russ. Econ. имѣется ниже особый очеркъ.

Это — двѣ, въ теперешней Россійской хозяйственной обстановкѣ, главныхъ по объему продукціи и по спросу отрасли промышленности, работающей на личное потребленіе. Когда мы перейдемъ къ отраслямъ промышленности, работающимъ продукты для производственнаго потребленія, то увидимъ, что повышеніе производительности въ нихъ несравненно меньше, чѣмъ въ индустріи, работающей на личное потребленіе. Прежде всего это обстоятельство слѣдуетъ отмѣтить для угольной промышленности. Что касается *металлургической и металлообрабатывающей промышленности*, то она ясна изъ приведеннаго Начальникомъ Главметалла П.И. Судаковымъ обслѣдованія Южныхъ Заводовъ въ Февралѣ и началѣ Марта (Эк.Ж. 7.3. 23). По этому обслѣдованію:

Петровскій Заводъ: Работаетъ одна домна и нѣсколько прокатныхъ станковъ. Мартенъ при посѣщеніи завода комиссіей Судакова не работалъ, изъ за невозможности, вслѣдствіе мятелей, доставить газовый уголь. Былъ пущенъ снова черезъ два дня по отъѣздѣ комиссіи.

Относительно продолженія работъ на Петровскомъ Заводѣ Судаковъ считаетъ это затруднительнымъ, «въ особенности, если принять во вниманіе изношенность его двигателей».

«Шахты Петровскаго Завода находятся въ удовлетворительномъ состояніи, но и тутъ, какъ вездѣ на Югѣ, остро чувствуется недостатокъ квалифицированныхъ забойщиковъ, въ особенности по сравненію съ наличнымъ количествомъ рабочихъ другихъ категорій».

На Макеевскій Заводъ комиссія попала къ моменту консерваціи; сейчасъ тамъ работаютъ лишь вспомогательные цеха. Кромѣ того, здѣсь ведутся работы по пуску газогенератора, токъ отъ котораго будетъ передаваться на рудники для сбереженія нѣсколькихъ изношенныхъ паровыхъ установокъ. Что же касается Макеевскаго Труболитейнаго Завода, то тамъ работы идутъ полнымъ ходомъ.

На Юзовскомъ заводѣ работаетъ одна домна и кровельный станъ. Въ теченіи марта ожидается пускъ рельсопрокатнаго отдѣла для выполненія заказа Н.К.П.С.. Работа вначалѣ будетъ вестись изъ имѣющихся запасовъ болванки, а въ дальнѣйшемъ будутъ пущены двѣ Мартеновскія печи.

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*) См. Russ. Econ № 9.

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На *Маріупольскомъ Заводѣ* работаетъ одна Мартеновская печь, два листопрокатныхъ стана — большой и малый — и трубный отдѣлъ, изготовляющій прокатныя трубы для нефтепромышленности. Отдѣлъ изготовленія трубъ, сваренныхъ водянымъ газомъ, предполагается къ пуску въ ближайшее время.

Брянскій Заводъ. Работаютъ сортовой, проволочный и кровельный станы. Состояніе завода удовлетворительно. Домна можетъ быть пущена лишь послѣ накопленія соотвѣтствующихъ запасовъ топлива.

Шодуаръ А. Работаютъ два Мартена на нефти и трубопрокатный цехъ.

Гантке работаетъ гвозди, болты, гайки, телеграфную проволоку. Нагрузка 60% до-военной.

Днѣпровскій заводъ. Работаетъ одинъ Мартенъ и одинъ мелкопрокатный станъ.

Харьковскій Паровозостроительный работаетъ по паровозамъ новымъ и ремонту удовлетворительно.

Такъ рисуется дѣятельность тѣхъ чѣи Южныхъ Заводовъ, которые пока еще не попали въ консервацію и на которыхъ кое-какія работы при НЭП-ѣ производятся.

Объ общей производительности различныхъ отраслей промышленности въ 22 г. по сравненію съ 21 г. и 20 г. и до-коммунистическимъ временемъ даетъ представленіе таблица *) П.И. Попова (см. діагр. № 2).

Названіе группъ производства	Стоимость производс. по до-воен. цѣнамъ въ % отъ стоимости соотвѣтственн. производс. въ 1912 г.**)		
	Въ 1920 г.	Въ 1921г.	Въ 1922 г.
Обработка минераловъ	16.7 %	26.8 %	24.6 %
Горнообрабатывающая промышленность	33.0 %	29.7 %	36.3 %
Переработка нефти	16.6 %	35.8 %	39.2 %
Металлическая промышленность	6.1 %	9.0 %	7.3 %
Обработка дерева	11.6 %	11.6 %	13.4 %
Химическая промышленность	20.8 %	28.6 %	30.4 %
Пищевая промышленность	12.3 %	12.7 %	11.0 %
Кожевенная промышленность	113.4 %	95.6 %	99.0 %
Обработка хлопка	6.6 %	7.5 %	15.4 %
» шерсти	35.9 %	34.0 %	55.0 %
» шелка	2.2 %	3.1 %	9.3 %
» льна	35.1 %	29.3 %	72.7 %
» пеньки и проч. волокнист.	32.7 %	24.1 %	15.4 %
» бумаги	24.1 %	18.9 %	17.9 %
Всего окончейной продукціи	15.0 %	17.0 %	20.3 %
	Въ милліон	золотыхъ	рублей
Суммарная въ абсолютныхъ цифрахъ стоимость производства 14 перечисленныхъ группъ	473	535	641

Соотвѣтственная стоимость производства этихъ же 14 группъ въ 1912 г. — 3.151 милл. зол. рублей.

*) Сборникъ «На Новыхъ Путяхъ», см. Эк. Ж. 31.3. 23.
**) Вѣроятныя цифры.

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НЕУСТОЙЧИВОСТЬ ПОЛОЖЕНІЯ ВЪ ПРОМЫШЛЕННОСТИ.

Увеличеніе производительности создаетъ, однако, только внѣшнее, кажущееся благополучіе въ хозяйствѣ индустріи. На самомъ дѣлѣ положеніе ея очень слабо, ибо оно крайне неустойчиво. Несомнѣннымъ показателемъ этой неустойчивости является неуклонное и при НЭП-ѣ убываніе въ промышленности запасовъ сырья при остающемся въ стабильномъ или ухудшающемся положеніи склада готовыхъ издѣлій и кассы. Первыя и откровенныя указанія на это, — т.е., на предрѣшающую весь вопросъ о НЭП-ѣ неизмѣнность отрицательнаго знака въ коммунистическомъ индустріальномъ воспроизводствѣ и при НЭП-ѣ, — сдѣлалъ А. Рыковъ *) еще въ Октябрѣ 22 г. Слѣдуетъ отмѣтить одно очень важное обстоятельство, ставшее извѣстнымъ только въ послѣднее время и не благодаря Коммунистической печати, а благодаря свидѣтельству лицъ, посѣщавшихъ при НЭП-ѣ Россію.

Первые шаги НЭП-а сопровождались и были чрезвычайно облегчены включеніемъ въ оборотъ капитала, остававшагося до НЭП-а при Главкахъ въ скрытомъ и для оборота мертвомъ состояніи. Чѣмъ больше изучаешь Россійскій Хозяйственный Организмъ, тѣмъ больше приходится удивляться и гордиться скрытой жизнеспособностью этого громаднаго тѣла. Всегда остается и появляется на сцену еще какая-то послѣдняя копейка, даже въ рубищѣ и коммунистическомъ грабежѣ сохраненная.

По лицу земли Русской въ эпоху массовой націонализаціи и экспропріаціи 18 г. было Коммунистической Властью опечатано очень много, но не всѣ склады съ товарами. Даже не всѣ тѣ, на которыхъ были печати и у дверей которыхъ по заведенному порядку смѣнялись часовые, были извѣстны Главкамъ и Центрамъ. Относительно многихъ просто позабыли, кто реквизировалъ и кто имѣетъ право изъ склада черпать. Спецамъ и людямъ причастнымъ не было никакого интереса при Главкахъ напоминать объ этихъ тайникахъ еще оставшагося богатства. Когда они при НЭП-ѣ попали въ Правленія Трестовъ и т.д., всѣ эти «невидимые» запасы выплыли на дневной свѣтъ и вошли въ соотвѣтственные «начинательные» балансы на хозяйственныхъ основаніяхъ ведомыхъ предпріятій. Крупная доля оживленія промышленности въ первую эпоху НЭП-а должна быть отнесена за счетъ притока свѣжаго капитала въ видѣ именно этихъ «невидимыхъ» товаровъ.

Когда Рыковъ. устанавливаетъ размѣръ проѣданія капитала, надо помнить, что дѣло идетъ о проѣданіи капитала, попавшаго къ НЭП-овской промышленности не только отъ Главковъ и Центровъ, но и этого свѣжаго, «невидимаго» до того капитала.

Такимъ образомъ все повышеніе производительности, улучшеніе быта персонала, обслуживающаго НЭП-овскую промышленность, НЭП-мановъ и т.д. — вообще городского населенія — шло исключительно за счетъ проѣданія дѣйствительно послѣднихъ остатковъ постояннаго капитала въ сырьѣ и готовомъ товарѣ. Усиленное проѣданіе сырья привело къ тому, что, примѣрно. съ половины 23 г. въ цѣломъ рядѣ отраслей будетъ исчерпано почти все сырье старое, т.е., главнымъ образомъ, полученное большевиками по наслѣдству отъ капитализма (секвестрованное) и отчасти взятое ими по твердымъ цѣнамъ въ эпоху военнаго коммунизма. Это сырье — очень дешево. Относительно работы НЭП-а на немъ А. Кактынь говоритъ:

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*) См. Капинтернъ и Коминтернъ Russ. Econ., стр. 3009 и...

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(Эк, Ж. 31.3. 23) «сырье и часть вспомогательныхъ матеріаловъ, расходовавшіяся предпріятіями изъ старыхъ запасовъ, оцѣнивались ими въ калькуляціяхъ себѣстоимости по цѣнамъ довоеннымъ или заготовительнымъ въ періодъ «военнаго коммунизма», цѣнамъ, во первыхъ, крайне низкимъ, а во вторыхъ, сплошь и рядомъ опредѣлявшимся наугадъ, такъ какъ заготовки шли въ порядкѣ разверстки или натуральнаго товарообмѣна. Это обстоятельство въ значительной степени искажаетъ эту статью себѣстоимости, завѣдомо ее понижая».

Если издѣлія промышленности, изготовленныя на этомъ дешевомъ сырьѣ, уже теперь испытываютъ острый кризисъ сбыта, то веденіе производства на новомъ заграничномъ или на вольномъ рынкѣ пріобрѣтенномъ Россійскомъ сырьѣ станетъ, и коммерчески, и политически положительно невозможнымъ.

Въ этомъ лежатъ, и матеріальные, и психологическіе корни неустойчивости НЭП-овской промышленности.

Остановимся бѣгло на этихъ послѣднихъ.

Съ каждымъ днемъ рессурсы для дальнѣйшаго веденія НЭП-овской промышленности истощаются. Какое вліяніе это имѣетъ на психику? Сознаніе безысходности, близкаго наступленія послѣдняго дня этихъ рессурсовъ родятъ въ Коммунистическомъ Правительствѣ гнетущее настроеніе, растерянность и метаніе изъ стороны въ сторону въ исканіи выхода. Всякое lucidum intervalum этой агонизирующей Государственной Коммунистической Промышленности повышаетъ въ Коммунистическомъ Начальствѣ присущія ему «комнаглость» и «комвранье». *) Смѣняющее эти миражи улучшенія сознаніе реальности дѣлаетъ Коммунистическую власть снова исключительно искательной и угодливой.

Смычка Власти и города, съ одной стороны, и деревни, съ другой стороны, не достигнута.

Городъ, живущій отъ НЭП-овской промышленности и службы Коммунистическому Правительству, подобенъ крѣпости, отрѣзанной отъ всего остального міра, крѣпости, въ которой каждый день блокады уменьшаетъ запасы воды и хлѣба. Сказать съ точностью, на сколько еще дней осталось сырья, конечно, невозможно по правительственнымъ отчетамъ. Въ этомъ отношеніи дѣйствительность, вѣроятно, много хуже опубликованнаго до сихъ поръ Коммунистической Властью положенія съ остающимся еще старымъ сырьемъ. Естественно, что всякое начальство осужденной крѣпости скрываетъ отъ жителей истинный размѣръ остающагося количества воды и хлѣба. Тревога за завтрашній день ползетъ и растетъ отъ Коммунистическаго Начальства къ НЭП-овскимъ низамъ, а отсюда ко всему остальному городскому населенію.

Мы видимъ, что и сама линія загонщиковъ въ НЭП-овскомъ «corner-ѣ» или въ НЭП-овской облавѣ на мужика не очень крѣпка. Въ любомъ мѣстѣ она уязвима.

ГЛАВА IV. ПРИЧИНЫ УБЫТОЧНОСТИ.

Посмотримъ теперь, что именно придавало процессу воспроизводства НЭП-овской индустріи отрицательный знакъ, что дѣлало НЭП-овскую промышленность неэкономичной, убыточной, а самое положеніе ея неустойчивымъ.

Мы остановимся только на нѣсколькихъ и главнѣйшихъ причинахъ.

*) Пользуюсь терминологіей В. И. Ленина.

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Недостатокъ капитала у Коммунистическаго Правительства для возстановленія матеріальной части воспроизводственной базы, и въ промышленности, и въ сельскомъ хозяйствѣ является одной изъ главнѣйшихъ причинъ убыточности всей промышленности. Этотъ недостатокъ капитала, какъ тѣнь, всюду слѣдуетъ за начинаніями Коммунистическихъ Правителей. Занять деньги они нигдѣ не могутъ, ибо кредитомъ Коммунистическая власть положительно нигдѣ, ни внутри Россіи, ни заграницей, не пользуется. Недостатокъ капитала обнаруживается не одинаково въ различныхъ отрасляхъ.

Въ однѣхъ отрасляхъ, несмотря на сокращеніе продукціи и нагрузки, всетаки приходится возобновлять и держать въ порядкѣ все оборудованіе. Напримѣръ, въ желѣзнодорожномъ хозяйствѣ приходится мѣнять шпалы, рельсы и т.д. почти внѣ зависимости отъ размѣровъ движенія. Въ такихъ отрасляхъ недостатокъ капитала для возобновленія бросается всѣмъ въ глаза. Всѣ понимаютъ, что онъ ведетъ сперва къ цѣлому ряду побочныхъ расходовъ, сопровождающихъ обычно веденіе всякаго неисправнаго полуразрушеннаго хозяйства, а затѣмъ къ полной катастрофѣ — остановкѣ работы. Эта остановка есть *вопросъ только времени*.

Въ другихъ отрасляхъ, гдѣ, въ зависимости отъ потребной продукціи, можно пустить въ работу только часть всего имѣющагося количества, скажемъ, текстильныхъ фабрикъ, укоренившаяся при НЭП-ѣ система «свертыванія промышленности» и «раздѣванія» не работающихъ заводовъ маскируетъ пока и до извѣстной степени гибельность для этихъ отраслей недостатка капитала и кредита у Коммунистическаго Правительства.

Работающій заводъ работаетъ при относительно хорошей нагрузкѣ, и ему кажется, что его себѣстоимость какъ будто не зависитъ отъ того, что другіе заводы его отрасли промышленности стоятъ. Иллюзія скоро разсѣивается: ему приходится помимо всего прочаго нести новый накладной расходъ по консерваціи не дѣйствующихъ заводовъ. А количество этихъ послѣднихъ вслѣдствіе, въ конечномъ счетѣ, низкаго уровня національнаго дохода по с. хозяйству, все растетъ. С. - хозяйственная же база не можетъ быть сколько нибудь-значительно и быстро расширена безъ прилива свѣжаго капитала извнѣ.

Во всякомъ случаѣ въ смыслѣ выгодности производства, и для первой, и для второй категорій предпріятій положеніе одинаково скверное. Накладные расходы, вслѣдствіе недостатка капитала и сопровождающей этотъ недостатокъ неполной нагрузки *) для обѣихъ отраслей промышленности, увеличиваются. Стоимость продукта или услугъ ихъ по сравненію съ докоммунистическимъ хозяйствомъ рѣзко повышаются.

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*) Увеличеніе себѣстоимости при уменьшеніи нагрузки видно на примѣрѣ работы Каменноугольной промышленности въ Донбассѣ. Я цитирую таблицу, даваемую А. Кактынемъ въ Эк.Ж. 1.4. 23.

РУДНИКИ	Степень нагрузки въ 1922 г. въ % отъ 1913 г.	Стоимость 1 пуда угля въ коп.
Баковскій (отъ 14 и 15 гг.)	49%	11.7
Парамоновскій	39%	15.1
Голубовскій	26%	11.4
Рутченковскій	22%	14.3
Щербиновскій	21%	15.
Брянскій	14%	19.6
Горловскій	11%	23.4
Казневскій	10%	27.1
Екатерининскій	2%	56.2

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УПРАВЛЯЮЩІЙ ПРОМЫШЛЕННОСТЬЮ АППАРАТЪ.

Накладные расходы настолько сильно выросли по сравненію съ докоммунистическимъ временемъ, что искать причину этого роста приходится не только въ недостаткѣ для возстановленія и пополненія основного капитала.

О ростѣ можно судить по таблицѣ, даваемой А. Кактынемъ (Эк. Ж. 31.3. 23.)

Распредѣленіе себѣстоимости продукціи по основнымъ статьямъ расхода въ процентахъ:

Названіе продукта:	1913 г.			1922 г.		
	Матер и топл.	Раб-сила	Накл. расх.	Матер и топл.	Раб-сила	Накл. расх.
Пара галошъ на зав. «Красный Треугольникъ»	78.0%	5.0%	17.0%	39.0%	4.0%	57.0%
Тысяча папиросъ на Госуд. Таб. фабр. (быв. Лафермъ) (безъ акциза)	71.0%	19.0%	10.0%	58.0%	20.0%	22.0%
Мундир. сукно по тресту «Моссукно»	80.1%	7.4%	12.5%	60.7%	11.1%	28.2%
Пудъ подошвы 1-го сорта по Кіевскому Кожтр.	86.7%	4.2%	9.1%	64.5%	6.2%	29.3%
Пудъ угля въ Донбассѣ	23.4%	44.5%	32.2%	28.7%	32.2%	39.1%
Пудъ шлаковаго чугуна на Ташинскомъ заводѣ	71.1%	7.6%	21.3%	63.9%	5.2%	36.9%

Ростъ накладныхъ былъ, и абсолютный вмѣстѣ съ ростомъ цѣнъ, и относительный, а именно, за счетъ двухъ другихъ статей расходовъ — на матеріалъ и рабочую силу.

Помимо указанной, высота накладныхъ обуславливалась еще двумя причинами: 1) безхозяйственностью дѣйствій управляющаго промышленностью аппарата и 2) большимъ налоговымъ бременемъ. Остановимся на первомъ. А. Кактынь говоритъ (Эк. Ж. 23.2. 23) — «Наши синдикаты и тресты слишкомъ поспѣшно и легко идутъ на дальнѣйшее повышеніе (цѣнъ), сильно обгоняя ростъ средняго общетоварнаго индекса и прикрывая этимъ не только свои неизбѣжные объективные недостатки, но и свои «субъективные» дефекты: организаціонные, чрезмѣрность въ штатахъ и въ надстройкахъ, чрезмѣрный, главкистскаго типа, бюрократическій, а не коммерческій централизмъ въ управленіи промышленности, высокіе накладные расходы и т д. и т.д.».

По свидѣтельству Свидерскаго, Предсѣд. Комиссіи С.Т.О. по обслѣдованію себѣстоимости (Эк. Ж. 31. 3. 23) — «значительность накладныхъ расходовъ въ промышленности обуславливается высокими накладными расходами по пріобрѣтенію сырья, его упаковкѣ, браковкѣ, консервированію... нераціональному использованію силовыхъ и паровыхъ установокъ... и, особенно, по комиссіоннымъ расходамъ».

Несомнѣнно на лицо — безхозяйственность управляющаго аппарата. Чѣмъ она обусловливается? Неспособностью или неподготовленностью личнаго состава? Отчасти и это имѣетъ мѣсто. Я рекомендую обратиться къ печатаемой въ этомъ же №9 Russ. Econ статьѣ «Соціальный составъ аппарата, управляющаго промышленностью». Главная причина кроется, однако, не въ личныхъ качествахъ персонала, а въ той базѣ, на основаніи которой онъ поставленъ управлять промышленностью.

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Можно понять и объяснить неумѣлостью личнаго состава большіе расходы на упаковку сырья, утечку, браковку, консервированіе; нераціональное использованіе установокъ и т.д. Но «личной неумѣлости» даже «нечестности» персонала уже недостаточно для того, чтобы можно было объяснить «чрезмѣрность въ штатахъ, чрезмѣрный, главкистскаго типа, бюрократическій, а не коммерческій централизмъ въ управленіи» и, особенно, ни съ чѣмъ не сравнимые т.н. комиссіонные расходы.

Въ другихъ мѣстахъ коммунистической прессы эти «комиссіонные расходы» называются попросту взятками, которыя получаютъ при посредствѣ комиссіонеровъ многія лица изъ администраціи трестовъ не только отъ частныхъ торговцевъ, но и отъ другихъ трестовъ.

Ничего подобнаго по распространенности этого взяточничества не знала частная промышленность не только въ Россіи, но и въ никакой другой странѣ. Случалось и случается иногда въ халатно ведомомъ частномъ предпріятіи взяточничество служащихъ. Но это — исключеніе. Въ НЭПовской Коммунистической Промышленности это — правило, бытъ. Праведники изъ числа фабричныхъ директоровъ и членовъ правленій трестовъ, очевидно, безсильны бороться съ нимъ. Ясно, что причина лежитъ не въ личныхъ качествахъ персонала, а въ чемъ то болѣе общемъ, — въ той правовой базѣ ,на основаніи которой администрирующій аппаратъ стоитъ во главѣ промышленности. Онъ несобственникъ ея, какъ это въ большей или меньшей степени бываетъ въ капиталистическомъ обществѣ, собственникъ, заинтересованный не только въ ея настоящемъ, но и въ ея будущемъ. Онъ въ ней приказчикъ промотавшагося хозяина, человѣкъ безъ крѣпкихъ корней, посаженный милостью Коммунистической Диктаторствующей Власти.

И еще одно: онъ уже глубоко презираетъ эту власть и ни капли не вѣритъ уже ни въ ея дѣло, ни въ ея прочность и въ ея будущее. Оттого герой и праведникъ изъ администрирующаго аппарата *) надрываетъ силы затѣмъ, чтобы что-то сохранить и сдѣлать для будущей послѣкоммунистической Россіи, а обыкновенный человѣкъ изъ этого администрирующаго аппарата рветъ, что можетъ, сегодня.

Отсюда и идетъ присущая НЭП-у безхозяйственность и убыточность производства.

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*) Управляющій аппаратъ состоитъ изъ: 1) бывшихъ директоровъ и другихъ старшихъ служащихъ управлявшихъ промышленностью еще въ до-коммунистическое время. Эти люди въ большей или меньшей степени сохранили капиталистическую производственную дисциплину и, главное, любовь къ своей профессіи и дѣлу. Поскольку эти качества въ нихъ сильны, постольку въ нихъ живъ и проявляется импульсъ къ сохраненію имущества и забота о будущемъ процвѣтаніи данной отрасли промышленности. 2) Прежніе собственники. Эти послѣдніе, если они попали въ прежнія свои предпріятія, являются естественными партизанами «хозяйственности» и, наконецъ, 3) выдвинутые коммунистической диктатурой люди изъ рабочихъ или прежнихъ мелкихъ служащихъ. Та часть изъ нихъ, которая обладаетъ характеромъ «производственника» и врожденной талантливостью въ новомъ ихъ положеніи быстро умственно развивается и присматривается и ищетъ возможности закрѣпить свое теперешнее положеніе и въ будущей капиталистической эпохѣ. Эта часть склонна къ хозяйственности. Вся же остальная ни о какой хозяйственности не думаетъ.

Не слѣдуетъ забывать, что даже въ лучшихъ изъ элементовъ перечисленныхъ трехъ группъ импульсъ къ хозяйственности долженъ мало-по-малу замирать вслѣдствіе того, что база ихъ теперешняго высокаго положенія въ администрирующемъ промышленность аппаратѣ лишена устойчивости, зависящей отъ ихъ собственныхъ достоинствъ; она вся покоится прежде всего на «протекціи и милости» начальства изъ Компартіи.

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3) *Налоговое бремя.* П.И. Поповъ въ сборникѣ «На новыхъ путяхъ» даетъ *) приблизительный подсчетъ измѣненій національнаго дохода отъ с. - хозяйства и промышленности по Европейской Россіи за послѣдніе три года по сравненію съ 12 г. Доходъ 12 г. онъ беретъ, исходя изъ извѣстныхъ исчисленій Пр. С.Н. Прокоповича и уменьшая ихъ въ зависимости отъ теперешнихъ размѣровъ территоріи Россіи.

Въ милл. золотыхъ рублей:

	1912	1920	1921	1922
Стоимость продукціи с.-хозяйства и промышленности вмѣстѣ взятыхъ	10.568	5.681	5.478	5.055
Въ томъ числѣ доля продук. падающая на:				
а) Сельское хозяйство	6.117	4.970**)	4.633	3.955
б) Промышлен. (вмѣстѣ съ ремесленной и кустарной)	4.451	711	845	1.100
в) Одну крупную и среднюю промышлен.	3.721	518	585	705
г) Одну ремесленную и кустарную	730	193	260	395

За время 20 - 22 г. цифры, несомнѣнно, очень преувеличены Поповымъ. Такъ, напримѣръ, доходъ отъ с.-хозяйства въ 21 г. въ цѣнахъ 12 г. врядъ ли по моимъ подсчетамъ могъ быть больше 2800 милл. зол. руб. (45% отъ 6117***). Этой оптимистичностью П. Поповъ, очевидно, старается сгладить неблагопріятное впечатлѣніе отъ громадной разницы между доходомъ за до-коммунистическій періодъ и за коммунистическую эпоху. Если цифры за 1920-22 г. не вѣрны по своей абсолютной величинѣ, то онѣ все таки чрезвычайно интересны, ибо по нимъ можно судить о характерѣ относительныхъ измѣненій въ національномъ доходѣ отдѣльныхъ отраслей хозяйства и общаго. Для наглядности я даю ихъ графически, въ діаграммѣ № 3. На этой діаграммѣ ясно виденъ чрезвычайно важный процессъ: *за три послѣднихъ года коммунистическаго хозяйства національный доходъ неизмѣнно изъ года въ годъ падаетъ.*

Даже по Поповской оптимистической оцѣнкѣ коммунистическихъ успѣховъ доходъ 1922 г. равенъ только 48% отъ дохода 12 г. На самомъ дѣлѣ онъ врядъ ли достигаетъ и 32% ****). Если мы сравнимъ размѣры обложенія въ до-коммунистическое время и теперь, то увидимъ, что прямые и косвенные налоги по коммунистическому государственному бюджету на 22-23 г. (Эк. Ж. 4.3. 23) равнялись 518 милл. руб., т.е., составляли около 53% отъ соотвѣтствующихъ статей бюджета 14 года. Нѣтъ никакого сомнѣнія, что теперешнее налоговое обложеніе, а равно и величина всего бюджета 22-23 г. непомѣрно велики по отношенію къ теперешнему національному доходу.

*) См. Эк.Ж. 23.2. 23.

**) Цифра 4970 не дана Поповымъ. Взята мною приблизительно по 1921 г. съ увеличеніемъ ея въ отношеніи 1738: 1638, т.е. валового (по послѣднимъ даннымъ) сбора зернового хлѣба въ 20 и 21 г.. По 4970 получена величина суммарной продукціи въ 5681.

***) См. Russ. Econ., стр. 1276.

****) Считая, что національный доходъ отъ с.-хозяйственныхъ промысловъ уменьшился (согласно моимъ подсчетамъ) до 45%, а отъ индустріальныхъ (согласно подсчетамъ Попова) до 20% отъ до-военнаго размѣра.

И. Реингольдъ (Эк.Ж. 22.3. 23) говоритъ: «Если принять подсчетъ П. Попова дохода отъ промышленности и с. хозяйства и учесть, что доходъ отъ торговли транспорта и пр. сократились еще рѣзче, то современный (22 г.) національный доходъ составитъ 35-40% отъ до-военнаго».

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Съ Мая 21 г. Коммунистическое Правительство все время сжимаетъ расходы на содержаніе Правительственнаго и партійнаго аппарата своей власти, тщетно пытаясь сократить ихъ до такихъ размѣровъ, чтобы всѣ эти расходы покрыть тѣмъ, что можно выколотить изъ крестьянства, ибо вся государственная промышленность явно убыточна. Къ этому сжатію побуждаетъ Компартію стремленіе, какъ можно дольше удержаться у власти, отдаливъ моментъ банкротства. Всякое сжатіе имѣетъ свой предѣлъ, прежде всего, въ размѣрѣ страны. Затѣмъ сжимать дальше, вѣроятно, становится опаснымъ для существованія самой власти. Отсюда теперешній размѣръ бюджета.

Въ отношеніи крестьянства налоговой прессъ и до НЭП-а былъ нажатъ до отказа. При НЭП-ѣ онъ нажатъ не меньше. Если подсчитать продналогъ, прямое и косвенное обложеніе открытое, а также скрытое (отъ эмиссіи), то крестьянство платитъ никакъ не меньше 25% отъ своего валового дохода.

Между тѣмъ, за исчерпаніемъ наслѣдства, полученнаго отъ буржуазнаго строя, Совѣтской власти становится все труднѣе и труднѣе находить источники во вновь создаваемыхъ цѣнностяхъ. Слѣдствіемъ является то, что коммунисты-политики все больше и больше стали давить на промышленность.

Отмѣчу попутно, что сильное обложеніе послѣдней составляетъ логически неотъемлемую часть идеи и практики НЭП-а. При помощи такого обложенія Компартія и диктаторствующіе въ ней коммунисты-политики должны отнимать у коммунистовъ-хозяйственниковъ громадную долю выгодъ, которую должна получать Государственная Коммунистическая Промышленность при «corner-ѣ», дѣлаемомъ крестьянину. Отсюда ожесточенная борьба между коммунистами-политиками и товарищами изъ Наркомфина, съ одной стороны, и хозяйственниками, съ другой: послѣдніе должны были платить свой оброкъ. Въ этой борьбѣ, главнымъ образомъ, и надо искать корней теперешняго раскола въ коммунистической партіи.

Налоги на промышленность въ нѣкоторыхъ отрасляхъ ея, напримѣръ, въ сахарной, достигаютъ 50% отъ стоимости продукта, какъ разъ та величина, на которую были вздуты цѣны промышленной продукціи по сравненію съ цѣнами сельско-хозяйственной (см. крив. III и I на діагр. № 1).

4) *Призрачность калькуляціи* влечетъ за собой не только убыточность, но еще большое зло: всякія, вообще, разумныя хозяйственныя предвидѣнія перестаютъ существовать. Калькуляція призрачна прежде всего потому, что лучшая даже единица, въ которой она ведется,—рубль довсенный, золотой, товарный — не имѣетъ реальнаго существованія, реальныхъ костей и плоти. Это тѣни изъ «Страны Воспоминаній» или души, еще не родившіяся, изъ «Царства Будущаго».

Далѣе, цѣна въ совѣтскихъ рубляхъ не имѣетъ подъ собой сколько нибудь опредѣленной хозяйственной базы, ибо:

1) Совѣтскій рубль непрерывно обезцѣнивается инфляціей, возведенной коммунистическимъ правительствомъ въ роль своеобразной и постоянно дѣйствующей «налоговой системы». Какія бы нечеловѣческія усилія въ направленіи бережливости, труда, хозяйственности и т.д. ни дѣлали всѣ создающіе теперь въ Россіи матеріальныя цѣнности слои населенія — это нисколько не улучшаетъ ихъ положенія въ смыслѣ стабилизаціи рубля и 2) свободный рынокъ, регулируемый спросомъ и предложеніемъ, почти также не существуетъ при НЭП-ѣ, какъ не существовалъ при Главкизмѣ. О свободномъ, до извѣстной степени, рынкѣ можно еще говорить при обмѣнѣ съ деревней продукціи кустарно-ремесленной, т.е. (см.

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діагр. № 3) объ обмѣнѣ 8% отъ всѣхъ получаемыхъ въ національномъ доходѣ 22 г. цѣнностей. Вся крупная и средняя промышленность находится въ государственномъ «corner-ѣ». Говоря объ обмѣнѣ съ этой промышленностью, можно говорить только въ военныхъ терминахъ: о гражданской экономической войнѣ города и деревни, о вооруженной экспропріаціи, успѣшно и неуспѣшно совершаемой первымъ надъ второй, объ удавшихся или неудавшихся обходахъ и прорывахъ фронтовъ и т.д. Здѣсь нѣтъ мѣста свободному товарному рынку.

Политика цѣнъ коммунистическаго правительства, его синдикатовъ и трестовъ — это нѣчто вродѣ игры въ поккеръ: выиграть можно при плохихъ картахъ и проиграть — при хорошихъ.

Когда по отношенію къ НЭП-овскому хозяйству коммунистическій экономистъ или нэпманъ говоритъ: «балансъ, прибыль, убытокъ, рубль, цѣна, выгодность» и т.д., совершенно тщетно искать подъ этими терминами того содержанія, которое въ нихъ вкладывается въ капиталистическомъ хозяйствѣ. Содержаніе подъ этими терминами кроется совсѣмъ иное, или, можетъ быть, вѣрнѣе, реальнаго содержанія совсѣмъ нѣтъ. Есть нѣчто призрачное, мѣняющееся, неуловимое.

Когда коммунистическій экономистъ или нэпманъ дѣлаетъ калькуляціи, составляетъ балансы, они, въ дѣйствительности, похожи на человѣка, считающаго свои барыши во снѣ или въ не совсѣмъ трезвомъ видѣ. Проснется или протрезвится, и вдругъ окажутся убытки тамъ, гдѣ грезились милліонныя прибыли, черепки вмѣсто червонцевъ. И главное: считаетъ и ни одной минуты не увѣренъ, что считаетъ вѣрно.

Чрезвычайно любопытной иллюстраціей этой «призрачности» является исторія съ балансомъ Моссукна (см. Эк. Ж. 26.II. 22 и 14.12. 22).

Не очень, кажется, трудная задача для хозяина предпріятія сказать въ концѣ операціоннаго года, заработалъ ли онъ или потерялъ. Въ капиталистическомъ строѣ это такъ. Въ НЭП-овскомъ это далеко не такъ.

Правленіе треста Моссукно *) опубликовало свой балансъ (Эк. Ж. 26. 11. 22), предпосылая ему слѣдующее замѣчаніе: «Трудно работать въ условіяхъ падающей валюты. Но нелегкая также задача составить въ этихъ условіяхъ правильный балансъ, отражающій положеніе дѣла въ твоемъ предпріятіи и способный выявить реальные, не «бумажные» результаты твоей годовой работы. Намъ хотѣлось бы подѣлиться съ товарищами - хозяйственниками нашими методами составленія и провѣрки баланса, поставить эти методы на общее товарищеское обсужденіе, такъ какъ полагаемъ, что вопросы баланса являются въ настоящее время чрезвычайно злободневными: въ ближайшій мѣсяцъ истекаетъ срокъ годичной работы значительной части нашей трестированной промышленности и, вмѣстѣ съ тѣмъ, наступаетъ срокъ учесть результатъ этой работы».

Оба баланса на 11.11. 21 и на 1.10. 22 составлены въ дензнакахъ 22 г. Для начинательнаго баланса стоимость полученнаго отъ казны имущества и матеріальныхъ статей, принятая по до-военной оцѣнкѣ, переведена въ дензнаки 22 г., приравнивая 1 до-военный рубль = 6 рублямъ дензнаковъ 22 г.. Спустя 11 мѣсяцевъ въ балансѣ на 1.10. 22 тѣ же статьи переоцѣниваются по коэффиціенту 1 до-воен. р. = 520 руб. въ дензнакахъ 22 г. Совершенно понятно, что размѣръ вычисленной прибыли вполнѣ зависитъ отъ того, принятъ ли теоретическій коэффиціентъ соотношенія между совѣтскимъ и до-военнымъ рублемъ за 520, за большую или за мень-

*) 22 фабрики съ 11 ½ тыс. рабочихъ.

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шую, чѣмъ 520, величину. Моссукно взяло коэффиціентъ въ 520 и соотвѣтственно вычислило, что получило за 11 мѣсяцевъ своей дѣятельности прибыль въ 3.22 милл. зол. руб., принявъ 1 зол. руб. равнымъ 545 руб. въ дензнакахъ 22 г.

Трестъ чувствуетъ всю шаткость своихъ вычисленій. Онъ пробуетъ еще разъ рѣшить дѣйствительно неразрѣшимую въ обстановкѣ НЭП-а задачу,— есть ли прибыль или убытокъ, и пересчитываетъ свой балансъ въ аршинахъ сукна по т.н. суконному рублю.

Получаетъ какъ будто тоже прибыль. Не вѣритъ себѣ и еще разъ рѣшаетъ свою задачу. Онъ говоритъ: «Въ виду трудности оцѣнки баланса, благодаря *условному* значенію всѣхъ индексовъ и *отсутствію болѣе или менѣе твердыхъ рыночныхъ цѣнъ*, при неустойчивомъ курсѣ рубля, мы подошли къ провѣркѣ баланса еще совсѣмъ съ другой стороны». На этотъ разъ дѣло идетъ, по выраженію представителей Моссукна, о т. н. «хозяйской провѣркѣ». Въ бухгалтерскія книги извѣрились. По формулировкѣ того же представителя Моссукна: «Натура — вѣрнѣе книги».

Потребовался спеціальный диспутъ въ редакціи Экономич. Жизни (см. очень любопытный отчетъ объ этомъ диспутѣ въ Эк. Ж. 14.12. 22) для того, чтобы рѣшить, потерпѣли ли товарищи изъ Моссукна убытокъ или прибыль, и сколько, отъ ихъ производства. На этомъ диспутѣ, по словамъ отчета: «Консультантами госфондовой комиссіи было высказано предположеніе, что показанная прибыль вовсе не является прибылью отъ производства, а можетъ имѣть своимъ источникомъ другія, напр., побочныя операціи треста». По мнѣнію тов. Стоклицкаго: «отдѣльныя, плохо дѣйствующія фабрики могли приносить убытокъ, а общая прибыль можетъ получиться отъ торговыхъ операцій (отъ вздуванія, предположимъ, цѣнъ), покрывая убыточность этихъ отдѣльныхъ предпріятій».

Авторитетное собраніе въ редакціи Экон. Жизни не рѣшило, есть ли прибыль или убытокъ и сколько. Такъ обстоитъ дѣло съ «призрачностью калькуляціи».

Типичный примѣръ разрушенія индустріальнаго хозяйства и прорыва «corner'a». — Иллюстраціей того, какъ подъ вліяніемъ перечисленныхъ выше причинъ убыточности должно разрушиться при НЭП-ѣ хозяйство любой отрасли промышленности, прорваться «corner», и того, какую горечь разбитыхъ надеждъ чувствуетъ при этомъ человѣкъ, который повѣрилъ въ возможность вести промышленное предпріятіе при НЭП-ѣ и попытался съ громаднымъ напряженіемъ силъ это сдѣлать, могутъ служить «Мысли и факты» К. Тараненко (Эк. Ж. 17.3. 23).

Рѣчь идетъ о положеніи дѣла въ сахарномъ трестѣ — этомъ «трестѣ-именинникѣ», какъ онъ былъ названъ за свои производственные успѣхи въ Госпланѣ.

Я предоставляю слово самому К. Тараненко: Вотъ что онъ говоритъ: «Блестящіе результаты (мы такъ, не стѣсняясь, говоримъ) кампаніи текущаго года, утроившей послѣ ликвидаціи полной задолженности по производству 22 г. полученный отъ Государства количественно (въ пудахъ сахара) оборотный капиталъ, не создали благопріятной обстановки для дальнѣйшей работы, и теперь, какъ никогда, чувствуется... тревога за дальнѣйшую судьбу сахарной промышленности...

Въ прошломъ году многіе отвѣтственные товарищи изъ Н.К.В.Т. и Н.К. не вѣрили въ реальность ожидаемаго нами производственнаго результата, развивали мысль о фантастичности полученія 12 милл. пуд. сахара, строили иллюзію о крестьянскомъ потребителѣ сахара и добивались

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ввоза заграничнаго сахара... Теперь НКВТ молчитъ... Мы получили 12 милл. пуд. сахара... Изъ нихъ мы потратили 6 милл. пуд. на ликвидацію производства и частичную подготовку къ кампаніи 23 г., а 6 милл. пуд. сахара и 1 милл. сахаро-продуктовъ (рома, патоки и проч.) всего 7 милл. пуд. у насъ остается на кампанію 23 г., что теоретически составляетъ 40% на всю кампанію, (а въ прошломъ году было только 18%).

Какъ будто все благополучно... Но это, къ сожалѣнію, только такъ «кажется». Въ чемъ дѣло?

Приводимая ниже таблица *) даетъ первый отвѣтъ. За пудъ сахара-песка производства 21-22 г. съ акцизомъ можно было получить въ Москвѣ:

Мѣсяцы	Золотых. рублей	Ситца аршинъ	желѣза кровельн пудъ	Угля пудъ	% отнош. акциза къ цѣн. сах.
Январь 22 г. (безъ акциза)	29.62	80	—	60	—
Май (съ акцизомъ)	13.3	71.9	4.13	45.49	31.25 %
Іюнь	17.5	54.42	4.02	28.00	28.58 %
Іюль	15.79	43.64	3.54	20.69	33.33 %
Августъ	20.81	66.64	5.23	31.59	21.84 %
Сентябрь	18.87	60.61	3.85	34.96	20.00 %
Октябрь		Продажи не было			
Ноябрь (новый сахаръ)	6.74	26.71	2.10	23.59	36.56 %
Декабрь (произ. 22-23 г.)	6.00	25.24	2.70	24.83	25.65 %

Эта табличка указываетъ на опредѣленно неблагопріятное соотношеніе цѣнъ сахара и промышленныхъ продуктовъ съ появленіемъ сахара производства 22-23 г., и это соотношеніе останется такимъ же въ Январѣ и Февралѣ 23 г.

Второй отвѣтъ. Намъ нужно въ теченіи Февраля-Сентября реализовать 7 милл. пуд. сахара, т.е. по милліону въ мѣсяцъ, т.е., беря по Февралю, нужно извлечь изъ рынка до 200 трилліоновъ рублей въ мѣсяцъ, что при наблюдаемой депрессіи рынка страны абсолютно невыполнимая задача, а потому намъ, или прійдется понизить цѣну и продавать въ убытокъ сахаръ, т.е. расходовать оборотный капиталъ въ натурѣ, или — замедлять темпъ реализаціи и умерщвлять тѣмъ производственный пульсъ хозяйства, или, наконецъ, слезно молить о кредитѣ...

Третій отвѣтъ. Мы платимъ государственныхъ налоговъ около 50% съ продажной цѣны пуда сахара.

Товарищи изъ НК , конечно, усумнятся въ этомъ. Поэтому расшифруемъ приведенную цифру. Акциза за продаваемый сахаръ намъ приходится платить въ среднемъ 30%. За плантаторскій сахаръ (выпущенный натурой крестьянамъ за свеклу) и сахаръ, выпущенный натурой крестьянамъ за работу, акцизъ за каковой сахаръ уплачивается сахаротрестомъ, около 10%. Уравнительный промысловый налогъ — 7%. Мѣстные налоги, оплата школьнаго персонала за счетъ Наркомпроса, городскіе налоги — всего 3%. Итого 50%. Если же принять многократныя обложенія по уравнительному сбору да прибавить еще соцстрахъ (Украина 21% зар-

*) Для наглядности я нанесъ цифры этой таблицы на діаграмму № 4. Колебаніе цѣны пуда сахара въ золотѣ показаны въ рубляхъ кривою 1. Тѣ же колебанія въ единицахъ товаровъ — ситцѣ, кровельномъ желѣзѣ и углѣ — показаны на кривыхъ II, III и IV въ %, причемъ Январскія цѣны, а для кровельнаго желѣза Майскія приняты за 100%. Для наглядности въ точкахъ переломовъ кривыхъ II, III и IV поставлены также соотвѣтствующія цифры въ пудахъ и аршинахъ.

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платы, а РСФСР — 25%), культурпросвѣтъ — 10%, 2% — завкомы, 2% — ВУЗ-ы, шефство, тоже составляющіе вмѣстѣ около 5% продажной цѣны сахара, получимъ бремя непосильное и для цвѣтущей промышленности!

Всѣхъ этихъ налоговъ, а это, по нашему, основное, въ прошломъ году для насъ не было, ибо акцизъ введенъ съ 15 Мая послѣ выпуска нами почти всего сахара; уравнительнаго налога тоже не было до конца года (производства), соцстрахъ и др. введены также только въ серединѣ лѣта, теперь же намъ нужно съ перваго шага платить налоги за все производство 22 г.. Въ частности теперь (25 февраля) на Больше-Грубановскомъ Сах. Зав. Тамбовск. губ. продается съ торговъ сахаръ за неплатежъ уравнительнаго сбора... и мы ничѣмъ не можемъ помочь.

При такомъ положеніи наши производительныя оборотныя средства сразу уменьшаются на 50% одними налогами. Если еще учесть цѣнностное отношеніе сахара къ золоту и промышленнымъ издѣліямъ, то получается, что у насъ остается въ цѣнностяхъ только 98% прошлогодняго оборотнаго капитала или 12% отъ потребныхъ средствъ. Ясное дѣло, что при производственной себѣстоимости (безъ возстановленія и амортизаціи) пуда сахара въ 5 р. 10 к. зол., если мы въ Декабрѣ продавали сахаръ въ Москвѣ по 6 р. 30 к.. а изъ нихъ платили Государству 50%, то мы теряемъ на пудѣ 2 р. 40 к., т.е. расходуемъ оборотный капиталъ.

Спросятъ, почему мы по такимъ цѣнамъ продаемъ сахаръ. Отвѣтъ простой. Сахаротрестъ былъ выпущенъ въ хозяйственное плаванье съ 18% потребныхъ оборотныхъ средствъ... Намъ пришлось проявить клоунскую ловкость, чтобы умудриться получить кредитъ на остальные 82%.

Основными кредиторами у насъ были крестьяне-плантаторы, затѣмъ рабочіе и хозяинъ-государство (общепромышленная ссуда, подтоварная и др.) Но насталъ срокъ погашенія кредита, и намъ за 3 мѣсяца пришлось выбросить до 6 милл. пуд. сахара.... При такомъ положеніи правильнаго сбыта уже не могло быть. Больше всего промышленности повредилъ главный кредиторъ, крестьянинъ-плантаторъ, выбросившій за полъ-цѣны на рынокъ сахаръ, за который акцизъ платилъ Сахаротрестъ (подъ нажимомъ налоговъ въ началѣ декабря). А вѣдь плантаторы получили около 3 милл. пуд. сахара, натурой въ уплату за сырье: цифра большая».

На этомъ мы оборвемъ сплошную выписку изъ статьи Тараненко и приведемъ кратко его дальнѣйшія соображенія о причинахъ, не позволяющихъ вести хозяйственно сахарное дѣло. Онъ упрекаетъ экономистовъ изъ НКФ въ томъ, что они совершенно неправильно берутъ до-военныя соотношенія для обложенія промышленности во время НЭП-а, ибо 1) въ то время былъ оборотный капиталъ. Теперь при НЭП-ѣ «кредита нѣтъ (ибо то, что мы получаемъ, нельзя назвать кредитомъ, въ большинствѣ случаевъ это грабежъ, кромѣ, конечно, общепромышленныхъ ссудъ)», 2) «промышленность по своимъ размѣрамъ деградировала на 40 лѣтъ, т.е., находится въ положеніи 1875-1880 г.; 3) «Заводы истрепались и требуютъ капитальныхъ ремонтовъ, а пока хотя бы основательнаго залатыванія дыръ». 4) въ сельскомъ хозяйствѣ надо возстановить почти заново постройки, инвентарь и культурность земель; 5) для сохраненія основного капитала «консервируемыхъ заводовъ» требуется отъ сахарной промышленности, въ дополненіе къ непосредственнымъ расходамъ на производство, громадныя средства для «удержанія ихъ въ положеніи statu quo — охраны отъ дальнѣйшаго разрушенія». Далѣе, Тараненко дѣлаетъ сравненіе выгодности

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сахарнаго производства въ два періода. Для краткости свожу его соображенія въ таблицу.

	1875—1880 г. г.	1922 г.
Продукція общая въ милл. пуд.....	12	12
Продажная цѣна руб. пуд. франко..	5 р. 25 ст. отпр.	6 р. 00 Москва
Акцизъ въ % отъ продажной цѣны..	5 %	40 %
Прямые налоги	1-3 %	10 %

Горечь упрековъ, бросаемыхъ товарищамъ изъ Н.К.Ф. А.Тараненко, понятна и находитъ оправданіе въ сообщаемыхъ имъ фактахъ.

Мы видимъ, какъ на общемъ фонѣ чрезвычайнаго сжатія покупательной способности деревни (напомню: «Товарищи изъ Н.К.В.Т. и Н.К.Ф. строили иллюзію о крестьянскомъ потребителѣ сахара»), сами условія веденія промышленнаго хозяйства при НЭП-ѣ обезкровливаютъ сахарную промышленность. Недостатокъ капитала для возстановленія, невозможно высокое налоговое обложеніе и призрачность калькуляціи дополняютъ и усиливаютъ другъ друга. Создается обстановка «запретительная» для веденія сколько-нибудь серьезнаго промышленнаго предпріятія.

Достаточно хотя бы прослѣдить внимательно по діагр. № 4 за лихорадочной до Ноября 22 г. и летальной послѣ этого срока температурой цѣнъ на сахаръ, чтобы понять, почему у Тараненко опускаются руки и вырываются горькія слова. Станемъ немного въ сторону отъ горячаго спора между Тараненко и товарищами изъ Н.К.В.Т. и Н.К.Ф. и посмотримъ на дѣло объективно.

Его реальная и хозяйственная сущность проста (см. діагр. № 4). Себѣстоимость сахара — 5.10 руб. Еслибы къ ней Сахаротрестъ присчиталъ разумную амортизацію и прибыль, скажемъ, въ 30%, а Н.К.Ф. — разумное обложеніе, скажемъ, въ 10%, то продажная цѣна получилась бы терпимая, что-нибудь около 7.25 руб.

На самомъ дѣлѣ сахаротрестъ продавалъ до Октября по несравненно болѣе высокой цѣнѣ и крупно наживалъ. На чемъ? — На «corner-ѣ», который онъ одновременно съ товарищами изъ Н.К.В.Т. (привозной сахаръ) дѣлалъ потребителю. Струны натягивались очень азартно. Сахарный «corner», какъ и всѣ остальные индустріальные «corner-ы», прорвался. Но на сахарномъ фронтѣ прорывъ случился (Октябрь) нѣсколько раньше, чѣмъ на остальныхъ, гдѣ онъ сталъ обозначаться въ разныхъ мѣстахъ съ Декабря по Мартъ.

Плоды прорыва сахарнаго «corner-а» будутъ теперь пожинать и сахаротрестъ и товарищи изъ Н.К.Ф.

ГЛАВА V. СОЦІАЛЬНЫЯ ПОСЛѢДСТВІЯ РАЗЛОЖЕНІЯ НЭП-а.

Матеріальное крушеніе НЭП-а разсѣиваетъ послѣднія иллюзіи въ отношеніи возможности успѣховъ и эволюціи Совѣтской Власти, иллюзіи даже наиболѣе романтично настроенныхъ людей. Это крушеніе и, въ особенности, пожалуй, созданная НЭП-омъ возможность учесть размѣръ этого крушенія при помощи, пусть, призрачной, пусть, очень плохой, но все-таки какой-то калькуляціи — закончили процессъ уясненія въ сознаніи широкихъ соціальныхъ слоевъ Россіи одной очень важной истины. Коротко эту истину можно формулировать такъ: — Коммунистическій

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режимъ и его творецъ, Компартія, въ теперешнемъ положеніи — это промотавшійся, и матеріально, и идейно банкротъ.

Промотавшееся солнце не имѣетъ поклонниковъ.

Это новое сознаніе дѣлаетъ тонъ теперешнихъ соціальныхъ отношеній въ Россіи.

Какъ протекалъ этотъ процессъ растраты духовныхъ и матеріальныхъ цѣнностей?

Выйдя изъ стремленія раскрѣпостить человѣческую личность отъ экономической эксплоатаціи, коммунистическая идеологія пришла къ закрѣпощенію личности и экономическому, и политическому, несравненно большему, чѣмъ въ до-коммунистическое время.

Въ области матеріальныхъ отношеній практика коммунистическаго правительства свелась къ послѣдовательной экспропріаціи соціальныхъ слоевъ — слой за слоемъ — къ пожиранію до гола всякаго побѣга, который можетъ дать плодъ только въ будущемъ. Началось съ буржуазіи, продолжилось крестьянствомъ и, затѣмъ, индустріальнымъ рабочимъ и, наконецъ, докатилось до партійнаго товарища — коммуниста-хозяйственника.

По части пожиранія Компартія подобна тучѣ саранчи. Гдѣ прошла, тамъ — черно и безнадежно. Ничего не пропуститъ. Разница между двумя политиками пожиранія — саранчи и коммуниста — только въ очереди полей. Саранча объѣдаетъ подрядъ. Компартія — на выборъ, по линіи наименьшаго сопротивленія — соціальнаго и политическаго. Это исканіе линіи наименьшаго сопротивленія продиктовало Компартіи НЭП.

Оттого я и даю свой отрицательный отвѣтъ относительно НЭП-а и даю его, надѣюсь, въ полномъ единеніи съ огромнымъ количествомъ тѣхъ, кто остался и страдаетъ въ Россіи.

Начала строить свою власть Компартія въ соціальномъ антагонизмѣ прежней Россіи. Создала своеобразную соціальную солидарность теперешней Россіи: объѣденныя поля всѣ равны въ своей бѣдности, и всѣ одинаково мало ждутъ добраго отъ Коммунистическаго строя. Этимъ опредѣляются теперешнія одинаковыя и враждебныя отношенія къ Коммунистическому правительству основныхъ группъ населенія.

Уничтожить или, по крайней мѣрѣ, смягчить антагонизмъ между, съ одной стороны, крестьянствомъ, а съ другой — Рабоче-Крестьянскимъ Правительствомъ теоретически, а фактически — Компартіей, не удалось при помощи НЭП-а. Его ласкающіе взоръ цвѣты весны 21 г. созрѣли къ осени 22 г. въ очень терпкія ягоды — «corner-а» Государственной Коммунистической промышленности и Комиссію по депрессіи хлѣбныхъ цѣнъ. Антагонизмъ увеличился и обострился. Авторитетъ и престижъ Коммунистической власти, кажется, окончательно погибли въ глазахъ крестьянской среды.

Городской рабочій терпѣливо уходилъ изъ начавшейся свертываться при НЭП-ѣ промышленности въ надеждѣ, что ему станетъ лучше житься, когда это свертываніе, наконецъ, окончится. Теперь онъ видитъ, что оно никогда не кончится ни при НЭП-ѣ, ни при Коммунистической власти. Естественно, онъ не доволенъ. Коммунисты-хозяйственники увидѣли, что выгоды, если бы таковыя даже и получились отъ «corner-а», дѣлаемаго Государственной промышленностью крестьянству, или, вообще, отъ какихъ бы то ни было операцій промышленнаго дѣла, то эти выгоды попадутъ, главнымъ образомъ, не къ нимъ, а къ коммунисту-политику и бюрократу.

Для коммуниста-хозяйственника стала ясна его скромная роль —

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таскать каштаны для товарищей изъ Н.К.В.Т., Н.К.Ф., Г.П.У., Политбюро и т.д.. Онъ ею не доволенъ.

Наконецъ, широкія массы городского населенія. Когда НЭП, при началѣ своей карьеры, внесъ огонекъ въ потухавшую при Главкахъ жизнь промышленности, онъ увеличилъ спросъ на интеллигентный трудъ въ разнообразныхъ, такъ или иначе съ промышленностью связанныхъ занятіяхъ городского населенія. Онъ далъ работу и улучшеніе быта города. Даже внѣшній видъ городского населенія улучшился. Люди, впавшіе въ 19 и 20 г. въ апатію отчаянія, не видѣвшіе по мѣсяцамъ куска мыла, при НЭП-ѣ стали умываться и чинить платье. Теперь, при концѣ карьеры НЭП-а сырьевая и товарная база индустріальнаго производства съ каждымъ днемъ усыхаетъ. Городъ сталъ себя чувствовать какъ бы въ режимѣ осажденной крѣпости. Уменьшеніе куска хлѣба уже началось. Выбрасываніе на улицу прогрессируетъ. Для городского населенія НЭП оказался послѣднимъ обманомъ Коммунистической власти. Будущее этому городскому населенію кажется еще болѣе темнымъ отъ послѣднихъ миганій догорающей свѣчки былого НЭП-овскаго благополучія.

Отсюда — упорное недовольство.

Я говорилъ о подтачивающихъ корни промышленности факторахъ — нѣсколькихъ лежащихъ внутри ея и одномъ, лежащемъ во внѣ, а именно — усыханіи покупательной способности сельско-хозяйственнаго рынка. Нашъ обзоръ хозяйства при НЭП-ѣ былъ бы не полонъ, еслибы мы не остановились еще на одномъ факторѣ, который можетъ разсматриваться по отношенію къ промышленности, и какъ внѣшній, и какъ внутренній. Роль этого фактора вѣрнѣе,, цѣлой отрасли хозяйства, настолько велика для промышленности, что остановка въ этой отрасли можетъ просто на просто опрокинуть всю Россійскую промышленность. Я говорю о желѣзно-дорожномъ транспортѣ.

ГЛА. VI. ЖЕЛѢЗНОДОРОЖНЫЙ ТРАНСПОРТЪ.

Желѣзнодорожному транспорту пришлось сыграть въ коммунистическомъ хозяйствѣ совершенно исключительную роль. Онъ былъ первой по времени отраслью хозяйства, въ которой несостоятельность коммунистической системы не только была съ непререкаемой очевидностью обнаружена (зима 19-20 г.), но и была признана самими коммунистами.*)

Ранней весной 20 г. вся оффиціальная коммунистическая печать была полна самыми образными, самыми художественными выраженіями и сравненіями, въ которыхъ описывался развалъ транспорта и громадное вліяніе этого развала на все хозяйство Россіи. Не только на хозяйство — на существованіе самой власти коммунистовъ надъ Россіей.

Разработавъ конкретную программу возстановленія транспорта, Коммиссаріатъ Путей Сообщенія тогда же безъ обиняковъ заявилъ, что спасеніе транспорта совершенно идентично со спасеніемъ совѣтской власти, которая, по его словамъ, «умретъ вмѣстѣ съ транспортомъ».

Эта программа, изложенная въ т.н. «историческомъ» приказѣ № 1042 (28.5.20) была разсчитана на нѣсколько лѣтъ, а именно. на возстановленіе транспорта къ 1925 году.

Съ весны 20 г. и по сей день транспортъ вообще и, въ особенности, ж.д. транспортъ никогда не переставалъ быть locus minoris resistentiae комму-

*) См. «Возстановленіе движенія на Россійскихъ ж. д.» М. Брайкевича. «Russ. Econ.» стр. 11 и 146.

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нистическаго хозяйства. Всякій очередной кризисъ той или другой отрасли этого хозяйства непремѣнно отражался въ первую очередь на транспортѣ, въ большей или меньшей, конечно, степени. Какъ только сжималась продукція угля, дровъ, нефти, первые признаки этого сжатія были видны на топливныхъ складахъ желѣзныхъ дорогъ. Дороги, и безъ того почти парализованныя, работали при такомъ сжатіи ея подъ ежеминутной угрозой полной остановки движенія, имѣя двух-трехдневные запасы топлива. Въ результатѣ появились въ отчетахъ т.н. «холодные» паровозы, т.е. паровозы, которые нельзя было употребить для движенія изъ-за недостатка топлива.

Съ другой стороны, какое бы жалкое существованіе ни влачила тяжелая индустрія въ Россіи во всѣ годы коммунистическаго режима, стоило чуть-чуть болѣе обостриться кризису въ металлоснабженіи или металлообрабатывающей промышленности, и тотчасъ изъ депо исчезали «холодные» паровозы. Ж.д. движенію грозила остановка уже изъ-за недостатка исправныхъ паровозовъ. Тогда послѣдніе начинали въ «ударномъ порядкѣ» чиниться коммунистическимъ правительствомъ всюду въ Россіи, чуть ли не на жестяныхъ заводахъ и хлопчатобумажныхъ фабрикахъ. Кромѣ того, на страницахъ коммунистической печати, съѣздахъ и митингахъ снова и снова начиналась кампанія по утѣшенію россійскихъ гражданъ надеждами на улучшеніе въ движеніи, которое наступитъ тогда, когда будетъ выполненъ заграничный заказъ на паровозы. Какъ извѣстно, этотъ заказъ былъ сдѣланъ въ результатѣ нашумѣвшаго зимою 19-20 г. доклада инж. Ломоносова, въ которомъ онъ констатировалъ наступленіе въ ближайшемъ будущемъ катастрофы въ транспортѣ и говорилъ о средствахъ съ нею бороться. Докладъ этотъ привелъ въ панику не только Съѣздъ Совѣтовъ Нар. Хоз., гдѣ былъ прочитанъ, но и самый Совѣтъ Народныхъ Комиссаровъ.

Далѣе, какъ ни мало предъявлялъ грузовъ къ перевозкѣ сжавшійся до крайнихъ размѣровъ товарооборотъ въ Россіи, при малѣйшемъ повышеніи требованія транспортъ оказывался не въ состояніи удовлетворить потребность, и нужное для національнаго хозяйства текущее «ударное» хозяйственное мѣропріятіе разбивалось о разрушенный транспортъ. Такъ неизмѣнно случается при доставкѣ, напримѣръ, сѣменнаго матеріала для посѣвовъ. Прибывшія, наконецъ, сѣмена засѣваются тогда, когда всѣ разумные сроки посѣвовъ давно уже миновали.

Районированная, благодаря разрушенію транспорта, на рядъ почти изолированныхъ другъ отъ друга хозяйственныхъ областей, Россія даже при тенденціи къ возрожденію (если бы такое возрожденіе и имѣло мѣсто—теперь его нѣтъ) промышленности обречена, до возстановленія транспорта, на застой натуральнаго хозяйства.

Разрушающаяся промышленность влечетъ за собой разрушеніе транспорта, а разрушающійся транспортъ ускоряетъ разрушеніе промышленности. Изъ сказаннаго выше ясно, что жизнь желѣзнодорожнаго транспорта является самымъ чувствительнымъ барометромъ, по которому безошибочно можно судить о состояніи главнѣйшихъ, по крайней мѣрѣ, отраслей коммунистическаго хозяйства.

Посмотримъ потому, какъ текла жизнь транспорта въ 22 г., и каковы были достиженія въ этомъ году на пути выполненія программы «историческаго приказа № 1042». Если былъ замѣтный успѣхъ, значитъ все коммунистическое хозяйство идетъ при Нэп-ѣ къ лучшему будущему — есть, значитъ, надежда какъ-то вылѣзти изъ ямы.

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Въ іюнѣ 20 г. мнѣ приходилось говорить: «Если пунктирная кривая *) на графикѣ № 1 (показывающемъ ростъ процента больныхъ паровозовъ на сѣти Россійскихъ ж.д.) не начнетъ прочно опускаться, это будетъ значить, что произошелъ внутренній крахъ совѣтской власти, о возможности котораго говорятъ Ленинъ и Рыковъ.»

Постановка вопроса, мнѣ кажется, тогда была сдѣлана правильно. Мѣнять въ ней ничего не приходится и теперь. Надо просто посмотрѣть, насколько транспортъ вообще и ремонтъ больныхъ паровозовъ, въ частности, улучшились за время съ весны 20 г. и, особенно, въ 22 г. На основаніи этихъ фактическихъ данныхъ предсказанія о ближайшей хозяйственной и политической погодѣ коммунистическаго режима сдѣлаетъ, мнѣ кажется, одинаковыя и коммунистическій, и буржуазный экспертъ въ вопросахъ экономической жизни страны.

Паровозный паркъ. — Изъ разсмотрѣнія табл. А (Паровозный паркъ) статьи «Коммунистическая промышленность въ 1922 г. въ цифрахъ», даваемой въ этомъ же № 9 Russ. Econ. видно, что % больныхъ паровозовъ за 12 мѣсяцевъ 22 г. понизился съ 65.3% до 58%, а количество здоровыхъ паровозовъ возрасло съ 6573 шт. (янв.) до 8044 (декабрь), т.е. на 1471 шт. Свидѣтельствуетъ ли это улучшеніе о началѣ возстановленія Россійской промышленности и транспорта, и насколько оно прочно закрѣплено? На оба эти вопроса приходится дать отвѣтъ отрицательный. Нэпъ на дѣятельность паровозостроительныхъ заводовъ, несомнѣнно, оказалъ благопріятное вліяніе. Таблица I.Д. (паровозостроительные заводы) показываетъ, что производство новыхъ паровозовъ съ 78 шт. (21 г.) поднялось въ 22 г. до 105 (12,8% отъ производительности 1914 г.) т.е. на 27 шт. Однако, тѣ же паровозостроительные заводы уменьшили выпускъ паровозовъ изъ капитальнаго, средняго и текущаго ремонта въ общемъ на 102 паровоза.

Такимъ образомъ, главную работу по ремонту паровозовъ несли по старому желѣзнодорожныя мастерскія. Нужно думать, однако, что улучшеніе съ переходомъ къ Нэпу въ работѣ этихъ мастерскихъ можетъ только удержать въ стабильномъ состояніи общій % больныхъ паровозовъ. Сколько-нибудь значительно понизить его ж.д. мастерскія, при всемъ своемъ желаніи и добросовѣстности въ работѣ, никакъ не могутъ, благодаря общему низкому уровню промышленности и всего хозяйства Россіи. Это совершенно ясно изъ размѣровъ удовлетворенія ж.д. матеріалами, о чемъ я буду говорить ниже. Приростъ количества здоровыхъ паровозовъ явился результатомъ другого обстоятельства. Инж. В. Фоминъ (Эк. Ж. 9.11.22) говоритъ: «На 1 октября 22 г., по даннымъ эксплоатаціоннаго отдѣла, наличіе паровознаго парка равняется 7913 паровозамъ, считая въ томъ числѣ около 700 паровозовъ новыхъ, поступившихъ на русскія дороги изъ-за границы». Сколько поступило ихъ послѣ 1 октября, полныхъ свѣдѣній я не нашелъ. Равнымъ образомъ, я не нашелъ указаній, всѣ ли 700 паровозовъ поступили изъ Германіи или частью и изъ Швеціи. Что касается до поступленія изъ послѣдней, то Эк. Ж. (17.1.23) говоритъ: «До 1.1.23 изъ Швеціи должно было поступить 230 паровозовъ, а прибыло 204».

Если считать приблизительно, что за 22 г. изъ-за границы поступило около 1000 паровозовъ, то улучшеніе въ % больныхъ съ 65,3% до 58% свидѣтельствуетъ не объ улучшеніи хозяйственной жизни Россіи, а о томъ, что растрачиваемый Коммунистическимъ Правительствомъ старый золотой

*) См. докл. «Возстановленіе движенія на Россійскихъ ж. д.» «Russian Econom.», стр. 161 и 27.

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запасъ Россіи, благодаря настойчивости русскихъ инженеровъ, удалось не весь просто проѣсть. Часть его истрачена на полезное и для будущей Россіи дѣло, именно — новые паровозы.

Заграничныя поступленія паровозовъ имѣютъ характеръ единовременный. Такъ какъ золотой фондъ теперь почти истраченъ, они должны скоро остановиться. Безъ нихъ же 65,3% могли бы понизиться не до 58%, а только до 61,3%, т.е. % больныхъ паровозовъ въ декабрѣ 22 г. былъ бы выше, чѣмъ въ февралѣ 20 г., когда онъ равнялся 59,2% *).

Мы видимъ, такимъ образомъ, что «пунктирная кривая на графикѣ № 1 не начала прочно опускаться» въ 1922 г. Характеризуемое этой кривой трагическое положеніе паровознаго парка въ 1920 г. вызвало, какъ мы говорили уже, панику въ Коммунистическомъ Правительствѣ и заставило принять программу возстановленія паровознаго парка, изложенную въ приказѣ № 1042.

Убываніе количества больныхъ паровозовъ по этой программѣ должно было бы итти по нижеслѣдующей таблицѣ, цитируемой мною изъ ст. инж. В. Фомина «Пятилѣтіе Совѣтскаго Транспорта» (Эк. Ж. 9.11.22).

На какое число	Всего паровозов. шт.	Въ томъ числѣ больныхъ шт.				% % больныхъ паровоз.
		Въ больш ремонтѣ	Въ средн. ремонтѣ	Въ текущ ремонтѣ	Итого	
1. 7. 20	16.000	1.800	3.700	4.100	9.600	60
1. 1. 21	16.000	2.100	3.000	3.500	8.600	54
1. 1. 22	16.000	1.700	1.500	3.000	5.200	39
1. 1. 23	16.000	1.100	900	2.500	4.500	28
1. 1. 24	16.000	900	900	2.000	3.800	24
1. 1. 25	16.000	700	900	1.600	3.200	20

Мы видимъ, что на 1.1.23, согласно этой программѣ, больныхъ паровозовъ въ паркѣ должно было оставаться 4500 или, принимая въ расчетъ увеличеніе валового количества съ 16000 до 19200 (см. табл. I А.), максимумъ — 5300 шт.; на самомъ дѣлѣ ихъ на 31.12.22 имѣется 11156. Процентъ больныхъ на 1.1.23 по программѣ долженъ былъ быть — 28%, на самомъ дѣлѣ онъ больше, чѣмъ въ два раза выше.

Нужно отмѣтить, что теперь, въ концѣ 22 г., locus minoris resistentiae транспорта лежитъ не въ паровозномъ паркѣ. Недостатокъ топлива, во первыхъ, и громадное, по сравненію съ до-коммунистическимъ періодомъ, сокращеніе національнаго дохода и потребности въ перевозкѣ грузовъ, во вторыхъ, даютъ возможность справиться съ движеніемъ, имѣя всего 5800 здоровыхъ паровозовъ. Соотвѣтственно мы видимъ, что количество «холодныхъ» паровозовъ растетъ съ Января (1061 шт.) до декабря (2157 шт.). Locus minoris resistentiae транспорта, какъ мы увидимъ ниже, лежитъ въ состояніи верхняго строенія и, въ частности, въ шпальномъ хозяйствѣ.

Вагонный паркъ. — Количество теоретически-здоровыхъ вагоновъ съ Января 22 г. уменьшилось (см. табл. I.В.) къ концу 22 г. круглымъ числомъ на 27.000 штукъ. Я говорю «теоретически», ибо далеко не всѣ здоровые вагоны годны для рабочаго парка. Въ октябрѣ 22 г. рабочій паркъ составлялъ 193 тыс. вагоновъ. Около 73 тысячъ находились подъ жильемъ, складами, въ рабочихъ поѣздахъ и т.д. Даже то, что числится въ рабочемъ паркѣ, — далеко не здоровый вагонъ.

*) См. «Возстановленіе транспорта на Росс. ж. д.», «Russ. Econ.», стр. 150 и 16.

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По части этого обстоятельства «обзоръ*) состоянія и работы транспорта въ 1921 г.» уже въ 21 г. констатируетъ: «Самое понятіе о состояніи вагоновъ, которые слѣдуетъ считать здоровыми, потерпѣло значительное измѣненіе. Если подходить къ вагону съ точки зрѣнія требованій до-военнаго времени, то можно считать, что фактически здоровыхъ вагоновъ для движенія въ настоящее время немного, а ухудшеніе вагоновъ продолжается. — Такъ, % больныхъ вагоновъ, негодныхъ для движенія по сравненію съ нормальнымъ временемъ (1913 г.), повысился въ среднемъ до 300%. Это явленіе находитъ отраженіе въ невозможности отыскать хотя бы небольшое количество здоровыхъ вагоновъ, годныхъ для экстренныхъ перевозокъ, требующихъ исправнаго состоянія. Такъ, напр., для перевозки хлѣбныхъ грузовъ, перевозки товаровъ изъ Эстоніи, трудно было укомплектовать 30-50 тысячъ вагоновъ».

Въ 22 г. общее состояніе вагоновъ рабочаго порта очень мало или совсѣмъ не улучшилось.

Количество перевозокъ и использованіе подвижного состава. — Мы видѣли, что въ области количества и качества подвижного состава 22 г. не принесъ серьезныхъ улучшеній. Но въ дѣлѣ эксплоатаціи его НЭП въ значительной степени развязалъ руки желѣзнодорожному персоналу и далъ возможность улучшить, и движеніе, и использованіе подвижного состава.

Утвержденный С. Н. Х. 9.1.21. декретъ по установленію плотности перевозокъ транспорта и 12.6.22 Уставъ желѣзныхъ дорогъ Р.С.Ф.С.Р. въ извѣстной степени возвратили желѣзнымъ дорогамъ физіономію въ порядкѣ ведомаго коммерческаго предпріятія.

Это далеко еще не настоящій порядокъ коммерческаго дѣла: за перевозки вѣдомства и тресты должаютъ, взыскивать трудно, иногда невозможно, вопросъ объ измѣненіи тарифовъ постоянно и всѣми поднимается, сбезцѣнивающійся рубль не даетъ возможности сдѣлать сколько-нибудь правильную калькуляцію и т. д. но, за всѣмъ тѣмъ, все таки есть нѣкоторыя отправныя точки для введенія упорядоченія отношеній между грузоотправителемъ и дорогой, между отдѣльными службами, для введенія зачатковъ здоровой дисциплины и чувства отвѣтственности среди самого желѣзнодорожнаго персонала.

Все это сказалось на интенсификаціи работъ и сокращеніи численности персонала, повышеніи использованія наличнаго подвижного состава. Объ этомъ свидѣтельствуетъ разсмотрѣніе табл. I.С. (см. «Коммунистическая промышленность за 1922 г. въ цифрахъ»). Общее количество за 1922 г. (изъ расчета имѣющихся цифръ за 10 мѣсяцевъ) тысячъ поѣздо-верстъ равняется 113.334 или 104% отъ 21 г., 102% отъ 20 г. и только 27% отъ 13 г.

Правда, въ численномъ своемъ выраженіи успѣхъ по сравненію съ 20 и 21 г.г. не великъ, но важно то, что изъ прежней общей безформенности и хасса отношеній въ дѣлѣ транспорта въ 22 г. начали выявляться нѣкоторыя твердыя точки, изъ которыхъ можетъ возрождаться жизнь транспорта тогда, когда теперешній уродливый коммунистическій и НЭП-овскій режимъ національнаго хозяйства Россіи отойдетъ въ область прошлаго. Эти твердыя точки и тотъ, небольшой даже, практическій успѣхъ, который при помощи ихъ уже теперь достигается инженерами и прочими квалифицированными спеціалистами и работниками транспорта, обѣщаютъ персоналу возможность сохраниться, и духовно, и матеріально для будущей здоровой жизни транспорта.

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*) Стр. 86. Изд. Н. К. П. С. Москва 1921 г.

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Въ этомъ отношеніи НЭП для транспорта явился нѣкоторой надеждой, нѣкоторой моральной передышкой. Твердой матеріальной базы для возможности возстановленія и возрожденія транспорта онъ ни въ какой мѣрѣ не создалъ. Можно съ увѣренностью сказать, что, если весь хозяйственный строй Россіи не станетъ очень и *очень быстро* на путь правового и капиталистическаго режима, транспортъ несомнѣнно умретъ. Умретъ ли вмѣстѣ съ нимъ, какъ это говорилъ Н.К.П.С. и многіе отвѣтственные коммунисты въ 20 г., и коммунистическій режимъ — я не берусь судить. Для меня одно несомнѣнно: НЭП не такой грунтъ, на которомъ можно строить зданіе возрождающагося транспорта. Слишкомъ для этого мало соковъ, мало національнаго дохода отъ всѣхъ промысловъ Россіи.

Снабженіе металломъ. — Это станетъ ясно, если мы обратимся теперь къ разсмотрѣнію того, что дѣятели ж. д. транспорта могли получить для жизненно-необходимаго возстановленія его матеріальной базы отъ Коммунистическаго Правительства и коммунистической государственной промышленности.

Посмотримъ, прежде всего, какъ обстояло въ 22 г. дѣло со снабженіемъ металломъ. Вопросъ этотъ имѣетъ громадное значеніе, прежде всего, для возстановленія и ремонта подвижного состава, какъ мы объ этомъ уже говорили выше, и, затѣмъ, для сохраненія пути, какъ мы объ этомъ будемъ говорить ниже.

По даннымъ, опубликованнымъ Коммунистическимъ Правительствомъ въ 23 г., составлена помѣщаемая ниже таблица, рисующая, какъ валовую потребность въ основныхъ матеріалахъ всѣхъ русскихъ желѣзныхъ дорогъ въ ихъ современномъ состояніи, такъ и степень ихъ удовлетворенія, по каждому матеріалу въ отдѣльности и по всей ихъ совокупности.

Потребности желѣзно-дорожнаго транспорта и ихъ удовлетвореніе основными матеріалами (въ тысячахъ пудовъ).

Матеріалы и издѣлія	1920			1921			1922		
	Потребн.	Удовлетвор.		Потреб.	Удовлетвор.		Потреб.	Удовлетвор.	
		Колич	%		Колич	%		Колич	%
Чугунъ	2.484	1.741	70	3.429	2.685	79	2.307	1.260	55
Желѣзо сорт.	4.520	1.408	31	5.807	867	15	5.306	1.065	20
Желѣзо кров.	1.265	527	42	1.464	371	25	1.430	670	47
Сталь рессорн.	380	39	10	385	95	25	—	—	—
Проволока	460	161	35	594	46	7	377	34	9
Гвозди	610	137	22	749	270	36	897	199	22
Болты	447	161	36	662	112	16	728	140	19
Олово	22	18	79	39	6	19	18	15	84
Свинецъ	59	33	55	130	78	60	47	123	251
Баббитъ	155	100	65	213	47	22	317	47	15
Бандажи	1.273	549	44	1.388	682	49	563	269	47
Оси	344	106	31	146	54	37	16	8,7	55
Дымогарн. трубы	399	204	51	400	390	98	411	224	54
Мѣдн. топ. части	53	21	39	10	8	80	26	15	58
Паров. запас. части	315	151	51	218	93	42	360	42	12
Поковки ваг. зап. части	310	50	16	406	46	11	351	24	7
Чугун. отл. зап. час. ваг	360	152	42	570	140	24	730	58	8
Рессоры, круж.	200	85	42	262	66	26	281	40	14
Рельсы	8.300	1.336	16	5.709	2.734	48	5.891	1.413	24
Всего	20.956	6.979	33	22.581	8.801	39	20.056	5.640	28

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Изслѣдуя таблицу, мы видимъ, что сравнительно ничтожная потребность въ металлахъ и издѣляіхъ удовлетворена въ 1920 г. на 33%, въ 1921 — на 39%, а въ 1922 г., несмотря на интенсивное поступленіе заграничныхъ матеріаловъ, лишь на 28%. Перспективы на 1923 г. въ этомъ отношеніи чрезвычайно тяжелыя. Въ связи съ новой экономической политикой и переходомъ трестированныхъ заводовъ на «хозяйственный расчетъ» комиссаръ Пут. Сообщенія вступалъ въ договорныя отношенія съ отдѣльными трестами, но ни одному изъ нихъ не могъ полностью уплатить денегъ, причитающихся за полученныя издѣлія. Въ настоящее время рядъ заводовъ не въ состояніи, не получивъ средствъ, выполнить заказы К.П.С.. Въ 1923 г. пишетъ обозрѣватель «Эк. Ж.» (24.1.23) «недостаточность денежныхъ средствъ дорогъ, расходующихъ большую часть своихъ средствъ на заработную плату и не имѣющихъ оборотнаго капитала, не позволяетъ транспорту дѣлать заказы на все потребное количество матеріаловъ и издѣлій... Запасы, сдѣланные за прежніе годы, истощаются, и необходимость болѣе полнаго удовлетворенія матеріалами и частями дѣлается все болѣе настоятельной», т.е. все растущій износъ частей тягового аппарата не позволяетъ больше ими пользоваться, и съ мѣсяца на мѣсяцъ требовательныя вѣдомости на смѣну частей растутъ.

При такомъ положеніи дѣло капитальнаго и средняго ремонта не только не можетъ осуществляться согласно «программѣ возстановленія къ 1925 г.», изложенной въ приказѣ № 1042, но даже удовлетворить въ самомъ ближайшемъ будущемъ, несмотря на прибытіе новыхъ паровозовъ изъ-за границы, теперешнимъ, очень пониженнымъ, требованіямъ въ погрузкѣ и перевозкѣ.

Рельсы. — Посмотримъ, какъ такое снабженіе металломъ отражается на верхнемъ строеніи пути.

П.И. Красовскій слѣдующими словами изображаетъ состояніе рельсоваго хозяйства на 1.1.23.: «Средняя до-военная норма ежегодной смѣны рельсъ на сѣти дорогъ была принята въ 2 1/2% отъ протяженія главныхъ путей, что составляло около 2.000 верстъ... Настоящее состояніе рельсоваго хозяйства характеризуется недосмѣной на главныхъ путяхъ противъ принятыхъ въ до-военное время нормъ 11.000 верстъ, израсходованіемъ до 50% наверстного запаса рельсъ, что составляетъ 400 верстъ пути, и, наконецъ, употребленіемъ для построекъ стратегическихъ и топливныхъ линій до 2000 верстъ рельсовъ, полученныхъ отъ разборки вторыхъ главныхъ путей... Положеніе съ рельсовыми скрѣпленіями вполнѣ аналогично».

Н.К.П.С. былъ вынужденъ ограничить планъ смѣны рельсъ на ближайшее пятилѣтіе 23-27 г.г. вмѣсто 2 1/2% только 1 1/2%, предполагая впослѣдствіе постепенно увеличивать этотъ процентъ до 2 1/2%. Этотъ планъ долженъ былъ бы привести дороги къ нормальной смѣнѣ рельсъ — въ 2000 верстъ ежегодно — только въ 1941 г. Согласно ему, на 23 г. было предъявлено Н.К.П.С. требованіе на 1600 верстъ рельсъ или, считая со скрѣпленіями, 8,6 милл. пуд. металла. Уже въ январѣ высшими органами Коммунистическаго Правительства было заявлено, что больше 5,3 милл. пуд. металла въ 23 г. отпущено быть не можетъ. Количество рельсъ въ частности было сокращено съ 1600 верстъ до 800. Сколько же этого количества будетъ въ дѣйствительности дано жел. дорогамъ, будетъ, конечно, видно только въ концѣ 23 года.

Шпалы, брусья и пр. лѣсной матеріалъ. — Наиболѣе слабымъ мѣстомъ во всемъ транспортномъ хозяйствѣ являются теперь не паровозы и не топливо, а верхнее хозяйство и, въ частности, шпальное хозяйство.

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Именно вслѣдствіе относительной простоты его веденія, катастрофическое разстройство въ немъ съ особой очевидностью показываетъ всю несостоятельность коммунистической хозяйственной системы даже въ ея смягченной, гибридной съ капитализмомъ формѣ, т.е., въ НЭП-ѣ.

Металлургія, металлообработка — все это сложныя относительно хозяйства, требующія хорошаго оборудованія, тонкаго хозяйственнаго расчета и правового порядка для ихъ веденія. Но шпалы — дѣло элементарное. Практически можно ограничиться топоромъ и продольной пилой да минимальной хозяйственной распорядительностью, чтобы наготовить шпалы, я не говорю дешево, гдѣ ужъ тутъ говорить о дешевизнѣ при коммунистическомъ хозяйствѣ, но все таки наготовить ихъ такъ и столько, чтобы не разрушить верхнее строеніе.

И за всѣмъ тѣмъ, именно въ отношеніи смѣны шпалъ россійскія желѣзныя дороги находятся дѣйствительно въ катастрофическомъ положеніи. Я думаю, что здѣсь именно самое уязвимое мѣсто транспорта. Не имѣвшая прецедента въ исторіи всѣхъ странъ, почти полная, катастрофическая пріостановка ж.д. движенія *можетъ случиться* у насъ, въ Россіи именно вслѣдствіе повальнаго выхода изъ строя скромнѣйшаго и безотвѣтнаго работника ж.д. движенія — шпалы. И она устала, и ей не подъ силу при коммунистическихъ порядкахъ работать. Что это именно такъ, видно изъ опубликованнаго Н.К.П.С. къ IX Съѣзду Совѣтовъ «Обзора состоянія и работы транспорта въ 1921 г.»

Приложеніе 35 ое этого обзора показываетъ, въ какіе годы были уложены находящіяся теперь въ пути россійскихъ ж. дорогъ шпалы. Я ограничиваюсь выпиской изъ этого приложенія по 1908 г. Хотя въ пути есть еще шпалы, уложенныя за время 1904-1907 г.г., но количество ихъ такъ уже ничтожно (всего за 4 года 0.13% дубовыхъ и 59% сосновыхъ пропитанныхъ), что эти годы можно опустить. Вотъ эта таблица «Обзора».

«Распредѣленіе въ % отношеніи по годамъ укладки шпалъ, лежащихъ въ главномъ пути сѣти жел. дорогъ:

Годъ укладки	Срокъ службы	% об. колич. всего налич. шпалъ					% отъ даннаго сорта				
		Дубовыя	Сосн. пропитанн.	Сосн. не пропитан.	Еловыя	Лиственн.	Дубовыя	Сосн. пропитан.	Сосно. не пропитан.	Еловыя	Лиственн.
1920	1	0.17	0.83	4.67	0.68	0.05	1.99	1.57	16.43	22.26	8.63
1919	2	0.33	1.40	4.35	0.42	0.05	3.83	2.62	15.29	13.75	10.98
1918	3	0.64	2.17	5.63	0.30	0.04	7.50	4.12	19.80	9.79	7.26
1917	4	1.01	3.59	4.34	0.18	0.10	11.85	6.8	15.25	5.99	20.69
1916	5	1.34	5.85	4.66	0.80	0.07	15.77	11.08	16.37	26.08	12.98
1915	6	0.91	7.60	3.28	0.58	0.14	10.71	14.40	11.54	19.00	27.86
1914	7	1.15	6.89	1.26	0.09	—	13.51	13.05	4.42	2.95	0.29
1913	8	1.30	6.55	0.14	—	0.03	15.29	12.41	0.49	0.07	6.73
1912	9	0.54	6.44	0.03	—	—	6.33	11.64	0.12	0.05	0.60
1911	10	0.41	7.08	0.03	—	0.01	4.80	13.42	0.12	0.04	2.09
1910	11	0.42	2.12	0.03	—	0.01	4.97	4.02	0.11	0.02	1.89
1909	12	0.09	1.30	—	—	—	1.08	2.46	0.01	—	—
1908	13	0.07	0.78	0.01	—	—	0.87	1.48	0.03	—	—

Насколько драматиченъ смыслъ цифръ этой таблицы, Вы легко увидите изъ слѣдующаго, сопровождающаго ее замѣчанія «Обзора состоянія и работы транспорта въ 1921 г.»

«Исходя изъ размѣровъ смѣны текущаго года и учитывая, что преимущественно укладываются въ пути непропитанныя шпалы, фактическій

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средній возрастъ шпалъ, лежащихъ въ пути къ 1-му Января 22 г., будетъ приблизительно слѣдующій:

Для	сосновыхъ	непропитанныхъ	4.2 года
»	»	пропитанныхъ	7.3 »
»	»	еловыхъ	4.5 »
»		дубовыхъ	7.2 »
»		лиственныхъ	4.6 »

Средній нормальный срокъ службы шпалъ на русскихъ ж. д. по даннымъ эксплоатаціонной статистики составляютъ:

Для	сосновыхъ	непропитанныхъ	4.5 года
»	»	пропитанныхъ	8 лѣтъ
»		еловыхъ	3.75 года
»		дубовыхъ	8 лѣтъ
»		лиственныхъ	3 года

Такимъ образомъ, явствуетъ, что въ 1922 г. возрастъ главной массы шпалъ сосновыхъ пропитанныхъ и непропитанныхъ приближается къ среднему предѣльному своему сроку службы; другіе типы, какъ еловые и лиственные, этотъ срокъ превзойдутъ. Эти данныя даютъ яркую характеристику того критическаго положенія, въ которомъ окажутся въ 1922 г. желѣзныя дороги Республики».

При регулярной смѣнѣ шпалъ до войны нормальная годовая потребность ж. д. была 19-20 милл. шт.; ясно, что при запущенной смѣнѣ шпалъ 19—20 милл. уже не можетъ хватить. Какъ въ этомъ отношеніи обстоитъ дѣло, и сколько Н.К.П.С. можетъ получить шпалъ отъ Коммунистическаго Правительства, его органовъ и трестовъ?

Цитированный мною «Обзоръ состоянія и работы транспорта въ 1921 г.» отвѣчаетъ на этотъ вопросъ такъ: «Шпальный голодъ чувствовался транспортомъ уже давно, еще въ 1919 г. Въ 1920 г. онъ пріобрѣлъ исключительно острый и, мѣстами, особенно на югѣ, грозный характеръ. Все это время удовлетвореніе потребности Главлѣскомомъ было, не взирая на рядъ чрезвычайныхъ мѣръ, исключительно низкимъ.

Въ результатѣ неудовлетворенія потребность въ шпалахъ возросла съ 19-20 операц. года къ 21-22 операц. году на 2/3 — съ 18-20 милл. до 30-32 милл. шт. для всей сѣти... Къ исполненію Главлѣскомомъ было (въ 21 г.) принято 66% потребности, т.е., 20 милл. шт.. Однако, и эта голодная норма была исполнена имъ всего въ 19%, — по имѣющимся въ Н.К.П.С. на 15.10.21. свѣдѣніямъ на дороги до 1.9.21. поступило изъ заготовки Главлѣскома всего 3,765 милл. шт.»

Что же далъ для возобновленія шпалъ 22 годъ?

П.И. Красовскій *) (Эк. Ж. 24.1.23) говоритъ: «На 1922 г. потребность дорогъ выразилась суммой въ 44 милл. шт., а окончательная программа смѣны была утверждена Госпланомъ и С.Т.О. въ количествѣ 22.765 милл. шпалъ... Заканчивающаяся въ настоящее время кампанія показываетъ, что... дороги получили всего 10 1/2 милл. шпалъ... Общее количество негодныхъ для дальнѣйшей службы шпалъ въ пути составляетъ въ настоящее время около 50% отъ наличнаго числа ихъ, и для полной смѣны ихъ въ теченіе 23 г. потребовалось бы 60 милл. новыхъ шпалъ. Однако очевидно, что заготовка и укладка въ одинъ годъ такого количества шпалъ является совершенно невыполнимыми...

Необходимо предвидѣть, что срывъ и предстоящей шпальной кампа-

*) См. «Состояніе техническаго хозяйства жел. дорогъ».

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ніи приведетъ рельсовую сѣть къ полной катастрофѣ, когда, вслѣдствіе изношенности и слабости элементовъ верхняго строенія, дорогамъ не удастся долѣе гарантировать безопасность движенія безъ значительнаго пониженія скоростей движенія». До какихъ размѣровъ эта скорость теперь понижается, мы увидимъ дальше. Теперь отмѣтимъ попутно замѣчаніе «Обзора» относительно теперешняго положенія пропитки: «Пропитка*) шпалъ находится въ вѣдѣніи Главконсервдерева, но носитъ случайный характеръ. Нѣкоторые заводы въ полной исправности и при наличіи сырья могли бы работать». Къ этому мы добавимъ: въ до-коммунистическую эпоху 60% всѣхъ потребляемыхъ шпалъ подвергалось предварительной пропиткѣ. Удовлетвореніе дорогъ перевозными и мостовыми брусьями, бревнами, досками и др. лѣснымъ матеріаломъ находится не въ лучшемъ положеніи, чѣмъ удовлетвореніе шпалами.

Новыя правила въ эксплоатаціи желѣзныхъ дорогъ. Таблица I.С., какъ я говорилъ уже, указываетъ на улучшеніе въ движеніи и использованіи подвижного состава, на нѣкоторый прогрессъ транспорта. Между тѣмъ послѣднія измѣненія въ правилахъ эксплоатаціи съ несомнѣнностью свидѣтельствуютъ о большомъ регрессѣ.

Процессъ регресса ясенъ: то, что понималось въ Россіи подъ названіемъ «правильное движеніе», исчезаетъ съ сѣти Россійскихъ ж.д. и замѣняется другимъ движеніемъ, совершенно отличнымъ отъ «правильнаго», по названію и существу дѣла — т.н. «временнымъ движеніемъ».

Это бьющее въ глаза противорѣчіе — прогрессъ и регрессъ одновременно — имѣетъ свою реальную причину. Новыя правила эксплоатаціи вызваны къ жизни, конечно, не стремленіемъ сдѣлать экономію на количествѣ обслуживающаго движеніе и путь персонала, какъ это старается показать правительственная коммунистическая пресса, хотя и экономія тутъ тоже играетъ нѣкоторую роль. Основная причина глубже: она лежитъ въ такой средней по Россіи ненадежности верхняго строенія пути, при которой скорость и весь характеръ движенія могутъ соотвѣтствовать только тому режиму, который бываетъ на строющейся ж.д. съ не вполнѣ оконченной балластировкой и подбивкой пути, съ не вполнѣ еще отстроенными искусственными сооруженіями и зданіями, однимъ словомъ, на не принятой еще для «правильнаго движенія» общаго пользованія въ эксплоатацію дорогѣ. На такой дорогѣ поѣзда двигаются по упрощеннымъ правиламъ т.н. «временнаго движенія».

Начало оффиціальному оформленію этого процесса регрессивнаго перехода россійскихъ ж.д. отъ «правильнаго» ко «временному» движенію положено извѣстнымъ раздѣленіемъ дорогъ на 3 категоріи. По этому раздѣленію, на части дорогъ предполагалось сохранить почти правильное движеніе, на части — нѣчто въ родѣ «временнаго», и часть была обречена на модное для НЭП-а «консервированіе» — практически говоря, на упраздненіе.

Дальнѣйшее оформленіе этого процесса усыханія на россійскихъ жел. дорогахъ «правильнаго движенія» нашло себѣ выраженіе въ тезисахъ Госплана о такъ называемомъ «упрощеніи методовъ эксплоатаціи ж.д.» (Эк. Ж. 6.2.23).

Я выпишу изъ этихъ тезисовъ то, что носитъ на себѣ явные признаки «правилъ временнаго движенія»: 1) «упразднить излишніе (?) техническіе

*) Стр. 47. Паденіе пропитки видно изъ приведенной выше таблицы распредѣленія въ % отношеніи шпалъ, лежащихъ въ главномъ пути.

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разъѣзды; закрыть временно или совсѣмъ тѣ станціи, которыя мало дѣятельны; закрыть вторые пути на тѣхъ двупутныхъ дорогахъ 2-го разряда, на коихъ пропускная способность не свыше 5 паръ поѣздовъ въ сутки; допустить не освѣщеніе и снятіе фонарей со стрѣлокъ внѣ главныхъ путей; упразднить старшинство поѣздовъ на всѣхъ линіяхъ, кромѣ линій съ большимъ транзитнымъ пассажирскимъ движеніемъ; допустить равноправность движенія поѣздовъ съ паровозами тендеромъ впередъ; длину участка службы путей установить до 200 верстъ, предѣльную длину околотковъ — 24 версты; охраняемые переѣзды оставить только въ городахъ, большихъ селеніяхъ и на бойкихъ трактахъ; настилъ между рельсовъ на желѣзныхъ мостахъ можетъ быть снятъ; количество и площадь эксплоатируемыхъ служебныхъ и техническихъ зданій должны быть уменьшены; сократить количество дѣйствующихъ водокачекъ».

Что эти мѣры означаютъ? — Нѣкоторое пониженіе безопасности *) движенія, уменьшеніе пропускной способности, пониженіе скоростей движенія на россійскихъ ж.д. путяхъ. Разумны ли онѣ технически и коммерчески? Съ большой болью сердечной за долю россійскаго транспорта, которому въ Россіи было отдано рядомъ поколѣній спеціалистовъ столько любви и труда, — приходится сказать — да. Если въ путяхъ, по свидѣтельству П. И. Красовскаго (Эк. Ж. 24.1.23), лежитъ сгнившихъ шпалъ 1/2 всего наличнаго количества ихъ — приходится забыть о скорости въ 30-40 верстъ на перегонѣ и перетаскивать товарные поѣзда отъ одной, пока еще не закрытой станціи къ другой по рельсамъ съ половиннымъ количествомъ шпалъ съ новой, НЭП-у присущей скоростью — уже въ 10-5 верстъ.

Гніеніе второй, пока еще оставшейся, половины шпалъ есть вопросъ мѣсяцевъ, въ лучшемъ случаѣ одного, двухъ лѣтъ. Неизбѣжно и каждый день приближается тотъ моментъ, когда эта вторая половина откажется служить и ее нечѣмъ будетъ смѣнить.

Протянувшееся по всей Россіи тѣло россійскаго транспорта поражено — при НЭП-ѣ — гангреной. За членомъ членъ его мертвѣетъ. Правы, можетъ быть, были работники транспорта, когда въ 20 г. предсказывали, что коммунистическая власть умретъ вмѣстѣ съ транспортомъ.

Громаднымъ же утѣшеніемъ для будущей, свободной Россіи можетъ, однако, служить то несомнѣнное обстоятельство, что общія судьбы коммунистической власти и россійскаго транспорта, послѣ этого насыщеннаго трагедіей момента — смерти — разойдутся разными дорогами. Изъ того, что останется, россійскій транспортъ возродится къ новой и, я думаю, блестящей жизни. Эти твердыя точки опоры, эти здоровыя зерна будущаго возрожденія уже начали выявляться въ 22 г. въ эпоху НЭП-а.

И всѣ тѣ инженеры и квалифицированные работники транспорта, которые тамъ, въ Россіи, съ невѣроятнымъ напряженіемъ пронесли сквозь коммунистическую эпоху эти здоровыя зерна жизни, сдѣлали большое и національное дѣло для будущей и свободной Россіи.

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*) Коммунистическое Правительство очевидно отдаетъ себѣ отчетъ въ положеніи. Я цитирую по Эк. Ж. (6. 2. 23) отчетъ о засѣданіи Госплана, посвященномъ упрощенію методовъ эксплоатаціи: «Секція подчеркиваетъ, что проведеніе на транспортѣ упрощенныхъ методовъ эксплоатаціи скажется въ конечномъ счетѣ несомнѣннымъ ухудшеніемъ общаго состоянія транспортнаго механизма. Въ виду недостатка матеріальныхъ и финансовыхъ рессурсовъ и возможнаго отсюда невольнаго прекращенія движенія на тѣхъ или иныхъ линіяхъ жел. дорогъ 3-ей категоріи, проведеніе упрощенныхъ методовъ эксплоатаціи необходимо».

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ОТНОШЕНІЕ АМЕРИКИ КЪ РОССІИ.

Въ № 7-8 Russ. Econ. мы привели документы, рисующіе отношеніе Америки къ Россіи. За истекшее съ той поры время много было сдѣлано попытокъ убѣдить американское правительство въ томъ, что т.н. Новая Экономическая Политика Коммунистическаго Правительства уже внесла тогда коренныя измѣненія въ россійскій режимъ, при которыхъ хозяйственное возрожденіе Россіи и участіе въ этомъ возрожденіи Америки становятся возможнымъ дѣломъ. Содержаніе двухъ приводимыхъ нами ниже заявленій по русскому вопросу лидерствующихъ американскихъ государственныхъ дѣятелей показываетъ, что эти попытки не имѣли успѣха.

Въ оффиціальныхъ заявленіяхъ двухъ лидерствующихъ и правящихъ американскихъ гражданъ мы позволимъ себѣ добавить письмо болѣе скромнаго гражданина С.Ш.А., которое онъ помѣстилъ въ англійской прессѣ («Times», 5.5.23.) по поводу стараній англійскаго рабочаго движенія поддержать Коммунистическое правительство во время полученія послѣднимъ извѣстной ноты лорда Керзона. Горячее и дружеское сочувствіе Stanley Washburn'a къ русскому народу тѣмъ болѣе цѣнно, что авторъ письма три года провелъ въ Россіи, будучи въ качествѣ временнаго корреспондента прикомандированъ къ Россійской арміи во время Великой войны. Тамъ онъ научился понимать, чего стоитъ русскій народъ, и тамъ онъ научился любить его (*Ред.*).

I. ОТВѢТЪ СТАТСЪ-СЕКРЕТАРЯ Ч. ХЬЮЗА НА ОБРАЩЕНІЕ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ ЖЕНСКОЙ ЛИГИ МИРА И СВОБОДЫ (21 марта 1923г.)

Въ отвѣтъ на обращеніе делегаціи Международной Женской Лиги, въ которомъ Miss Boynton указала на то, что условія признанія Совѣтскаго Правительства, поставленныя Ч. Хьюзомъ въ его рѣчи къ делегаціи Лиги въ маѣ 1922 г., въ настоящее время въ значительной степени выполнены Совѣтскимъ Правительствомъ, и что слѣдуетъ формально признать послѣднее, Ст. Секр. Ч. Хьюзъ сказалъ слѣдующее:

«Съ большимъ удовольствіемъ принимая вашу делегацію, я высоко цѣню искренность и серьезное отношеніе, сказывающіяся въ вашемъ обращеніи. Я знаю, какъ сильно вы заинтересованы въ дѣлѣ мира, и глубоко сочувствую вашимъ пожеланіямъ и стремленіямъ. При исполненіи своихъ оффиціальныхъ обязанностей, я дѣлалъ все возможное, чтобы содѣйствовать достиженію этихъ цѣлей, которыя близко принимаю къ сердцу.

«Обращаясь къ представительницамъ вашей организаціи въ маѣ прошлаго года, я указывалъ на то, насколько всѣ мы заинтересованы въ благополучіи Русскаго народа. Опытъ прошлаго года, давшій намъ возможность еще ближе ознакомиться съ великими несчастьями, выпавшими на его долю, еще болѣе усилилъ это чувство.Мы постоянно и неотступно думаемъ о томъ, какъ можемъ мы помочь этому несчастному народу.

«Что касается благотворительной помощи, то она оказывалась въ огромныхъ размѣрахъ. Не думаю, чтобы какой либо безпристрастный человѣкъ могъ сомнѣваться въ сердечномъ отношеніи Американскаго народа и въ нашемъ желаніи помочь. Но, какъ вы сами указывали, одной благотворительности мало. Корень вопроса лежитъ много глубже. Это — экономическая проблема; и гуманныя стремленія, какъ бы сильны они не были, не могутъ измѣнить этой сущности дѣла. Мы не только не имѣемъ

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желанія путаться во внутреннія дѣла Россіи; не только признаемъ за русскимъ народомъ право на установленіе собственнаго государственнаго устройства; но считаемъ, что такое вмѣшательство было бы совершенно безплоднымъ. Спасеніе Россіи не можетъ быть принесено въ нее извнѣ. Всѣ надежды Россіи заключаются въ томъ, что она сама можетъ сдѣлать. Совершенно невозможно вмѣшиваться въ вопросы, зависящіе всецѣло отъ русскаго народа, и которые, до тѣхъ поръ, пока они не разрѣшены, не даютъ возможности оказать дѣйствительную помощь и создать основаніе для возрожденія Россіи.

«Россіи нужны промышленность и торговля; но ни та, ни другая не могутъ быть созданы какими бы то ни было формальными политическими соглашеніями. Какъ ни важны такія соглашенія для облегченія торговыхъ и промышленныхъ дѣлъ, — сами по себѣ они не способны вызвать къ жизни эти дѣла или создать для нихъ необходимыя условія. Нельзя помогать тому, чего не существуетъ.

«Въ Россіи существуетъ потребность въ капиталѣ. Но русскому народу не можетъ быть выгоднымъ поддерживать авантюристовъ или тѣхъ, кто желалъ бы проникнуть въ Россію, чтобы ее эксплоатировать. Выгодно для Россіи, какъ средство увеличенія ея производительности и развитія промышленности и торговли, должно быть помѣщеніе тамъ капитала тѣми, кто вкладываетъ его разъ на всегда, находятся тамъ и вступаютъ въ постоянныя отношенія, ведя свое дѣло; такіе же лица, поскольку они являются иностранцами, должны быть обезпечены, что ихъ капиталъ будетъ въ безопасности и что его стоитъ тамъ помѣщать раньше, чѣмъ они рѣшатся его вложить въ дѣло. Условія для такой помощи со стороны иностранцевъ, которую Вы признаете столь необходимой, лежатъ въ самой странѣ и зависятъ отъ ея правительства. Создать ихъ извнѣ невозможно, по самому существу дѣла.

«Затѣмъ, слѣдуетъ сказать, что во всемъ томъ, что говорится о торговлѣ Россіи съ другими народами, очень много ошибокъ. Конечно, какъ другіе народы, такъ и нашъ народъ, торгуетъ съ Россіей. Торговля ведется, насколько она возможна, но объемъ ея относительно незначителенъ.

«Если вы обратитесь къ статистикѣ, то вы убѣдитесь, что признаніе или непризнаніе Совѣтскаго Правительства тѣмъ или другимъ государствомъ имѣетъ очень мало значенія въ отношеніи размѣровъ торговыхъ операцій. Если Россія покупаетъ, она должна имѣть на что покупать; иными словами, она должна производить, чтобы быть въ состояніи покупать.

«Очень радъ отмѣтить, что состояніе сельскаго хозяйства въ Россіи нѣсколько улучшилось, такъ какъ оно является основнымъ элементомъ русскаго хозяйства. Въ этомъ заключается нѣкоторое основаніе для надежды; но, все же, состояніе земледѣлія тамъ еще далеко отъ того, какимъ оно должно было бы быть. Состояніе промышленности и транспорта положительно ужасное. Если Вы желаете познакомиться ближе съ ихъ состояніемъ, могу вамъ посовѣтовать обратиться къ Совѣтскому представителю, Рыкову, и къ сообщенію, сдѣланному имъ въ концѣ прошлаго года, которое, конечно, вы можете достать. Разсмотрѣніе этого сообщенія, я думаю, внесетъ нѣкоторыя исправленія въ сдѣланныя вами оптимистическія утвержденія.

«Правда, и въ законодательствѣ, и въ методахъ были введены нѣкоторые измѣненія, которыхъ я не имѣю никакого намѣренія отрицать, такъ какъ мнѣ отнюдь не доставляетъ удовольствія, всматриваясь въ то, что происходитъ въ Россіи, находить, что все тамъ плохо. Наоборотъ, мнѣ было бы чрезвычайно пріятно видѣть, что тамъ наблюдается совершенно

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обратное. Однако, совершенно безполезно было бы преувеличивать значеніе сдѣланныхъ измѣненій или неправильно истолковывать ихъ результаты. Измѣненія эти далеко недостаточны для того, чтобы создать условія, благопріятствующія развитію промышленности и торговли въ Россіи.

«Разсматривая анализъ Гражданскаго Уложенія, сдѣланный г. Бранденбургскимъ, и знакомясь съ сдѣланными недавно измѣненіями въ законахъ, вы несомнѣнно убѣдитесь, что эти измѣненія неудовлетворительны и недостаточны. Какъ вамъ извѣстно, Брандунбургскій имѣлъ близкое касательство къ выработкѣ этихъ законовъ. И причина того, что запасы продуктовъ въ Россіи изсякаютъ, и что она постепенно бѣднѣетъ, заключается именно въ томъ, что необходимыхъ условій эти законы еще не создаютъ. И когда я говорю объ этихъ необходимыхъ условіяхъ, я имѣю въ виду нѣчто такое, чего никто внѣ Россіи, а тѣмъ менѣе мы, не можемъ искусственно создать. Я имѣю въ виду условія, необходимыя для возможности настоящихъ дѣловыхъ отношеній въ томъ мірѣ, какой сейчасъ существуетъ. И если требуются какія бы то ни было доказательства того, насколько эти условія дѣйствительно необходимы, примѣръ Россіи ихъ, несомнѣнно, даетъ.

«Я вполнѣ понимаю различіе между чисто-экономическими вопросами и вопросомъ о дипломатическихъ сношеніяхъ. Какъ я уже сказалъ годъ тому назадъ представителямъ вашей организаціи, — основнымъ вопросомъ въ дѣлѣ признанія правительства является вопросъ о его способности и готовности выполнять международныя обязательства. Устойчивость, конечно, чрезвычайно важна и, даже, положительно необходима. Нѣкоторые даже полгаютъ, что, какъ будто, устойчивость есть все, что требуется. Но что можетъ значить устойчивость и опредѣленность, если онѣ сводятся къ постоянному проведенію политики невыполненія обязательствъ и конфискаціямъ. Въ случаѣ съ Россіей мы имѣемъ очень простой способъ провѣрки по одному изъ основныхъ вопросовъ, а именно — по вопросу о добросовѣстности въ исполненіи международныхъ обязательствъ. Я говорю, что именно добросовѣстность есть основной вопросъ, потому что на словахъ обѣщанія дѣлаются очень просто. Между тѣмъ, какой смыслъ имѣютъ всѣ разговоры объ обѣщаніяхъ, если уже существующія обязательства не исполняются и собственность конфискуется?

«Здѣсь мы имѣемъ дѣло не съ вопросами о богатомъ и бѣдномъ, это — вопросъ совершенно принципіальный. Не далѣе, какъ на этихъ дняхъ я получилъ письмо по поводу двухъ женщинъ-американокъ, жившихъ въ Россіи и вложившихъ всѣ свои сбереженія въ русскія бумаги; онѣ — бѣдныя женщины, и чрезвычайно обезпокоены тѣмъ, будутъ ли эти бумаги такъ или иначе признаны.

«Наше собственное Правительство, послѣ первой революціи, предоставило Россіи заемъ въ суммѣ 187.000.000 долларовъ. При этомъ, я долженъ отмѣтить, что мы первые признали правительство Керенскаго: это правительство не держалось политики отказа отъ своихъ обязательствъ. Что же сдѣлало Совѣтское Правительство? Декретомъ 21 января 1918 г. оно просто объявило, что всѣ внѣшнія обязательства аннулируются безусловно и безъ всякихъ исключеній.

«Такимъ образомъ, все данное нами взаймы Россіи изъ того, что мы реализовали выпускомъ «Займа Свободы», такъ же, какъ и военные займы, заключенные Россіи до революціи для цѣлей веденія войны, были просто на просто аннулированы. Но С.Ш.А. не являются жестокимъ кредиторомъ. С.Ш.А. не стремятся налагать непосильные платежи на должника, который не въ силахъ платить.

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«Но снисходительное отношеніе и соотвѣтствующее соглашеніе — дѣло одно, а отказъ отъ выполненія обязательствъ — другое. Между тѣмъ, до настоящаго времени я не слышалъ о томъ, чтобы это заявленіе Совѣтскаго Правительства было въ какомъ бы то ни было смыслѣ измѣнено.

«Всѣ предложенія, о которыхъ до настоящаго времени сообщалось, всегда сопровождались совершенно непріемлемыми оговорками. Это въ корнѣ подрываетъ нѣкоторыя изъ сдѣланныхъ вами предложеній, въ которыхъ вы основывались на принципахъ религіи, близкихъ сердцу каждаго изъ насъ, такъ какъ добросовѣстность является основою братскихъ отношеній. Нѣтъ никакой надежды на успѣхъ вашей проповѣди, которая является и нашей — проповѣди добрыхъ братскихъ отношеній — въ мірѣ, исполненномъ ненависти и не одушевленномъ искреннею добросовѣстностью.

«Дѣло обстоитъ чрезвычайно просто. Въ этомъ случаѣ разсуждать отвлеченно не приходится, такъ какъ какой же смыслъ имѣютъ увѣренія, когда мы видимъ, что собственность отбирается безъ возмѣщенія и обязательства не исполняются; это касается имущества всякаго рода, включая, напримѣръ, и капиталы, вложенные однимъ изъ нашихъ крупныхъ обществъ страхованія жизни.

«Не только было бы ошибочно поощрять такіе отказы отъ исполненія обязательствъ и конфискаціи, но необходимо помнить и о томъ, что нельзя поощрять Совѣтское Правительство въ его стараніяхъ подвергнуть другіе народы тѣмъ же несчастіямъ, какія постигли русскій народъ.

«Мнѣ хотѣлось бы вѣрить, что эти старанія теперь оставлены. Въ ноябрѣ прошлаго года Зиновьевъ сказалъ, что вѣчнымъ въ русской революціи является то, что она есть начало міровой революціи. Ленинъ, на послѣднемъ конгрессѣ Третьяго Интернаціонала, въ прошломъ году заявилъ, что революціонеры всѣхъ странъ должны изучать организацію, подготовку, методы и сущность революціонной работы. Тогда, по его убѣжденію, шансы будущей міровой революціи не только хороши, но великолѣпны. Троцкій, обращаясь къ Третьему Конгрессу Коммунистическаго Союза Молодежи въ Октябрѣ прошлаго года — замѣтьте, не два года тому назадъ, а въ прошломъ октябрѣ — сказалъ: « Это значитъ, товарищи, что революція наступаетъ и въ Европѣ, и въ Америкѣ; наступаетъ систематически, шагъ за шагомъ, упорно, со скрежетомъ зубовнымъ въ обоихъ лагеряхъ. Она будетъ затяжную, жестокой и кровавой».

«И вотъ, мнѣ хотѣлось бы видѣть доказательства того, что эта политика оставлена. Мнѣ хотѣлось бы видѣть возможность быть полезнымъ. Мы желаемъ помочь; и въ этомъ Департаментѣ, и во всѣхъ правительственныхъ органахъ мы не менѣе вашего стремимся содѣйствовать поддержанію мирныхъ отношеній въ мірѣ, освободиться отъ ненависти, достигнуть взаимнаго пониманія; но міръ, который мы желали бы видѣть, не долженъ находиться подъ угрозою разрушительной пропаганды Совѣтскаго Правительства; въ немъ должна господствовать добросовѣстность; обязательства должны выполняться, и должны существовать здоровыя основанія международныхъ отношеній».

II. ПИСЬМО МИНИСТРА ТОРГОВЛИ С.Ш.А. ГЕРБЕРТА ХУВЕРА ГЕНР. СЕКРЕТАРЮ МЕЖДУНАРОДНАГО КОМИТЕТА У.М.С.А..,

23 Марта 1923 года.

Многоуважаемый г. Хиббардъ,

Мною, вмѣстѣ съ Вашимъ запросомъ, получены аналогичные запросы и отъ другихъ организацій помощи, съ просьбою дать очеркъ современнаго

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положенія въ Россіи, поскольку оно имѣетъ отношеніе къ дѣлаемымъ американцами попыткамъ помощи и реконструкціи.

Начать приходится съ того, чтобы дать нѣкоторое понятіе о положеніи въ самой Россіи. Поэтому, ниже я привожу сводку мнѣній цѣлаго ряда внимательныхъ наблюдателей, изучившихъ положеніе на мѣстѣ.

Немыслимо дать исчерпывающую картину полнаго обнищанія цѣлаго великаго народа. Война, революція, блокада, страшная засуха и голодъ прошлаго года, а также опытъ и провалъ коммунизма — все это вмѣстѣ взятое породило бѣдствія и нищету, равныхъ которымъ не знала исторія послѣднихъ вѣковъ.

Ужасающій голодъ и эпидеміи были остановлены въ своемъ развитіи благотворительною помощью и лучшимъ урожаемъ въ августѣ прошлаго года. Наблюдаются нѣкоторые признаки возстановленія народной самодѣятельности, вызваннаго измѣненіями въ экономической политикѣ, но уровень жизни все же ниже, чѣмъ въ любой цивилизованной странѣ, болѣзни широко распространены и смертность высока.

«Экономическое отступленіе» отъ коммунизма, начатое два года тому назадъ, создало побужденія къ улучшенію въ нѣкоторыхъ направленіяхъ. Оно возстановило, въ значительной степени, личную предпріимчивость въ сельскомъ хозяйствѣ, мелкой торговлѣ и мелкой промышленности. Земледѣльческое населеніе (свыше 90% всего населенія) проявляетъ нѣкоторые признаки, позволяющіе надѣяться на улучшеніе, благодаря передѣлу помѣщичьихъ земель, установленію ограниченнаго права наслѣдованія, опредѣленію размѣровъ налоговаго обложенія съ установленіемъ доли, платимой въ натурѣ, и свободѣ рыночнаго оборота, позволяющей продавать излишки, что, все вмѣстѣ, до нѣкоторой степени возстановило необходимую личную заинтересованность въ производствѣ. Возстановленіе было задержано страшнымъ голодомъ, который былъ вызванъ въ 1921 г. въ Поволжьи и Южной Украйнѣ убылью скота, сокращеннымъ производствомъ с.-хоз. орудій на фабрикахъ въ теченіе ряда лѣтъ, и вредителями. Возстановленіе, по существу, наблюдается, но оно будетъ медленнымъ и болѣзненнымъ, если ему не будетъ оказана помощь извнѣ. Недавнее оффиціальное сообщеніе, за достовѣрность котораго отвѣтственности я на себя не принимаю, касающееся увеличенія въ сборѣ продналога съ 70.000.000 бушелей въ 1921 г. до 220.000.000 бушелей въ 1922, такъ же, какъ и заявленіе о томъ, что правительство имѣетъ возможность, сверхъ помощи голодающимъ районамъ, вывезти отъ 10 до 50 милліоновъ бушелей излишковъ, во всякомъ случаѣ является признакомъ увеличенія въ производствѣ зерна. Однако, у крестьянъ еще не хватаетъ рабочаго и молочнаго скота, и дѣти во многихъ мѣстностяхъ, вслѣдствіе этого, испытываютъ недостатокъ въ молокѣ и жирахъ.

Въ крупной промышленности отступленіе отъ коммунизма выразилось во введеніи государственнаго соціализма путемъ созданія ряда государственныхъ трестовъ, обнимающихъ большинство крупныхъ отраслей промышленности, какъ напр., хлопковый и текстильный тресты, нефтяной трестъ и т.п., и въ контролѣ надъ вывозомъ и ввозомъ черезъ посредство государственной монополіи. Тресты сами оплачиваютъ своихъ рабочихъ и продаютъ свои продукты или услуги, какъ другъ другу, такъ и публикѣ, вмѣсто прежней системы, при которой всѣ продукты или услуги обращались въ общій фондъ и изъ послѣдняго отпускались каждому по нормѣ. Это измѣненіе, однако, было недостаточно для того, чтобы улучшить положеніе крупной промышленности, такъ какъ оно не возстановило необходимыхъ

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побужденій къ тому, чтобы вкладывать въ промышленность капиталъ и способности. Это обстоятельство, наряду съ упадкомъ въ умѣніи работать и убылью въ административномъ персоналѣ, сопровождавшимися повышеніемъ себѣстоимости производства и, съ общимъ пониженіемъ покупательной способности населенія, вызвали сильную безработицу въ промышленности. Безработица, въ свою очередь, вызвала недоѣданіе, на этотъ разъ не отъ неурожая, а отъ бѣдности, между тѣмъ, какъ отмѣна коммунистической системы пайковъ поставила эту группу населенія въ очень тяжелое положеніе.

Производство обрабатывающей промышленности въ теченіе прошлаго года повысилось на нѣсколько процентовъ, по сравненію съ эпохой коммунизма; въ отдѣльныхъ отрасляхъ промышленности оно колебалось въ предѣлахъ отъ 3 до 35% до-военнаго. Производство, однако, велось во всѣхъ трестахъ съ убыткомъ и сопровождалось уменьшеніемъ запасовъ, унаслѣдованныхъ отъ прежняго режима. Эмиссія бумажныхъ денегъ для покрытія этихъ убытковъ привела къ тому, что сейчасъ долларъ стоитъ 50.000.000 рублей, и либо уже происходитъ, либо неизбѣжно должно произойти новое сокращеніе производства. Производство угля составляетъ, примѣрно, 1/3 до-военнаго; въ результатѣ, города недостаточно отапливаются, а промышленность и транспортъ испытываютъ постоянныя затрудненія. Производство текстиля составляетъ около 25% до-военнаго, и населеніе, поэтому, ощущаетъ недостатокъ въ одеждѣ.

Внѣшняя торговля составляетъ монополію государства, и вывозъ въ 1922 г. оцѣнивается въ 40.000.000 долларовъ, т.е. около 5% до-военнаго. Совѣтское Правительство заявляетъ, что производящійся теперь вывозъ хлѣба предназначается для закупки с.-хоз. орудій и хлопка, но количество ихъ, которое можетъ быть пріобрѣтено такимъ образомъ, должно быть незначительно, по сравненію съ потребностями. Вывозъ другихъ продуктовъ, какъ лѣсъ, мѣха, ленъ, желѣзный ломъ и т. п., нѣсколько увеличитъ количество ввозимаго сырья, но будетъ недостаточенъ для обезпеченія возстановленія Россіи, если онъ не будетъ сопровождаться приливомъ капитала. Финансовое положеніе Правительства настолько плохо, что оно было вынуждено закрыть значительную часть школъ.

Россія нуждается въ экономическомъ возрожденіи, въ возстановленіи ея производительности. Ея крестьянство нуждается въ земледѣльческомъ инвентарѣ и скотѣ. Ея рабочимъ нужны орудія производства; ея промышленности — сырье; ея фабрикамъ — новое оборудованіе; ея транспортъ долженъ быть отремонтированъ и пополненъ. Если ея крупная промышленность должна быть возстановлена, ей нужны квалифицированные рабочіе и подготовленные руководители, а также та личная заинтересованность, которой не существуетъ въ ея національзованной промышленности.

Кромѣ того, для возстановленія ея нужно привлечь изъ-за границы огромные капиталы и профессіонально подготовленный персоналъ, чтобы руководить реконструкціей. Несомнѣнно, нѣкоторое число спекулянтовъ и охотниковъ за концессіями, желающихъ нажить сотни процентовъ въ годъ, согласятся пойти на такой рискъ, но значительный приливъ капитала изъ разумнаго процента не можетъ имѣть мѣста, пока вся система не будетъ такъ измѣнена, что создадутся основныя условія, обезпечивающія безопасность и увѣренность въ будущемъ.

«Совершенно напрасно было бы надѣяться, что притокъ въ Россію иностранныхъ сбереженій, предпріимчивости и знаній можетъ явиться результатомъ оффиціальнаго признанія нами Совѣтскаго Правительства.

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Въ дѣйствительности, въ Россіи не наблюдалось сколько нибудь замѣтнаго притока капитала изъ странъ, признавшихъ ее, несмотря на то, что тѣ же страны вывозятъ свои капиталы въ другихъ направленіяхъ. Это не является доводомъ въ пользу признанія или противъ такового, а есть просто установленіе того факта, что возстановленіе крупной промышленности находится въ зависимости отъ другихъ необходимыхъ предпосылокъ, каковыми являются обезпеченность и свобода частной предпріимчивости, и что эти факторы могутъ быть созданы только въ самой Россіи черезъ посредство ея собственныхъ учрежденій. Русскій народъ долженъ самъ, своими средствами и по своему разрѣшить этотъ вопросъ. Держась теперешней политики, русскій народъ, быть можетъ, нашелъ бы выходъ изъ положенія, окончательно забросивъ крупную промышленность, такъ какъ можно себѣ представить, что онъ можетъ обойтись безъ крупной промышленности, создавъ земледѣльческое государство съ низкимъ уровнемъ культуры, которое ввозило бы необходимѣйшіе индустріальные продукты въ обмѣнъ на вывозъ предметовъ питанія. Все, что можетъ сдѣлать благотворительность, это — поднять наиболѣе нуждающіяся отдѣльныя группы населенія изъ состоянія крайней нищеты до уровня общей бѣдности, такимъ образомъ продливъ ихъ существованіе на будущее.

«Такъ или иначе, я имѣю въ виду показать, что въ отношеніи «помощи» Россіи имѣются на лицо четыре совершенно различныя проблемы. Первая изъ нихъ — страшный голодъ, явившійся результатомъ неурожая 1921 г. Въ этомъ случаѣ, помощь пришлось оказывать путемъ отправки продовольствія изъ Америки, осуществляемой за счетъ мобилизаціи суммы приблизительно въ 70.000.000 долларовъ Американской Администраціей Помощи и дѣйствовавшими совмѣстно съ нею организаціями, а именно: Христіанкой Ассоціаціей Молодыхъ Людей и ея студенческаго благотворительнаго фонда, Америк. Еврейскаго Объединеннаго Распредѣлительнаго Комитета, Комитета Помощи Меннонитовъ, Національнаго Католическаго Благотворительнаго Совѣта, Національнаго Лютеранскаго Совѣта, Общества Помощи Поволжью въ Центральныхъ Штатахъ, Федеральнымъ Совѣтомъ Христіанскихъ Церквей въ Америкѣ и Южной организаціей Баптистовъ. Кромѣ того, крупныя суммы были пожертвованы Конгрессомъ и Американскимъ Краснымъ Крестомъ.

Все это спасло жизнь 11 милліоновъ человѣкъ; кромѣ того, другія иностранныя организаціи поддерживали около 1 милліона человѣкъ. Хотя урожай 1922 г. отчасти улучшилъ положеніе, недостатокъ необходимыхъ предметовъ питанія для дѣтей заставилъ A.R.A. и дѣйствовавшія совмѣстно съ нею организаціи продолжать отправку въ Россію необходимыхъ припасовъ для 3.000.000 дѣтей до слѣдующаго урожая. Американскіе квакеры и нѣкоторыя Британскія организаціи также работаютъ въ этомъ направленіи. Если будущій урожай окажется хорошимъ, продолженіе отправокъ пищевыхъ продуктовъ, даже для дѣтей, перестанетъбыть необходимымъ.

Вторая проблема — болѣзни. ARA, при помощи суммъ, ассигнованныхъ Конгрессомъ, и при содѣйствіи Краснаго Креста, вела борьбу съ распространеніемъ тифа, тифоида ,маляріи и оспы. Путемъ снабженія медикаментами и организаціи работы русскихъ врачей, было оборудовано 12.000 больницъ и были сдѣланы прививки болѣе, нежели 15.000.000 человѣкъ. Такимъ образомъ, распространеніе болѣзней было значительно сокращено. Предметовъ медицинскаго снабженія, находящихся сейчасъ въ распоряженіи оказывающихъ помощь организацій, хватитъ до буду-

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щаго лѣта; послѣ того, ихъ должны будутъ ввозить либо правительство, либо благотворительныя организаціи.

Третья проблема — бѣдность. Она наиболѣе рѣзко выражается въ безработицѣ, такъ какъ при ней голодная смерть, разъ только людямъ не на что покупать, можетъ имѣть мѣсто и при обиліи и дешевизнѣ продовольствія. Въ порядкѣ благотворительности, здѣсь помощь можетъ быть организована только на индивидуальныхъ началахъ. Главное леченіе здѣсь заключается въ реконструкціи. ARA, совмѣстно съ Студенческимъ Фондомъ У.М.С.А. и при помощи ряда великодушныхъ жертвователей, дѣлаетъ кое что въ этомъ направленіи, снабжая продовольствіемъ и одеждою отъ 100 до 150 тысячъ студентовъ, учителей различныхъ профессій, которые необходимы для возстановленія Россіи.

Четвертая проблема — реконструкція. Въ отношеніи крупной промышленности и внѣшней торговли она совершенно невозможна, пока не измѣнены основныя экономическія условія и не притекаетъ въ Россію иностранный капиталъ. Въ отношеніи земледѣльческаго населенія положеніе не такъ безнадежно, такъ какъ потребности менѣе велики, побужденія къ производству въ значительной степени возстановлены, и въ этомъ направленіи благотворительная работа можетъ имѣть созидательное значеніе. Работа, какую въ этомъ направленіи дѣлаютъ нѣкоторыя американскія ассоціаціи, уже приноситъ хорошіе плоды и должна быть продолжена. Но, будучи спеціальной организаціей, созданной исключительно для борьбы съ голодомъ, ARA не можетъ браться за дѣло реконструкціи. Первая фаза помощи — отправка продовольствія — окончится, я надѣюсь, со времени будущаго урожая, хотя это и зависитъ отъ результатовъ послѣдняго. Другія формы помощи — медицинская помощь, облегченіе бѣдности, реконструкція — будутъ заслуженно привлекать вниманіе благотворительности еще многіе годы и представятъ обширное поле дѣятельности для тѣхъ, кто желаетъ посвятить себя этому дѣлу, потому что ужасающія страданія великаго народа, ощупью старающагося выбраться на свободу послѣ вѣковой несправедливости, не могутъ не привлечь симпатій всякаго благомыслящаго человѣка. Но одно абсолютно необходимо: чтобы усилія американцевъ были направляемы отвѣтственными руководителями и не были выброшены на пропаганду, они должны дѣлаться черезъ посредство одной изъ указанныхъ ранѣе религіозныхъ организацій.

Уважающій Васъ *Г. Хуверъ*.

III. ПИСЬМО STANLEY WASHBURN'A РЕДАКТОРУ ГАЗЕТЫ «THE TIMES».

М. Г.,

Ничто такъ не удивляетъ американца, непродолжительное время проводящаго въ Англіи, какъ позиція, занимаемая Британской Рабочей Партіей и нѣкоторыми членами Либеральной Партіи по вопросу объ отношеніяхъ съ Совѣтской Россіей.

Вопросъ о торговлѣ съ Россіей и о признаніи Совѣтскаго Правительства остро стоялъ въ Америкѣ въ 1919 г., и сошелъ со сцены въ 1920 г., когда для Американскаго народа стало ясно, что онъ сводится къ выбору между моралью и выгодой. Съ момента своего вступленія въ должность и до настоящаго времени Президентъ Хардингъ, какъ лично, такъ и въ лицѣ своего Статсъ-Секретаря, неуклонно держался политики, основанной на высокомъ нравственномъ принципѣ, гласящемъ, что торговыя соображенія и преходящія коммерческія выгоды для С.Ш.А. не стоятъ того, чтобы

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ради нихъ итти на компромиссъ и признавать правительство, установленное насиліемъ, пришедшее къ власти путемъ уничтоженія представительныхъ учрежденій, держащееся только террором, и постоянно старающееся уничтожить всю религіозную, умственную и нравственную жизнь — факторы, которые, по мнѣнію большинства американцевъ, составляютъ основу англо-саксонской цивилизаціи и являются источникомъ величія народовъ, говорящихъ на англійскомъ языкѣ.

Въ 1919 г. въ Америкѣ существовала нѣкоторая путаница понятій относительно того, что именно представляетъ собою совѣтскій строй, и былъ переходный періодъ, когда мнѣнія на этотъ счетъ расходились, тѣмъ болѣе, что тогда у насъ, какъ и вездѣ, было много людей демобилизованныхъ и безработныхъ. Но первою группою въ Америкѣ, разобравшейся въ томъ, что представляетъ собою русскій опытъ, съ его диктатурой надъ рабочими, для трудящагося,— былъ именно самъ рабочій классъ. Совершенно ясно и отчетливо это было опредѣлено Самуэлемъ Гомперсомъ, президентомъ Американской Рабочей Федераціи, когда онъ отвергъ русское понятіе о государствѣ, вмѣстѣ со всѣмъ, къ чему оно привело, и съ притязаніемъ на признаніе или торговыя права. Съ тѣхъ поръ, американскіе рабочіе постоянно и съ возрастающимъ упорствомъ, отвергали всякія мѣропріятія, которые, какъ бы выгодны они не представлялись, обозначали бы поддержку или признаніе образа правленія, который всякій американскій рабочій считаетъ, съ точки зрѣнія своихъ правъ и привилегій, наиболѣе враждебнымъ своимъ интересамъ изъ всѣхъ правительствъ міра. По моему мнѣнію, поворотъ въ средѣ американскихъ рабочихъ организацій въ направленіи консерватизма былъ болѣе всего вызванъ желаніемъ избѣжать именно того, къ чему, повидимому, стремится Британская Рабочая Партія, а именно — болѣе близкаго общенія съ Совѣтами, погубившими Россію, и вліянія ихъ ученій.

Наблюдающаяся сейчасъ въ Англіи агитація въ пользу сближенія съ Россіей представляется американцами тѣмъ болѣе порицательной, что они вспоминаютъ позицію, занятую англійскими рабочими организаціями въ 1863 г., когда нѣкоторые англійскіе капиталисты добивались признанія Южной Конференціи на томъ основаніи, что англійскіе рабочіе были безъ работы вслѣдствіе неполученія съ Юга сырыхъ матеріаловъ, и что всѣ отрасли англійской промышленности, зависящія отъ хлопка, были парализованы. Американцы не забыли, что тогда именно англійскіе рабочіе, несмотря на безработицу, вызванную блокадою Южныхъ Штатовъ, тысячами подписывались подъ обращеніями къ Англійскому Королю, отвергающими признаніе государства, основаннаго на томъ положеніи, что рабство экономическое необходимо для его существованія. Значитъ ли это, что уровень нравственнаго сознанія англійскихъ рабочихъ понизился, или что существо русскаго вопроса неправильно понимается въ Англіи — вотъ проблема, интересующая американцевъ.

То, что Англія была великою страною въ продолженіе тысячи лѣтъ, и что она создала величайшую въ міровой исторіи имперію, не есть простая случайность. Всѣмъ этимъ она именно обязана тому, что она, прежде всего, стояла за высокіе моральные принципы, за свободу духовной и умственной жизни и за извѣстный уровень національной и личной этики, на которомъ покоились ея торговля и кредитъ. Сила Англіи, по мнѣнію американцевъ, заключается въ честности англійской мысли.

Мы думаемъ, что четыреста пятьдесятъ тысячъ канадцевъ, триста тысячъ австралійцевъ и сотни тысячъ другихъ Британскихъ поданныхъ шли сра-

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жаться и умирать во Франціи, потому что борьба шла за высокія начала морали, которыя вызвали въ бой лучшихъ представителей англо-саксонской крови. Мы не думаемъ, чтобы коммерческія выгоды играли роль въ умѣ и сознаніи тѣхъ, которые похоронены на поляхъ англійскихъ сраженій во всѣхъ краяхъ свѣта. Мы вѣримъ въ то, что люди, такъ славно павшіе, шли на свою жертву сознательно, чтобы обезпечить въ будущемъ существованіе лучшаго порядка въ мірѣ. И теперь въ Америкѣ милліоны людей считаютъ, что кощунствомъ въ отношеніи этихъ людей, павшихъ во время войны, является то, что, спустя всего нѣсколько лѣтъ, значительная часть англичанъ желаетъ вступить въ соглашеніе съ правительствомъ, держащимся у власти при помощи гоненія на Церковь и уничтоженія свободы и имѣющимъ своею опредѣленною цѣлью, ясно высказанною его руководящими представителями, поддержаніе классовой борьбы во всемъ мірѣ.

Около двадцати столѣтій тому назадъ, Іуда Искаріотскій продалъ Христа за тридцать сребренниковъ. Теперь, мы въ Америкѣ не можемъ повѣрить, чтобы Англія, по нашему пониманію имѣющая традицію такой высокой нравственности, въ этомъ случаѣ распяла свой многовѣковый идеализмъ на крестѣ коммерческой выгоды, чтобы взамѣнъ получить тѣ нѣсколько милліоновъ фунтовъ стерлинговъ, какіе можетъ дать торговля съ Россіей въ видѣ кожъ, лѣса и нефти.

Искренно преданный Вамъ
Stanley Washburn.

Лондонъ, 14 мая 1923 г.

ПОЛОЖЕНІЕ ТЕКСТИЛЬНОЙ ПРОМЫШЛЕННОСТИ.

Эта отрасль промышленности заслуживаетъ совершенно исключительнаго вниманія: производительность, сбытъ, сырьевое обезпеченіе текстиля въ 1922 г. претерпѣли рѣзкія измѣненія по сравненію съ 21 годомъ.

Несмотря, однако, на значительное увеличеніе производительности въ 22 г. по сравненію съ 20 и 21 гг., общая конъюнктура текстильной промышленности—ея динамика—въ началѣ 23 г. говоритъ съ несомнѣнностью и съ большей очевидностью, чѣмъ, пожалуй, всякая другая отрасль коммунистической государственной промышленности за то, что вся коммунистическая хозяйственная система, даже въ ея НЭП-овскомъ компромисномъ съ капитализмомъ видѣ, спѣшными шагами подходитъ къ окончательному краху.

Эта особая показательность текстиля зависитъ отъ слѣдующихъ причинъ: 1) Относительное значеніе текстиля въ Россійскомъ національномъ доходѣ было всегда очень велико. Въ 1913 г. в общей стоимости валовой производительности россійской фабрично-заводской промышленности, оцѣнивавшейся приблизительно въ 4,25 милліарда зол. рублей*), производство текстиля составляло 1,44 милліарда или 34%, и 2) текстиль всегда,

*) По Европейск. Россіи: фабрично-заводск. предпріятія — 3,84 милліарда и производства обложенныя акцизомъ 0,41 милліарда золот. руб. Соотвѣтственный чистый доходъ отъ тѣхъ же отраслей составлялъ 1,003 и 0,130 милліардовъ. С. Н. Прокоповичъ «Опытъ исчисленія народнаго дохода».

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а теперь въ особенности, занимаетъ въ Россіи особо выгодное положеніе въ смыслѣ обезпеченности сбыта. Суровый законъ предѣльной полезности толкаетъ въ Россіи теперь человѣка почти такъ же неумолимо къ куску матеріи, какъ и къ куску хлѣба. Продукція орудій производства — тяжелая индустрія, въ смыслѣ соревнованія съ текстилемъ, довольствуется вторымъ мѣстомъ въ глазахъ потребителя.

Если, при всѣхъ этихъ преимуществахъ, даже текстильная индустрія близка, какъ мы увидимъ ниже, къ краху, — значитъ хозяйственная коммунистическая система доживаетъ послѣдніе дни осужденнаго.

Обратимся теперь къ отдѣльнымъ факторамъ, характеризующимъ состояніе текстильной промышленности въ 1922 г.

Производительность. — Потребность въ матеріи громадна. Какъ только россійскій гражданинъ получилъ ту ничтожную свободу хозяйственнаго распоряженія, которую ему далъ НЭП, онъ набросился прежде всего на ткань.

Отечественные запасы и производство текстиля не удовлетворили горячки спроса потребителя. Несмотря на бѣдность валютой, въ Россію потекъ иностранный текстиль. На съѣздѣ текстильной промышленности — въ октябрѣ с.г. — проф. Кафенгаузъ сообщилъ, что за первую половину 22г. въ Россію было ввезено иностранныхъ тканей и готоваго платья на громадную по теперешнему масштабу сумму *въ 45 милл. зол. руб.* (по цѣнамъ 13 г.). Если прибавить сюда издѣлія, ввезенныя черезъ Батумъ, Дальневосточную Республику и контрабаднымъ путемъ черезъ средне-азіатскую границу, то окажется, что 40% всего потребленія Республикой мануфактурныхъ товаровъ падаетъ на импортъ (Эк. Ж. 17.10.22). Переходъ на хозяйственный разсчетъ и спросъ далъ толчекъ отечественному производству по хлопку, льну, шерсти и шелку, которое съ октября 21 г. стало расти.

О темпѣ этого роста даетъ представленіе даваемая инж. А.А. Лебедевымъ въ «Хлопковомъ дѣлѣ» таблица *) съ 1.10.21 по 1.7.22. Мы ее пополняемъ по 1.1.23.

Хлопчато-бумажное производство.

Мѣсяцы	Пряжа тысяч. пудовъ	Суровье милл. аршинъ	Отдѣл. ткань мил. ар.	Мѣсяцы	Пряжа тысяч. пудовъ	Суровье милл. аршинъ	Отдѣл. ткань мил. ар.
Октябрь 1921 . .	119	11,7	17,7	Іюнь 1922 . .	290	52,7	41.5
Ноябрь » . . .	171	19,4	23,7	Іюль » . . .	180	30,1	31,9
Декабрь » . . .	288	32,2	37	Августъ » . . .	240	41,4	29,5
Январь 1922 . .	179	36,8	34	Сентяб. » . . .	330	59	40
Февраль » . . .	311	42,9	36,6	Октябрь » . . .	383	70	58,6
Мартъ » . . .	364	58,9	46,8	Ноябрь » . . .	375	65,8	55,6
Апрѣль » . . .	184	28,8	25,8	Декабрь » . . .	409	73,9	62,6
Май » . . .	297	46,5	34,8				

Совѣтскіе дѣятели, пытаясь убѣдить своихъ сторонниковъ и противниковъ въ томъ, что ихъ хозяйство выходитъ изъ тупика, приводили въ послѣднее время обычно, какъ доказательство своего успѣха, наблюдающійся ростъ производительности работающей непосредственно на рынокъ

*) Докладъ на V Всеросс. Съѣздѣ Союза Текстильщиковъ 7. 10. 22. См. «Хлопковое Дѣло» № 9-10, 22 года. Цифры А. А. Лебедева нѣсколько отличаются по отдѣльнымъ мѣсяцамъ отъ опубликованныхъ ранѣе оффиціально. Смот. данныя, приведенныя нами въ «Russ. Econ.» № 6 и № 7-8. На годовой результатъ это отличіе не вліяетъ значительно.

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легкой промышленности, а именно—главной отрасли легкой индустріи — текстиля. Предсѣдатель Высш. Сов. Нар. Хоз. П.А. Богдановъ, указывая въ своемъ докладѣ на X-мъ Съѣздѣ Совѣтовъ на тяжелыя условія производства и рынка, въ которыхъ приходилось работать въ 1922 г. промышленности, подчеркнулъ, что большой подъемъ, который замѣчается въ текстильной промышленности, доказываетъ ея способность справиться со стоящей передъ ней задачей. Тотъ же успѣхъ подчеркнулъ въ своемъ докладѣ и Л.Б. Каменевъ. Посмотримъ, дѣйствительно ли оправляется текстильная промышленность и насколько здоровъ и надеженъ ея ростъ.

Насколько увеличилось производство? Сравненіе цыфръ 21 и 22 г.г. даютъ слѣдующій отвѣтъ (въ тысячахъ единицъ).

Годы	Льнян. пром.		Хлопчатобум. пром.			Шерстяная про мышл.		
	Пряжи пуд.	Ткани арш.	Пряжи пуд.	Суров. арш.	Гот. тов. арш.	Пряжи пуд.	Суров. арш.	Гот. тов. арш.
1921	495	38.191	1.117	158.236	214.094	371	12.484	19.357
1922	1.225	93.691	3.496	584.039	470.041	731	28.183	31.667
Увеличеніе на %	145%	145%	214%	270%	120%	97%	305%	64%

Производство въ 22 г. повысилось въ 2-2½ раза противъ 21 г. Относительно — это большой успѣхъ. Абсолютно — очень небольшой. Не можетъ быть и рѣчи о какомъ-либо серіозномъ приближеніи къ до-военной выработкѣ. По сообщенію предсѣдателя Высш. Сов. Нар. Хоз. П. Богданова на съѣздѣ текстильной промышленности, хлопчато-бумажная промышленность производитъ въ пять разъ меньше, чѣмъ въ нормальное время, а при этомъ тратитъ топлива въ 3 раза больше. На томъ же съѣздѣ было указано, что льняная промышленность работаетъ въ размѣрѣ 35-40% отъ довоеннаго времени, пеньковая — 21%, трикотажная — 17% и шелковая — 3% (Эк. Ж. 13.10.22).

Устойчивость роста производительности. — Слѣдуетъ отмѣтить, что ростъ производительности во вторую половину 22 г. уже остановился. Стоитъ сравнить цифры за первые 6 мѣсяцевъ, данныя въ № 7-8, съ приводимой ниже производительностью за 2-ую половину.

П.А. Богдановъ, хвалясь успѣхомъ текстильной промышленности на X Съѣздѣ Совѣтовъ, уже тогда ясно видѣлъ, что успѣхъ выдыхается. Онъ вскользь обращаетъ вниманіе на оборотную сторону: «*Тотъ подъемъ, который въ легкой индустріи мы сейчасъ имѣемъ, опережаетъ подъемъ нашего сырьевого хозяйства.* Намъ приходится въ этомъ году закупить до 2 милліоновъ пуд. хлопка заграницей, купить до 300.000 пуд. шерсти, ибо тонкорунное овцеводство у насъ совершенно погибло. Одной изъ основныхъ нашихъ задачъ является поднятіе нашего сырьевого хозяйства въ ближайшемъ году» (Изв. 27.12.22).

Опасность надвигается несомнѣнная и большая. Она имѣетъ еще двѣ причины, помимо указанной П.А. Богдановымъ. Первая — это дороговизна производства, при которой воспроизводственный процессъ имѣетъ знакъ минусъ. Соотвѣтственно, основной капиталъ проѣдается: сокращаются запасы сырья и готоваго товара. Вторая — ничтожность покупательной способности населенія —чрезвычайно быстро обнаружилась, какъ только указанная выше первая горячка спроса была удовлетворена. Уже въ октябрѣ 22 г. въ указанной выше рѣчи на Всероссійскомъ текстильномъ съѣздѣ

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проф. Кофенгаузъ настаиваетъ на необходимости охраненія русской текстильной промышленности отъ иностранной конкуренціи.

Дороговизна производства. — При цитированіи *) характеристики общаго состоянія промышленности по бюджету В.С.Н.Х. на кварталъ «октябрь-декабрь» инж. Якуба и Абрамовича, мы уже отмѣчали, что производство государственной промышленности идетъ съ убыткомъ въ 38%. Въ своей «характеристикѣ» Инж. Якубъ и Абрамовичъ считаютъ несомнѣнно убыточными промышленности: металлическую, электротехническую, каменноугольную, нефтяную, рудную, золотую. *Прибыльными* они считаютъ: текстильную, пищевую, кожевенную, химическую, бумажную и силикатную. При этомъ они оговариваются (Эк.Ж. 7 и 8. 10.22), что прибыль ими понимается условно: «Прежде всего нѣсколько словъ о самомъ терминѣ «прибыль и убытокъ». При послѣдующемъ его примѣненіи ни амортизація (въ формѣ какого-бы то ни было ремонта и возстановленія), ни проценты на капиталъ, ни обезцѣненіе дензнаковъ въ разсчетѣ себѣстоимости во вниманіе не принимаются».

Вотъ при такомъ способѣ составленія счета прибылей и убытковъ текстильная промышленность въ 4-ую четверть 22 г. должна была дать: хлопчатобумажная — 20%, льняная — 17%. Что касается до пеньковой, здѣсь опредѣленный убытокъ. Шерстяная, очевидно, работаетъ тоже съ убыткомъ, ибо для того, чтобы свести концы съ концами при «хозяйственномъ разсчетѣ», она «разсчитываетъ зато распродать часть своихъ складовъ готовыхъ издѣлій».

Что отрицательно вліяетъ на стоимость продукта? По Якубу и Абрамовичу, прежде всего, поставки на Госорганы. Мы уже говорили объ этомъ разрушающемъ факторѣ въ жизни переведеннаго на коммерческій разсчетъ предпріятія. — Госорганы просто не платятъ или платятъ очень скверно. Убыточность льняной, по сравненію съ хлопчато-бумажной, въ значительной степени зависитъ отъ того, что первая работаетъ на госорганы 60% своего производства, а вторая только 40%. Госорганъ — это накладной расходъ на производство. Второй причиной является увеличеніе почти въ три раза расхода на топливо въ 1922 г. (15,5% отъ стоимости продукціи) по сравненію съ 1908 г. (только 5,5%). О другихъ причинахъ хозяйственно-техническаго характера, являющихся слѣдствіемъ «повышенія продуктивности текстильной промышленности и подработки старыхъ запасовъ» вспомогательныхъ матеріаловъ, при низкомъ уровнѣ остальной индустріи въ Россіи, говоритъ А. А. Лебедевъ («Хлопковое дѣло» № 9-10, 22 г.).

Убыточность. — Возвращаемся теперь къ вопросу, насколько дорого производство, вѣрнѣе—насколько оно оказалось въ дѣйствительности прибыльно или убыточно. Помимо сдѣланной уже оговорки относительно термина «прибыль и убытокъ» слѣдуетъ добавить, что вопросъ еще болѣе осложняется тѣмъ, что самый измѣритель цѣны, денежная единица — совѣтскій рубль, золотой рубль, товарный рубль — все это давно стало понятіями въ высшей степени условными, текучими во времени, пожалуй, даже мнимыми. Итакъ, даже пренебрегая всѣми указанными выше оговорками, надо сказать, что предположенія Якуба и Абрамовича о прибыльности текстильной промышленности не оправдались, и текстильная промышленность на самомъ дѣлѣ была убыточной.

О томъ, какъ текстильной промышленности приходилось сбывать свои

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*) «Russ. Econ.», стр. 3008.

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товары въ первыя три четверти года, даетъ наглядное представленіе слѣд. таблица:.

Ситецъ № 6 изъ 2-пудн. митк. Довоен. цѣна — 18 коп.

Мѣсяцы	Себѣстоимость	Объявл. цѣна (цѣна синдик.)	Цѣна, принят. рынкомъ
	Въ совѣтскихъ рубляхъ.		
25 марта	198.000	190.000	150.000
24 апрѣля	380.000	240.000	200.000
8 мая	—	290.000	240.000
15 мая	610.000	375.000	290.000
29 мая	—	550.000	375.000
15 іюня	625.000	625.000	550.000-375.000
1 августа	—	687.000	625.000
15 августа	825.000	825.000	687.000
15 сентября	—	825.000	825.000
2 октября	1.520.000	1.520.000	1.100.000

(«Эк. Ж.» 13. 12. 22)

Истощеніе рынка. — Политика заблаговременнаго повышенія цѣнъ не давала, какъ мы видимъ, достаточно удовлетворительныхъ результатовъ въ смыслѣ покрытія въ теченіе всего года. Къ началу 23 г. она стала явно несостоятельной. Покупательная способность т. назыв. свободнаго рынка оказалась явно перенапряженной.

Чрезвычайно показателенъ въ этомъ отношеніи послѣдній 14-й бюллетень общетоварнаго индекса Гос. План. Ком., который отмѣчаетъ заминку на рынкѣ и начавшееся пониженіе реальной цѣнности для всѣхъ текстильныхъ товаровъ. Какъ вся текстильная группа, такъ, въ большинствѣ, и отдѣльныя ея отрасли, еще въ послѣдніе три мѣсяца 22 г. неизмѣнно опережали общій ростъ цѣнъ. Въ январѣ 1923 г. ростъ цѣнъ на текстильные товары, какъ общее правило, неизмѣнно отстаетъ отъ общаго роста цѣнъ, такъ что январь приноситъ съ собою значительное пониженіе реальной цѣнности текстильныхъ товаровъ. Это ухудшеніе общей торговой конъюнктуры для текстильныхъ товаровъ видно изъ слѣд. таблицы, въ которой приведены приростъ или пониженіе ихъ реальнаго цѣнностнаго уровня, сравнительно съ уровнемъ общетоварнымъ и выраженнаго въ процентахъ послѣдняго.

	Октябрь	Ноябрь	Декабрь	Январь
Хлопчат. бумажн.	+29	+10	+50	—18
Ленъ, пенька и ихъ ткани	+23	0	— 6	— 4
Шерсть и ея ткани	+18	+11	+18	— 7
Текстильн. сырье	+41	+13	— 3	—17
» фабрикаты	+22	+10	+34	— 9
Весь текстиль	+27	+ 7	+28	— 13

Кризисъ сбыта наступилъ и, очевидно, даетъ себя чувствовать. На недавнемъ съѣздѣ уполномоченныхъ текстильнаго синдиката его предсѣдатель В.П. Ногинъ указалъ на необходимость уменьшить предложеніе товаровъ на московскомъ рынкѣ и перенести ихъ сбытъ, главнымъ образомъ, въ провинцію (Эк. Ж. 4.2.23). Оказывается, личнаго потребленія благоденствующихъ коммунистовъ и имъ сочувствующихъ недостаточно для того,

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чтобы построить прочный рынокъ сбыта для текстиля.. Пришла очередь для текстильной промышленности упереться въ непреодолимый тупикъ— усыханіе покупательной способности населенія. Первые признаки этого усыханія обозначились еще въ мартѣ 22 г. Причины усыханія — въ пониженіи производительности и національнаго дохода по всему фронту различныхъ промысловъ Россіи.

Текстиль въ своемъ наступленіи къ развитію производственныхъ операцій слишкомъ выдвинулся за этотъ депрессированный хозяйственный фронтъ Россіи. Онъ не поддержанъ остальнымъ производствомъ. Его наступленіе выдыхалось. И потому его участь есть участь всякаго зарвавшагося слишкомъ впередъ и потерявшаго связь съ общимъ фронтомъ. Онъ будетъ очень потрепаннымъ и растерявшимъ свои силы возвращаться на старыя позиціи. Насколько онъ ихъ растерялъ, мы увидимъ сейчасъ.

Сырьевая база. — Что процессъ повышенія производительности текстильной индустріи не имѣетъ здоровыхъ корней, и что производственная база ея (запасы сырья и капиталъ въ готовыхъ товарахъ) должна была быть разстроена, можно было ожидать уже изъ разсмотрѣнія приведенныхъ выше цѣнъ себѣстоимости (поскольку, конечно, онѣ не были показаны умышленно съ превышеніемъ текстильн. синдикат.) и цѣнъ, принятыхъ рынкомъ.

Что именно случилось съ матеріальной производственной базой текстиля? То, что случилось и со всей остальной промышленностью. Несмотря на всю осторожную и тонкую эвазивность рѣчи Л. Б. Каменева на X съѣздѣ Совѣтовъ (23.12.22) положеніе ясно и изъ его словъ: Онъ говоритъ: «Мы очень плохо торговали — и проторговались. Этотъ грѣхъ ни въ коемъ случаѣ нельзя скрыть. Объяснять его можно отсутствіемъ оборотныхъ средствъ. Надо было продавать подешевле, чтобы выплатить заработную плату, не было учета и т.д. *Наши матеріальные фонды уменьшились.* До недавняго времени всѣ убытки промышленности балансировались за счетъ *дешевой* (правильнѣе — даровой, т. е. полученной по наслѣдству отъ капиталистическаго хозяйства базы. *М. Б.*) сырьевой базы. Результаты— или гибель сырьевого хозяйства, или увеличеніе цѣны сырья, а, слѣдовательно, увеличеніе производственной стоимости фабриката до размѣровъ, совершенно не соотвѣтствующихъ доходамъ городского и сельскаго населенія, что еще болѣе усугубляется значительнымъ повышеніемъ заработной платы».

Дѣло, конечно, тутъ не въ торговлѣ. Не только торговали плохо, а, вообще, хозяйствовали плохо.

Въ какомъ положеніи, поэтому, сырьевая база? Мы уже приводили цифры Рыкова *). Съ 1.1.22 (6.530.000 пуд.) по 1.8.22 (4.500.000 пуд.) запасы хлопка сократились на 2,5 милл. пуд., шерсти съ 1.1.22 (1.117.000 п.) по 1.9.22 (731.000 пуд.) — на 0.38 милл. пуд., льна — съ 1.1.22 (4.750.000 пуд.) по 1.6.22 (1.460.000 пуд.) — на 3.29 милл. пудовъ.

Въ декабрѣ положеніе еще болѣе ухудшилось. Ф.И. Пленкинъ **) говоритъ: «Хлопка можетъ хватить не долѣе 15 марта 1923 г.» Нѣсколько болѣе утѣшительную картину даетъ А.А. Лебедевъ ***). Имъ сдѣланъ подсчетъ на 1.8.22. Принимая во вниманіе урожай 22 г. въ Туркестанѣ, имѣющійся

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*) «Russ. Ec.», стр. 3009,

**) См. «Промышленность въ цифрахъ», «Эк. Ж.» 24. 12. 22.

***) «Положеніе текстильной промышленности въ Россіи». Журн. «Хлопковое Дѣло» № 9-10, 1922 г.

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на фабрикахъ и складахъ Г.Х.К. хлопокъ, а равно и тотъ хлопокъ, который будетъ купленъ въ Бухарѣ, Хорезмѣ, Персіи и на Кавказѣ, и сможетъ быть доставленъ, вся хлопчато-бумажная промышленность можетъ разсчитывать въ предстоящую кампанію на 3.700.000 пуд. русскаго хлопка. Считая расходъ по 400.000 пуд. въ мѣсяцъ, начиная съ 1.8.22, фабрики обезпечены русскимъ сырьемъ по май 23 г.

Запасы льна А.А. Лебедевымъ исчисляются: «Льняного сырья на фабрикахъ (на 1.8.22) имѣется 1.5 милл. пуд., изъ коихъ 0.5 милл. пуд. льна пригодны для пряденія. Для выполненія программы льна необходимо имѣть (на работу съ 1.10.22 по 1.10.23) до 2,5 милл. пуд.. Пріобрѣтеніе льна необходимо немедленно, не упуская сезона. А на это нужны громадныя средства, которыми фабрики не обладаютъ, да и ранѣе, до революціи, онѣ пользовались кредитомъ. Иначе ленъ уйдетъ отчасти заграницу, отчасти въ крѣпкія руки, а фабрики останутся безъ сырья.» Шерсти, по А. А. Лебедеву, для годовой выработки (тыс. арш.: груб. суконъ — 6.350; тонкихъ — 7.000; шерст. и полушерст. коневальн. тканей — 13.802, всего 27.152) надо тыс. пуд.: меринос. мытой 197; полугрубой — 44; грубой 363, всего — 604.

На 1.9.22. имѣлось тыс. пуд.:

У кого	Меринос.	Полугруб.	Грубой
У трестовъ	45	40	255
У товарищ. «Шерсть»	15	8	276
У разныхъ лицъ и учрежденій	20	20	15
Итого	110	68	546

По болѣе позднимъ даннымъ, чѣмъ Лебедевскія, (Извѣст. 18.1.23), шерстяное производство обезпечено сырьемъ въ среднемъ только на 4 мѣсяца, т.е. по Май 23 года.

Настолько сократились размѣры сырьевой базы текстильной промышленности.

Каковы возможности ея пополненія? Прежде всего, русскіе источники.

И. Любимовъ (Эк. Ж. 26.12.22) говоритъ: «Площадь посѣвовъ хлопка въ Туркестанѣ (безъ Бухары и Хивы) *) съ 578.000 дес. (въ 1916 г.) сократилась къ 1922 г. до 52.000 дес. (на 91%)... Сборъ волокна съ 15 милл. пуд. до 0.6-07 милл. пуд. Урожайность на десятину упала съ 80-90 пуд. до 30-40 пуд.»

А. А. Лебедевъ («Хлопковое Дѣло» № 9-10) говоритъ: «Источникъ для полученія **) шерсти у насъ ослабѣлъ, какъ это видно изъ таблицы:

Количество овецъ, верблюдовъ и козъ въ Азіат. и Евр. Россіи 21г. (по даннымъ Наркомзема):

	Овецъ грубой шерсти	Меринос.***)	Верблюдовъ	Козъ
1921 г.	50.000.000	200.000	1.300.000	1.500.000
1916 г.	80.000.000	2.500.000	—	—

*) Съ Хивой и Бухарой хлопковая посѣвная площадь всего Туркестана въ 16 г. — 714.346 дес., въ 15г. — 679.033, въ 14 г. — 566.328 и въ 13 г. — 497.858. См. «Труды Секціи Промышл. и Товарооб.», Москва 1920 г.

**) Считается полученіе шерсти: 1) съ овцы груб. шерсти — 2,4 фунта мытой, 2) съ 1 мериноса — 2,5 фунта мытой 3) 1 верблюда — 9 фун. очищенной и 4) 1 козы — 4 фунта грязной.

***) Въ 1912 г. мериносовъ насчитывалось въ Россіи 3,7 милл. головъ, въ 1922 ихъ было — 100.000 штукъ. («Эк. Ж.» 9. 12. 22 и «Торг.-пром. газ.» 7. 12. 22)

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Принимая во вниманіе данныя переписи 1916 г., мы видимъ, что сокращеніе овцеводства вообще произошло на 35% до 21 г., а для 22 г. на 70%. Меринос. на 90% для 21 г. и 97% для 22 г. (по даннымъ Ц.С.У., Лосицкаго и проф. Иванова)».

Слѣдуетъ отмѣтить попутно: въ довоенное время изъ Россіи вывозились грубые сорта шерсти, на долю же мериносовой шерсти приходилось не болѣе 2-3%. Наоборотъ, все возраставшій ввозъ шелъ за счетъ мериносовой шерсти. Итакъ, источникъ русской мериносовой шерсти теперь, практически говоря, совершенно изсякъ.

Благополучнѣе обстоитъ дѣло со льномъ. Посѣвная площадь подъ волокнистымъ льномъ занимаетъ въ 1922 г. около 400.000 дес. или около 50% довоеннаго, валовой сборъ волокнистаго льна — 5 милл. пуд. или около 25% довоеннаго. По разсчетамъ члена правленія Льноторга В.С. Козянскаго, на рынокъ можетъ поступить 3-3,5 милл. пуд. (Эк. Ж. 9.12.22).

Резюмируемъ: отечественнымъ сырьемъ обезпечена только льняная промышленность. Хлопчатобумажная и шерстяная находятся въ громадной зависимости отъ иностраннаго сырья.

Это обстоятельство имѣетъ рѣшающее значеніе. Оно подрѣзываетъ въ корнѣ весь успѣхъ, имѣвшійся въ развитіи текстильной производительности въ 22 году.

Русское сырье для коммунистической государственной индустріи — всегда дешевое сырье. Громаднѣйшая доля его была просто даровымъ (реквизированнымъ, секвестрированнымъ и т.д. у прежнихъ собственниковъ) сырьемъ. Меньшая часть сырья (производства послѣ 17 г.) была тоже очень дешевымъ продуктомъ, взятымъ у населенія путемъ нажима при помощи всевозможныхъ регулировокъ, твердыхъ цѣнъ, принудительныхъ товарообмѣновъ и прочихъ методовъ, на которые такъ расточительно и изобрѣтательно диктаторствующее Коммунистическое Правительство. Если, при этомъ дешевомъ русскомъ сырьѣ, текстильная промышленность шла въ 22 г. какъ мы видѣли, съ убыткомъ и не находила уже сбыта въ январѣ 23 г., что будетъ, когда она перейдетъ въ значительной части на иностранное сырье?

Снабжать фабрики этимъ — иностраннымъ — сырьемъ по излюбленнымъ дешевымъ коммунистическимъ методамъ хозяйствованія въ Россіи — будетъ уже внѣ власти Коммунистическаго Правительства.

Для этихъ методовъ и путей оно просто недосягаемо. За него придется платить настоящей валютой и настоящимъ золотомъ. Такое сырье будетъ дорогимъ сырьемъ. Не трудно понять, что корни дерева нэповской коммунистической текстильной индустріи почти взяли уже всѣ даровые соки кругомъ и уперлись въ каменистую почву — въ иностранное сырье. Даже красный купецъ А.М. Краснощековъ, какъ извѣстно—звѣзда не первой величины на коммунистическомъ небосклонѣ—понимаетъ, что дѣло скверно.

На совѣщаніи крупной промышленности и транспорта онъ говоритъ (Торг.-Пром. Газ., 20.12.22): — «Текстильная промышленность, которая должна по бюджету дать государству опредѣленный доходъ, сидитъ сейчасъ безъ сырья. У насъ нѣтъ хлопка, у насъ не хватаетъ шерсти, мы все это должны закупить заграницей, *и на это нѣтъ средствъ. Сама текстильная промышленность можетъ свести концы съ концами только при томъ условіи, если она съѣстъ все, что у нея есть, и останется безъ сырья*».

Положеніе вещей констатировано имъ довольно правильно. Во всякомъ случаѣ правильнѣе, чѣмъ это сдѣлано П.А. Богдановымъ и Л.Б. Каменевымъ на X декабрьскомъ Съѣздѣ Совѣтовъ, о чемъ мы уже говорили въ началѣ нашей статьи.

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Намъ остается добавить очень немного. Коммунистическая власть разстрѣливаетъ свои послѣдніе снаряды: заграничными органами текстильныхъ трестовъ производятся энергичныя закупки сырья на американскомъ и англійскомъ рынкахъ.

Закупка хлопка заграницей производится частью въ Ливерпулѣ, частью непосредственно у американскихъ фирмъ. Операція по закупкѣ сосредоточена въ текстильномъ синдикатѣ. Кромѣ валютно-товарныхъ операцій съ Центросоюзомъ, на покупку хлопка получена ссуда подъ векселя отъ Нар. Ком. Фин. на 6 милл. зол. рубл. и заключена кредитная операція съ Государственнымъ Банкомъ на 11 1/3 милл. зол. рубл.. На 26.1.23 было закуплено 13,2 тыс. кипъ американскаго и 1,075 кипъ египетскаго хлопка. Заканчиваются переговоры о заключеніи сдѣлокъ еще на 6-7 тыс. кипъ (Эк. Ж., 28.1.23) Московскимъ суконнымъ трестомъ (Моссукно) закуплена заграницей мериносовая шерсть, изъ которой прибыло въ Москву и разверстано между фабриками треста 4,7 тыс. пудовъ.

СОСТАВЪ ПЕРСОНАЛА, РУКОВОДЯЩАГО КОММУНИСТИЧЕСКОЙ ПРОМЫШЛЕННОСТЬЮ.

«Эк. Жизнь» (4. 1. 23) опубликовала очень интересныя свѣдѣнія, дающія довольно ясное представленіе о томъ, какова физіономія персонала, руководящаго теперь промышленностью при коммунистическомъ режимѣ.

Указано число коммунистовъ, образовательный цензъ и до-коммунистическая классовая принадлежность.

Количество и распредѣленіе по рубрикамъ служащихъ В. С. Н. Х. — центральнаго органа, правящаго промышленностью:

	Количество отдѣльныхъ правленій	Число служащихъ			Начальниковъ управленій и членовъ комиссій								
		Общее	Въ томъ числѣ коммунистовъ		Общее число	Въ томъ числѣ коммунистовъ		Получили образованіе					
			Колич.	%		Колич.	%	Высшее техническ.	Высшее общее	Среднее техническ.	Среднее общее	Низшее техническ.	Низшее общее
Функціон. отдѣловъ и организ. на правахъ отд.	14	4.478	166	3.7	105	19	18	28	54	2	11	1	9
Главн. Управленій и орган. на правахъ Гл. Упр.	13	5.542	215	3.9	271	52	19	106	98	3	32	4	31
Синдикатовъ	16	1.881	135	7	111	34	30.5	31	37	4	16	0	23
	43	11.901	516	4.3	490	105	21.4	165	189	9	59	5	63

Такимъ образомъ, процентъ коммунистовъ на весь рабочій персоналъ учрежденія руководящаго хозяйствомъ страны (11.901 чел.) равенъ 4,3%.

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Для верховъ возглавляющихъ учрежденіе, процентъ этотъ однако равенъ уже 21,4. Сотрудникъ совѣтской газеты не безъ грусти отмѣчаетъ, что оффиціальная безпартійность 95,7% главныхъ работниковъ Высш. Сов. Нар. Хоз., отнюдь не означаетъ безпартійности, такъ сказать, душевной.

Спеціалисты на высшихъ должностяхъ даютъ 72,3% лицъ съ высшимъ спеціальнымъ или общимъ образованіемъ.

Совершенно иную картину представляетъ составъ управленій трестовъ. По анкетѣ, произведенной въ 300 трестахъ, образовательный цензъ членовъ правленія слѣдующій:

Всего членовъ коллегій	Спеціальн. техн. образов.			Общее образованіе			Не указано
	Высшее	Среднее	Низшее и домаш	Высшее	Среднее	Низшее и домаш	
875	223	67	17	43	139	365	21

Всего лицъ съ высшимъ образованіемъ среди членовъ правленій трестовъ только 30,3%. Наибольшая группа получила домашнее образованіе (43,7%). «Слѣдуетъ отмѣтить, пишетъ обозрѣватель «Экон. Жизни», что члены правленій трестовъ подъ домашнимъ образованіемъ подразумѣваютъ и прежнее тюремное самообразованіе, этимъ, по преимуществу отличаются коммунисты».

За то партійный составъ трестоуправленій въ значительной мѣрѣ болѣе утѣшителенъ для обозрѣвателя совѣтской газеты.

Партійный составъ

Всего членовъ коллегіи	Коммунист.	Безпартійн.	Не указано
875	325	502	48

Коммунистовъ 37,2%, безпартійныхъ 57,4%.

По отношенію къ соціальному составу анкета показываетъ, что рабочихъ и крестьянъ имѣется 68% въ общемъ количествѣ руководителей трестовъ. Но эти «рабочіе и крестьяне» не всѣ фактически таковыми являются, ибо на вопросъ объ основной профессіи до 1914 г. отвѣты получались слѣдующіе:

Основная профессія до 14 года

Всего членовъ коллегій	Инженеры	Землевладѣльц	Фабрик.	Лица своб. проф.	Не указано	Служащіе	Рабочіе	Крестьяне	Торговцы
875	232	1	27	12	86	237	256	6	18

Такимъ образомъ по профессіи рабочими и крестьянами являются 56,3%, а не 68%. Многіе записали себя въ привеллигированное въ Сов. Россіи сословіе лишь по правамъ родителей.

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Анкета среди высшаго исполнительнаго персонала (директоровъ заводовъ) дала слѣдующіе результаты:

По партійности

Всего директоровъ и ихъ замѣстителей	Коммунистовъ	Другихъ партій	Безпартійныхъ	Не выяснено.
1.951	441	2	1.458	50

Слѣд. административный и технической составъ фабрикъ и заводовъ на ¾ безпартійный.

По образовательному цензу:

Всего	Высшее	Среднее	Низшее	Домашнее	Не выяснено
1.951	387	445	932	142	45

Такимъ образомъ, съ высшимъ образованіемъ имѣется лишь 19% директоровъ и около 23% со среднимъ. Остальные 58% съ низшимъ и домашнимъ или, по квалификаціи обозрѣвателя «Эк. Ж.», «тюремнымъ» образованіемъ.

«При сравнительно слабой партійности, пишетъ тотъ же обозрѣватель, недостаточный образовательный уровень членовъ заводоуправленій не можетъ быть отнесенъ къ положительнымъ качествамъ».

По времени поступленія въ предпріятіе

Всего	До 1918г.	Въ 1918	Въ 1919	Въ 1920	Въ 1921	Въ 1922	Не выясн
1951	259	96	125	274	498	629	70

Изъ этой интересной таблицы видно, что лишь 13% директоровъ работаетъ на заводахъ съ 1918 г. Наибольшій процентъ (72%) находится на заводахъ, которыми управляетъ, *лишь 2 года*. Если принять во вниманіе что 58% изъ нихъ съ низшимъ образованіемъ и могли лишь практически ознакомиться съ дѣломъ на самомъ предпріятіи, становится понятнымъ заключеніе изслѣдователя анкетъ: «заводоуправленія едва ли хорошо учитываютъ хозяйственно-матеріальную сторону предпріятій, едва ли знаютъ предпріятія и едва ли приносятъ тотъ минимумъ полезной работы, какая обычно требуется коммерческой необходимостью, обусловливающей устойчивость предпріятій».

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ТРАГЕДІЯ ПОТЕРЯННАГО РАВНОВѢСІЯ НА ЕВРОПЕЙСКОМЪ КОНТИНЕНТѢ.

М.В. Брайкевичъ. Докладъ читанъ въ Р.Э.О. 17.5.23 и въ соединенномъ собраніи Прелставителей Русскихъ организацій, созванномъ Союзомъ Представителей Торговли и Промышленности въ Лондонѣ 22.5.1923.

Около полугода тому назадъ мнѣ приходилось говорить *) о вѣроятности наступленія штормовой полосы радикальныхъ и бурныхъ перемѣнъ въ европейской послѣверсальской атмосферѣ.

За истекшіе шесть мѣсяцевъ произошли два событія, уже теперь измѣнившихъ чрезвычайно положеніе на европейскомъ континентѣ и чреватыхъ еще большими послѣдствіями для самаго ближайшаго будущаго.

Первое событіе — это оккупація Рура Франціей. Второе — это опубликованная 9.5.23 нота Лорда Керзона Совѣтскому Правительству.

Нѣтъ сомнѣнія, что эти два событія уже ввели насъ въ штормовую полосу. Оба они чрезвычайно повысили давленіе экономической и политической атмосферы, и Западной Европы, и Россіи. Пока, это еще не девятый валъ шторма, но дѣло подходитъ къ нему.

ГЛАВА I.

ОККУПАЦІЯ РУРА И НОТА ЛОРДА КЕРЗОНА — ДВѢ СТОРОНЫ ПРОБЛЕМЫ РАВНОВѢСІЯ.

Какъ ни далекъ, повидимому, Руръ отъ Москвы, но я склоненъ думать, что нота Лорда Керзона Совѣтскому Правительству находится въ ближайшемъ экономическомъ и политическомъ сосѣдствѣ съ актомъ оккупаціи Рурскаго бассейна Франціей.

Для того, чтобы пояснить эту мою мысль, я очень коротко напомню о недавнемъ прошломъ. Очень скоро послѣ, если не во время самой Версальской Конференціи, для многихъ изъ союзническихъ государственныхъ дѣятелей серьезнаго калибра, т.е. — для дѣятелей не только предписывающихъ съ легкимъ сердцемъ и минутнымъ успѣхомъ будущія судьбы народамъ, но и думающихъ, насколько такія предписанія осуществимы въ реальной жизни, стало ясно, что новое, въ Версалѣ построенное зданіе европейскаго международнаго положенія не додѣлано, не приведено къ прочнымъ уравновѣшеннымъ пропорціямъ.

И дѣйствительно: вопросъ о томъ, какова будетъ роль въ этомъ новомъ европейскомъ зданіи двухъ такихъ крупныхъ факторовъ, какъ Россія и Германія, былъ въ сущности не рѣшенъ, а отложенъ на будущее.

Эти роли намѣчались въ общихъ и довольно туманныхъ чертахъ въ видѣ пассивныхъ и послушныхъ диктатурѣ Антанты персонажей, довольствующихся тѣмъ мѣстомъ, которое будетъ имъ указываться въ будущемъ каждый разъ особо и которое можно будетъ мѣнять по волѣ Антанты.

*) См. Коминтернъ и Капинтернъ Russ. Econ., стр. 2606 и 2991.

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На чемъ строили свои надежды на пассивность и покорность Россіи и Германіи союзническіе государственные дѣятели не серьезнаго типа, т.е. тѣ, которые больше предписывали, чѣмъ думали объ исполнимости предписаній?

Для случая Россіи — на балканизаціи Россіи, на гражданской войнѣ, въ значительной степени подогрѣваемой многоземными стараніями, на большевистской диктатурѣ надъ Россіей, наконецъ, на послѣвоенномъ хозяйственномъ истощеніи ея. Для случая Германіи — на лишеніи Германіи значительной доли ея природныхъ рессурсовъ угля и желѣзной руды, на невыполнимо высокомъ размѣрѣ репараціонныхъ платежей, уменьшеніе коихъ въ мѣру «дѣйствительной, будущей платежеспособности» Германіи предоставлялось доброй волѣ Антанты, наконецъ, на фактическомъ обезоруженіи Германіи.

Для того, чтобы такая международная система могла держаться, необходимо было дѣйствительно имѣть силу и возможность осуществлять диктатуру союзниковъ непрерывно. Безъ этого система должна была развалиться.

Пока былъ крѣпокъ цементъ изъ пафоса побѣдъ и престижа Антанты, пока не начали сказываться въ жизни самихъ державъ Антанты послѣдствія послѣвоенной экономики, до тѣхъ поръ построенное въ Версали зданіе послѣвоенной Европы могло кое-какъ держаться.

Ну, а что будетъ послѣ, когда наступятъ послѣпобѣдные будни?

Коротко говоря — старая система «европейскаго равновѣсія» смѣнилась новой «диктатурой Антанты», и ощущеніе или, вѣрнѣе, предчувствіе будущей трагедіи потеряннаго равновѣсія на Европейскомъ континентѣ родилось вмѣстѣ съ рожденіемъ новаго европейскаго «порядка».

За Версальской конференціей послѣдовалъ длинный рядъ попытокъ союзниковъ достроить совмѣстно неустойчивое зданіе. При этомъ передъ ними неизмѣнно возникали двѣ стороны задачи равновѣсія на европейскомъ континентѣ, двѣ проблемы — Россія и Германія.

Когда говорили о репараціонныхъ платежахъ, о гарантіяхъ мира на франко-нѣмецкой границѣ, — говорили, въ сущности, о будущемъ мѣстѣ и роли Германіи въ Европѣ.

Когда говорили о возстановленіи европейскаго хозяйства, — говорили въ сущности о будущемъ мѣстѣ и роли Россіи въ зданіи послѣвоенной Европы. Первая проблема интересовала больше Францію, вторая — Англію. Но чрезвычайно важнымъ и показательнымъ является то обстоятельство, что всякая попытка рѣшить первую проблему разновременно и независимо отъ второй неизмѣнно упиралась въ невозможность это сдѣлать до тѣхъ поръ, пока не будетъ рѣшена эта вторая проблема.

Обѣ эти проблемы являлись двумя сторонами одного большого вопроса — потеряннаго равновѣсія Европы.

Всѣ совмѣстныя попытки союзниковъ кончились неудачей. Въ результатѣ диктатуры послѣвоенная экономика принесла такіе плоды, что сами матеріальныя силы обоихъ союзниковъ, а за ними и престижъ измѣнялись, уменьшаясь неизмѣнно. Покончить съ достройкой потому становилось вопросомъ срочной необходимости.

Такъ складывалась теперешняя трагедія исканія потеряннаго равновѣсія на европейскомъ континентѣ.

Послѣ неудачи совмѣстныхъ исканій два главныхъ европейскихъ союзника перешли къ исканіямъ, другъ отъ друга независисмымъ. Отсюда — два рѣшенія. Одно — французское. Это оккупація Рура. Другое, болѣе

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сложное, англійское. Это возвѣщеннный *) Бонаръ Лоу и Макъ Кена переходъ отъ диктаторствованія и аррогантности временъ Ллойдъ Джоржа къ политикѣ «мира и сдержанности». Эта политика стала искать разумныхъ соглашеній и согласованій британскихъ интересовъ съ интересами другихъ народовъ. Она уже имѣетъ свои успѣхи. Этотъ курсъ былъ начатъ соглашеніемъ съ С.Ш.А. о расплатѣ по англійскимъ долгамъ, продолженъ сотрудничествомъ съ Ирландіей по ликвидаціи гражданской войны въ послѣдней и рядомъ уступокъ Турціи, направленнымъ къ удовлетворенію ея національнаго чувства и интереса Турецкаго народа. Наконецъ, мнѣ представляется, что майская нота Лорда Керзона диктовалась подъ вліяніемъ этого курса. Ниже я приведу убѣдительныя, какъ мнѣ кажется, соображенія въ пользу только что высказаннаго предположенія. Теперь я прошу принять его пока на вѣру.

Майская нота Лорда Керзона явится, въ такомъ случаѣ, первымъ шагомъ къ установленію въ будущемъ добрыхъ отношеній съ Россійскимъ народомъ, ибо она кладетъ начало ликвидаціи дружеской поддержки Ллойдъ Джоржа коммунистической диктатуры надъ Россіей и плановъ эксплоатаціи Россіи при посредствѣ этой диктатуры. Она является плюсомъ для ускоренія процесса возстановленія здороваго государственнаго бытія Россіи.

Я утверждаю, что оккупація Рура и майская нота Совѣтской Власти суть двѣ стороны одной и той же задачи — исканія равновѣсія Европы; что нота Керзона является логическимъ отвѣтомъ на оккупацію Рура, точнѣе, — англійскимъ коррективомъ французскаго рѣшенія задачи о равновѣсіи Европы, что этотъ коррективъ таитъ въ себѣ возможности смягчить рѣзкость французскаго рѣшенія до степени пріемлемости его для Германіи, дѣлая, вмѣстѣ съ тѣмъ, практически достижимыми тѣ цѣли, которыя ставитъ себѣ Франція, т.е. полученіе возможно большихъ репарационныхъ платежей и твердыхъ гарантій отъ военныхъ нападеній Германіи. Замѣчу попутно, что оба рѣшенія на рѣдкость разнятся по своему духу, по основной идеѣ, въ корнѣ ихъ лежащей, являясь типичнымъ продуктомъ столь различной національной психологіи и національной экономики, какъ съ одной стороны — англійская, а съ другой — французская.

Оккупація Рура и новыя отношенія Англіи къ Совѣтской Власти будутъ тѣми двумя центрами, отъ которыхъ будутъ развертываться ближайшія событія въ тепрешнюю штормовую для народовъ Европы полосу. Оба эти центра привлекаютъ потому къ себѣ громадный интересъ.

Естественно, что мотивы, вѣроятное теченіе и конечныя слѣдствія двухъ этихъ методовъ нахожденія равновѣсія на Европейскомъ континентѣ — англійскаго и французскаго — обсуждаются представителями различныхъ народовъ и классовъ съ черзвычайной страстностью.

Я постараюсь сохранить всю объективность, говорить о позиціяхъ отдѣльныхъ народовъ только такихъ, которыя диктуются не личной волей и вкусами лидеровъ и правительствъ, а жизненной необходимостью ихъ для экономическаго и политическаго существованія этихъ народовъ, наконецъ, говорить объ этихъ позиціяхъ только затѣмъ, чтобы показать, насколько онѣ совмѣстимы или необходимы для нужной всѣмъ европейскимъ народамъ созидательной цѣли — нахожденія европейскаго равновѣсія.

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*) См. Russ. Econom., стр. 2630 и 3014.

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ГЛАВА II.

ДИНАМИЧЕСКАЯ И СТАТИЧЕСКАЯ СИСТЕМА РАВНОВѢСІЯ.

Новая система европейскаго равновѣсія можетъ быть формулирована такъ:

1) Равновѣсіе экономическое. — Существованіе совершенно независимыхъ національныхъ хозяйствъ такъ, чтобы въ случаѣ чрезмѣрной агрессивности одного изъ нихъ остальныя могли бы соединиться противъ него.

2) равновѣсіе военно-техническое. — Существованіе совершенно независимыхъ державъ такъ, чтобы въ случаѣ стремленія одной державы къ захвату диктатуры остальныя могли соединиться противъ нея.

Эту формулировку должно установить на основаніи опыта Европы: 1) отъ 14 г. до Версальской конференціи и 2) въ особенности отъ Версальской конференціи до теперешней штормовой полосы Европы.

Она нѣсколько отличается, вѣрнѣе, видоизмѣняетъ и дополняетъ старую формулировку «европейскаго равновѣсія». Послѣдняя выражалась, какъ извѣстно, такъ: необходимо существованіе въ Европѣ нѣсколькихъ независимыхъ другъ отъ друга державъ, какъ военныхъ силъ, для того, чтобы въ случаѣ чрезмѣрнаго увеличенія одной изъ нихъ, остальныя могли соединиться противъ нея.

Старая формула имѣла въ виду по преимуществу количество и статику силъ. Новая вноситъ серьезную поправку на качество и динамику ихъ.

Старая считала главнымъ образомъ количество мирнаго и военнаго состава арміи и величину наготовленныхъ для войны, наличныхъ запасовъ военнаго снаряженія. Новая считаетъ качество человѣка на фронтѣ и въ тылу, психологическую подготовленность его къ координированно-массовымъ и индивидуальнымъ дѣйствіямъ и количество потенціальнаго снаряженія, т.е., не столько того, которое готово, сколько того, которое мобилизованная промышленность сможетъ сдѣлать уже во время самой войны.

Это видоизмѣненіе и дополненіе вызываются тѣмъ, что индустріализація, массовое производство, вообще, весь строй промышленнаго быта, начиная, примѣрно, съ послѣднихъ десятилѣтій XIX вѣка, обнаружилъ удивительную способность съ огромной импульсивностью и быстротой мѣнять качество и психологію человѣка, чрезвычайно повышая продуктивность человѣческаго матеріала.

Въ очень недавнія еще времена Европы — въ эпоху сельско-хозяйственнаго и ремесленнаго быта — душевный образъ и продуктивность средняго типового человѣка у каждаго народа измѣнялись и прогрессировали относительно медленно. Можно сказать съ достаточнымъ основаніемъ, что во время сельско-хозяйственнаго и ремесленнаго быта европейская цивилизація имѣла статическій характеръ. Индустріализмъ измѣнилъ его на динамическій. Онъ чрезвычайно повысилъ темпъ измѣненій и прогресса не только матеріальныхъ, но и духовныхъ силъ человѣка. Нація, пошедшая успѣшнѣе своего сосѣда по пути индустріализма, при одинаковой численности населенія и арміи увеличиваетъ фактическую свою силу въ 3-4 раза противъ этого своего сосѣда.

Индустріальный вѣкъ — вѣкъ динамической цивилизаціи — для защиты и нападенія заставляетъ равняться не только количествомъ солдатъ и уровнемъ индустріальнаго развитія. Это и вызываетъ необходимость видоизмѣненія старой формулировки Европейскаго равновѣсія на новую.

Нельзя, конечно, сказать, чтобы старая система «европейскаго равновѣ-

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сія» не принимала раньше совсѣмъ въ расчетъ динамики силъ. Она тоже съ нею считалась, но считалась относительно мало потому, что самъ темпъ измѣненія и развитія силъ былъ несравненно болѣе медленъ, чѣмъ въ наше время динамической цивилизаціи.

Было бы правильнымъ, пожалуй, назвать поэтому новую систему европейскаго равновѣсія *динамической* въ отличіе отъ старой, которая по своему характеру была скорѣе *статической*.

Въ этомъ заключается основная разница между обѣими системами равновѣсія. Однако, главное въ старой формулировкѣ равновѣсія — ея коренная идея — остается незыблемой въ своемъ созидательномъ смыслѣ и силѣ для формулы новаго, динамическаго равновѣсія. Эта идея — отрицаніе и страховка отъ диктатуры. Я сказалъ, что формулировка новой проблемы европейскаго равновѣсія вытекаетъ, главнымъ образомъ, изъ опыта эпохи отъ Версальской конференціи до теперешней штормовой полосы. Эта эпоха ознаменовалась отрицаніемъ, и на практическомъ поприщѣ, и въ идеологіи необходимости системы «европейскаго равновѣсія». На практикѣ Ллойдъ Джоржъ пытался утвердить въ Европѣ соединенную диктатуру двухъ наиболѣе сильныхъ союзниковъ — нѣчто въ родѣ pax sociorum. Не представляетъ большого интереса для нашей темы вопросъ о томъ, насколько велики были шансы у Ллойдъ Джоржа для того, чтобы этотъ pax sociorum обратился въ конечномъ счетѣ въ pax britanica, а не въ pax galica.

Гораздо больше интереса представляетъ то обстоятельство, что цѣлая школа молодыхъ англійскихъ либераловъ, расходясь лично съ Ллойдъ Джоржемъ, считала ,однако, *) такъ же, какъ и онъ, «систему европейскаго равновѣсія» уже отжившей своей вѣкъ.

Идейный разрывъ съ старой системой европейскаго равновѣсія былъ популяренъ не только въ либеральныхъ кругахъ, но и въ значительной части консервативныхъ и рабочихъ. Можно сказать, не преувеличивая, что громадная часть англійскаго общественнаго мнѣнія въ эпоху отъ Версальской конференціи до теперешней штормовой полосы рвала съ «системой равновѣсія».

Особый интересъ это явленіе пріобрѣтаетъ потому, что оно имѣло мѣсто именно въ той Англіи, все прежнее рѣшающее вліяніе которой на европейскія дѣла покоилось на примѣненіи ею «системы европейскаго равновѣсія».

Во всѣхъ случаяхъ чрезмѣрнаго по англійской оцѣнкѣ усиленія одной изъ державъ Европы Англія неизмѣнно являлась въ роли учредителя и промотора новой коалиціи изъ остальныхъ державъ, направленной противъ усиливавшейся. Это было англійской спеціальностью и никѣмъ въ Европѣ не оспариваемой англійской привиллегіей. При этомъ «система равновѣсія» имѣла еще одно громадное практическое достоинство для Англіи: — она оченъ дешево ей обходилась. Главнымъ дѣйствующимъ орудіемъ системы былъ умъ, опытъ и талантъ англійскаго дипломата, а не дорого стоющая матеріальная, военная сила. Англійскіе дипломаты всегда успѣвали пять или шесть такъ назыв. великихъ державъ Европы раздѣлить на двѣ конкурирующія и приблизительно уравновѣшивающіяся по ихъ силамъ группы. Достаточно было находившейся въ «splendid isolation» Англіи добавить небольшую англійскую военную силу на одну или другую чашку вѣсовъ, чтобы сохранить миръ и попутно еще выговорить тѣ или другія компенсаціи для себя. Даже безъ этихъ компенсацій «система равновѣсія» приносила Англіи громадную выгоду, ибо она обезпечивала 1) миръ, совершенно

*) См. проф. Поллардъ. Essays in Liberalism. Lectures and papers which were deliverd at the Liberal Summer School of Oxford. London. 1922.

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необходимый для успѣха англійской торговли и 2) умѣренность расходовъ на англійскую армію. И не только Англія наживала и преуспѣвала, благодаря «системѣ равновѣсія», но и для всей Европы эта система была въ конечномъ счетѣ очень выгодна, ибо она гарантировала въ значительной степени независимость національнаго хозяйственнаго развитія и ростъ національнаго дохода.

Если англійская государственная мысль стала въ послѣвоенную эпоху отказываться отъ столь практичной и выгодной для Англіи системы «европейскаго равновѣсія», то, значитъ, была какая-то другая система, которая казалась еще болѣе выгодной. Это и была система «союзнической диктатуры».

Далѣе слѣдовала экспериментальная провѣрка. На практикѣ за четыре года ея примѣненія система «союзнической диктатуры» не оправдала надеждъ, на нее возлагавшихся. Я уже говорилъ *), какъ въ сферѣ европейскаго хозяйства она привела къ расхожденію равновѣсія сельско-хозяйственной и индустріальной продукціи Европы, рѣзкому паденію покупательной способности сельско-хозяйственнаго рынка и къ ослабленію экономической, а за нею и военной мощи самихъ диктаторствующихъ.

Къ этому слѣдуетъ добавить, что и въ области чисто военной: 1) она, очевидно, не создала спокойствія для англійскаго партнера по диктатурѣ — Франціи — за неприкосновенность границы послѣдней съ Германіей 2) между многими другими европейскими государствами породила отношенія, очень далекія отъ дружелюбія **).

Однако, осознаніе самого факта — обнаруженіе на практикѣ несостоятельности системы «союзнической диктатуры» — составляетъ достояніе пока только части англійскихъ государственныхъ дѣятелей и въ частности составляетъ достояніе Правительства Бонаръ Лоу - Балдвинъ - Керзонъ.

Эта часть и начинаетъ перестраивать постепенно международныя отношенія Европы и Англіи въ направленіи новой динамической системы европейскаго равновѣсія.

Другая часть англійскихъ государственныхъ дѣятелей пока еще остается партизаномъ «системы диктатуры». Отсюда и происходитъ та буря споровъ въ Англійскомъ общественномъ мнѣніи объ Англо-Совѣтскихъ отношеніяхъ, которую вызвала нота Лорда Керзона. Глубокій и не высказанный до конца смыслъ этого спора въ слѣдующемъ: для сторонниковъ ренесанса «системы европейскаго равновѣсія» представляется полезнымъ въ интересахъ Англіи существованіе въ Европѣ нѣсколькихъ крупныхъ

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*) Коминтернъ и Капинтернъ Russ. Econ. № 7-8.

**) Такой большой авторитетъ, какъ бывшій премьеръ Ллойдъ Джоржъ такъ, во время парламентскихъ преній по Англо-Совѣтскимъ отношеніямъ, рисуетъ теперешнее европейское положеніе (Times, 16,5,23): «Я просилъ бы Правительство считаться съ тѣмъ, въ какомъ состояніи находится міръ. Оно очень тяжелое. Міръ не такое теперь мѣсто, гдѣ можно бросать спички... Тысячи миль границъ отъ Балтики до Чернаго моря находятся въ очень опасномъ положеніи. Польша съ ея спорами относительно Галиціи — Галичане вѣдь одной съ русскими расы — создаетъ положеніе, грозящее большими опасностями. Дальше на Югъ идетъ Бессарабія; тревожныя настроенія въ маленькихъ республикахъ вдоль Балтики; тревожныя настроенія въ Германіи относительно Рура. Мы еще не вышли изъ нашихъ затрудненій на Востокѣ. Торговля не оживаетъ. И я далеко не увѣренъ, ни за ближайшія, ни за отдаленныя перспективы. Я далеко не спокоенъ относительно всѣхъ этихъ расовыхъ раздраженій, которые всюду разжигаются въ Европѣ, и всѣхъ осложненій, которые еще могутъ имѣть мѣсто. Россія — страна съ 120.000.000-мъ населеніемъ, затрагивающая насъ во всякомъ пунктѣ, граничащая съ Польшей, Румыніей и Германіей, полной чувства мести».

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самостоятельныхъ государствъ, въ частности Франціи, Россіи, Италіи и Германіи съ соблюденіемъ въ отношеніи послѣдней нѣкоторыхъ гарантій.

Для того, чтобы построить комбинацію изъ двухъ уравновѣшивающихся группъ, практически надо имѣть не менѣе четырехъ державъ: сторонникамъ ренесанса «равновѣсія» *начинаетъ быть нужна* здоровая Россія. Наоборотъ, сторонникамъ «системы диктатуры» представляется полезнымъ въ интересахъ Англіи существованіе въ Европѣ въ идеалѣ одного независимаго и диктаторствующаго государства — модернизованнаго сюзерена. Остальныя должны находиться въ разныхъ ступеняхъ зависимости *). Для нихъ нужна разлагающаяся Россія.

Достижимъ ли идеалъ, т.е. одно диктаторствующее государство? Въ условіяхъ современной динамической цивилизаціи государство можетъ питать надежду и сохранить свое диктаторское положеніе, хотя бы даже на короткій срокъ, при непремѣнномъ соблюденіи двухъ условій. Оно должно находиться на высшей ступени, и въ военномъ, и въ индустріальномъ отношеніи. Англія не имѣетъ и врядъ ли можетъ имѣть достаточно сильную для роли Европейскаго сюзерена армію. Франція не имѣетъ для такой роли индустріи высокаго уровня и большого масштаба. Даже при рѣшимости начать перестраивать французскую экономическую психологію и планомѣрно создавать индустрію большого масштаба, для достиженія этой цѣли потребуется около 15-20 лѣтъ.

Въ Европѣ существовала единственная страна, у которой было гармоничное и опасное для ея сосѣдей сочетаніе указанныхъ выше двухъ необходимыхъ условій. Такой страной была Германія.

Такимъ образомъ, вмѣсто «единогосударственной диктатуры» приходится довольствоваться «двойственной диктатурой» со всѣми проистекающими отсюда практическими неудобствами. Въ этомъ второе слабое мѣсто англійскихъ нео-либераловъ и «системы диктатуры». Первое, какъ мы видѣли, лежитъ въ области экономики: диктатура разрушаетъ покупательную способность с.-хозяйственнаго рынка.

Выше я привелъ соображенія, которыя заставляютъ меня думать, что позиціи англійскихъ сторонниковъ ренесанса «системы европейскаго равновѣсія» имѣютъ серьезные шансы на торжество.

Естественнымъ потому является слѣдующій вопросъ: представляется ли система равновѣсія чѣмъ то вродѣ «вѣчнаго идеала» международныхъ человѣческихъ отношеній? Отвѣтъ отрицательный. Мы прекрасно знаемъ, что Америка и, вообще, страны Новаго Свѣта живутъ хорошо и безъ системы равновѣсія и, практически говоря, почти безъ арміи.

Если, однако, мы зададимъ себѣ тотъ же вопросъ относительно странъ европейскаго континента, то на него прійдется отвѣтить, что *при теперешнемъ хозяйственномъ положеніи* Европа не доросла еще до болѣе моральной системы международныхъ отношеній Новаго Свѣта. Этому препятствуетъ господство въ большинствѣ лидерствующихъ европейскихъ странъ экономической системы національныхъ хозяйствъ, покоящейся на гипертрофированномъ вывозѣ **) продуктовъ индустріи и гипертрофированномъ ввозѣ продуктовъ сельскаго хозяйства и сырьевыхъ. Пока эта система не будетъ перестроена, до тѣхъ поръ экономическое соперничество Европейскихъ

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*) Весьма значительную часть территоріи Европы занимаютъ теперь государства 1) т.н. kept states и 2) государство-данникъ. Форма чисто вассальной зависимости.

*) См. Russ. Econ. № 6, стр. 2162 и 2021.

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странъ изъ за внѣшнихъ рынковъ сбыта индустріальной продукціи всегда будетъ питать тенденцію къ междуевропейскимъ столкновеніямъ.

Потому при данномъ положеніи хозяйства Европы «система равновѣсія» можетъ считаться *практически единственной* системой международныхъ европейскихъ отношеній, при которой возможно возстановленіе изъ теперешняго экономическаго и политическаго хаоса.

Для того, чтобы покончить съ «равновѣсіемъ» возвратимся еще разъ къ идеямъ англійскихъ нео-либераловъ. Отрицая систему европейскаго равновѣсія, они по психологическимъ и политическимъ причинамъ не могутъ, конечно, заострять въ прямолинейной и рѣзко выраженной формулировкѣ необходимость «диктатуры» Англіи на европейскомъ континентѣ. Они говорятъ болѣе мягко, что Англія должна побѣдить въ международныхъ отношеніяхъ, и для этого требуютъ болѣе активной, чѣмъ этого требовалъ старый англійскій либерализмъ, международной политики.

Какія практическія средства ими предлагаются для того, чтобы эта активная международная политика была успѣшна? Это лига націй, при посредствѣ авторитета которой и черезъ которую должна пропагандироваться слѣдующая идея: международные конфликты въ Европѣ возбуждаются не сознательнымъ хищничествомъ, а взаимнымъ и вовсе не необходимымъ недовѣріемъ и страхомъ народовъ другъ передъ другомъ.

Значеніе экономическаго интереса и конфликта не признается такимъ образомъ англійскими нео-либералами за доминирующее въ международныхъ европейскихъ отношеніяхъ. Это очень благородно, но, къ сожалѣнію, не соотвѣтствуетъ европейской реальности.

Вѣроятно, потому Лигѣ Націй и не удалось до сихъ поръ склонить европейскіе народы къ новой вѣрѣ англійскаго нео-либерализма.

ГЛ. III. НОТА ЛОРДА КЕРЗОНА ЕСТЬ ПОВОРОТНЫЙ ПУНКТЪ ВЪ ОТНОШЕНІЯХЪ АНГЛІИ КЪ РОССІИ.

Посмотримъ теперь, каковы и насколько правильны мои соображенія за то, что майская нота лорда Керзона находится въ соотвѣтствіи и диктовалась новымъ курсомъ англійской политики — курсомъ теперешняго правительства на «европейское равновѣсіе», что она кладетъ начало ликвидаціи дружеской поддержки Ллойдъ Джоржемъ коммунистической диктатуры надъ Россіей и тѣмъ самымъ является поворотнымъ пунктомъ къ добро желательнымъ отношеніямъ Англійскаго Правительства къ возрожденію Россійскаго народа и Россійской государственности.

Я долженъ васъ предупредить заранѣе, что значительная часть русскаго общественнаго мнѣнія, можетъ быть даже большинство его, держится пока во взглядѣ на ноту Керзона другой точки зрѣнія.

Послѣдняя можетъ быть формулирована такъ: нота Керзона направлена не противъ Коммунистическаго Правительства, а противъ Россіи. Она есть продолженіе и развитіе старой политики т. е. политики Ллойдъ Джоржа на ослабленіе Россіи. Теперь Россія истощена больше, чѣмъ въ 21 г., а авторитетъ и престижъ Компартіи расшатанъ почти окончательно, и внутри Россіи, и заграницей. Всякое внѣшнее осложненіе можетъ оказаться гибельнымъ для власти и положенія Коммунистическаго Правительства внутри Россіи. Компартія нуждается въ иностранной поддержкѣ для того, чтобы быть Русскимъ Правительствомъ больше, чѣмъ нуждалась въ ней въ эпоху Временнаго Правительства и Брестъ-Литовска. Потому сопро-

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тивляемость Коммунистическаго Правительства иностранной требовательности понизилась чрезвычайно. Настало потому время прижать большевиковъ.

Цѣлью ноты является: 1) съ одной стороны, осадить Совѣтскую Власть, указать ей ея истинное, соотвѣтствующее реальной обстановкѣ мѣсто и роль — роль kept government англійскаго имперіалистическаго капитала или, выражаясь въ терминахъ стариннаго языка, аглицкаго сателита — а 2) съ другой стороны, при посредствѣ такого проученнаго и приведеннаго къ послушанію Коммунистическаго Правительства выжимать изъ Россіи какъ можно больше: пока зону территоріальныхъ водъ, потомъ новый торговый договоръ съ особыми преимуществами для англійскихъ купцовъ, затѣмъ цѣлый рядъ уступокъ, клонящихся къ дальнѣйшему ослабленію Россіи.

Я думаю, что только что изложенная точка зрѣнія не правильна. Ея возникновеніе и существованіе вполнѣ естественно и понятно въ атмосферѣ тѣхъ тяжелыхъ разочарованій въ отношеніяхъ съ другими народами, которые пришлось пережить русскому народу по дѣлу участія его въ Большой Войнѣ. Тѣмъ не менѣе она все таки неправильна. Она является результатомъ, главнымъ образомъ, трехъ обстоятельствъ, изъ которыхъ два первыхъ имѣютъ преходящій характеръ, а послѣднее ошибочно истолковывается. Обстоятельства эти: 1) болѣзненная теперешняя наша склонность отождествлять всякое вообще англійское отношеніе къ Россіи съ отношеніемъ къ Россіи бывш. премьера Ллойдъ Джоржа; 2) старой репутаціей лорда Керзона, какъ руссофоба и наконецъ, 3) рѣзкостью и ультимативностью самаго тона ноты.

Трудно, конечно, съ исчерпывающей доказательностью установить конечныя цѣли дипломатическаго акта почти въ тотъ моментъ, когда онъ совершенъ. Дипломатія есть такой родъ человѣческой игры, самый смыслъ которой часто состоитъ въ томъ, чтобы на возможно долгое время затемнить эти конечныя цѣли.

Но посколько экономическій факторъ руководитъ дипломатіей, постолько же онъ даетъ руководящую нить для предвидѣнія ея конечныхъ цѣлей. Экономическій анализъ и заставляетъ меня не соглашаться съ только что изложенной точкой зрѣнія, скажемъ даже, большинства. Я ее привелъ заранѣе затѣмъ, чтобы вы съ тѣмъ болѣе обостреннымъ вниманіемъ прослѣдили, не ошибаюсь ли я въ своихъ соображеніяхъ.

Итакъ я перехожу къ моей точкѣ зрѣнія.

Оффиціальные мотивы ноты: 1) антибританская пропаганда Коммунистическаго Правительства на Востокѣ, 2) препятствія англійскому рыбному промыслу и 3) непристойный тонъ ноты М. Вейнштейна въ отвѣтъ на представленіе англійскаго правительства о смягченіи участи духовныхъ лицъ, осужденныхъ на смертную казнь въ связи съ гоненіями на религію.

Если бы дѣло шло не объ отношеніяхъ между двумя правительствами, изъ которыхъ каждое отрицаетъ самую базу режима другого, причемъ одно изъ нихъ активно стремится къ ниспроверженію капиталистической системы, а другое терпитъ коммунистическую только для достиженія спеціальныхъ выгодъ, то перечисленныхъ выше трехъ причинъ было бы достаточно для того, чтобы испортить дружескія отношенія до степени ультиматума.

Для даннаго случая ихъ врядъ ли достаточно. Вѣдь, ничего новаго и особеннаго за послѣднее время не произошло. До, во время и послѣ заключенія торговаго договора коммунисты вели пропаганду на Востокѣ, болѣе ѣдкую, чѣмъ всякая другая, ибо въ ней моментъ національный сочетался

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и усиливался съ моментомъ классовой борьбы и міровой соціалистической революціи. Такая пропаганда есть спеціальность большевиковъ, а для даннаго момента, какъ мнѣ уже приходилось говорить,*)и императивная необходимость, вытекающая изъ ихъ теперешняго положенія. Религіозныя гоненія и, что еще болѣе разрушительно для морали народа, растлѣніе чистоты самой идеи религіи — большевиками никогда не прекращалось. До, во время и послѣ заключенія торговаго договора, выступленія коммунистическихъ лидеровъ не только въ Коминтернѣ, но и въ различныхъ съѣздахъ и конференціяхъ, оффиціально созываемыхъ правительствомъ, наконецъ въ правительственной коммунистической печати не были любезнѣе въ отношеніи Англіи, чѣмъ тонъ ноты М. Вейнштейна. Публично и съ подобающими случаю поясненіями и помпой коммунисты сожигали чучело своего покровителя Ллойдъ Джоржа во время самаго расцвѣта англо-совѣтской дружбы.

Прежнее англійское правительство все это сносило почти безъ протеста. Теперешнее — шлетъ ультиматумъ.

Объясненій этому контрасту можетъ быть дано два.

Первое объясненіе заключается въ томъ, что указанныя оффиціально три причины ультиматума были на самомъ дѣлѣ не причинами, а только поводомъ для него, и что ультиматумъ былъ вызванъ другими причинами, которыя возникли относительно недавно и о которыхъ онъ не говоритъ.

Второе объясненіе въ томъ, а) что правительство Ллойдъ Джоржа переносило это къ себѣ отношеніе коммунистической власти во имя достиженія столь жизненно-важныхъ для Англіи цѣлей, что въ сравненіи съ ними уколы, причиняемые англійскому престижу коммунистическими манерами дипломатическихъ сношеній, казались мелочью, на которую можно не обращать вниманія и б) что теперь эти цѣли правительству Бонаръ Лоу-Балдвинъ-Керзонъ представляются практически недостижимыми или не столь важными для Англіи.

Я думаю, что имѣетъ силу, и первое, и второе объясненіе.

Причины ультиматума были не тѣ или не только тѣ, которыя указывались оффиціально. На самомъ дѣлѣ онѣ кроются гораздо глубже, въ болѣе жизненныхъ и интимныхъ частяхъ англійскаго государственнаго корабля. Я говорилъ о нихъ подробно, когда говорилъ о вѣроятности наступленія штормовой полосы для европейскаго континента. Здѣсь я только напомню о нихъ коротко.

Прежде всего это охлажденіе союзническихъ или дружескихъ отношеній между политическимъ англійскимъ капиталомъ и Коминтерномъ. Вызвано оно было сознанной невозможностью получить другъ при посредствѣ друга тѣ выгоды, которыя первоначально отъ союза ожидались. Это — причины важныя, но не самыя важныя: онѣ затрагиваютъ интересъ только относительно небольшой, хотя очень вліятельной и активной части англійскаго національнаго капитала.

Другая категорія причинъ гораздо болѣе важна, ибо она поражаетъ интересъ уже всего англійскаго національнаго капитала.

Лежитъ она въ томъ, что коммунистическая диктатура 1) понизила покупательную способность россійскаго, а вслѣдствіе того и обще-европейскаго с.-хозяйственнаго и сырьевого рынка въ отношеніи пріобрѣтенія суммарнаго количества продукціи промышленности и 2) оказавшись некредитоспособной на міровомъ денежномъ рынкѣ и по самому существу

*) Коминтернъ и Капинтернъ «Russ. Econ.» № 7-8.

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своей экономической базы негодной для возстановленія національнаго хозяйства внутри Россіи, фатально и неизбѣжно стала спекулировать на разжиганіе мірового переворота на Востокѣ и Западѣ возбужденіемъ антагонизмовъ не только а) національностей Востока противъ имперіалистической ихъ эксплоатаціи и б) классовыхъ, но и в) Европейскихъ народовъ другъ противъ друга.

Въ результатѣ въ значительной части европейскаго континента господствуютъ раздраженіе и неувѣренность — экономическая и политическая. Въ такой атмосферѣ англійская внѣшняя торговля чувствуетъ себя очень плохо. Это поражаетъ интересъ всего англійскаго національнаго капитала, ибо *74% всего англійскаго національнаго дохода такъ или иначе зависитъ отъ внѣшней торговли*, имѣя связь въ конечномъ счетѣ съ операціями или по импорту или по экспорту.

И, наконецъ, третья, очень прозаическая причина, проникающая въ сознаніе болѣе широкихъ круговъ самаго посредственнаго англійскаго кругозора: Коммунистическое Правительство истратило уже почти весь золотой запасъ.

Ея одной достаточно для того, чтобы торговыя отношенія прекратились de facto, несмотря на то, что торговый договоръ даже будетъ существовать de jure.

Я думаю, что правильность перваго моего объясненія достаточно обоснована.

Перейдемъ теперь къ аргументаціи второго объясненія. Здѣсь можно ограничиться только нѣсколькими словами, ибо вся аргументація можетъ быть замѣнена простымъ указаніемъ на одинъ, очень большого значенія фактъ въ жизни англійской государственной мысли. Я уже говорилъ о немъ раньше: въ основу курса политики Англійскаго Правительства, возглавлявшагося бывшимъ премьеромъ Ллойдъ Джоржемъ, была положена идея, радикально отличающаяся отъ основной идеи, на которой построена политика теперешняго англійскаго правительства. Тогда это былъ курсъ на «диктатуру» — теперь это курсъ на «равновѣсіе».

Строго говоря, этимъ я могъ бы ограничиться въ обоснованіи моей точки зрѣнія на ноту лорда Керзона, считая сказанное достаточнымъ.

Я дополню однако короткія замѣчанія, сдѣланныя мною при изложеніи другой точки зрѣнія, скажемъ большинства, нѣсколько болѣе подробнымъ анализомъ ея. Она требуетъ къ себѣ очень бережнаго и вдумчиваго отношенія, ибо она возникла въ большой и широкой россійской душѣ, такой спокойной и довѣрчивой раньше и такой изстрадавшейся и недовѣрчивой теперь.

Этотъ анализъ попутно увеличитъ, какъ мнѣ кажется, число доводовъ, въ силу которыхъ я держусь моей точки зрѣнія на ноту лорда Керзона и критики которыхъ я съ большимъ интересомъ отъ васъ жду. Признаюсь, что мнѣ было бы очень больно не только за лишнія испытанія, предстоящія еще Россіи, но и за степень, до которой, значитъ, упалъ умственный и моральный уровень «европейскаго человѣка», если бы мы въ результатѣ объективнаго обсужденія пришли бы къ выводу, что правильна пессимистическая точка зрѣнія на ноту Керзона, а не предлагаемая вамъ мною оптимистическая. Но я предпочитаю во всякомъ случаѣ горькую но реальную истину моему болѣе утѣшительному теперешнему заблужденію, если моя теперешняя точка зрѣнія есть дѣйствительно заблужденіе.

Перейдемъ теперь къ анализу пессимистической точки зрѣнія. Въ ней есть два главныхъ пункта, которые требуютъ особаго вниманія. Эти пункты:

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1) нота есть продолженіе политики Ллойдъ Джоржа и 2) она направлена не противъ Коммунистическаго Правительства, а противъ Россіи.

Продолженіе-ли политики Ллойдъ Джоржа? Посмотримъ прежде всего, подтверждаетъ ли реальный ходъ событій, находящихся въ связи съ нотой, предположеніе, что она является продолженіемъ политики Ллойдъ Джоржа: — Если бы это было такъ, то правительство не встрѣтило бы такой бурной опозиціи въ парламентѣ, чуть не дошедшей до нарушенія парламентской практики: не ставить голосованія довѣрія правительству при обсужденіи вопросовъ иностранной политики.

Ллойдъ Джоржъ еще разъ формулировалъ свою политику въ отношеніи Россіи. Его точка зрѣнія повидимому раздѣлялась всей оппозиціей. Была она изложена въ нѣсколькихъ, но исчерпывающихъ ея смыслъ фразахъ.

По его словамъ, онъ всегда боялся Россіи. Онъ говоритъ дальше: «Большевизмъ — явленіе преходящее. Никакая страна не можетъ выдерживать развиваемую имъ температуру безъ того, что не разлагаться отъ нея.» Это его діагнозъ. А вотъ его рецептъ поведенія для правительства: не ухудшать и не смущать теченіе дней большевистской власти, поддерживать дружескія отношенія съ нею. Зачѣмъ, спросимъ мы. — Затѣмъ, чтобы не ускорять хода событій къ имъ предвидимому и неизбѣжному прекращенію въ Россіи коммунистическаго режима.

Принятъ ли представителями правительства этотъ рецептъ къ выполненію? Вы видите, что тов. мин. ин. дѣлъ Мак' Нейль очень любезно, но очень твердо заявилъ, что у правительства имѣется собственная, продуманная политика въ отношеніи совѣтской власти. «Эти требованія», говоритъ онъ, «не есть плодъ спѣшной формулировки — и я могу добавить, въ виду нѣкоторыхъ сообщеній прессы, — они были выставлены съ надлежащаго обсужденія и одобренія ихъ премьеръ министромъ. Къ этимъ требованіямъ пришли послѣ обсужденія ихъ въ засѣданіи всего состава кабинета министровъ, въ которомъ предсѣдательствовалъ самъ премьеръ. Слѣдовательно вся политика имѣетъ несомнѣнно его санкцію и одобреніе».

Такимъ образомъ мы имѣемъ основанія думать, 1) что нота лорда Керзона есть поворотъ отъ политики бывшаго премьера Ллойдъ Джоржа, а не ея продолженіе и 2) что она является актомъ не одного только министра иностранныхъ дѣлъ, а всего Кабинета, придававшаго этому повороту очень большое значеніе.

И что дѣло было именно такъ, вы видите изъ того, что еще болѣе высокій чѣмъ тов. мин. ин. дѣлъ, авторитетъ, именно замѣститель премьера Балдвинъ два раза выступалъ въ парламентѣ по поводу ноты — до и послѣ засѣданія, посвященнаго дебатамъ по ней, говорилъ въ тонѣ непреклонной рѣшительности о готовности правительства сдѣлать ее вопросомъ довѣрія.

Только что отмѣченный ходъ событій при обсужденіи англо-совѣтскихъ отношеній въ парламентѣ даетъ основанія сдѣлать, кромѣ главнаго, еще два дополнительныхъ заключенія, а именно 1) представленіе о нотѣ, какъ демонстраціи съ цѣлью припугнуть коммунистовъ и получить этимъ путемъ отъ нихъ уступки въ вопросѣ о территоріальныхъ водахъ отпадаетъ. Такая цѣль на практикѣ достигалась бы съ гораздо меньшей «публичностью». Послѣдняя, напротивъ, затрудняетъ для большевиковъ позицію уступокъ, и 2) отпадаетъ соображеніе о происхожденіи ноты, какъ о результатѣ «руссофобства» лорда Керзона.

По поводу послѣдняго я сдѣлаю попутно два замѣчанія: а) лордъ Керзонъ и министерство ин. дѣлъ совершенно ясно демонстрировали свое не-

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согласіе съ политикой бывшаго премьера Ллойдъ Джоржа, направленной къ поддержанію коммунистической власти, еще во время заключенія торговаго договора и б) практика англійскаго государственнаго аппарата такова, что элементъ личныхъ симпатій исключается изъ дѣйствій всякаго англійскаго министра ин. дѣлъ. На иностранную политику слѣдуетъ смотрѣть, какъ на политику всего англійскаго народа, а не какъ на политику партійную и еще менѣе личную. Лордъ Керзонъ былъ «руссофобомъ» потому и тогда, когда Англія, побуждаемая системой европейскаго равновѣсія, строила комбинацію равновѣсія противъ Россіи. Онъ и всякій другой англійскій министръ ин. дѣлъ будетъ «руссофиломъ» если и когда Англія, движимая той же системой равновѣсія будетъ строить комбинаціи, гарантирующія противъ чрезмѣрнаго усиленія другой европейской державы, скажемъ Германіи.

Въ конечномъ счетѣ англійскій министръ иностранныхъ дѣлъ — не «руссофобъ» и не «руссофилъ». Онъ просто — англофилъ. Другіе народы для него приблизительно такъ же равны, какъ бѣлые и черные для шахматнаго игрока. Такова — реальность.

Противъ кого направлена? Отвѣту на этотъ вопросъ позвольте предпослать два замѣчанія болѣе общаго характера.

Первое. Въ нѣкоторыхъ пунктахъ, дѣйствительно, трудно провести намъ грань между Коммунистическимъ Правительствомъ и Россіей. Въ нихъ, ударяя по Коммунистическому Правительству, Вы легко можете больно ударить по Россіи и тѣмъ не выполнить вашего долга передъ «будущей Россіей» и предъ «всей некоммунистической Россіей», которая находится теперь внутри Россійскихъ географическихъ границъ и которой отъ коммунистическаго режима еще болѣе тяжело, чѣмъ «некоммунистической Россіи», находящейся внѣ Россійскихъ географическихъ границъ, — т. е. Россійской эмиграціи.

Такіе пункты, напримѣръ: вопросы о проливахъ, территоріальныхъ водахъ, торговыхъ и прочихъ сношеніяхъ Россіи съ внѣшнимъ міромъ и нѣкоторые др. Количество такихъ пунктовъ относительно не велико.

Для всѣхъ же остальныхъ можно съ категоричностью принять за правило: чѣмъ хуже Коммунистическому Правительству, тѣмъ лучше Россіи. Чѣмъ дольше въ Россіи длится температура коммунистическаго режима, тѣмъ больше истощаются силы россійскаго народа и Россіи.

Въ этомъ мы всѣ, я думаю, согласны съ Ллойдъ Джоржемъ. Разойдемся мы съ нимъ только въ выводахъ: онъ хочетъ, чтобы коммунистическій режимъ продолжался, какъ можно дольше, мы — какъ можно меньше.

Второе. Свойствомъ Россійской національной психологіи было ставить въ международной политикѣ цѣли не матеріальнаго, а духовнаго порядка. Цѣли эти бывали умныя или глупыя, реакціонныя или прогрессивныя, но въ огромномъ количествѣ случаевъ онѣ лежали въ области запросовъ духа. Лучшую часть русскаго общества можно было увлечь въ область активныхъ внѣшнихъ выступленій идеей защиты угнетеннаго народа, родственнаго намъ по религіи или расѣ, освобожденія Европы отъ деспотизма грубой, скажемъ нѣмецкой, силы и т. д. Но ваше дѣло было бы безнадежно, если бы вы попытались обосновать ваши позиціи на выгодахъ для русской промышленности или торговли.

Мы не станемъ разбирать, худо ли это или хорошо, равно искать корней этой психологіи. Послѣдній вопросъ тоже очень интересенъ. Ограничимся просто констатированіемъ факта.

Отъ привычной психологіи довольно трудно отдѣлаться. Русская

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мысль совершенно неосновательно ждала бы отъ англійской дипломатіи привычныхъ ей въ Россіи не только мотивовъ, но и языка для ихъ выраженія. Англійская національная психологія ставитъ себѣ въ области международной политики цѣли главнѣйшимъ образомъ матеріальнаго порядка. Англійская дипломатія есть дипломатія крупнѣйшей торговой фирмы. Ея назначеніе обезпечить своему національному хозяйству опредѣленный матеріальный интересъ. Всякій народъ для нея есть прежде всего торговый кліентъ, и она къ нему относится, держится съ нимъ того или другого тона въ зависимости отъ того, хорошъ ли онъ или худъ, какъ кліентъ торговой фирмы. Вы помните тотъ англійскій девизъ, который года два тому назадъ тоже въ связи съ отношеніями къ Россіи приводилъ Асквитъ: «I am not bound to make my country the knight errant of the human race». Вы видите: здѣсь разница національной психологіи. Каждый народъ можетъ дать только то, что у него есть. Мы должны просто понять разницу психологіи и судить о нотѣ въ этомъ реальномъ пониманіи.

Перейдемъ теперь къ отвѣту. Въ нотѣ есть нѣчто, что вопреки, можетъ быть, логикѣ разума, но въ угоду эмоціямъ сердца, склоняетъ многихъ русскихъ считать ее направленной противъ Россіи. Это ея тонъ и агрессивность въ отношеніи суверенныхъ правъ Россіи на территоріальныя ея воды. Дѣйствительно, ни одно Англійское Правительство не говорило ни съ однимъ Русскомъ Правительствомъ въ томъ тонѣ, въ которомъ говоритъ лордъ Керзонъ съ коммунистами. Но не слѣдуетъ забывать и обратнаго. Ни одно Россійское Правительство никогда не говорило ни съ однимъ Англійскимъ Правительствомъ въ тонѣ ноты М. Вейнштейна. Если ваше русское чувство задѣвается дипломатическимъ языкомъ лорда Керзона, то въ равной мѣрѣ и англійское національное чувство можетъ быть задѣто дипломатическимъ языкомъ комиссаріата иностр. дѣлъ, говорящимъ теперь за Россію. Обѣ стороны квиты.

Насъ должна интересовать, однако, больше не эта, такъ сказать, внѣшняя сторона вопроса о рѣзкости тона, а нѣчто болѣе глубокое. Посмотримъ, какія глубокія причины и намѣренія вызывали эту рѣзкость тона, какъ со стороны Совѣтскаго, такъ и со стороны Англійскаго Правительства. Выясненіе ихъ дастъ намъ ключъ къ правильному пониманію, противъ кого именно была направлена нота лорда Керзона — противъ Совѣтскаго Правительства исключительно или противъ Россіи. Я приглашаю васъ возстановить въ вашей памяти два члена формулы «динамическаго равновѣсія» Европы и посмотрѣть сперва, какъ они будутъ выглядѣть на фонѣ теперешняго экономическаго и политическаго положенія коммунистической власти.

Я уже говорилъ, здѣсь коротко, а раньше подробно,*) что теперешнее экономическое и политическое положеніе совѣтской власти императивно толкаетъ ее къ политикѣ «на міровой переворотъ».

Нота М. Вейнштейна не есть по существу простой дѣловой отвѣтъ на представленіе Англійскаго Правительства о помилованіи, имѣющій цѣлью такъ или иначе разрѣшить возникшій вопросъ въ отношеніяхъ между двумя правительствами. Если бы она имѣла эту цѣль, она была бы написана въ самомъ худшемъ случаѣ въ тонѣ вѣжливаго отказа. Между тѣмъ въ ней мы видимъ цѣлый, къ дѣлу не идущій и на первый взглядъ ненужный потокъ самыхъ крайнихъ рѣзкостей. Зачѣмъ этотъ потокъ? — Во всякомъ случаѣ это не озорство и не легкомысліе М. Вейнштейна: онъ—тренированный, и знающій свое дѣло человѣкъ. Да, наконецъ, въ такомъ серьезномъ отно-

*) «Russ. Econ.» стр. 3018 и 2634.

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сительно дѣлѣ онъ не могъ послать своей ноты, не показавъ ее главѣ комиссаріата иностранныхъ дѣлъ.

Остается предположить другое, а именно что рѣзкость была *вызвана не «обращеніемъ* англійскаго правительства о помилованіи, а была *проявлена по поводу» этого обращенія*, была умышленна и била дальше ближайшей задачи — отвѣтить, скажемъ, отказомъ на представленіе о помилованіи. Дѣло шло не о дипломатической перепискѣ, а объ обращеніи черезъ голову англійскаго представителя министерства иностр. дѣлъ къ народамъ міра, — о старомъ большевистскомъ пріемѣ: «всѣмъ, всѣмъ, всѣмъ». Это уже кусокъ пропаганды, разсчитанной на умаленіе англійскаго государственнаго престижа. Такая пропаганда есть логическое слѣдствіе теперешняго коммунистическаго курса на «міровой переворотъ», подхода Коминтерна къ «самымъ конечнымъ цѣлямъ».*) Ея смыслъ: «рѣзкостью тона» — «выиграть авторитетъ» въ глазахъ, главнымъ образомъ, народовъ Востока за счетъ умаленія престижа Англіи. Черезъ голову англійскаго министерства иностр. дѣлъ Коммунистическое Правительство обращается, собственно говоря, къ этимъ народамъ Востока, заостряя и подчеркивая «рѣзкостью тона» лозунги ближайшей своей пропаганды: «Вотъ какимъ тономъ мы разговариваемъ съ Англіей. Мы сильны. Англія не смѣетъ стрѣлять». — Востокъ, вѣдь, уважаетъ военную силу не меньше западныхъ цивилизованныхъ странъ.

Почему Совѣтское Правительство позволяетъ себѣ такую рѣзкость тона? Потому что оно нащупало слабость Англіи при теперешней европейской обстановкѣ — при теперешнемъ потерянномъ равновѣсіи на европейскомъ континентѣ. Слабое мѣсто лежитъ во второмъ членѣ формулы «динамическаго равновѣсія». Англія не обладаетъ достаточными военными силами вообще и въ частности для того, чтобы въ какой нибудь мѣрѣ воспрепятствовать Коммунистическому Правительству говорить съ нею въ тонѣ ноты М. Вейнштейна.

Дѣйствительно, пока Совѣтское Правительство терпится россійской арміей,—оно недосягаемо для Англіи: никакая война Англіи противъ Россіи невозможна. Для войны Англіи надо было бы имѣть крупную сухопутную армію. Рѣзкость тона ноты Вейнштена есть внѣшній знакъ того, что 2-ой членъ формулы «динамическаго равновѣсія» въ отношеніи оцѣнки силъ Россіи великъ. Одного второго члена, однако, не достаточно, тѣмъ болѣе, что и онъ великъ только *статически* при теперешнемъ разрушеніи индустріи въ Россіи: — Россія сильна теперь въ военномъ отношеніи, но не въ военно-техническомъ.

Рѣзкость тона ноты Вейнштейна, однако, совершенно не основательна съ точки зрѣнія *динамики* силъ и *динамики* международнаго вѣса Россіи. Величина перваго члена формулы «динамическаго равновѣсія», требующаго экономической силы и независимости, очень мала для Россіи. И этимъ Россія *обязана исключительно Коммунистическому Правительству*, разрушившему русскую индустрію. Это дѣлаетъ позиціи Коммунистическаго Правительства крайне уязвимыми — оно очень чувствительно къ малѣйшему давленію извнѣ — и съ точки сохраненія имъ авторитета и престижа въ Россіи: всякое демонстрированіе экономической слабости дѣлаетъ Коммунистическое Правительство жалкимъ и безпомощнымъ въ глазахъ русской арміи и русскаго народа.

Не существуетъ, вѣроятно, на свѣтѣ пріема дипломатической игры, который бы не былъ извѣстенъ такому опытному дипломату, какъ лордъ

*) «Russ. Econ.» стр. 3015 и 2630.

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Керзонъ. Большевистскій пріемъ — говорить черезъ голову правительствъ «всѣмъ, всѣмъ, всѣмъ» — и разрушать этимъ престижъ Англійскаго Правительства—не новъ, и лордъ Керзонъ платитъ Коммунистическому Правительству той же монетой.

На рѣзкость тона, иниціатива которой принадлежитъ коммунистическому комиссару ин. дѣлъ, я это подчеркиваю, лордъ Керзонъ отвѣчаетъ тоже рѣзкостью. Свой ударъ онъ направляетъ почти исключительно въ сторону перваго члена формулы «динамическаго равновѣсія» т. е. демонстрируетъ слабость экономическихъ рессурсовъ, которыми обладаетъ Коммунистическое Правительство. Онъ оперируетъ угрозой разрыва торговаго договора.

Отмѣчу попутно свое полное согласіе съ сторонниками пессимистической точки зрѣнія на ноту Керзона въ ихъ утвержденіи, что сопротивляемость Коммунистическаго Правительства иностранному давленію должна теперь очень понизиться. Большевики уже теперь быстро пошли на уступки. Не сомнѣваюсь, что они пойдутъ еще на большія. Но мой выводъ изъ этого утвержденія совсѣмъ другой, чѣмъ дѣлаютъ пессимисты.

Я думаю, что этой пониженной сопротивляемостью Коммунистическаго Правительства лордъ Керзонъ пользуется не для того, чтобы пожать при ея помощи сравнительно дешевые лавры, т. е. выжать уступку въ ширинѣ*) территоріальныхъ водъ, хотя и отъ этой уступки онъ не откажется, а для достиженія болѣе сложной цѣли.

Самой своей рѣзкостью нота Керзона черезъ головы Коммунистическаго Правительства говоритъ не «всѣмъ, всѣмъ, всѣмъ», а только русскому народу. Она ставитъ въ центрѣ остраго вниманія всей некоммунистической Россіи, живущей теперь внутри и внѣ россійскихъ географическихъ границъ, слѣдующую мысль:

«Какъ слабо положеніе Коммунистическаго Правительства и до какой степени разрушенія довело оно россійскую экономику, если простая перспектива лишиться въ самомъ худшемъ случаѣ возможности продать въ Англіи товара на 4,9 мил. ф. и купить на 4,5 м. ф. въ годъ заставляетъ Коммунистическое Правительство панически бросить наступательныя позиціи ноты М. Вейнштейна и начать безудержно сдавать лорду Керзону позиціи: 1) дорогія сердцу всякаго коммуниста: пропаганду мірового переворота на Востокѣ и классовой революціи въ капиталистическомъ мірѣ и 2) дорогія милліонамъ національно мыслящихъ русскихъ: суверенитетъ и престижъ Россіи».

Маскарадъ кончился. Коммунистическое Правительство съ лихорадочной поспѣшностью срываетъ съ себя величественную, горделивую мантію «Великаго вождя народовъ и классовъ въ ихъ міровой революціи противъ имперіалистическаго капитала», въ которой комиссаріатъ иностранныхъ дѣлъ поручилъ М. Вейнштейну написать его ноту. И велитъ Красину надѣть выслуженный Коммунистическимъ Правительствомъ и приличествующій его государственнымъ и хозяйственнымъ талантамъ фракъ лакея «имперіалистическаго иностраннаго капитала» и летѣть кланяться лорду Керзону.

Наглость панически переходитъ въ трусость.

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*) Я склоненъ думать, что самъ вопросъ о рыбной ловлѣ и территоріальныхъ водахъ былъ взятъ изъ архивовъ англійскаго министерства иностр. дѣлъ въ ноту лорда Керзона потому, что въ немъ англійскій министръ ин. дѣлъ могъ найти ту небольшую область, гдѣ Англія могла продемонстрировать свое военное превосходство надъ континентальной Россіей.

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Зрѣлище — довольно ѣдко разлагающее престижъ Коммунистическаго Правительства не только въ глазахъ коммунистовъ, но и въ глазахъ десятковъ милліоновъ національно мыслящихъ русскихъ, но и въ глазахъ такъ называемой красной арміи, которая давно перестала быть красной и стала обыкновенной національной арміей, единственной силы, которой еще держится Коммунистическое Правительство.

Я предпочитаю рѣзкій тонъ лорда Керзона потому, что онъ царапаетъ и будитъ русское національное чувство, льстивому и дружественному языку Ллойдъ Джоржа и Мальцана, говорящихъ о *сильной Россіи подъ мудрымъ водительствомъ эволюціонирующей коммунистической власти* — «этого единственно возможнаго для Россіи правительства», потому что тонъ Ллойдъ Джоржа и Мальцана усыпляетъ русскую національную бдительность.

Цѣнность рѣзкости тона лорда Керзона въ томъ, что она ставитъ людей и вещи на свое мѣсто, даетъ безпощадную, но дѣловую и реальную оцѣнку теперешняго дѣйствительнаго вѣса Россіи въ международныхъ отношеніяхъ и разсѣиваетъ иллюзіи, порождаемыя болтовней и враньемъ коммунистическихъ лидеровъ о способности ихъ оградить національные*) интересы Россіи.

Разъ мысль получила толчекъ, она не останавливается на первыхъ пріобрѣтеніяхъ. Она идетъ дальше въ своихъ выводахъ.

Вспомнимъ: только комбинація изъ двухъ членовъ формулы «динамическаго равновѣсія», т. е. изъ экономической и военной самостоятельности и силы, можетъ обезпечить Россіи независимое государственное существованіе и уваженіе въ международныхъ отношеніяхъ. Нова ли эта мысль для русской арміи и для русской промышленности? Мы хорошо знаемъ, что совсѣмъ не нова, что она составляетъ достояніе не единицъ, а массъ, ибо она познана и выстрадана не въ теоріи, а на практикѣ — на безчисленныхъ и кровавыхъ поляхъ Галиціи въ вѣчно памятное отступленіе весны 1915 г.

Тогда промышленность и, вообще, хозяйство страны были только не подготовлены къ защитѣ національныхъ интересовъ Россіи. Ихъ можно было перестроить и перестроили. И то о т с у т с т в і е ружей и снарядовъ у арміи стоили старому режиму потери престижа, которая дальше докатилась до активнаго содѣйствія арміи въ ниспроверженіи режима.

Теперь промышленность и хозяйство разрушены, продолжаютъ разрушаться еще дальше и не имѣютъ никакой надежды быть возстановлены при коммунистическомъ режимѣ, и вся красная армія, изволеніемъ коей только и держится Коммунистическое Правительство, подставляется тѣмъ же Коммунистическимъ Правительствомъ, безоружная и неснабженная на убой и разгромъ при сколько нибудь серьезномъ столкновеніи съ хорошо вооруженнымъ противникомъ. Никто вѣдь не вѣритъ въ красной арміи бахвальству Троцкаго, что онъ отберетъ у противника оружіе, изготовленное во Франціи. Какъ бы героичны ни были, голыми руками офицеръ и солдатъ

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*) Коммунистическое Правительство очень старательно пытается убѣдить и Россію и міръ въ томъ, что Россія и Коммунистическое Правительство — это нѣчто нераздѣльное. Кто противъ Коммунистическаго Правительства, тотъ противъ Россіи, мы настоящая Россія, говорятъ они. Пропагандѣ этихъ идей Коммунистическое Правительство придаетъ громадное значеніе.

Къ роли «рыцарей національной Россіи» и «національнаго россійскаго правительства» коммунисты стали стремиться еще съ конца 20 года. О причинахъ этого стремленія я говорилъ «Russ. Econ.» стр. 495 и 338.

Теперь въ роли паладина русскихъ національныхъ интересовъ особенно парадируетъ К. Радекъ.

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не отниметъ у противника пушку и пулеметъ. Оружіемъ ихъ должна обезпечить собственная экономическая мощь страны.

А до чего доведена эта экономическая мощь, если одна угроза расторгнуть торговый договоръ приводитъ коммунистическую власть въ лакейскій трепетъ? Нѣтъ сомнѣнія, что вся комбинація съ нотой М. Вейнштейна дала для престижа Коммунистическаго Правительства совсѣмъ другіе результаты, чѣмъ тѣ, на которые она была разсчитана.

Ультиматумъ лорда Керзона нанесъ тяжелый ударъ шатающемуся и безъ того престижу коммунистической класти и нанесъ его совершенно независимо отъ того, руководился ли лордъ Керзонъ дружественными намѣреніями въ отношеніи Россіи, подчинится ли ультиматуму Коммунистическое Правительство или нѣтъ.

Въ этомъ отношеніи ноту Керзона надо считать уже теперь положительнымъ явленіемъ для интересовъ Россіи.

Торговыя сношенія. Въ результатѣ ноты лорда Керзона можетъ возникнуть опасность для Россіи только въ одномъ единственномъ случаѣ. Это — если бы въ окончательномъ результатѣ нота повлекла за собой прекращеніе торговыхъ сношеній не только съ торговой делегаціей Коммунистическаго Правительства, но вообще съ Россіей. Это очень ухудшило бы начавшійся при НЭП'ѣ очень скромный процессъ эмансипаціи частнохозяйственной и кооперативной дѣятельности отъ коммунистической государственной диктатуры. Какъ ни скромны и какъ ни мало устойчивы достигнутые успѣхи, всетаки этотъ процессъ — положительное явленіе.

Помимо отрицательнаго вліянія въ матеріальномъ отношеніи на указанный выше процессъ эмансипаціи, прекращеніе торговыхъ отношеній съ Россіей будетъ имѣть отрицательный эфектъ и моральнаго порядка: всякая торговая блокада вызоветъ среди некоммунистическихъ элементовъ внутри Россіи горькое чувство на то, что является новая помѣха для чего то лучшаго, что какъ будто стало чувствоваться при НЭП'ѣ.

До сихъ поръ со стороны Англійскаго Правительства сдѣланъ рядъ заявленій о томъ, что торговыя отношенія съ Россіей оно хочетъ сохранить даже въ томъ случаѣ, если бы торговый договоръ былъ расторгнутъ.

Въ сущности торговый договоръ имѣетъ двойственную природу. Съ одной стороны, это былъ политическій актъ, которому въ моментъ его подписанія придавалось значеніе: 1) перваго шага къ юридическому признанію и 2) демонстрированія Англіей потенціальной поддержки Коммунистическому Правительству въ утвержденіи его диктатуры надъ Россіей. Съ другой стороны, это былъ актъ торговый, регулирующій процедуру чисто торговыхъ отношеній.

Среди правительственныхъ круговъ возраженія имѣются главнѣйшимъ образомъ противъ политической части торговаго договора. Что касается торговыхъ сношеній, то въ отношеніи ихъ слѣдуетъ отмѣтить, что въ серьезной и наиболѣе вліятельной части Сити имѣются тенденціи измѣнить теперешній характеръ торговли въ слѣдующемъ направленіи: усилить торговыя сношенія съ возникающими теперь въ Россіи частными торговыми фирмами и свободной кооперацією за счетъ уменьшенія или полнаго сокращенія торговыхъ сношеній съ органами коммунистической государственной торговой монополіи. Эта серьезная часть Сити полагаетъ, что коммунистическая торговая монополія, эксплоатируя беззастѣнчиво русскаго производителя, тѣмъ самымъ убиваетъ въ немъ импульсъ къ хозяйственной дѣятельности, не даетъ развиться англійской торговлѣ съ Россіей

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теперь и создаетъ скверныя перспективы для будущаго, ибо русскій рынокъ не будетъ возстанавливать своей покупательной способности.

Эти тенденціи къ измѣненію характера торговыхъ сношеній идутъ до извѣстной степени въ разрѣзъ съ интересами Коммунистическаго Правительства, но не противорѣчатъ интересамъ Россіи.

Такимъ образомъ, для торговыхъ отношеній съ Россіей пока нѣтъ никакой угрозы. Эти отношенія могутъ прерваться только въ томъ случаѣ, если этого пожелаетъ Коммунистическое Правительство и проявитъ особую активность въ направленіи ихъ срыва.

Заключеніе. Подводя итогъ до сихъ поръ сказанному, мы видимъ что: 1) перемѣна Англійскаго Правительства къ Коммунистическому имѣетъ глубокія экономическія причины, 2) выявленіе этой перемѣны въ видѣ ноты лорда Керзона было только ускорено нотой М. Вейнштейна, 3) никакой войны между Англіей и Россіей не можетъ быть, 4) никакой торговой блокады не предполагается, 5) Англія дѣловито и холодно просто отказываетъ въ своей поддержкѣ Коммунистическому Правительству, какъ торговому контрагенту, не только обанкротившемуся, но и создающему безпокойство въ остальномъ мірѣ, каковое безпокойство не совмѣстимо съ процвѣтаніемъ англійской торговли и наступленіемъ «динамическаго равновѣсія» въ Европѣ. Этотъ отказъ не есть вмѣшательство Англіи въ русскія дѣла, а просто предоставленіе Коммунистическаго Правительства собственной его участи, опредѣляемой внутренними силами Россіи. Поэтому, пока не обнаружатся новыя, до сихъ поръ неизвѣстныя обстоятельства, слѣдуетъ считать, что нота лорда Керзона направлена въ указанныхъ выше границахъ и смыслѣ противъ Коммунистическаго Правительства, но она не направлена противъ Россіи, напротивъ въ смыслѣ блага Россіи она положительное явленіе.

Къ этому я добавлю еще нѣсколько словъ. Не то для Россіи важно, будетъ или не будетъ въ результатѣ ноты Керзона расторгнутъ торговый договоръ. Я скорѣе думаю наприм., что торговый договоръ теперь не будетъ расторгнутъ и что Коммунистическое Правительство пойдетъ на всѣ уступки ультиматуму. Эта его «Новая Международная Политика» предрѣшена неуспѣхами «Новой Экономической Политики».

Не невѣроятно и, пожалуй, даже не особенно вредно такое теченіе событій, при которомъ до дня своего окончательнаго крушенія Коммунистическое Правительство просуществуетъ хоть короткое время въ видѣ kept government англійскаго капитализма или, выражаясь въ терминахъ старинаго языка, — аглицкаго сателита. Повторяю, все это не важно и все это очень быстротечно.

Важно то, что въ Европѣ создалась такая обстановка, при которой жизненный интересъ Англіи повелительно толкаетъ ее на измѣненіе политики временъ Ллойдъ Джоржа въ отношеніи Россіи. Нота лорда Керзона — это первый признакъ того, что англійская государственная мысль сознала наличіе этой обстановки.

Ультиматумъ и переговоры въ коммунистическомъ пониманіи. Для того, чтобы имѣть путеводную нить для пониманія смысла событій, которыя будутъ развертываться въ связи съ нотой лорда Керзона, не безинтересно будетъ посмотрѣть, какъ само Коммунистическое Правительство смотритъ на такія вещи какъ: переговоры съ капиталистическими правительствами, ультиматумъ, въ чемъ видитъ оно сильныя или слабыя стороны свои и капиталистическихъ правительствъ и, наконецъ, какъ представляетъ себѣ конечныя цѣли этихъ переговоровъ.

Прецедентъ болѣе или менѣе похожій на теперешнюю обстановку уже

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имѣлся. Это Брестъ-Литовскій миръ. Я ограничусь краткими выписками изъ очень интереснаго предисловія Л. Троцкаго къ изданной коммиссаріатомъ ин. дѣлъ исторіи переговоровъ въ Брестъ-Литовскѣ.*) Предисловіе это написано 1 августа 1919 г. Судя по тому, что приходится читать теперь въ совѣтской печати по поводу ноты лорда Керзона, основныя идеи коммунистической дипломатіи остались тѣ же.

Троцкій пишетъ: «Мы всѣ были солидарны въ томъ, что переговоры нужно тянуть, какъ можно долѣе, чтобы извлечь изъ нихъ весь агитаціонный, «капиталъ» и въ то же время выгадать, какъ можно болѣе времени, давъ исторіи возможность приблизить насъ къ германской и обще-европейской революціи. Разногласія начинались съ вопроса: какъ быть въ случаѣ ультиматума? Тов. Ленинъ ставилъ вопросъ ребромъ: ни въ какомъ случаѣ не доводить переговоровъ до разрыва. Разъ мы не можемъ вести войну, то не позволительно играть съ войной. Меньшинство партіи, наоборотъ, считало обязательнымъ довести переговоры до разрыва, чтобы отвѣтить на наступленіе партизанской войной: Наконецъ было теченіе, которое считало невозможнымъ военное сопротивленіе, но въ то же время находило необходимымъ довести переговоры до открытаго разрыва, до новаго наступленія Германіи такъ, чтобы капитулировать пришлось уже передъ очевиднымъ примѣненіемъ имперіалистической силы и вырвать тѣмъ самымъ изъ-подъ ногъ почву инсинуацій и подозрѣній, будто переговоры являются только прикрытіемъ уже состоявшейся сдѣлки.**) Этотъ агитаціонный доводъ представлялся рѣшающимъ автору настоящихъ строкъ. При борьбѣ двухъ крайнихъ теченій въ партіи временное преобладаніе получила средняя точка зрѣнія, давшая каждому изъ фланговъ надежду на то, что дальнѣйшій ходъ событій подтвердитъ правильность его діагноза и прогноза. Переговоры были прерваны... Переходъ нѣмцевъ въ наступленіе, захватъ ими ряда городовъ, разстрѣлы коммунистовъ на Украинѣ — все это слишкомъ ясно показало, что дѣло идетъ не о закулисной сдѣлкѣ. Намъ ничего не оставалось, какъ временно капитулировать передъ силой.

Если мы не оказались вовлеченными въ безнадежную войну, которая закончилась бы разгромомъ русской революціи (читай «большевистской контрреволюціи» М. Б.) въ теченіе 2-3 мѣсяцевъ, то этимъ партія обязана той рѣшительности, съ какой т. Ленинъ поставилъ вопросъ о необходимости временной капитуляціи, — «переходѣ на нелегальное положеніе по отношенію къ германскому имперіализму», какъ выражался онъ на партійныхъ собраніяхъ. Но оглядываясь назадъ, можно сейчасъ съ полной увѣренностью сказать, что временный разрывъ брест-литовскихъ переговоровъ и переходъ германскихъ войскъ въ наступленіе противъ насъ въ послѣднемъ счетѣ не повредилъ, но наоборотъ помогъ дѣлу европейской революціи (читаи «укрѣпленію престижа Коммунистическаго Правительства въ Россіи черезъ очищеніе репутаціи коммунистическихъ лидеровъ по части ихъ зависимости

*) Мирные переговоры въ Брестъ-Литовскѣ. Изд. Народнаго Комиссаріата Иностранныхъ Дѣлъ. Москва 1920.

**) Здѣсь дѣло идетъ объ очень распространенныхъ въ 1917 г. обвиненіяхъ большевистской партіи въ томъ, что она получила деньги и пр. содѣйствіе отъ нѣмецкаго генеральнаго штаба для разложенія русской арміи и соотвѣтственныхъ подозрѣніяхъ, что коммунистическое правительство дѣйствуетъ въ Брестъ-Литовскѣ не самостоятельно, а по предварительному сговору съ нѣмецкимъ правительствомъ.

Роль большевистскихъ лидеровъ въ разложеніи русской арміи и ихъ связь съ нѣмецкимъ генеральнымъ штабомъ была впослѣдствіи, какъ извѣстно, подтверждена ген. Людендорфомъ.

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отъ штаба ген. Людендорфа» М. Б.). Послѣ захвата нѣмцами Двинска, Ревеля и Пскова англійскіе и французскіе рабочіе не могли, разумѣется, вѣрить, что дѣло идетъ о закулисномъ сотрудничествѣ большевиковъ съ Гогенцоллерномъ. Это надолго затруднило бандитамъ Согласія возможность наступать на насъ. Во всякомъ случаѣ здѣсь умѣстно сказать: все хорошо, что хорошо кончается».

Такъ смотритъ Троцкій и компартія на «переговоры и ультиматумъ». Въ чемъ Троцкій видитъ слабую сторону въ позиціяхъ компартіи? — Въ прикосновенности ея и совмѣстныхъ дѣйствіяхъ съ контрразвѣдкой нѣмецкаго генеральнаго штаба. Онъ всѣми силами хочетъ вытравить изъ памяти русскихъ и рабочихъ круговъ странъ Согласія это продажное и скользкое прошлое компартіи. Въ своемъ предисловіи онъ постоянно возвращается къ этому вопросу.

Въ чемъ Троцкій видитъ сильную сторону позицій компартіи? — Онъ говоритъ: «Но у насъ было въ то же время одно огромное преимущество: мы гораздо лучше знали и понимали нашихъ партнеровъ, чѣмъ они насъ. Кюльманъ представлялъ себѣ большевиковъ, какъ революціонную разновидность тѣхъ колоніальныхъ «политиковъ» безъ роду и племени, выскочекъ, демагоговъ, которыхъ можно на одномъ поворотѣ исторіи использовать, чтобы затѣмъ, если понадобится, толкнуть ихъ въ спину... Можно не сомнѣваться, что германскій имперіализмъ никогда не затѣялъ бы съ нами мирныхъ переговоровъ, если бы *понималъ* (курс. Троцкаго) насъ, если бы предчувствовалъ, какая опасность ему отсюда грозитъ... Они не понимали насъ. Мы же знали ихъ и предвидѣли послѣдствія того, что произойдетъ. Вотъ почему брест-литовскіе переговоры въ послѣднемъ счетѣ цѣликомъ пошли на пользу русской (читай «большевистской» М. Б.) и международной революціи... Послѣ нашей формальной капитуляціи въ Брестъ-Литовскѣ германскій имперіализмъ не продержался и 9 мѣсяцевъ».

Это горделивое утвержденіе Троцкаго требуетъ, конечно, нѣкоторой поправки «германскій имперіализмъ не продержался и 9 мѣсяцевъ» не только потому, что Троцкій создавалъ «агитаціонный капиталъ» на брест-литовскихъ переговорахъ и капитуляціи, но несомнѣнно и его капля меду въ этомъ дѣлѣ есть.

Какъ представлялъ себѣ въ 1919 г. Л. Троцкій будущую политику компартіи на основаніи опыта ея въ Брестъ-Литовскѣ? — Онъ говоритъ: «Съ своей стороны, мы готовы были повторить брест-литовскіе переговоры съ новыми англо-французскими партнерами: исторія показала, что отъ перваго Бреста не мы оказались въ накладѣ. Но именно поэтому буржуазные классы Антанты послѣ всѣхъ колебаній, шатаній и пересудовъ, повидимому окончательно отказались отъ переговоровъ съ правительствомъ большевиковъ. Въ этомъ отказѣ есть весьма цѣнное историческое признаніе, какъ правильности нашей брест-литовской политики, такъ и нашей возрастающей силы. Германскій имперіализмъ вступилъ съ нами въ переговоры, ибо надѣялся справиться съ нами безъ труда. Англо-французскій имперіализмъ не вѣритъ себѣ и потому боится насъ. Если для того, чтобы опрокинуть австро-германскій имперіализмъ исторіи понадобился этапъ Бреста, то это вовсе не значитъ, что уходя отъ Бреста, англо-французскій хищники уйдутъ отъ гибели. Исторія изобрѣтательна и въ распоряженіи ея имѣется много методовъ и средствъ, а мы не доктринеры и охотно примемъ гибель нашихъ враговъ, независимо отъ того, въ какомъ видѣ она обрушится на ихъ головы».

Такова идеологія компартіи и Троцкаго въ отношеніи будущей политики

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Коммунистическаго Правительства. Она не потеряла своего интереса для пониманія текущихъ событій.

Кое-что, правда, измѣнилось не къ выгодѣ престижа Коммунистическаго Правительства. Повывѣтрились, какъ внутренній пафосъ коммунистовъ, такъ и вѣра въ нихъ вовнѣ. Не только въ глазахъ Кюльмана и очень многихъ другихъ, ничего общаго съ Кюльманомъ не имѣющихъ, но даже въ своихъ собственныхъ коммунистическихъ глазахъ, компартія теперь больше «колоніальные политики безъ роду и племени, выскочки и демагоги», чѣмъ вожди міровой соціалистической революціи. Вѣра въ спасительность послѣдней тоже повывѣтрилась.

ГЛ. IV. ГЕРМАНІЯ И РОССІЯ ВЪ СИСТЕМѢ ДИНАМИЧЕСКАГО РАВНОВѢСІЯ ЕВРОПЫ.

Выше я говорилъ, что теперешнее измѣненіе англійской политики въ отношеніи Россіи вызывается курсомъ кабинета Бонаръ Лоу-Балдвинъ-Керзонъ на «динамическое равновѣсіе» въ Европѣ.

Въ предыдущей главѣ я показалъ, какими путями разрушеніе русскаго національнаго хозяйства поражаетъ интересъ англійской внѣшней торговли и въ конечномъ счетѣ всего англійскаго національнаго капитала.

Депрессія англійской торговли и ея слѣдствіе — кризисъ индустріальнаго перепроизводства, являющійся выраженіемъ теперешняго, т. е. при теперешнемъ сжатіи покупательной способности внѣшняго мірового рынка, состоянія «перенасыщенія индустріализмомъ» англійскаго національнаго хозяйства и соціальное безпокойство, вызываемое безработицей — создаютъ понижательную тенденцію для величины «динамическаго вѣса»*) Англіи, явно уменьшая его первый членъ.

Для того, чтобы изъ этого положенія начать выходить, кабинету Бонаръ Лоу-Балдвинъ-Керзонъ нужна не спекулятивная, авантюристическая и мелочная торговля временъ Ллойдъ Джоржа съ Россіей, а такое положеніе дѣлъ въ Россіи, которое будетъ давать основаніе для надеждъ и возрожденія солидныхъ и крупныхъ торговыхъ отношеній, т. е. солидное и прочное возстановленіе россійскаго хозяйства. Коммунистическій режимъ оказался явно несостоятельнымъ его возстановить. Послѣдняя попытка — НЭП — тоже не оказалась практическимъ методомъ для этого.

Отсюда: продолженіе коммунистическаго режима въ Россіи перестаетъ совпадать съ жизненными интересами Англіи и направленіемъ политики къ «миру и сдержанности» кабинета Бонаръ Лоу.

Вы видите, что пока вопросъ о независимости государственнаго существованія Россіи, о независимомъ динамическомъ вѣсѣ Россіи еще не ставится въ заостренной и императивной формѣ.

Въ этой главѣ я постараюсь показать, что на самомъ дѣлѣ онъ уже вступаетъ и для Англіи въ стадію заостренную и императивную.

Для этого мы перейдемъ отъ болѣе узкаго масштаба главы III, въ ко-

*) Для сокращенія я буду называть «динамическимъ вѣсомъ» страны: 1) экономическія силы національнаго хозяйства данной страны плюсъ 2) военно-техническія силы правительства той же страны.

Для осуществленія динамическаго равновѣсія слѣдовательно требуется наличіе въ Европѣ двухъ группъ съ такимъ числомъ странъ въ группѣ I и II, чтобы сумма «динамическихъ вѣсовъ» группы I уравновѣшивалась съ суммой «динамическихъ вѣсовъ» группы II. Число странъ въ группѣ въ предѣлѣ можетъ равняться единицѣ.

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торой мы ограничивались отношеніями только между двумя странами — Англіей и Россіей, — къ болѣе широкому масштабу, анализу болѣе сложнаго клубка европейскихъ отношеній, т. е. отношеній между Англіей, Франціей, Россіей и Германіей въ ихъ совокупности.

Я приглашаю васъ снова возстановить въ вашей памяти два члена формулы динамическаго равновѣсія и посмотрѣть, какъ они будутъ выглядѣть уже въ окончательномъ видѣ, т. е. на широкомъ фонѣ международныхъ отношеній въ Европѣ. Разсматривать мы будемъ динамическіе вѣса отдѣльныхъ странъ и комбинаціи, которыя изъ нихъ могутъ образовываться.

Я уже говорилъ, что Германія въ смыслѣ динамическаго вѣса занимала до 1914 г. единственное и совершенно исключительное положеніе въ Европѣ. Величина и гармоничность роста, и перваго, и второго члена ея динамическаго вѣса создавали тенденцію къ чрезвычайной импульсивности увеличенія значенія всего динамическаго вѣса какъ абсолютно, такъ и относительно роста динамическихъ вѣсовъ Англіи и Франціи.

Англія и Франція, живя и дѣйствуя подъ вліяніемъ идеи «двойственной диктатуры», подрѣзали въ Версали почти подъ корень второй членъ (разоруженіе) динамическаго вѣса Германіи и очень сильно — первый (угольные и желѣзные рессурсы плюсъ репараціонные платежи quantum satis). Благодаря этой операціи сумма динамическихъ вѣсовъ Англіи и Франціи на много, казалось, должна была превосходить динамическій вѣсъ Германіи. Если же добавить къ нимъ еще динамическіе вѣса странъ, такъ называемыхъ «kept states», то, казалось, получается такой запасъ прочности, который могъ удовлетворить самыя взыскательныя требованія.

Однимъ словомъ, все казалось въ порядкѣ, и система двойственной диктатуры — pax Sociorum — была обезпечена на неопредѣленно долгую жизнь. Соотвѣтственно, динамическій вѣсъ Россіи могъ быть приравненъ 0. За истекшіе съ Версаля четыре года динамическіе вѣса Англіи и отчасти Франціи уменьшились, а съ другой стороны динамическій вѣсъ Германіи крупно выросъ несмотря на всю тяжесть, которой Антанта его придавила по Версальскому договору.

Проблема защиты англійскихъ жизненныхъ интересовъ отъ импульсивнаго роста динамическаго вѣса Германіи выростаетъ передъ Англіей въ еще болѣе грозномъ заданіи, чѣмъ это было въ дни Эдуарда VII. То ближайшее и простѣйшее рѣшеніе, которое предложила Франція, т. е. военное овладѣніе германской индустріальной базой въ Рурѣ, для смотрящей далеко впередъ англійской государственной мысли представляется рѣшеніемъ не прочнымъ, паліативомъ, могущимъ помочь и то несовершенно на очень короткое время. Помимо этого, рѣшеніе это представляется чреватымъ новой и громадной катастрофой на европейскомъ континентѣ. Англія ищетъ другого болѣе надежнаго рѣшенія.

Соотвѣтственно, динамическій вѣсъ Россіи уже не можетъ приравниваться 0, и Англія начинаетъ возвращаться къ заботливости, свойственной временамъ Эдуарда VII о томъ, чтобы динамическій вѣсъ Россіи былъ положительной и достаточно значительной величиной.*)

*) Для того, чтобы вы, хотя на время, могли отрѣшиться отъ воспоминаній о Ллойдъ Джорджѣ и допустить вѣроятность того, что Англія дѣйствительно можетъ заботиться о динамическомъ вѣсѣ Россіи, я рекомендую вамъ посмотрѣть книжку этюдныхъ, но мастерскихъ портретовъ англійскихъ государственныхъ дѣятелей — The mirrors of Downing St. Прочтите безъ старой, излишней россійской довѣрчивости, но и безъ новой излишней подозрительности то, что очень освѣдомленный авторъ этой книжки, A Gentleman with the Duster, говоритъ о Россіи, Англіи, Германіи и роли Лорда Карнока.

Въ кругахъ близкихъ къ англійскому министерству ин. дѣлъ о лордѣ Кар-

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Посмотримъ, насколько правильны предпосылки для только что сдѣланнаго заключенія. Для этого разсмотримъ нѣсколько подробнѣе слѣдующіе вопросы: 1) увеличился ли динамическій вѣсъ Германіи съ Версальскаго мира, 2) каково значеніе динамическаго вѣса Россіи для европейскаго равновѣсія и 3) обезпечиваетъ ли окупація Рура противъ импульсивно растущаго динамическаго вѣса Германіи.

Объективное разсмотрѣніе этихъ трехъ вопросовъ въ конечномъ счетѣ дастъ намъ надежное основаніе для сужденія о томъ, реальны или призрачны теперешнія опасенія англійской и французской государственной мысли за жизненные интересы ихъ народовъ и дѣйствительно ли требуются какія то новыя, Версальскимъ договоромъ не предусмотрѣнныя мѣры для того, чтобы не только теперешній pax Sociorum, но и всякая вообще независимость народовъ на европейскомъ континентѣ не были опрокинуты и замѣнены pax Germanica, при которомъ, по картинному выраженію генер. Бернгарди, народамъ будутъ оставлены только глаза, чтобы плакать.

Вопросъ этотъ далеко не праздный, ибо глубокая тревога за то, что Германія и теперь, какъ до 1914 г., стремится къ установленію pax Germanica на европейскомъ континентѣ, начинаетъ охватывать, правильно или нѣтъ это надо рѣшить, ту часть государственной мысли, которая видитъ не только завтрашній день.

нокѣ въ 20 г. говорили, какъ о «the man, who made the war». Самъ лордъ Карнокъ считалъ это свое прозвище милой шуткой. Однако, и онъ, и авторъ книги, относящійся съ глубокимъ укаженіемъ къ заслугамъ передъ Англіей лорда Карнока, говоритъ намъ о ея происхожденіи:

A Gentleman with the duster говоритъ такъ: «Никто изъ живущихъ политиковъ не былъ такъ предусмотрителенъ и такъ тонко наблюдателенъ во время задолго до возникновенія войны и никто въ дни колебаній между войной и миромъ не зналъ такъ навѣрно, что война уже пришла, какъ этотъ скромный и привѣтливый человѣкъ.

Сэръ Артуръ Никольсонъ, нашъ посланникъ въ Петроградѣ и впослѣдствіи лордъ Карнокъ выигралъ для Англіи то, что ни одинъ человѣкъ не сдѣлалъ до него — любовь Россіи. Тѣ, въ чьихъ рукахъ были судьбы Россіи, вѣрили ему. Онъ былъ ихъ другомъ въ дни неизвѣстности, которая начинала безпокоить ихъ и заставлять сознавать слабость ихъ страны и сквозь которую до ихъ ушей все больше и больше доносился гулъ приближающагося шторма. Лордъ Карнокъ, искренне любя своихъ русскихъ друзей, принималъ ихъ довѣріе, какъ другъ. Его совѣтъ былъ достойный совѣтъ. Онъ совѣтовалъ своимъ друзьямъ привести ихъ домъ въ порядокъ и быть твердо увѣренными въ ихъ собственной силѣ. Ихъ финансы были въ хаотическомъ состояніи, ихъ армія дезорганизована. Пусть они начнутъ съ этихъ областей, приведутъ въ порядокъ финансы и армію...

Въ теченіе его пребыванія въ Петроградѣ, послѣ широкаго опыта въ другихъ странахъ, онъ два раза видѣлъ, какъ Россія была унижена Германіей...

Лордъ Карнокъ состоялъ въ министерствѣ иностр. дѣлъ въ іюлѣ 1914 г. Онъ одинъ зналъ, что Россія можетъ драться. Для всего остального человѣчества, навѣрное и для императора Вильгельма, ближайшее будущее представлялось, какъ новое безкровное униженіе Русскаго Медвѣдя... Но въ это время Россія была готова и въ это время лордъ Карнокъ зналъ, что Россія можетъ драться. Я не думаю, чтобы еще какой нибудь государственный человѣкъ въ Европѣ обладалъ этимъ знаніемъ — знаніемъ отъ котораго зависило все...

Онъ видѣлъ (раньше), что Россія, благодаря своей слабости, представляетъ искушеніе для самыхъ худыхъ страстей Германіи... Сильная Россія могла встревожить Германію, но она же была главнымъ оплотомъ міра противъ прусскаго владычества... Любя Россію, лордъ Карнокъ работалъ для Россіи, надѣясь, что увѣренная въ себѣ Россія можетъ спасти человѣческій родъ отъ ужасовъ войны и, если война придетъ, отъ еще большихъ ужасовъ германскаго порабощенія».

Мы понимаемъ, что лордъ Карнокъ работалъ не только изъ любви къ Россіи, но и изъ любви къ Англіи. Послѣднее, впрочемъ, только увеличиваетъ вѣроятность повторенія тѣхъ временъ, когда Англія содѣйствовала повышенію динамическаго вѣса Россіи.

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Увеличился ли динамическій вѣсъ Германіи съ Версальскаго мира? Этотъ вопросъ является предметомъ самаго детальнаго и бдительнаго наблюденія, и со стороны Англіи, и со стороны Франціи. Я приведу только очень коротко послѣдніе результаты этихъ наблюденій.*)

Согласно этимъ наблюденіямъ, основной характеръ германскаго хозяйства съ Версальскаго мира по настоящее время опредѣляется, какъ неукоснительное разрушеніе въ результатѣ инфляціи кредита и финансовой системы государства съ одной стороны и съ другой, какъ 1) возсозданіе на теперешней нѣмецкой территоріи индустріи взамѣнъ потерянной вслѣдствіе территоріальныхъ уступокъ по Версальскому миру и конфискацій по нему же германскихъ индустріальныхъ предпріятій и различнаго промышленнаго инвентаря; 2) вообще расширеніе и созданіе новыхъ фабрикъ и заводовъ помимо п. 1 и 3) амальгамація индустріальныхъ предпріятій въ крупнѣйшіе концерны съ улучшеніемъ и удешевленіемъ технически-хозяйственнаго организма производства.

Германское Правительство почти обанкротилось, сохранивъ, однако, съ твердостью, заслуживающей всяческаго уваженія и подражанія, золотой запасъ почти полностью (на 31.12.22 £51,5 милл. по сравненію съ £58.5 милл. въ 1913 г.) Страна же рѣзко увеличила свою индустріальную базу противъ того, что у нея оставалось послѣ первыхъ же расчетовъ вслѣдъ за перемиріемъ и Версальскимъ миромъ.

Въ частности: 1) Металлургическое отечественное производство Германіи достигло въ 22 г. по чугуну 8¾ — 9 милл. тонъ и по литой стали не менѣе 9 милл. тонъ. Все это пошло на потребленіе внутренняго нѣмецкаго рынка. По чугуну это внутреннее нѣмецкое потребленіе составляло 180%, а по стали 150% отъ всего англійскаго производства въ томъ же 22-мъ году. Это указываетъ на лихорадочную дѣятельность по возстановленію и расширенію нѣмецкой индустріи, ибо весь германскій вывозъ заграницу законченныхъ стальныхъ и чугунныхъ издѣлій покрывалъ въ конечномъ счетѣ свои потребности въ металлѣ помимо продукціи германской металлургіи. По вѣсу онъ балансировался со ввозомъ въ Германію необработаннаго чугуна, стали изъ-за границы, главнымъ образомъ изъ производственныхъ центровъ за западной германской границей.

Эти цифры показываютъ и другое, а именно, что общая нагрузка и производительность нѣмецкой металлургіи была въ 1922 г. на много въ лучшемъ положеніи, чѣмъ въ Англіи, ибо размѣръ металлургическаго оборудованія обѣихъ странъ почти одинаковъ.

2) Амальгамація по вертикали въ большіе концерны дала нѣмецкой промышленности не только удешевленіе техническаго процесса производства, но и громадное торговое преимущество: единую интегральную прибыль по всему концерну, въ предѣлахъ коей можно весьма гибко маневрировать по части стоимости продукціи и девидентовъ отдѣльныхъ предпріятій, входящихъ въ концернъ. Нѣмецкій промышленникъ можетъ въ случаѣ надобности рѣзко понизить продажныя цѣны въ любомъ предпріятіи концерна, скажемъ въ сырьевыхъ, покрываясь высокими цѣнами на об-

*) 1) Report of the Economic and financial conditions in Germany to March 1923 by Mr J. W. F. Thelwall, commercial Secretary to His Magesty's Embassy, Berlin, assisted by Mr. C. J. Kavanagh Commercial Secretary, Occupied Territories etc. Cologne. Publ. Department of Overseas Trade.

2) La Ruhr et l'Allemagne par L. Coupaye Ingenieur en chef d'artillerie navale — Chargé de missions Preface de Adrien Dariac. President de la Commission des Finances de la Chambre des Députes. Encyclopédie Parlementaire 1922.

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работанныя издѣлія и сохраняя тотъ же уровень единой интегральной прибыли по концерну.

3) Способность нѣмецкой промышленности къ конкуренціи на внѣшнихъ рынкахъ съ промышленностью, работающей въ другихъ, скажемъ англійскихъ условіяхъ чрезвычайно велика вслѣдствіе низкой себѣ-стоимости нѣмецкаго производства. Послѣдняя является результатомъ кромѣ указанныхъ выше причинъ, т. е. связанныхъ съ амальгамаціей, еще или, главнымъ образомъ результатомъ процесса инфляціи.

4) Не только повышенная способность къ конкуренціи на внѣшнемъ рынкѣ, но и лихорадочный спросъ на внутреннемъ нѣмецкомъ рынкѣ основывается главнымъ образомъ на инфляціи.

Большинство англійскихъ экспертовъ думаетъ, что теперешняя нѣмецкая инфляціонная политика должна кончиться катастрофой — государственнымъ банкротствомъ. и что послѣ такой катастрофы германская хозяйственная жизнь должна будетъ перестроиться на здоровую стабилизованную денежную единицу. Въ это время англійская промышленность въ смыслѣ конкуренціи на внѣшнемъ рынкѣ будетъ находиться въ лучшихъ, т. е. болѣе равныхъ условіяхъ съ нѣмецкой промышленностью. Практическіе государственные дѣятели Англіи, конечно, согласны съ только что изложеннымъ мнѣніемъ экспертовъ: конечно, Германія придетъ въ концѣ концовъ къ здоровымъ финансамъ и стабильной денежной единицѣ. Ихъ интересуетъ, однако, другой практическій вопросъ: — когда. Это можетъ случиться такъ не скоро, что теперешній кризисъ англійскаго индустріальнаго перепроизводства и безработицы успѣетъ увеличиться до опасныхъ размѣровъ, въ особенности когда потребленіе внутренняго нѣмецкаго рынка на возстановленіе и расширеніе нѣмецкой индустріи закончится и эта увеличенная нѣмецкая индустрія обрушится на столь понизившійся въ своей покупательной способности внѣшній міровой рынокъ. Эта промышленная фаланга можетъ оказаться опаснѣе, чѣмъ военная фаланга въ наступленіяхъ Макензена.

5) Безработица и рабочія забастовки суть явленія, практически говоря, неизвѣстныя теперешней Германіи.

Резюмируя сказанное и принимая во вниманіе рядъ другихъ чрезвычайно цѣнныхъ и интересныхъ не только съ практической, но и съ научной точки зрѣнія наблюденій I. W. F. Thelwall и C. I. Kavanagh, врядъ ли можно думать, что безъ радикальнаго измѣненія въ общемъ положеніи Германіи ея правительство сможетъ или легко захочетъ пойти на отказъ отъ инфляціи.

Въ теперешней, по крайней мѣрѣ, обстановкѣ инфляція, являясь съ одной стороны чѣмъ то въ родѣ экспропріаціи внутренняго нѣмецкаго потребителя, а съ другой, чѣмъ то въ родѣ безвозвратнаго займа на внѣшнемъ денежномъ рынкѣ, служитъ тѣмъ не менѣе исправно цѣлямъ рѣзкаго усиленія матеріальной составляющей производственной базы нѣмецкой индустріи, покрытію отрицательнаго сальдо по внѣшней торговлѣ, достигшаго въ 22 г. 2.3 милліардовъ золот. марокъ, и, наконецъ, накопленію валюты въ иностранныхъ банкахъ нѣмецкимъ экспортеромъ. Экспортеръ впитываетъ въ себя, какъ губка, изъ всѣхъ классовъ населенія, оплачиваемыхъ въ маркахъ, всю валюту, которая можетъ образоваться въ Германіи. Конечно, это должно вызывать соціальное раздраженіе противъ индустріалистовъ-экспортеровъ и противъ правительства, разрѣшающаго экспортъ по лиценціямъ. Но съ другой стороны раздраженіе можетъ быть парализовано утвержденіемъ, что накапливаніе индустріалистомъ-экспортеромъ валюты въ иностранныхъ банкахъ идетъ не въ эгоистическихъ и личныхъ ихъ цѣляхъ,

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а является единственнымъ способомъ спасти отъ изъятія по репараціоннымъ платежамъ капиталъ, который потребуется еще германскому хозяйству въ будущемъ во время нормальной жизни. Конечно, почва очень скользкая для того, чтобы удержаться на обще-національномъ интересѣ и не скатиться къ личному. Отсюда подозрѣнія, защита и нападки на инфляцію и индустріалистовъ-экспортеровъ.

Кромѣ того инфляція практически почти аннулируетъ долги*) по облигаціямъ для промышленныхъ предпріятій и по закладнымъ и ипотекамъ для аграрныхъ хозяйствъ. Отсюда новые защиткики инфляціи и новое соціальное раздраженіе.

Несомнѣнно инфляція создаетъ крайне неустойчивое положеніе и опасныя соціальныя разслоенія, но ожидать, чтобы Германія легко и скоро съ нею разсталась при теперешнемъ ея положеніи врядъ ли будетъ правильно. Теперешнее положеніе — это экономическая война или подготовка къ войнѣ. Больше того, это не только внѣшняя экономическая война, но и внутренняя гражданская экономическая война между соціально-экономическими группами въ Германіи. Инфляція — постоянный спутникъ всякой войны.

Какъ бы то ни было, несмотря или вслѣдствіе разрушенія государственныхъ нѣмецкихъ финансовъ и денежной системы, но матеріальный фактъ остается фактомъ: нѣмецкій индустріальный механизмъ обновленъ и усиленъ со временъ Версаля. Кромѣ того рабочій персоналъ сохраненъ, хорошо накормленъ и сдержанъ въ своей классовой требовательности вслѣдствіе патріотическихъ мотивовъ. Такой индустріальный аппаратъ есть громадный факторъ въ смыслѣ повышенія динамическаго вѣса Германіи. И потому на поставленный вопросъ, увеличился ли динамическій вѣсъ Германіи съ Версальскаго мира, мы должны отвѣтить безъ сомнѣній и утвердительно.

Каково значеніе динамическаго вѣса Россіи для европейскаго равновѣсія? Это значеніе со временъ Наполеоновскихъ войнъ оцѣнивалось въ Европѣ всегда высоко. Соотвѣтственно, когда старая система европейскаго равновѣсія строила свои комбинаціи противъ Россіи, она строила ихъ почти изъ всѣхъ великихъ державъ Европы. Наоборотъ, когда выросла опасность Германской диктатуры въ Европѣ и система равновѣсія стала строить коалицію противъ Германіи, главный оплотъ, какъ мы между прочимъ могли замѣтить изъ расказа о лордѣ Карнокъ, Англія видѣла въ Россіи. И не только Англія такъ высоко расцѣнивала значеніе Россіи. Бисмаркомъ было завѣщано Германіи не ввязываться въ войну съ Россіей. Крушеніе Наполеоновскихъ завоеваній началось съ его посягательствъ на независимость Россіи.

Въ дни національныхъ испытаній силы Россіи не такъ часто выявлялись въ драматическихъ эфектныхъ формахъ. Чаще это было нѣчто сѣрое, медленно затягивающее и истощающее, въ своей сѣрости грозное для противника. Почему и насколько громадны силы Россіи были и еще будутъ, — мы часто говорили въ Русскомъ Экономическомъ Обществѣ. Изъ только что отмѣченной оцѣнки ихъ иностранными государствами вы видите, что самые большіе оптимисты изъ насъ всетаки не дооцѣнивали динамическаго вѣса Россіи.

Всякое европейское государство, собираясь устраивать диктатуру въ

*) Долги эти составляютъ, вѣроятно, что-нибудь около 15-20 милліардовъ золот. мар.

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Европѣ или заботясь о динамическомъ равновѣсіи, не можетъ въ первую голову не думать о динамическомъ вѣсѣ Россіи. Оно должно имѣть этотъ вѣсъ на своей сторонѣ и не можетъ его уступить безъ крайности никакому другому государству, если это послѣднее есть или можетъ стать его противникомъ. Какъ создавались соотношенія динамическихъ вѣсовъ Англіи, Франціи, Германіи и Россіи въ эпоху «двойственной диктатуры»? — Англія и Франція считали въ то время, что динамическій вѣсъ Германіи уничтоженъ навсегда. Только поэтому онѣ не препятствовали тому теченію событій на уничтоженіе самостоятельности динамическаго вѣса Россіи, которое еще во время войны было намѣчено нѣмецкимъ генеральнымъ штабомъ и капитанами нѣмецкой тяжелой индустріи при посредствѣ коммунистической партіи и которое впослѣдствіи выразилось въ политикѣ поддержки Германіей коммунистической диктатуры надъ Россіей. Позже Ллойдъ Джоржъ пошелъ еще дальше Германіи по этому пути. Всегда и во всякомъ дѣлѣ первый, онъ и въ этомъ дѣлѣ уничтоженія самостоятельности динамическаго вѣса Россіи, сперва позаимствовавъ идеи нѣмецкаго штаба, бывшаго противника Англіи, затѣмъ быстро занялъ лидерствующую и наиболѣе активную роль въ ихъ выполненіи.

Почему позаимствованіе это считается теперь съ точки зрѣнія жизненныхъ интересовъ англійскаго народа не осторожнымъ и не удачнымъ для Англіи? По двумъ причинамъ: во-первыхъ, съ заключеніемъ о томъ, что динамическій вѣсъ Германіи уничтоженъ навсегда, слишкомъ поторопились, и во-вторыхъ, въ случаѣ разрушенія самостоятельности динамическаго вѣса Россіи, обломки этого вѣса не исчезаютъ безслѣдно въ пространствѣ, а увеличиваютъ чрезвычайно динамическій вѣсъ Германіи въ силу хотя бы географической близости.

Въ отношеніи Россіи можетъ быть только одна альтернатива: или Россія сохраняетъ самостоятельность динамическаго вѣса, — и тогда она факторъ въ системѣ европейскаго равновѣсія, или самостоятельсность разрушается—и тогда Россія, какъ факторъ для системы европейскаго равновѣсія, потеряна. Она дѣлается вассаломъ и неотъемлемымъ, но громаднымъ по величинѣ придаткомъ динамическаго вѣса Германіи.

Какъ разрушается самостоятельность динамическаго вѣса Россіи? — Уничтоженіемъ перваго члена его формулы. Слабымъ мѣстомъ Россіи всегда было опозданіе въ индустріальномъ развитіи по сравненію съ европейскими индустріальными странами и въ частности съ Германіей. Съ большой энергіей и успѣхомъ, изумившимъ насъ самихъ, мы нагоняли это опозданіе во время войны.

Теперь Коммунистическое Правительство убило русскіе уголь, бензолъ, металлургію, металлообработку и транспортъ. Безъ всего этого россійскія военныя силы не могутъ существовать, какъ независимая національная сила. Пока русская армія пользуется еще русскими военными запасами старыхъ временъ, она, въ случаѣ нападенія на Россію и при условіи очень большого подъема національныхъ чувствъ, такимъ нападеніемъ вызваннаго, еще можетъ выполнить свой долгъ передъ страной. Все это однако статика силъ. Пусть пройдетъ два, три года, и разрушенная россійская индустрія лишитъ русскую армію всякаго самостоятельнаго значенія, поставивъ ее въ полную зависимость отъ индустріальной Германіи.

Является ли разрушеніе Коммунистическимъ Правительствомъ россійской индустріи и стремленіе его растлить и развратить здоровый творческій духъ россійской индустріальной арміи НЭП'омъ и нэпманствомъ

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слѣдствіемъ спеціально «состоявшейся сдѣлки»*) Политбюро или болѣе законспирированныхъ центровъ коммунистической партіи съ нѣмецкимъ генеральнымъ штабомъ, или это дѣлается по «добродѣтельной» глупости и неспособности Коммунистическаго Правительства къ роли администратора русскаго національнаго хозяйства — не все ли это въ сущности равно для разрушенія динамическаго вѣса Россіи. Не такъ важно — почему дѣлается, какъ важно — что дѣлается.

Германскій экономическій имперіализмъ, готовившій всегда pax Germanica для Европы и прежде всего для Россіи, изобрѣтателенъ и въ распоряженіи его есть много методовъ и средствъ. Онъ такъ же, какъ и Троцкій, не доктринеръ и приметъ охотно гибель самостоятельнаго динамическаго вѣса Россіи независимо отъ того, изъ какихъ рукъ она идетъ: — Коммунистическаго Правительства, Ллойдъ Джоржа или, наконецъ, реставраціонныхъ и аграрныхъ столповъ русскаго самодержавія, считавшихъ уже время Витте, что все зло и крамола на Руси — отъ индустріализма.

Объективно обстановка такова: въ 1922 г. въ Германіи завершался процессъ переиндустріализаціи, въ Россіи — деиндустріализаціи.

Соотвѣтственно динамическій вѣсъ Россіи теряетъ свое самостоятельное существованіе и дѣлается спутникомъ динамическаго вѣса Германіи — ея аграрнымъ и колоніальнымъ гинтерландомъ.

Для того чтобы рѣшить, усиливаетъ ли это шансы установленія на европейскомъ континентѣ par Germanica или міровой соціалистической революціи, надо въ сущности рѣшить еще разъ тотъ вопросъ, который въ предисловіи къ брестъ-литовскимъ переговорамъ Троцкій нѣсколько можетъ быть поспѣшно разрѣшаетъ въ пользу коммунистовъ.

Вопросъ этотъ: «Кто гораздо лучше знаетъ и понимаетъ своего партнера». Германскій экономическій имперіализмъ или Коминтернъ, держащій теперь въ своихъ рукахъ динамическій вѣсъ Россіи.

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*) До войны германскій капиталъ относился отрицательно къ развитію русской индустріи. Если сравнить россійскія промышленныя предпріятія, основанныя при помощи капитала бельгійскаго, французскаго и англійскаго, съ предпріятіями, основанными на нѣмецкій капиталъ, то мы увидимъ, что роль Германіи въ промышленномъ развитіи Россіи была ничтожна. Въ Россіи Германія вкладывала свой капиталъ исключительно въ торговлю.

Эта совершенно опредѣленная прежняя политика продолжается опредѣленно и теперь. J. W. F. Thelwall (стр. 53) даетъ свѣдѣнія о крупнѣйшихъ соглашеніяхъ, заключенныхъ въ 22 г. между Германіей и Коммунистическимъ Правительствомъ и трестами. Это: 1) Сименсъ и Шуккертъ о поставкѣ инсталяціоннаго матерьяла Электротресту въ кредитъ на 500 милл. марокъ; 2) Вольфъ Штраусъ объ учрежденіи имъ торговой компаніи съ капиталомъ въ £0.03 милл. за что онъ вознаградилъ Коммунистическое Правительство, отпустивъ ему въ кредитъ товара на £0.75 милл. и открывъ дальнѣйшій кредитъ на £0.5 милл.; 3) даже Крупъ, попадая въ Россію, тотчасъ мѣняетъ свою привычную профессію металлурга и металлообработчика на новую — фермера и огородника.

Слѣдуетъ отмѣтить и другой интересный фактъ: Коммунистическое Правительство, констатировавшее еще въ мартѣ 22 г. наличіе въ Россіи кризиса индустріальнаго перепроизводства и при томъ положеніи, что продукція русской индустріи въ теченіи 22 г. больше, чѣмъ на половину не находила сбыта, вслѣдствіе паденія покупательной способности россійскаго с.-хозяйственнаго рынка, умудрилось все-таки вывезти изъ Германіи индустріальнаго товара не меньше, чѣмъ на 37,8 милл. золот. руб. (см. J. W. F. Thelwall. Report etc. стр. 56).

Троцкій, какъ мы видѣли выше, придавалъ въ Брестъ-Литовскѣ очень большое значеніе тому, чтобы вырвать почву изъ-подъ ногъ подобныхъ же подозрѣній относительно наличія «состоявшейся сдѣлки» между коммунистами и нѣмецкимъ генеральнымъ штабомъ. Всѣ эти старанія, какъ карточный домикъ, разлетѣлись впослѣдствіи, по опубликованію ген. Людендорфомъ его мемуаровъ.

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Здѣсь мы попадаемъ уже въ область авантюристической предпріимчивости и азартной игры, которая ставится обоими партнерами въ европейскомъ масштабѣ. Я не берусь рѣшать, у кого изъ этихъ двухъ игроковъ шансы на выигрышъ больше. Это не моя область.

Но одно для меня несомнѣнно: если измѣненіе въ динамическихъ вѣсахъ Россіи и Германіи будетъ идти и дальше, какъ въ 1922 г., то выиграть не можетъ никто третій, — ни «двойственная диктатура», ни идущая ей на смѣну система «динамическаго равновѣсія» на европейскомъ континентѣ, ни независимая русская государственность.

Обезпечиваетъ ли окупація Рура противъ импульсивнаго роста динамическаго вѣса Германіи? Окупація Рура есть послѣдній актъ трагедіи потеряннаго равновѣсія на европейскомъ континентѣ. Здѣсь, конечно, дѣло идетъ не о мѣщанскихъ страстяхъ и жадности къ лишнему милліарду золотыхъ марокъ. На чашахъ вѣсовъ Суда Божьяго лежатъ судьбы по крайней мѣрѣ четырехъ великихъ народовъ Европы, имѣющихъ за собой многіе годы; и заслугъ, и грѣховъ передъ культурой человѣческой.

Относительно четырехъ главныхъ персонажей трагедіи — Англіи, Франціи, Бельгіи и Германіи — ставится дѣйствительно грозный вопросъ, пришло ли ихъ время сходить съ первыхъ плановъ міровой исторіи. Каждый изъ этихъ четырехъ персонажей можетъ получить на Рурскомъ полѣ смертельную рану, съ которой его нація пойдетъ доживать свои чахлые дни въ провинціальную неизвѣстность въ сторонѣ отъ большихъ дорогъ исторіи.

Уклониться отъ участія въ развязкѣ на Рурскомъ полѣ этой трагедіи ни одинъ изъ этихъ четырехъ персонажей, завязавшихъ прологъ ея въ Версали, все равно не можетъ.

До того и для того чтобы рѣшить, сдать ли и кого въ архивъ исторіи, судьба неумолимо влечетъ ихъ къ этому грозному испытанію ихъ человѣческаго разума, ихъ человѣческой совѣсти и ихъ воли и способности къ жизни.

Мы, русскіе, почти уже пережили еще болѣе глубокую и выжигающую въ душѣ все мелкое и своекорыстное трагедію величайшей въ исторіи народовъ революціи.

Вы понимаете потому, съ какой большой чувствительностью къ справедливому и съ какимъ сочувствующимъ вниманіемъ должны мы относиться къ чужому національному испытанію и къ тому, что чувствуютъ, думаютъ и дѣлаютъ не худшіе, а лучшіе изъ представителей этихъ четырехъ націй для того, чтобы трагедія не окончилась по древнему рецепту, т. е. общей гибелью всѣхъ героевъ и добрыхъ и злыхъ.

При всемъ этомъ мы должны сохранить всю реалистичность нашего современнаго сознанія въ отношеніи обстановки современной трагедіи, т. е. «силы вещей» и «силы сложности характера» современныхъ героевъ — полудобрыхъ и полузлыхъ, устами которыхъ чаще говоритъ коллективная воля, чѣмъ ихъ собственная индивидуальная.

Въ чемъ у четырехъ главныхъ персонажей трагедіи ихъ жизненные національные интересы и каковы реальныя средства для ихъ достиженія, средства, покоющіяся въ конечномъ счетѣ на динамическихъ вѣсахъ этихъ народовъ?

Россія. Позвольте отвѣту на этотъ вопросъ предпослать короткое замѣчаніе о позиціи Россіи. Россійскіе національные интересы не трогаетъ главная проблема, которая рѣшается на Рурскомъ полѣ — борьба за внѣш-

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ній рынокъ индустріальной продукціи. Наше національное хозяйство*) принадлежитъ къ другой экономической породѣ, чѣмъ національныя хозяйства странъ группы А, т. е. живущихъ отъ внѣшней торговли и сильно переиндустріализированныхъ по сравненію съ потребностями ихъ собственнаго внутренняго рынка. Самый типъ нашего хозяйства — гармоническаго развитія внутреннихъ силъ страны и внутренняго рынка — позволяетъ намъ быть въ splendid isolation отъ агрессивной борьбы европейскихъ странъ за внѣшніе рынки. Мы страна мирная и въ аннексіяхъ внѣшнихъ рынковъ не заинтересованы. И второе: намъ очень не подходитъ «диктатура» въ Европѣ. Намъ будетъ скверно при pax Sociorum въ Европѣ, но мы несомнѣнно погибнемъ, не навсегда, конечно, но на одно, два поколѣнія навѣрное — при pax Germanica.

Возвратимся теперь къ позиціямъ четырехъ главныхъ персонажей.

Бельгія заинтересована во внѣшнихъ рынкахъ для своей индустріи чрезвычайно. Второй членъ динамическаго вѣса Бельгіи малъ по сравненію съ силами другихъ европейскихъ странъ. Внѣшній рынокъ она завоевываетъ исключительно мирными путями — упорнымъ трудомъ и организаторскимъ талантомъ своихъ гражданъ. Ея основная позиція только оборонительная — защита независимости бельгійскаго національнаго хозяйства. На Рурскомъ полѣ Бельгія участвуетъ только потому, что имѣетъ счастье и вмѣстѣ съ тѣмъ несчастье находиться на перекресткѣ великихъ трактовъ мірового хозяйства и вовлекается въ трагедію помимо воли, но въ силу географическаго положенія.

Ей, какъ и Россіи, не подходитъ «диктатура» въ Европѣ.

Франція. Обозначившійся съ несомнѣнностью къ концу 22 г. ростъ динамическаго вѣса Германіи покончилъ съ сомнѣніями французской государственной мысли относительно устойчивости того зданія, которое было построено въ Версали. Появилась тревожная увѣренность въ томъ, что динамическій вѣсъ Германіи уже настолько выросъ, что она имѣетъ возможность очень скоро выскользнуть изъ-подъ тяжести, которою ее придавилъ Версальскій договоръ, и что вся система «двойственной диктатуры» близка къ тому, чтобы смѣниться диктатурой германской. Для того, чтобы понять эту тревогу за національныя судьбы Франціи, вамъ надо возстановить въ вашей памяти общія намъ всѣмъ во время Большой Европейской войны психологическія настроенія остраго безпокойства за судьбы нашей собственной родины.

Франціи представляется, что водвореніе pax Germanica въ Европѣ можетъ прійти путемъ новой войны. Нѣтъ никакого сомнѣнія, что только военной силой Франція и можетъ отстаивать свои національные интересы въ столкновеніи съ Германіей.

Усиленіе военныхъ возможностей Германіи Франція видитъ въ: 1) расширеніи, усиленіи, интенсификаціи и амальгамаціи Рурской промышленности. Adrien Dariac съ тревогой говоритъ: «Тяжелая индустрія Рура, вся полностью сосредоточенная въ рукахъ нѣсколькихъ лицъ, призвана играть рѣшающую роль въ событіяхъ, которыя будутъ имѣть мѣсто въ ближайшемъ будущемъ Германіи».

Дѣйствительно, въ отношеніи индустріи большого масштаба Германія имѣетъ очень большое преимущество на случай войны съ Франціей: — уголь, сталь, металлообработка, взрывчатыя и газы. Это преимущество пріобрѣтаетъ особенное значеніе именно теперь, когда техника вообще и военная

*) «Russ. Econ.», стр. 2102 и 2424.

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въ частности находится наканунѣ новыхъ и важныхъ открытій въ рядѣ отраслей. Концентрированный въ немногихъ рукахъ, громадной силы нѣмецкій индустріальный аппаратъ можетъ дѣйствительно съ быстротой совершенно исключительной осуществлять завтра всякое новое слово въ военной техникѣ, сказанное сегодня. Такой индустріальный аппаратъ можетъ опрокинуть теперешнее превосходство французскихъ военныхъ силъ.

2) Франція въ эти дни тревожныхъ раздумій о будущемъ почувствовала себя очень одиноко. Въ случаѣ столкновенія ея армія можетъ остаться, практически говоря, одинъ на одинъ съ германской. Исчезло отвлеченіе отъ Франціи нѣмецкихъ силъ на Востокъ Россіей. Замѣнятъ ли старую русскую армію благодарныя арміи новыхъ, Антантой созданныхъ государствъ, — это можетъ показать только опытъ. Англійскія же сухопутныя силы и во время Великой войны имѣли гораздо меньшее значеніе, чѣмъ англійскій флотъ.

Мы видѣли, что динамическій вѣсъ Германіи уже теперь выросъ за счетъ уменьшенія независимости динамическаго вѣса Россіи. Франція не можетъ оцѣнить съ достаточной точностью, насколько это возрастаніе увеличится тогда, когда эта независимость русскаго динамическаго вѣса будетъ совершенно разрушена съ разрушеніемъ Коммунистическимъ Правительствомъ русской индустріи и когда осколки россійскаго динамическаго вѣса логикой матеріи станутъ нераздѣльно спутниками динамическаго вѣса Германіи. Эти послѣднія опасенія еще больше растутъ благодаря тому, что германская дипломатія нельзя сказать, чтобы съ большимъ тактомъ, но несомнѣнно на несчастіе своего собственнаго народа, ихъ муссировала демонстрированіемъ союза и военной конвенціи съ Коммунистическимъ Правительствомъ. Увеличивало ихъ также блэфированіе слухами о возможности появленія красной арміи на защиту Рура. Здравомыслящіе люди во Франціи, конечно, понимали, что германская дипломатія демонстрируетъ больше, чѣмъ теперь уже есть въ натурѣ. Но понимали и то, что время и Коммунистическое Правительство работаютъ въ одномъ направленіи, что сегодняшній блэфъ можетъ обратиться въ завтрашнюю реальность. Это нервировало.

Въ результатѣ, пока динамическій вѣсъ Франціи былъ еше достаточно великъ по сравненію съ германскимъ, благодаря величинѣ второго его члена, Франція рѣшила предупредить моментъ, когда соотношеніе динамическихъ вѣсовъ для возможной военной передѣлки pax Sociorum въ pax Germanica было бы не въ ея пользу.

Рѣшеніе: овладѣть теперь же при помощи военной силы сердцемъ индустріальнаго механизма — Руромъ. Репараціонные платежи, хотя о нихъ и говорятъ много, здѣсь на второмъ мѣстѣ. На первомъ — «гарантіи».

«До тѣхъ поръ пока мы сохранимъ», говоритъ Adrien Dariac непосредственно передъ окупаціей Рура, «наше теперешнее положеніе на Рейнѣ, мы будемъ представлять постоянную угрозу для 10-12 индустріальныхъ магнатовъ Германіи, которые на самомъ дѣлѣ являются въ финансовомъ отношеніи господами Германіи... Если таможенная черта, учрежденная между оккупаціонной зоной и свободной Германіей, не даетъ теперь большихъ и непосредственныхъ коммерческихъ выгодъ, то она однимъ своимъ присутствіемъ заставляетъ помнлть, что обмѣнъ между заводами, изготовляющими черный металлъ и фабриками законченныхъ издѣлій находится *въ нашей волѣ*. Мы можемъ однимъ простымъ поднятіемъ таможенныхъ тарифовъ взять дань, почти неограниченную, съ нѣмецкой металлургіи или даже де-

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зорганизовать ее... Мы должны сохранить во чтобы то ни стало наши средства возможнаго будущаго воздѣйствія на эту промышленную Германію, которая *заканчиваетъ свою организацію*. Теперь мы можемъ ее, *или разрушить, или использовать, контролируя*. Она чувствуетъ на себѣ тяжесть этой постоянной угрозы. Можетъ быть необходимость избавиться отъ этой рубашки Нэсса внушитъ Германскому Правительству, питаемому совѣтами и помощью заинтересованныхъ, тѣ настоящія предложенія, которыя могли бы намъ дать немедленное удовлетвореніе».

Adrien Dariac писалъ это въ октябрѣ 22 г. Теперь, въ маѣ 23 г. отъ таможни французская политическая диктатура перенесена во дворъ металлургическаго завода. Мы присутствуемъ при такомъ положеніи дѣлъ, которое завтра можетъ быть французской военной властью безъ труда обращено въ нѣчто въ родѣ «національзаціи», которая имѣла мѣсто для русской промышленности въ 17-18 г.г. Конечно, съ германскими промышленниками тяжелой индустріи и съ германскими рабочими, дисциплинированная и по европейски образованная французская военная власть обращается несравненно мягче, чѣмъ обращается съ русскими промышленниками и русскими рабочими Коммунистическое Правительство, пользовавшееся и пользующееся матеріальной и моральной поддержкой германской тяжелой индустріи, германскаго рабочаго движенія и германскаго генеральнаго щтаба. Это, однако, очень относительное утѣшеніе, ибо право владѣнія и распоряженія фабрикой и производствомъ такъ же зашаталось для германской тяжелой индустріи, какъ зашаталось оно и въ Россіи въ 17-18 гг.

Никакое пассивное сопротивленіе, никакой саботажъ и пр. не могутъ измѣнить факта: военной прочности оккупаціи. Этотъ военный успѣхъ поставилъ довольно прочныя подпорки у сильно покосившагося зданія «двойственной диктатуры». Такимъ образомъ, на *ближайшее*, но по моему короткое время опасность отъ выросшаго динамическаго вѣса Германіи и соотвѣтственно pax Germanica парированы французскимъ рѣшеніемъ трагедіи исканія потеряннаго равновѣсія на европейскомъ континентѣ.

Англія. Оккупація Рура не устраняетъ, однако, основныхъ причинъ, подтачивающихъ у самаго фундамента зданіе «двойственной диктатуры». Онѣ продолжаютъ дѣйствовать, несмотря на оккупацію. Если эти основныя причины не удалить, то не только «двойственная диктатура», но всякая возможность мирнаго существованія въ Европѣ все равно будетъ опрокинута и смѣнится или «единой германской диктатурой» или общимъ хаосомъ въ Европѣ.

Водвореніе pax Germanica на европейскомъ континентѣ, если ему вообще говоря суждено случиться, придетъ скорѣе не путями военныхъ дѣйствій, какъ это теперь представляется Франціи, а путями гораздо болѣе разрушительной и опасной войны — экономической.

Эту опасность видитъ, какъ мнѣ кажется, кабинетъ Бонаръ Лоу-Болдвинъ-Керзона и даетъ въ дополненіе къ французскому временному рѣшенію свое англійское, на болѣе долгій срокъ разсчитанное рѣшеніе теперешнимъ новымъ курсомъ на «динамическое равновѣсіе» на европейскомъ континентѣ.

Военная фаланга Макензена своимъ непрерывнымъ артиллерійскимъ огнемъ снабженная потокомъ снарядовъ изъ Рурскаго бассейна не такъ страшна, какъ индустріальная германская фаланга, которая по окончаніи перестроенія и переиндустріализаціи нѣмецкой промышленности, выйдетъ на внѣшній міровой рынокъ и огнемъ цѣнъ сравняетъ съ землею всякаго противника. Это не утопія, а одна изъ вполнѣ реальныхъ возможностей

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близкаго будущаго. На *ближайшее* будущее, но на короткое будущее опасность отъ наступленія индустріальной германской фаланги устранена французской оккупаціей Рура. Пока тамъ будетъ продолжаться періодъ пассивнаго сопротивленія и саботажа съ одной стороны и репрессій съ другой, производительность тяжелой индустріи и угля будетъ низка и накопленіе силъ для наступленія индустріальной фаланги будетъ парализовано. Больше того, конкурентныя способности англійской промышленности на внѣшнемъ рынкѣ за время оккупаціи даже улучшились. Что нужно англійскому промышленнику для того, чтобы находиться въ болѣе или менѣе равныхъ условіяхъ на внѣшнемъ рынкѣ съ германскимъ? — Нужно, чтобы 1) германская марка, если не дефлировалась, то по крайней мѣрѣ стабилизировалась и 2) уравнялись съ англійскими теперешніе производственные расходы германской промышленности законченныхъ издѣлій на сырье, т. е. повысились въ Германіи цѣны на уголь и черный металлъ. Оккупація Рура если не все, то значительную часть времени приносила эти плоды. Въ дополненіе къ этому выросъ сбытъ въ Германію англійскаго угля.

Англія, конечно, не странствующій рыцарь Германіи. Такой точки зрѣнія въ тѣхъ случаяхъ, когда интересы Англіи и Германіи расходятся, держатся въ Англіи всѣ — не только буржуазные министры, но и рабочее движеніе. Если вы хотите въ этомъ лишній разъ убѣдиться, прочтите очень интересный для людей, еще не потерявшихъ вѣры въ «интернаціональную, и космополитическую солидарность» организованнаго европейскаго рабочаго движенія, докладъ,*) сдѣланный англійской парламентской рабочей партіи четырьмя ея членами, обслѣдовавшими Руръ во время оккупаціи. Тамъ вы найдете довольно интересное обоснованіе предлагаемой ими «интернаціонализаціи» Рура.

Но что будетъ послѣ *ближайшаго* будущаго въ этомъ *близкомъ* будущемъ? Сопротивленіе германскихъ индустріалистовъ будетъ сломлено и висящая теперь въ воздухѣ «націонализація», при которой вообще нельзя вести сколько нибудь успѣшнаго хозяйства въ Рурѣ, получитъ ту или другую, но опредѣленную форму.

Относительно этой будущей формы приходится слышать очень рѣзкіе, но не исходящіе, кажется, изъ авторитетныхъ круговъ и во всякомъ случаѣ не окончательные проекты, допускающіе возможность «націонализаціи» теперешними оккупантами большинства акцій въ предпріятіяхъ тяжелой индустріи. Получится нѣчто въ родѣ НЭП'а для Германіи съ трестами, образованными по типу т. н. «смѣшанныхъ предпріятій». Акціи, конфискованныя въ покрытіе слѣдуемыхъ оккупантамъ репараціонныхъ платежей, могутъ быть проданы правительствами на своихъ биржахъ. Такимъ образомъ, крупная доля репараціонныхъ платежей покрывается. Предполагается, что германскіе собственники націонализированныхъ акцій получаютъ компенсацію отъ Германскаго Правительства. Такимъ образомъ, устанавливается въ Рурской тяжелой индустріи подъ правительственнымъ французскимъ и бельгійскимъ контролемъ Правленіе съ большинствомъ иностранныхъ директоровъ. Рурскіе уголь, черный металлъ, производныя химической промышленности и т. д. становятся, практически говоря, для остальной Германіи иностраннымъ продуктомъ.

Я не представляю себѣ возможности, чтобы такая форма могла осуществиться. Она вызвала бы въ Германіи катастрофу, громадное народное

*) «Times» 22.2.23.

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бѣдствіе, нищету, голодъ и смертность, которые можно было бы сравнить только съ тѣмъ, что теперь дѣлается въ Россіи. Какъ ни жестокъ «homo Europeus» я не думаю, чтобы онъ могъ рѣшиться повторить для Германіи то, что уже сдѣлано въ Россіи.

Болѣе вѣроятнымъ потому представляется болѣе мягкое рѣшеніе, по которому Германія обяжется уплатить зафиксированные, наконецъ, репараціонные платежи, а нѣмецкіе индустріалисты получатъ свободное распоряженіе Рурской промышленностью. Французскія войска, смягчивъ режимъ, всетаки останутся въ Рурѣ въ цѣляхъ гарантіи уплаты репараціонныхъ платежей, а, главнымъ образомъ, для контроля за тѣмъ, чтобы на заводахъ тяжелой индустріи была исключена возможность военной подготовки.

Что же произойдетъ, если все положеніе останется въ границахъ только французскаго рѣшенія проблемы исканія потеряннаго равновѣсія на европейскомъ континентѣ? Напряженіе военное не уменьшится, ибо теряющая все больше и больше независимость динамическаго вѣса Россія будетъ идти все больше и больше въ кильватерѣ Германіи. Динамическій вѣсъ послѣдней будетъ увеличиваться за счетъ Россіи, а германская база возможнаго военнаго сопротивленія будетъ переноситься на Востокъ.

Гораздо большая опасность лежитъ, однако, въ области экономики. Переоборудованіе германской промышленности заканчивается. Чрезвычайно крупная доля германскаго труда занята теперь созданіемъ предметовъ для этого переоборудованія, съ окончаніемъ котораго спросъ на нихъ на внутреннемъ нѣмецкомъ рынкѣ чрезвычайно сократится. Соотвѣтственныя машины и руки смогутъ жить только работой на внѣшній рынокъ.

«Сила вещей» заставитъ Германію выбрасывать на этотъ внѣшній рынокъ товара несравненно больше, чѣмъ германскій экспортъ 22 г., равный по количеству 29% отъ до-военнаго. И этотъ экспортъ въ 29% не легко усваивался при теперешнемъ сжатіи внѣшняго рынка и при томъ состояніи покупательной способности Россіи, въ которой она находится при коммунистическомъ режимѣ. Нѣтъ, конечно, основаній думать, что эта покупательная способность повысится, если не произойдетъ радикальныхъ измѣненій въ Россіи.

При этой малой покупательной способности внѣшняго рынка вся изобрѣтательность нѣмецкаго ума направится на конкуренцію, на дальнѣйшее удешевленіе нѣмецкаго товара сперва путемъ дальнѣйшаго улучшенія механизма производства. Не хватитъ этого, — удешевленіе будетъ сдѣлано за счетъ заработной платы Остановиться, вѣдь, невозможно. Германская индустріальная фаланга сотретъ съ лица земли всякаго поставщика индустріальной продукціи на міровой рынокъ, работающаго на нормальной заработной платѣ. Ея наступленіе окончательно опрокинетъ привычныя для теперешняго соціальнаго строя, но уже и теперь потрясенныя соотношенія стандартовъ жизни различныхъ соціальныхъ классовъ населенія, живущихъ на заработокъ отъ промысловъ разныхъ категорій. Трудно предвидѣть предѣлы и соціально-политическія послѣдствія этого опрокидыванія. Можно думать, что эти послѣдствія скажутся во всѣхъ странахъ міра. Вся опасность положенія заключается въ быстротѣ, съ которой пойдетъ процессъ.

Можно думать, что та катастрофа, которую произведетъ въ мірѣ наступленіе германской индустріальной фаланги далеко превзойдетъ по эфекту дѣйствія все то, что произвела на поляхъ Галиціи военная фаланга Макензена.

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Для того, чтобы предупредить катастрофу есть единственный выходъ: — повысить емкость внѣшняго рынка и создать условія постепеннаго разсасыванія переиндустріализаціи Германіи, созданной за время господства въ Европѣ системы «двойственной диктатуры».

Въ необходимости разрѣшить эту проблему и лежатъ глубокіе корни связи между оккупаціей Рура съ одной стороны, а съ другой теперешнимъ серьезнымъ измѣненіемъ англійской политики въ отношеніи Россіи. Нота Керзона есть только очень яркое выявленіе во внѣ этого созрѣвшаго внутри рѣшенія, новой и реальной оцѣнки теперешняго экономическаго положенія европейскаго континента.

Теперь *способствовать* продолженію коммунистической диктатуры въ Россіи — это значитъ отдавать динамическій вѣсъ Россіи въ руки Германіи такъ же навѣрное, какъ если бы особымъ международнымъ актомъ былъ формально предоставленъ Германіи мандатъ на Россію, ибо «силою вещей» и силою времени коммунистическій режимъ приведетъ къ этой отдачѣ. Ни одинъ уважающій себя англійскій государственный дѣятель не рѣшится отдать динамическій вѣсъ Россіи въ руки Германіи тогда, когда съ несомнѣнностью обнаружились живучесть и ростъ динамическаго вѣса Германіи несмотря на всю тяжесть и весь контроль, наложенные на него Антантой.

Остается *не способствовать* продолженію коммунистической диктатуры. Оставленный безъ внѣшней иностранной капиталлистической поддержки коммунистическій режимъ не удержится собственными силами противъ растущаго въ Россіи недовольства имъ. Собственными россійскими силами установится представительный строй. За политической свободой послѣдуетъ экономическая свобода и очень демократическій, вѣроятно, въ смыслѣ широты избирательнаго права, но опредѣленно буржуазный строй. За этимъ послѣдуетъ прекращеніе коммунистическому режиму присущей перманентной экономической гражданской войны — миръ внутри Россіи и вслѣдствіе мира импортъ въ Россію капитала изъ единственнаго оставшагося теперь въ мірѣ крупнаго источника капитала С. Ш. А. и изъ болѣе мелкихъ источниковъ — Бельгіи, Франціи и Англіи.

Въ Россіи, демократической и національной, быстро родится политика, направленная къ охранѣ только русскихъ интересовъ, чуждая спекуляціямъ «на міровой переворотъ» и, конечно, независимая отъ Германіи. Этимъ сразу облегчится военное напряженіе во Франціи, вызываемое теперешней высокой оцѣнкой военныхъ возможностей Германіи въ случаѣ, если она сможетъ опираться на россійскіе рессурсы. Тѣмъ самымъ появится во Франціи тенденція къ смягченію общаго давленія на Германію, и очень ослабится европейскій милитаризмъ.

Главное же то, что начнетъ рости внѣшній рынокъ. Прежде всего Россія, начавшая возстанавливать свое хозяйство, станетъ крупнымъ покупателемъ. А затѣмъ устанавливающійся на европейскомъ континентѣ мало по малу миръ и увѣренность въ отсутствіи «диктатуры», которая въ любой моментъ можетъ лишить человѣка его имущества и заработка, создадутъ атмосферу довѣрія, въ которой только и можетъ жить интенсивная хозяйственная дѣятельность.

Теперешняя переиндустріализація Германіи можетъ разсосаться въ общемъ повышеніи емкости внѣшняго рынка и возможная катастрофа отъ наступленія индустріальной германской фаланги будетъ предотвращена не только на общее благо европейскаго континента, но и самого германскаго народа.

Въ этомъ смыслъ и цѣнность англійскаго разрѣшенія трагедіи исканія

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потеряннаго равновѣсія на европейскомъ континентѣ. Оно есть отказъ отъ диктатуры и оперированіе независимыми динамическими вѣсами независимыхъ государствъ въ цѣляхъ созданія взамѣнъ диктатуры «равновѣсія», которое для Европы есть пока единственный путь къ соглашенію и миру европейскихъ народовъ.

Германія. О Германіи мнѣ остается сказать очень немного. Ея жизненный интересъ — получить независимое экономическое и политическое государственное существованіе. До сихъ поръ республиканское Германское Правительство не пользовалось для этого реальными, отвѣчающими теперешней дѣйствительности средствами, а шло путями, на которые его увлекалъ имперіалистическій капиталъ Германіи. Гальванизировались старыя мечты о pax Germanica. Эти пути были разработаны германскимъ экономическимъ имперіализмомъ еще до Великой войны.

Эти пути были: 1) овладѣніе Россіей и созданіе изъ нея аграрнаго тинтерланда, привѣска къ германской индустріальной имперіи, и 2) гегемонія на міровомъ рынкѣ. Они остались и теперь тѣми же.

Характеръ и внутренніе смыслъ и цѣли отношеній теперешняго республиканскаго демократическаго правительства Германіи къ Коммунистическому Правительству такіе же, какіе были при правительствѣ Гогенцоллерновъ и во время «состоявшейся сдѣлки» между Людендорфомъ и Ленинымъ или Троцкимъ и Кюльманомъ.

Индустріальная германская фаланга — это подновленная схема старой экономической политики — grip on the world — германскаго экономическаго имперіализма временъ до-военныхъ.

Надо отдать справедливость нѣмецкому національному уму и волѣ: техническое выполненіе разъ принятой схемы всегда настойчиво, логично и талантливо.

Есть, однако, какой то внутренній недостатокъ въ нѣмецкомъ національномъ умѣ: не хватаетъ творчества для созданія и пересозданія самой схемы, такой схемы, которая отвѣчала бы реальной обстановкѣ и подлиннымъ интересамъ націи въ этой новой обстановкѣ.

Сама концепція германскаго экономическаго имперіализма не была создана въ Германіи, а была позаимствована у англичанъ, которые дѣйствительно изобрѣли «экономическій имперіализмъ» и довольно тонко, мирно и благополучно на немъ наживали. Позаимствовали нѣмцы и такъ въ концѣ концовъ своей головной логикой и отсутствіемъ чувства реальной мѣры передѣлали концепціи и скомпрометировали ее во всеобщее свѣдѣніе, что самимъ изобрѣтателямъ приходится сдавать въ архивъ экономическій имперіализмъ въ отношеніяхъ ихъ съ цѣлымъ рядомъ народовъ.

Это отсутствіе чувства реальнаго и талантливости на самостоятельное творчество концепцій сказалось роковымъ образомъ. Республиканское правительство въ тягчайшіе дни для націи не нашло новой дороги, куда надо было повернуть, и безплодно блуждало на старыхъ путяхъ имперіализма.

Если не удалось осуществить pax Germanica при рессурсахъ и престижѣ могущественнѣйшей и независимой Германіи временъ до 14 г., то какъ можно надѣяться его осуществить теперь при Германіи, зависимой и поднадзорной, въ порядкѣ какой то конспиративной дѣятельности.

Для конспираціи нѣтъ мѣста: всякое хозяйственное движеніе и всякій хозяйственный результатъ всѣхъ этихъ очень «тайныхъ и тонкихъ» плановъ германской тяжелой индустріи промышленниковъ, и проч. по части овладѣнія Россіей и міровымъ рынкомъ дѣлаются, вѣдь, въ помѣщеніи съ боль-

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шими зеркальными стеклами и безъ ставень и занавѣсей. Прочтите цитированный Report of the Commercial Secretary to His Majosty's Embassy at Berlin и вы это поймете. Когда результаты станутъ опасны, планы будутъ просто остановлены военнымъ или экономическимъ давленіемъ. Въ такой обстановкѣ заниматься курсомъ на pax Germanica это все равно, что катать глыбу Сизифа.

Потому все то, что было до сихъ поръ принесено въ жертву этимъ «тайнымъ и тонкимъ» планамъ индустріальныхъ магнатовъ Германіи всѣмъ германскимъ народомъ, что было взято у разоряемаго народа въ пользу «экспортера» и что инфляція экспропріировала сплошь у цѣлыхъ соціальныхъ слоевъ Германіи — вся эта горькая реальность, безъ всякой пользы для Германіи, пошла на питаніе безплодныхъ иллюзій.

Все это не приблизило Германію къ настоящему выходу изъ черныхъ дней, не приблизило ее и къ настоящему миру ни съ Россіей, ни съ Англіей, ни съ Франціей. Германская пресса не напрасно жалуется, что Германія въ это безконечно тяжелое для нея время одинока въ мірѣ.

Пора бросить Сизифову глыбу и поворачивать на другую дорогу.

ГЛ. V. ЗАКЛЮЧЕНІЕ.

Два событія — оккупація Рура Франціей и новая англійская политика въ отношеніи Россіи уже ввели насъ въ штормовой послѣдній актъ трагедіи исканія потеряннаго равновѣсія на европейскомъ континентѣ.

Вы спрашиваете меня, каковъ исходъ этого акта и каковъ эпилогъ. Я не занимаюсь предсказаніями.

Я просто показалъ вамъ, какъ завязался прологъ, какъ развивались предыдущія дѣйствія и каковы намѣренія и силы главныхъ персонажей, которымъ предстоитъ сыграть этотъ актъ и опредѣлить его исходъ въ зависимости отъ ихъ воли, ума и совѣсти.

Исходъ не предрѣшенъ и не написанъ для нихъ заранѣе современнымъ Рокомъ — экономической необходимостью современной фазы развитія человѣческаго хозяйства. Рокъ даетъ «свободу дѣйствія» своимъ персонажамъ. Но если они сыграютъ бездарно и выберутъ исходъ, не согласный съ его основнымъ завѣтомъ — миромъ и экономической свободой хозяйствующаго на европейскомъ континентѣ, — то онъ сдастъ безвольныхъ, бездарныхъ или безсовѣстныхъ въ архивъ европейской исторіи.

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ИДЕОЛОГИЧЕСКІЯ ОБОСНОВАНІЯ ХОЗЯЙСТВЕННАГО СТРОЯ ПРИ НОВОЙ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОЙ ПОЛИТИКѢ.

Проф. Л. С. Таль.

Докладъ *) читанъ въ Р. Э. О. 24.1.23.

На небольшое количество научныхъ работниковъ, оставшихся въ Россіи выпала трудная задача осмысливать и оформливать направленіе и содержаніе экономическаго развитія за годы революціи.

Русскіе экономисты и юристы, поскольку это было возможно, не отказывались отъ выполненія этой задачи, къ сожалѣнію чрезвычайно затрудняемой крайне тяжелыми условіями жизни, бурнымъ темпомъ революціонныхъ событій и текучимъ характеромъ калейдоскопически мѣняющейся дѣйствительности.

Сейчасъ мы переживаемъ шестой годъ революціи; страсти, какъ будто нѣсколько улеглись, кривая, по которой протекаетъ русская экономическая жизнь, послѣ попытки подняться къ фантастическимъ высямъ законченного коммунистическаго строя, повернула опять въ сторону капиталистическаго хозяйства, но она стремилась удержаться на нѣкоторой средней линіи, которую можно охарактеризовать, какъ соціалистическое хозяйство, осуществляемое капиталистическими методами, т.е., путемъ широкаго использованія частно-капиталистической предпріимчивости.

Какъ совершилась эта эволюція, каково ея идеологическое содержаніе, возможенъ ли такой хозяйственный строй, каковы его необходимыя предпосылки?

Попытаемся кратко отвѣтить на эти вопросы. Первый годъ послѣ октябрьской революціи былъ періодомъ преимущественно декларацій о сущности новаго государственного и политического строя и агитаціи въ его пользу. Ничто не указываетъ на то, что сознательные вожди революціи считали возможнымъ немедленный радикальный переходъ къ коммунизму.

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*) Мы печатаемъ ниже не совсѣмъ обычный для Русскаго Экон. Общества докладъ. Онъ былъ сдѣланъ проф. Л. С. Талемъ, состоящимъ юрисъ-консультомъ Аркоса и однимъ изъ ближайшихъ помощниковъ Л. Б. Красина. Проф. Л. С. Таль — извѣстный въ Россіи спеціалистъ по концессіонному праву. Онъ не коммунистъ, но былъ привлеченъ въ качествѣ авторитетнаго спеціалиста коммунистической властью, когда было рѣшено перейти къ НЭП'у, для разработки положенія о концессіяхъ для сдачи иностраннымъ капиталистамъ предпріятій въ Россіи. Естественно, что проф. Л. С. Таль является крупнымъ авторитетомъ, могущимъ съ исчерпывающей полнотой освѣтить, какова юридическая природа трестовъ, синдикатовъ и т.д., и сказать, что они дали Россіи и что въ самомъ лучшемъ случаѣ могутъ дать.

Изъ краткаго изложенія преній, читатель увидитъ, что члены Р. Э. О. не раздѣлили оптимистической оцѣнки возможностей хозяйственнаго прогресса Россіи, благодаря введенію НЭП.

Несмотря на это несогласіе, Р. Э. О. было чрезвычайно благодарно проф. Л. С. Талю за проявленную имъ инициативу и любезность посѣтить Р. Э. О. и подѣлиться свѣдѣніями о НЭП, исходящими изъ первоисточника.

Докладъ вызвалъ довольно страстныя пренія, ибо касался слишкомъ большого съ государственной и общественной точки зрѣнія вопроса: есть ли НЭП путь къ выздоровленію или путь къ смерти Россійскаго національнаго хозяйства.

Этому больному вопросу впослѣдствіе былъ посвященъ другой докладъ — М. Брайкевича «Разложеніе НЭПа». *Ред.*

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Власть перешла къ нимъ раньше, чѣмъ они разсчитывали. У нихъ не было подробно разработаннаго плана такого перехода. Соціалистическая наука и даже партійныя программы содержали гораздо больше критики стараго и фантастическихъ изображеній желательного новаго строя, чѣмъ указаній на конкретное осуществленіе перехода къ нему. Вы знаете радикальные декреты перваго года: отмѣна права собственности на землю, націонализація частныхъ банковъ, а потомъ и полное уничтоженіе всѣхъ банковъ, отмѣна судовъ и замѣна стараго права соціалистическимъ правосознаніемъ, рабочій контроль, націонализація крупной промышленности, муниципализація многихъ торговыхъ предпріятій и городскихъ недвижимостей, отмѣна права наслѣдованія, уничтоженіе сословій и свободы печати, аннулированіе государственныхъ займовъ и т.д. Одновременно весь механизмъ государственнаго управленія былъ перестроенъ въ сторону диктатуры пролетаріата, осуществляемой его органами — Совѣтами, какъ представителями его классовыхъ интересовъ, и распространяющейся на всѣ сферы жизни: политическую, экономическую и духовную.

Провозглашая эти новыя начала общественнаго строя, власть еще не предрѣшала, насколько радикально они будутъ практически проводиться. Въ положительной своей части начертанная программа была чрезвычайно туманна и открывала весьма широкія, но очень неясныя возможности. То, что отнынѣ пролетаріатъ беретъ бразды хозяйственнаго управленія въ свои руки, самъ народъ, измученный войной и подчасъ введенный въ заблужденіе близорукой демагогіей, понималъ весьма упрощенно: какъ право распоряжаться наличными хозяйственными благами, ихъ источниками и орудіями производства для немедленнаго улучшенія положенія трудящихся, причемъ онъ не дифференцировалъ отдѣльной конкретной группы трудящихся и всей совокупности людей, живущихъ своимъ трудомъ. Въ результатѣ захваты и вмѣшательства часто принимали анархическія формы. Съ этимъ необходимо было бороться, и тутъ передъ Правительствомъ стояло два пути: или, довѣряясь его организаціоннымъ способностямъ и навыкамъ, предоставить самому народу организовываться въ порядкѣ общественнаго самоуправленія на коммунистическихъ началахъ, какъ это рисуютъ въ утопической литературѣ и не разъ уже пытались дѣлать въ формѣ небольшихъ общинъ, или же, признавъ, что наша хозяйственная и общественная культура для этого еще стоитъ слишкомъ низко, вступить на путь всесторонняго, обнимающаго также распредѣленіе, этатизма, т.е., сосредоточенія всего управленія хозяйственной жизнью въ рукахъ государства, точнѣе — Правительства, надѣленнаго отъ имени пролетаріата диктаторскими полномочіями. Всякій иной путь казался несовмѣстимымъ съ торжественно провозглашеннымъ соціалистическимъ строемъ и диктатурою пролетаріата. Совѣтское правительство пошло по второму пути, по пути «коммунистическаго этатизма». Правда, этотъ терминъ не былъ употребленъ, но онъ соотвѣтствуетъ сущности вещей. Ни стираніе грани между государствомъ и обществомъ, ни воскрешеніе ученія объ отмирающемъ государствѣ, которому суждено быть брошеннымъ въ музей исторической рухляди, — этотъ безсознательный компромиссъ коммунизма съ теоретическимъ анархизмомъ — практически дѣла не мѣняетъ. Рѣчь идетъ именно о коммунистическомъ этатизмѣ, т.е. о государственномъ управленіи хозяйствомъ на коммунистическихъ началахъ посредствомъ созданнаго для этой цѣли государственнаго административно-хозяйственнаго аппарата съ возможно болѣе пролетарскимъ составомъ, и сосредоточенія въ его рукахъ всѣхъ отраслей хозяйственной жизни.

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Я не буду исчерпывающе останавливаться на подробностяхъ организаціи этого аппарата. Во главѣ отдѣльныхъ частей стояли ВСНХ и хозяйственные Наркоматы: земледѣлія, продовольствія, путей сообщенія, торговли, финансовъ и труда. Отдѣльныя отрасли промышленности управлялись соотвѣтствующими Главками и Центрами, объединявшими въ свою очередь разныя болѣе узкія группировки, возглавляемыя кустовыми и т.п. управленіями, а имъ уже была подчинена техническая и административная дирекція отдѣльныхъ предпріятій. Во всѣхъ управленіяхъ и предпріятіяхъ было отведено широкое мѣсто рабочимъ, но самая идея рабочаго контроля, какъ таящая въ себѣ слишкомъ большой анархическій элементъ, была оставлена и замѣнена участіемъ представителей профессіональныхъ рабочихъ организацій въ органахъ управленія и, позднѣе, ихъ участіемъ въ общегосударственномъ контролѣ, переименованномъ въ Рабоче-Крестьянскую Инспекцію. Въ области сухопутного и водного транспорта сведеніе участія рабочихъ организацій къ формамъ, не подрывающимъ возможности раціональнаго хозяйственнаго управленія, встрѣчало особенно большія трудности. Для того, чтобы справиться съ этими задачами, во главу Вѣдомства пришлось временно ставить такихъ лицъ, какъ Троцкаго и Джержинскаго, которые были достаточно сильны, чтобы отстоять и защищать необходимое вѣдомству сотрудничество спеціалистовъ-некоммунистовъ.

Относительно другихъ областей я ограничусь нѣкоторыми общими указаніями. Какъ въ настоящее время заявляютъ вожди Правительства, немедленная радикальная соціализація всего хозяйства и, въ особенности, обмѣна и потребленія, первоначально не входили въ ихъ планы, но обстоятельства толкнули ихъ на путь такъ назыв. «*военнаго, т.е. оправдываемаго войною, коммунизма*». Послѣдній состоялъ въ фактическомъ распространеніи государственнаго управленія на всѣ отрасли хозяйства и въ полномъ уничтоженіи частного хозяйственного аппарата для производства и оборота. Владѣльцы промышленныхъ предпріятій были устранены отъ управленія націонализированными предпріятіями, которые по декрету 28 іюня 1918 г. были оставлены въ ихъ рукахъ на началахъ «безмездной аренды», и націонализація была распространена на новыя отрасли. Система учета товаровъ была замѣнена ихъ конфискаціей; торговля, даже предметами потребленія, въ томъ числѣ продуктами сельско-хозяйственными, была монополизирована. Внутри страны она уступила мѣсто государственному снабженію пайками по категоріямъ и пресловутому «мѣшечничеству». Кооперація была превращена въ распредѣлительный аппаратъ Наркомпрода и лишена самоуправленія. Народные банки — государственный и кооперативный — были закрыты, и ихъ функціи отчасти переданы органамъ Наркомфина. Въ деревняхъ рѣшающій голосъ былъ предоставленъ сельскому пролетаріату, такъ наз. Деревенской Бѣднотѣ, и для нуждъ арміи и городского населенія была принята система разверстки, т.е. отбирали у крестьянъ излишки продуктовъ для арміи и городского населенія. Она мыслилась, какъ принудительный заемъ городу, который долженъ быть оплаченъ издѣліями промышленности. Наемъ труда былъ замѣненъ системою распредѣленія рабочихъ рукъ, построенной на трехъ китахъ соціалистическаго трудового права: трудовой повинности, правѣ на примѣненіе своей рабочей силы за установленное вознагражденіе и правѣ нетрудоспособныхъ и безработныхъ на соціальное обезпеченіе.

Три года безъ малаго продолжалась эта единственная въ исторіи, по широтѣ замысла и по размаху, попытка сосредоточенія всего хозяйства

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огромной страны въ рукахъ государства, по сравненію съ которой блѣднѣетъ даже военное хозяйство Германіи, этотъ небывалый до сихъ поръ пароксизмъ этатизма. Какъ она была принята жизнью? Чему она насъ научила? Чѣмъ обогатился опытъ человѣчества? Въ рамкахъ доклада можно лишь очень суммарно отвѣтить на эти вопросы.

Первое, что обнаружилось при продѣланномъ въ Россіи опытѣ, было то, что «управлять», «администрировать» въ области хозяйства нельзя въ тѣхъ формахъ и тѣми методами, какъ въ сферѣ государственнаго управленія. Въ первой мало «править», нужно организовывать и вести хозяйство, т.е. направлять чужую дѣятельность такъ, чтобы она при наименьшей затратѣ энергіи и средствъ давала максимальное количество благъ, и во всякомъ случаѣ не меньшее количество, чѣмъ необходимо для удовлетворенія матеріальныхъ и культурныхъ потребностей народа. Можетъ ли бюрократическій, персонально незаинтересованный аппаратъ приспособиться къ этой задачѣ, можетъ ли онъ замѣнить хозяина, какъ организатора, и сложную техническую и коммерческую организацію, созданную капиталистическимъ хозяйствомъ? располагаетъ ли онъ какими-нибудь другими стимулами для поднятія производительности труда, кромѣ тѣхъ, которые примѣняются въ капиталистическомъ хозяйствѣ? На всѣ эти вопросы продѣланный въ Россіи опытъ пока даетъ отрицательный отвѣтъ. Хозяйственно-административный аппаратъ въ Россіи ничѣмъ не отличается отъ другихъ органовъ государственнаго управленія. Онъ работалъ тѣми же бюрократическими пріемами и былъ настолько дорогъ, что поглощалъ гораздо большую часть продукта, чѣмъ поглощала предпринимательская прибыль. Выяснилось, съ полной очевидностью, что аппаратъ, управляющій хозяйствомъ, долженъ быть инымъ, чѣмъ аппаратъ политическаго управленія: онъ долженъ быть близкимъ къ хозяйству, сливаясь съ нимъ, заинтересованнымъ въ немъ, болѣе самостоятельнымъ и болѣе отвѣтственнымъ. Замѣна матеріальной заинтересованности идеальною, т.е., сознаніемъ собственного долга, какъ стимула для продуктивности труда, тоже пока не удалась. Оказалось, что и при соціалистическомъ строѣ долженъ быть оставленъ нѣкоторый просторъ для индивидуальныхъ цѣлей и интересовъ, какъ стимула къ повышенію продуктивности труда; иначе пока нѣтъ возможности вести хозяйство не только съ прибылью, но даже безубыточно. Въ области снабженія обнаружилось, что принимая на себя его, государство взвалило на свои плечи непосильное бремя. Замѣнить сразу чуткій и подвижной аппаратъ частной торговли аппаратомъ снабженія оказалось невозможнымъ. А обществомъ новая система была съ полнымъ основаніемъ принята, какъ обязательство государства обезпечивать всѣмъ гражданамъ минимумъ благъ, необходимый для удовлетворенія матеріальныхъ и культурныхъ потребностей. Выяснилось, такимъ образомъ, что коммунистическій этатизмъ имѣетъ весьма опасную и серьезную оборотную сторону: *право каждаго члена общества на существованіе*. Отнимать у гражданъ возможность самообезпеченія при помощи торгового аппарата можно только при условіи, если одновременно признать за каждымъ гражданиномъ неотъемлемое и реальное осуществимое право на обезпеченіе со стороны государства. Иначе система должна рухнуть. Для насъ, юристовъ, это чрезвычайно важное и поучительное наблюденіе: въ правѣ соціалистическаго государства очень широкое мѣсто должно быть отведено неотъемлемымъ по конституціи правамъ личности, ибо цѣлый рядъ жизненныхъ потребностей, какъ пища, жилище, способы передвиженія и др., источники которыхъ соціализированы, могутъ быть при этомъ строѣ только такимъ пу-

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темъ обезпечены. Удовлетворяться упоминаніемъ въ конституціи объ одномъ только правѣ на примѣненіе труда невозможно. Обезпеченіе за всѣми гражданами вмѣстѣ, т.е., за обществомъ въ цѣломъ, права на долю продуктовъ народнаго хозяйства въ формѣ трудового вознагражденія или соціальнаго вспомоществованія еще не дѣлаетъ соціалистическаго хозяйства жизноспособнымъ. Тутъ ставится опредѣленная альтернатива: или государство обезпечиваетъ каждому гражданину долю, достаточную для сноснаго существованія, или оно открываетъ пути для самообезпеченія. Третьяго не существуетъ.

Въ области сельскаго хозяйства рѣзко обнаружилась связь производства съ рынкомъ. Сельскій хозяинъ только тогда склоненъ производить сверхъ личной потребности, если ему обезпечена возможность обмѣна излишка на необходимые ему предметы. Для нашего русского крестьянина, для котораго трудъ есть страда, печальная необходимость, только очевидная и ясная возможность выгоднаго для него сбыта продуктовъ является реальнымъ стимуломъ. Никакіе журавли въ небѣ его не соблазняютъ. Переходъ отъ историчѣски сложившихся формъ землепользованія къ инымъ формамъ и къ болѣе интенсивнымъ и совершеннымъ способамъ обработки земли не можетъ быть насильственнымъ. Наше крестьянское хозяйство прошло черезъ долгій историческій опытъ общины, изъ котораго вынесло отрицательное къ ней отношеніе. Оно, однако, не стало капиталистическимъ. Въ немъ, по общему правилу, предпринимательская прибыль является въ то же время заработной платой. Наше крестьянство, повидимому, желаетъ оставаться при системѣ мелкаго индивидуально-трудового хозяйства и не превращаться ни въ крупно-капиталистическое, ни въ крупно-соціалистическое. Въ области сельскаго хозяйства жизнь, такимъ образомъ, поставила двѣ проблемы: 1) какъ совмѣстить индивидуалистическое мелко-трудовое хозяйство съ системой этатизма, всецѣло построеннаго на концентраціи и подчиненіи отдѣльныхъ хозяйственныхъ единицъ и 2) чѣмъ замѣнить рынокъ для сбыта, какъ стимула для повышенія продуктивности крестьянскаго хозяйства? Коммунистическому этатизму не удалось разрѣшить ихъ.

Въ области труда также обнаруживались опасныя для новаго хозяйственнаго строя недоговоренности. Разница между новою и старою системою должна была состоять: а) въ принципѣ распредѣленія государствомъ рабочей силы и б) въ обезпеченіи всѣмъ трудящимся возможности зарабатывать или получать отъ государства средства къ существованію. Съ первымъ принципомъ жизнь не мирилась. Рабочая сила—не вещь, а часть человѣческой личности. Практически невозможно не считаться съ ея индивидуальными особенностями и желаніями. Ни Совѣтскія учрежденія и предпріятія, ни сами трудящіеся не соглашались отказываться отъ права выбора. Распредѣленіе рабочей силы фактически сводилось къ функціямъ биржи труда. Монополизированіе распредѣленія не удалось.

По второму вопросу объ обезпеченіи повторилось то, на что я уже указывалъ: провозглашая право на трудъ, государство волею-неволею принимаетъ на себя соотвѣтственную обязанность; иначе это пустой звукъ.

Огромныя трудности чисто психологическаго свойства, съ которыми новый строй встрѣчался при всѣхъ усиліяхъ и попыткахъ поднять продуктивность труда и дисциплину, оказались непреодолимыми. Тутъ, также какъ въ сельскомъ хозяйствѣ, очень ярко обнаружилось то, не отрицаемое же мыслящими коммунистами, положеніе, что соціалистическій этатизмъ дполагаетъ длительное и постепенное перевоспитаніе индивидуальной

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психики, пріученной въ теченіе вѣковъ къ грубому стимулированію осязательными личными выгодами и страхомъ личныхъ страданій.

Въ заключеніе—еще одна неразрѣшенная военнымъ коммунизмомъ проблема, принципіально едва-ли не самая важная. Въ острый періодъ революціи дѣйствующее право умолкаетъ и — какъ итогъ прошлаго — должно пройти черезъ фильтръ новыхъ побѣдившихъ идеаловъ и воззрѣній. Новое право должно быть сотворено самой революціей и въ соотвѣтствіи съ ея задачами. Но это—процессъ медленный, требующій времени, а всякій хозяйственный строй — соціалистическій не менѣе, чѣмъ капиталистическій — нуждается въ твердомъ общеобязательномъ правопорядкѣ. При соціалистическомъ этатизмѣ формы государственнаго управленія должны быть точно зафиксированы и — что еще болѣе важно — правовое положеніе каждаго индивида, кругъ его правъ и обязанностей, какъ члена общества или коммуны, должны быть точно установлены.

Въ Россіи грань между законодательнымъ и административнымъ актами была стерта, подзаконность администраціи по конституціи замѣнена двумя началами: коллегіальностью или контролемъ коллегіи и правомъ высшаго органа отмѣнять постановленія низшаго, какъ напр., ВЦИК по отношенію къ СНК, СНК по отношенію къ отдѣльнымъ Наркоматамъ, Центр. органовъ по отношенію къ мѣстнымъ. При такой системѣ критерій законности замѣняется критеріемъ цѣлесообразности. Неудовлетворительность этого положенія очень скоро обнаружилась, и стали искать коррективовъ. Соблюденіе декретовъ было признано обязательнымъ не только для обывателя, но также для всѣхъ учрежденій и должностныхъ лицъ, и надзоръ возложенъ на Государственный Контроль, позднѣе РКИ. Но практически это мало помогло. Въ населеніи было подорвано исторически сложившееся представленіе о зафиксированномъ въ законѣ прочномъ правопорядкѣ, охраняемомъ судомъ и обязательномъ для самой власти. Надъ государствомъ въ цѣломъ и надъ хозяйствомъ нависла угроза внутренней анархіи, вслѣдствіе упадка правовой культуры.

Не буду продолжать перечня неразрѣшенныхъ проблемемъ. Совѣтское Правительство не упорствовало. Съ окончаніемъ гражданской войны оно вступило на другой путь, названный Главою Правительства «Государственнымъ капитализмомъ», въ законѣ и въ жизни—«новою экономическою политикою» (НЭП), а его противниками-коммунистическою реакціею. Тутъ мы подходимъ къ явленіямъ, получившимъ широкую огласку, и я могу ограничиться краткими указаніями, конечно, далеко не исчерпывающими всего обширнаго матеріала.

Сущность НЭПА состоитъ въ уклонѣ въ сторону капиталистическаго хозяйства. Для послѣдняго характерны слѣдующіе признаки:

1) Его методъ: использованіе индивидуальной заинтересованности, какъ стимула къ раціонализаціи хозяйства и максимальному поднятію производительности (рентабельности) каждаго отдѣльного предпріятія.

2) То, что функціи организатора въ хозяйственной жизни исполняетъ собственникъ капитала или спеціально созданный имъ для этой цѣли, зависимый отъ него, аппаратъ.

3) То, что предприниматель получаетъ прибыль и несетъ убытки (коммерческій рискъ), уплачивая за трудъ установленное договоромъ вознагражденіе.

При капиталистическомъ строѣ, государство, какъ предприниматель и организаторъ хозяйства, находится въ равномъ положеніи съ частными лицами и обществами, ему не подчиненными, а координированными.

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Нэп не означаетъ перехода къ капиталистическому строю, а компромиссъ между коммунистическимъ этатизмомъ и капитализмомъ въ слѣдующихъ формахъ:

1) Въ нѣкоторыхъ областяхъ допускается свобода промысла и торговли на капиталистическихъ началахъ;

2) Частный предприниматель допускается къ участію въ государственномъ хозяйствѣ на договорныхъ началахъ: концессія, аренда;

3) Государство входитъ въ частно-капиталистическіе предпріятія въ качествѣ участника: такъ наз. «смѣшанные предпріятія»;

4) Въ области государственно-хозяйственной дѣятельности вводятся особыя формы соціально-хозяйственного самоуправленія и начало «хозяйственнаго разсчета».

Подробный разборъ каждой изъ этихъ формъ не умѣщается въ рамкахъ одного доклада. Оставаясь въ предѣлахъ своей темы, я ограничусь только послѣднимъ пунктомъ. Государство сохранило такъ наз. «командующія высоты», т.е. крупную промышленность, внѣшнюю торговлю, транспортъ, право распоряжаться земельнымъ фондомъ. Область, открытая для частной предпріимчивости и для кооперації ограничена мелкой промышленностью и торговлею. Поэтому очень важно уяснить себѣ, въ какихъ формахъ государство будетъ «хозяйничать» при НЭП-ѣ. Относительно сельского хозяйства отвѣтъ на этотъ вопросъ даетъ новый Земельный Кодексъ. Наиболѣе существенное отличіе отъ другихъ законодательствъ тутъ заключается въ отмѣнѣ частной собственности и въ связанной съ этимъ невозможности отчужденія правъ на землю, а, слѣдовательно, и ипотечнаго кредита. Въ области промышленности централизованное управленіе утупило мѣсто децентрализаціи. Въ декретѣ С.Т.О. отъ 12 августа 1921 г. (Соб. Узак. ст. 462) указаны «основные положенія о мѣрахъ къ возстановленію крупной промышленности и поднятію и развитію производства». Согл. ст. 1 этого декрета «наиболѣе крупныя, технически оборудованные, цѣлесообразно организованные и соотвѣтственно расположенные предпріятія въ данной отрасли промышленности могутъ быть соединены въ порядкѣ ст. VIII настоящаго положенія» (т.е. посредствомъ положеній, издаваемыхъ ВСНХ по соглашенію съ ВЦСПС) — «въ особое объединеніе, организуемое на началахъ хозяйственнаго разсчета. На тѣхъ же началахъ могутъ быть выдѣлены и отдѣльныя предпріятія». Этими же учрежденіями назначается Правленіе, которому передаются «въ завѣдываніе» соотвѣтственныя предпріятія со всѣмъ ихъ оборудованіемъ, матеріалами, запасами, топливомъ и сырьемъ, полу-сельско-хозяйственными угодьями, разработками и т.д., причемъ всему передаваемому имуществу составляется опись и дѣлается оцѣнка.

Вся продукція Объединенія за покрытіемъ расходовъ по производству поступаетъ въ общій государственный фондъ.

Правленіе находится подъ контролемъ соотвѣтствующаго высшаго органа и «отвѣчаетъ за свои дѣйствія не только въ административномъ порядкѣ, но и по суду» (ст. VII).

На этомъ основаніи возникло множество Объединеній разныхъ типовъ. Ихъ характеръ не совсѣмъ одинаковъ: иногда преобладаетъ административно-вѣдомственный характеръ, какъ напр., въ «Отдѣлахъ» (ср. напечат. въ Сборникѣ Приказовъ ВСНХ за январь «Положеніе о Торговомъ Отдѣлѣ ЦУС-а ВСНХ) или въ «Бюро» (ср. напр. въ сборникѣ Приказовъ ВСНХ № 20, стр. 26: «Положеніе о Крахмалпатбюро»). Другія, наоборотъ, стоятъ гораздо ближе къ обыкновеннымъ промышленнымъ трестамъ, какъ напр. Сахаротрестъ (янв., стр.37) и мн. др. Преобладаетъ средняя форма, пред-

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ставленная гл. обр. въ лѣсной промышленности. Согласно этимъ положеніямъ (напр. Сѣверолѣсъ и др.), они учреждаются «для управленія лѣсной промышленностью опредѣленнаго района и для эксплоатаціи лѣсныхъ богатствъ въ составѣ Ц.У.Л. Пром.», т.е. одновременно для административной и коммерческой цѣли. Далѣе существуютъ «синдикаты», напр. Соляной Синдикатъ (см. № 5 стр. 37, № 20 стр. 30), имѣющіе цѣлью«согласованіе дѣятельности соотвѣтствующихъ предпріятій РСФСР относительно добычи и сбыта, и содѣйствіе въ отношеніи матеріальнаго, техническаго и финансоваго снабженія». Есть далѣе, единичные «Комбинаты», т.е. вертикальные тресты (напр. № 11, стр.35). Въ послѣднее время стали прибѣгать къ объединеніямъ въ формѣ акціонерныхъ кампаній или паевыхъ товариществъ, хотя и они учреждаются обычно «при ВСНХ или другомъ учрежденіи». Тутъ связь съ администраціей формально наиболѣе слабая. Только одинъ изъ членовъ Правленія назначается Правительствомъ. Но по существу эта связь сохраняется тѣмъ, что акціонерами или пайщиками состоятъ исключительно государственныя предпріятія. Даже въ смѣшанныхъ предпріятіяхъ государство обыкновенно старается сохранить за собою не только право контроля, но рѣшающій голосъ въ Правленіи. Есть, наконецъ, и отдѣльныя «автономныя фабрики» (см., напр., Приказы ВСНХ за 1922 г., № 10, стр. 24).

«Положенія» всѣхъ этихъ объединеній, кромѣ акціонерныхъ и паевыхъ обществъ, болѣе или менѣе однородны по содержанію и согласованы съ упомянутыми «Общими Положеніями отъ 12 августа, изданными С.Т.О.». Не входя въ подробности, укажу, что въ болѣе новыхъ Положеніяхъ различается основной и оборотный капиталъ объединеній. Основнымъ капиталомъ признаются самыя предпріятія, переданныя въ ихъ вѣдѣніе, т.е., входящее въ ихъ составъ движимое и недвижимое имущество, а оборотнымъ— запасы и издѣлія этихъ предпріятій и ассигнованныя имъ кредизы. Свободно распоряжаться они могутъ только оборотнымъ капиталомъ. Это фактически распространяется и на тѣ объединенія, Положенія которыхъ не содержатъ указаннаго дѣленія капитала. Всѣмъ имъ вмѣняется въ обязанность «существовать за свой счетъ на началахъ хозяйственнаго разсчета и сохранить предоставленный имъ основной капиталъ въ цѣлости (путемъ амортизаціи). Правленіе назначается Правительствомъ на опредѣленный срокъ, въ теченіе котораго члены его могутъ быть смѣщены только Президіумомъ ВСНХ въ порядкѣ дисциплинарномъ или по приговору суда.

Производственная программа и смѣты представляются на утвержденіе Правительства, помощь котораго ограничивается представленіемъ кредита (авансовъ въ счетъ поставляемыхъ издѣлій) и снабженіемъ за установленную плату. Юридическое положеніе этихъ новыхъ образованій не совсѣмъ ясно. Въ нѣкоторыхъ положеніяхъ сказано, что они пользуются правомъ юридическаго лица, въ другихъ не сказано. Но, согласно ст. 19 Гражданск. Кодекса, «Государственныя предпріятія и ихъ Объединенія, переведенные на хозяйственный расчетъ и не финансируемые въ смѣтномъ порядкѣ, выступаютъ въ оборотѣ, какъ самостоятельныя и не связанныя съ казной юридическія лица. За ихъ долги отвѣчаетъ лишь имущество, состоящее въ ихъ свободномъ распоряженіи, т.е. не изъятое изъ оборота, согласно ст. ст. 21 и 22». Въ этихъ статьяхъ указаны только земля и націонализированные предпріятія, желѣзныя дороги, суда и строенія съ ихъ оборудованіемъ. Это не совсѣмъ совпадаетъ съ проводимымъ въ Положеніяхъ дѣленіемъ на основной и оборотный капиталъ. Ст. 19 также не даетъ отвѣта на вопросъ, отвѣчаютъ ли эти предпріятія по обязательствамъ Государства.

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Это зависитъ отъ того, являются ли они, какъ юридическіе лица, собственниками имущества, находящагося въ ихъ свободномъ распоряженіи» или таковымъ осталось государство. Но это—юридическія детали. Самый фактъ замѣны государственнаго управленія системою спеціально-хозяйственныхъ образованій (объединеній или отдѣльныхъ предпріятій), автономно самоуправляющихся въ опредѣленныхъ закономъ и ихъ положеніями предѣлахъ—фактъ безспорно весьма знаменательный Ими въ организаціонномъ отношеніи замѣнены и частный предприниматель, и административно-хозяйственное и государственное управленіе. Теперь необходимо выполнить еще двѣ задачи: 1) обезпечить максимальную продуктивность и рентабельность предпріятій и максимальную защиту всѣхъ причастныхъ къ предпріятію интересовъ (въ особенности интересовъ труда и потребителя), 2) придать внутреннему правовому порядку (конституціи) предпріятія или объединенія такую ясность и незыблемость, что иностранный и русскій капиталъ не будутъ опасаться участвовать въ нихъ или финансировать ихъ.

Задачи эти—очень большія и сложныя, но я убѣжденъ, что ихъ разрѣшеніе возможно, если только подойти къ нимъ съ чисто дѣловой точки зрѣнія, а не съ политической предвзятостью. Россія въ сущности столкнулась съ тѣми же проблемами, надъ которыми сейчасъ работаетъ мысль западныхъ хозяйственныхъ политиковъ, а именно: съ проблемой внутренней организаціи предпріятій, при которой собственность на капиталъ не властвуетъ, не подавляетъ,а, употребляя выраженіе Tawney *, превращается «изъ права въ функцію», соподчиненную, наряду съ вложеннымъ въ предпріятіе трудомъ общественной цѣли предпріятія; 2) съ проблемой контроля надъ предпріятіемъ, осуществляемаго совмѣстно всѣми заинтересованными элементами: капиталомъ, трудомъ, потребителемъ (въ лицѣ государства). Опытъ и литература западныхъ государствъ относительно Совѣтовъ (Германія, Австрія) контроля (Италія), участія рабочихъ (Франція, Норвегія), гильдейскаго соціализма и уитлеизма (Англія) и пр., должны быть тщательно изучены и по мѣрѣ возможности использованы. Но тутъ открывается широкій просторъ для творческого согласованія и постепеннаго практическаго осуществленія компромисса между тѣмъ, что есть жизненнаго и практически пригоднаго для нашей хозяйственной жизни въ соціализмѣ, этатизмѣ и капитализмѣ.

ПРЕНІЯ ПО ДОКЛАДУ.

Предсѣдательствуетъ М. Брайкевичъ.

М. В. Брайкевичъ. Вы противополагаете систему «Коммунистическаго этатизма» теперешней — «Государственнаго капитализма» или какъ она въ законѣ названа Новой Экономической политикѣ и говорите, что послѣдняя система — прогрессъ, потому что она — уклонъ въ сторону капитализма. Не лучше ли сдѣлать этотъ прогрессъ побольше и установить просто капитализмъ съ его аттрибутами: свободой политической и свободой экономической хозяйствующаго?

Васъ радуетъ замѣна «государственнаго управленія» системой «соціально-хозяйственныхъ образованій, автономно-самоуправляющихся въ опредѣленныхъ закономъ и положеніями предѣлахъ». Есть ли это въ самомъ дѣлѣ «независимость и свобода хозяйственнаго распоряженія»?

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*) The Acquisitive Society, стр. 96 сл.

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Для того чтобы это было ясно, будьте добры сказать, можетъ ли правительственный чиновникъ, какого ранга все равно, въ любой день и любого директора треста уволить или нѣтъ?

Л. С. Таль. Конечно, можетъ, но зачѣмъ онъ это будетъ дѣлать, если директоръ хорошъ.

М. В. Брайкевичъ. Вотъ въ капиталистическомъ строѣ собственника министръ торговли не можетъ убрать никакимъ способомъ. Больше того, приглашенный директоръ огражденъ въ своихъ правахъ контрактомъ съ неустойкой и волей общаго собранія акціонеровъ. Его положеніе независимѣе.

Ничего новаго въ смыслѣ юридической природы управляющаго промышленностью аппарата, въ НЭП'ѣ нѣтъ. По существу это старыя казенныя предпріятія на манеръ казенныхъ, скажемъ, заводовъ и т. д. Только на командующія мѣста въ нихъ назначаются выслужившіеся у партіи коммунисты, а за недостаткомъ у многихъ изъ нихъ надлежащей технической подготовки, приходится добавлять спецовъ. Своего рода коммунистическій непотизмъ. Конечно, «казенный заводъ» лучше чѣмъ прежняя Главкократія. Но за всѣмъ тѣмъ юридическаго лица, обладающаго правовыми гарантіями, нужными для успѣха хозяйственной дѣятельности и кредита, НЭП, мнѣ кажется, не создалъ.

В. В. Маркозовъ. Я не стану говорить о томъ, нравятся ли мнѣ или нѣтъ эти разнообразныя созданныя коммунистами «соціально-хозяйственныя образованія» для управленія фабриками и заводами, съ точки зрѣнія интереса прежнихъ собственниковъ. Люди разоряются и безъ революцій. Ничего особеннаго нѣтъ въ томъ, если я или другой промышленникъ разорены русской революціей. Важно и особенно то, что въ капиталистическомъ и правовомъ строѣ разореніе—эпизодъ, непріятный, но поправимый. Начнете энергично работать, снова наживете. При томъ же строѣ хозяйственной жизни, который имѣетъ мѣсто теперь въ Россіи, никакое возстановленіе послѣ разоренія не возможно. При этомъ разореніе прежняго собственника не принесло никому пользы: ни Россійскому государству, ни рабочему.

Положимъ, мы, промышленники, согласились бы съ вами, что права предоставляемыя этимъ «новымъ соціально-экономическимъ образованіямъ», всѣмъ этимъ трестамъ, синдикатамъ и т. д., достаточны для возрожденія хозяйства Россіи. Возстановленіе родины очень большое дѣло. Во имя этой великой цѣли мы могли бы смириться передъ коммунистическимъ правительствомъ, рѣшиться, скрѣпя сердце, подчиниться всему произволу, которое оно творитъ, возвратиться въ Россію и начать снова работать, — при однако «echu»: — если бы отъ этого была дѣйствительно польза родинѣ. Осуществима-ли въ реальности однако такая польза Россіи и русскому ароду?

Я утверждаю, что при томъ правовомъ положеніи, которое НЭП предоставляетъ хозяйствующему, никакого толку все равно не вышло бы.

Будемъ говорить совершенно практически. Наши бывшія предпріятія теперь разорены. Въ однихъ надо поправить машины, котлы и т. д. Въ другихъ нѣтъ сырья, оборотныхъ средствъ и т. д. Нужно занять капиталъ, чтобы пустить дѣло въ ходъ. Гдѣ? За границей. Когда у меня была собственность, я могъ это сдѣлать безъ большого труда. Теперь коммунистическое правительство у меня ее отняло. Я не могу принести съ собой капитала изъ-за границы, сдѣлавшись «директоромъ треста». Никто мнѣ кредита не дастъ. А съ голыми руками, даже при самомъ горячемъ съ моей стороны

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стремленіи работать и патріотизмѣ — я ничѣмъ у себя на родинѣ помочь не могу. Буду лишнимъ голоднымъ ртомъ для нея.

Вотъ коммунистическое правительство отняло отъ меня собственность. Можетъ ли оно, придумавъ эти «соціально-экономическія образованія» и т. д. и не устанавливая капиталистическаго режима, т. е. держа собственность безъ хозяина, найти кредитъ для ея возстановленія заграницей? — Тоже нѣтъ. Практика показала, это съ несомнѣнностью. Никакой заграничный инвесторъ не ввѣряетъ своихъ денегъ ни коммунистическому правительству, ни трестамъ.

Нѣтъ правовыми нормами огражденной собственности — нѣтъ кредита.

Тѣ тресты, у которыхъ остался еще товаръ отъ капиталистическихъ временъ и которые его могутъ продать заграницу, могутъ еще кое-какъ оборачиваться на наличныя, вырученныя отъ продажи. Въ такомъ положеніи находится, напримѣръ, Сѣверолѣсъ. Чуть производство посложнѣе и подальше отъ вывознаго порта — ничего не выходитъ.

Тѣ иностранцы, которые получили отъ коммунистическаго правительства концессіи, никакимъ производствомъ въ Россіи не занимаются, а ждутъ лучшихъ временъ.

В. Ѳ. Брейтвейтъ. Въ Англіи есть любопытная лига. Она поставила себѣ цѣлью бороться противъ того, чтобы юристы были государственными дѣятелями, конечно, внѣ сферы ихъ узкой спеціальности. Юристы невольно придаютъ больше значенія юридическимъ нормамъ, чѣмъ реальности. Мнѣ кажется, что тѣмъ же страдаетъ настоящій докладъ. Превратите прежде всего законы, о которыхъ вы говорите, дѣйствительно въ законы, которые исполняйте на практикѣ.

Я соціалъ-демократъ, меньшевикъ. Уже поэтому я не придаю моменту «собственности» излишняго значенія. Я не имѣю къ коммунистическому правительству претензіи за то, что оно у меня отняло фабрику или заводъ просто потому, что такого рода собственности у меня не было. Но большевики отняли у меня другую собственность — мою родину. Тутъ мой споръ съ ними — большой. Для всѣхъ гражданъ Россіи они сдѣлали невозможной жизнь въ Россіи, ибо у всякаго человѣка они отняли всѣ его политическія права и присвоили себѣ право за всѣхъ думать и судьбою всѣхъ распоряжаться. Посмотрите на некоммунистическую литературу въ Россіи, хотя-бы на «Экономистъ». Онъ не поднималъ острыхъ, политическихъ вопросовъ. Говорилъ объ экономикѣ. Посмотрите какъ сдержанно онъ долженъ былъ это дѣлать. И всетаки журналъ былъ закрытъ коммунистической властью за свои скромныя статьи. Вотъ посмотрите теперь какъ тамъ внутри Россіи некоммунистическіе авторы расцѣнивали положеніе теперешняго хозяйства Россіи и въ чемъ они видѣли выходъ изъ тупика. Ихъ голосъ авторитетенъ. Они намъ говорятъ, надо: 1) политически правовое государство и 2) полученіе извнѣ капитала. Если этого нѣтъ, то, говорятъ они, будетъ медленное и для страны потому вредное ковырянье.

Какъ поступаютъ съ возстановленіемъ хозяйства большевики, захватившіе себѣ диктаторское право за всѣхъ гражданъ Россіи думать и всѣмъ распоряжаться? Они избираютъ этотъ второй, медленный и долгій путь самобытнаго ковырянья. Идеологія коммунистическаго хозяйства — весь этотъ коммунистическій этатизмъ — оказался несостоятельнымъ. Коммунисты его мѣняютъ. Но какъ? Шагъ за шагомъ открывая давно всѣмъ извѣстныя истины политической экономіи. Россіи безконечно дорого обходятся эти ихъ обученіе и претензія компартіи на диктатуру въ мысли, политической власти и хозяйствѣ. Теперь уперлись въ политическій ту-

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пикъ. Пусть будутъ прежде всего политическія права и гарантіи. Невѣрно также на мой взглядъ сближеніе, дѣлаемое докладчикомъ между Германскимъ Экономическимъ Совѣтомъ и совѣтской системой. Германскій Экономическій Совѣтъ вовсе не замѣняетъ и не вытѣсняетъ парламентарную систему управленія страной. Онъ разрабатываетъ и всесторонне освѣщаетъ экономическіе вопросы. Рѣшеніе принадлежитъ парламенту.

Г. И. Бенигсенъ. Докладъ очень интересенъ. Не такъ въ немъ интересно, пожалуй, освѣщеніе юридической природы трестовъ. Для меня не представляетъ никакого сомнѣнія, что всякій коммунистическій трестъ — это просто государственное предпріятіе. Важнѣе и интереснѣе въ докладѣ яркое выявленіе факта, имѣющаго глубокое значеніе и по существу рѣшающаго весь вопросъ. Фактъ этотъ: законодательное творчество народныхъ комиссаровъ никѣмъ фактически не ограничено и грань между законодательной и административной властью стерта. Это повлекло за собой общее исчезновеніе правовой культуры. Возможно-ли въ этихъ условіяхъ какое-нибудь хозяйствованіе? Увѣренъ, что невозможно. Для даннаго момента прежде всего важно возстановленіе именно этой правовой культуры. Безъ нея не сдвинешься съ мѣста дальше.

А. В. Рутченко. Насколько удовлетворительна или неудовлетворительна та юридическая природа, которая была дана при НЭП'ѣ коммунистическимъ правительствомъ трестамъ, синдикатамъ и прочимъ «соціально-хозяйственнымъ оборудованіямъ», лучше всего судить по практикѣ. Не только русскіе промышленники не нашли возможнымъ вести свои прежнія предпріятія въ случаѣ полученія ихъ отъ коммунистической власти въ концессіи, но такой же точки зрѣнія держатся и иностранцы, которымъ принадлежатъ предпріятія въ Россіи. Послѣдніе сдѣлали рядъ попытокъ выяснить на мѣстѣ каковы въ точности будутъ условія этихъ концессій и возможности веденія предпріятій въ хозяйственной и правовой обстановкѣ НЭП'а. Послѣ всѣхъ этихъ попытокъ пришли къ заключенію: шансовъ на успѣшное веденіе хозяйствъ никакихъ. Я бы могъ привести рядъ конкретныхъ примѣровъ. Дѣло слишкомъ ясно, чтобы стоило приводить такихъ примѣровъ много. Сошлюсь хотя бы на переговоры о полученіи для эксплоатаціи рудниковъ Прохоровскаго Каменноугольнаго общества.

Л. С. Таль. Мнѣ очень больно, что я не былъ понятъ. Я не зову россійскую эмиграцію къ соглашательству съ коммунистической властью. Я — просто говорю: вы ушли изъ Россіи, мы остались въ ней. За это время произошло много событій и перемѣнъ величайшаго значенія. Не настало ли время и тѣмъ, кто ушелъ изъ Россіи и тѣмъ, кто въ ней все это время оставался, сѣсть за одинъ столъ и обсудить, не сможетъ ли новая экономическая политика быть хотя началомъ, нѣкоторымъ мостикомъ къ общей работѣ и къ лучшему будущему Россіи?

Когда я выѣхалъ изъ Россіи и встрѣтился за границей впервые съ моими земляками, эмигрировавшими изъ Россіи въ Берлинъ, я обратился къ нимъ съ этимъ же вопросомъ, жгучимъ для всѣхъ насъ остававшихся въ Россіи и пережившихъ эпоху коммунистическаго этатизма и зарожденіе теперешняго режима новой экономической политики. Вы поймите, этотъ вопросъ — есть крикъ наболѣвшей души.

Въ берлинской аудиторіи я встрѣтилъ отношеніе гораздо мягче. Здѣсь же мы стоимъ какъ-будто на двухъ разныхъ берегахъ. Для васъ, господа, то, что дѣлается въ Россіи — картина. Вы говорите, это не хорошо, это не вѣрно. Для меня — это трагедія, въ которой я живу. Общій смыслъ ва-

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шихъ возраженій — *революція должна оборваться*. Простите, господа, но мнѣ кажется, что вы ничего не забыли и ничему не научились съ 17 года.

Возраженія противъ доклада сводятся къ тому, что въ Россіи нѣтъ того правового порядка, при которомъ возможно возстановленіе хозяйственнаго строя и привлеченіе туда иностраннаго капитала. Если единственно возможнымъ «правовымъ строемъ» считать полную реставрацію частной собственности, то это вѣрно; съ этой точки зрѣнія соціальная революція въ Россіи и повсюду, сплошная оберрація и бредъ и нужно просто ждать реставраціи. Мы, лично переживающіе эту революцію, — далекіе отъ коммунизма и политики — научные работники, рѣшительно не раздѣляемъ этого мнѣнія. Мы вѣримъ въ творчество революціи и тщательно слѣдимъ за всякимъ проявленіемъ такового, направленнаго въ сторону организаціи, порядка, а не разрушенія. Съ этой точки зрѣнія переходъ къ системѣ надѣленія государственныхъ предпріятій и ихъ объединеній соціальной автономіей, хотя бы и ограниченной, мнѣ кажется большимъ и благотворнымъ шагомъ впередъ, многообѣщающимъ началомъ въ положительную сторону. Независимо отъ этого я вѣрю въ разумъ и внутреннюю логику хозяйственной жизни. Кто въ нихъ не вѣритъ и думаетъ, что большевики будутъ поступать не такъ, какъ имъ велитъ разумъ и ихъ собственный интересъ, тотъ не долженъ идти въ Россію. Но кто трезво смотритъ на этотъ вопросъ, долженъ задать себѣ вопросъ, заинтересовано ли совѣтское правительство въ бережномъ отношеніи къ своему кредиту, къ иностранному капиталу, ко всему, способствующему возстановленію Россіи или нѣтъ. Намъ кажется, что на это возможенъ только положительный отвѣтъ.

Мы внутри Россіи болѣзненно стоимъ передъ фактомъ: *революція не обрывается*. Какой выходъ? Намъ не рисуется, что коммунисты уйдутъ. Я не говорю въ защиту коммунистическаго режима. Я самъ горячо желаю, чтобы наступилъ правовой порядокъ. Я ставлю болѣе скромный и практическій вопросъ: что нужно, чтобы эти коммунисты дѣлали работу въ направленіи оздоровленія русской жизни.

Эти 400 хозяйственныхъ объединеній дѣйствуютъ. Они приносятъ свою пользу въ смыслѣ оздоровленія. Россія не можетъ ждать пока коммунисты уйдутъ. Вотъ гдѣ-то появился съ НЭП'омъ проблескъ. Пока мы не извѣрились, мы ухватываемся за то, что жизнь намъ даетъ.

Я не считаю потому никчемнымъ занятіемъ юриста анализъ юридической природы соціально-хозяйственныхъ образованій НЭП'а.

Я закончу двумя замѣчаніями. Первое касается привлеченія иностраннаго капитала въ концессіи. Дѣйствительно, иностранный капиталистъ не удовлетворенъ въ смыслѣ огражденія правъ собственности этаго капитала на случай, если бы онъ пошелъ въ концессіи, предоставляемыя ему коммунистическимъ правительствомъ. Потому стремленіе привлечь иностранный капиталъ дѣйствительно пока не увѣнчалось успѣхомъ. Не слѣдуетъ однако унывать. Когда мнѣ говорятъ иностранцы, что они не чувствуютъ достаточно твердой почвы, чтобы идти въ концессіи, я говорю имъ: жизнь возметъ свое, мало-по-малу положеніе выправится.

Второе замѣчаніе касается частной собственности. Важно не формальное установленіе института частной собственности а то, что теперь есть приближеніе къ реальному содержанію. Съ другой стороны, люди жили и раньше безъ частной собственности, не только въ Россіи. Средніе вѣка въ Европѣ тоже вѣдь почти не знали частной собственности и индивидуализированія хозяйственной области эпохи капитализма.

Въ заключеніе могу сказать: сравнивая теперешній государственный

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капитализмъ съ прежнимъ коммунистическимъ этатизмомъ, я, и также какъ я, другіе научные работники въ Россіи, мы привѣтствуемъ побѣду разума надъ стихіей.

М. В. Брайкевичъ. Итакъ позвольте закончить наши сегодняшнія пренія по чень интересному докладу проф. Л. С. Таля предсѣдательскимъ резюме.

Прежде всего о «двухъ берегахъ». По той живости даже страстности, съ которой оспаривалась здѣсь ваша точка зрѣнія на НЭП несоглашавшимися съ нею, вы уже можете видѣть, что для россійской политической эмиграціи Россія — не «картина», которую можно разсматривать съ точки зрѣнія «ума холодныхъ наблюденій». Россія и ея благо — это сердце россійской политической эмиграціи. Когда это сердце коммунистическая власть мучитъ и обезкровливаетъ, россійская политическая эмиграція всѣмъ существомъ своимъ чувствуетъ это, какъ чувствуютъ и тѣ русскіе, которые остались въ Россіи. Здѣсь нѣтъ «двухъ береговъ» и двухъ отдѣлившихся другъ отъ друга половинокъ одного національнаго организма. Россійская политическая эмиграція чувствуетъ себя единымъ со всею некоммунистической Россіей, цѣлостнымъ организмомъ. У этаго организма есть одно сердце. Это сердце — Россія и ея благо.

Россійская политическая эмиграція противополагаетъ себя и протестуетъ *исключительно противъ диктаторствующей надъ Россіей компартіи.* Для эмиграціи компартія — «они», вся некоммунистическая Россія — «мы». Но вѣдь то же противоположеніе — между «мы» и «они» есть, какъ въ Лондонѣ такъ и въ Москвѣ, между всею некоммунистической Россіей и диктаторствующимъ коммунистическимъ правительствомъ. Даже находясь на правительственной службѣ, большинство некоммунистовъ не переходятъ въ Россіи черезъ эту черту между «мы» и «они».

Не «картина» и не хладнокровныя умствованія диктовали сегодня возраженія на вашъ докладъ, а горячее чувство единства россійской политической эмиграціи со всѣмъ остальнымъ громаднымъ россійскимъ некоммунистическимъ населеніемъ и живой, дѣйственный патріотизмъ. Вашъ докладъ могъ бы вызвать такія же горячія возраженія, если бы онъ былъ прочитанъ у насъ на Родинѣ. Только общественные дѣятели у насъ на Родинѣ поосторожнѣе выражались бы, чѣмъ здѣсь въ Лондонѣ, или совсѣмъ бы поудержались отъ выраженія своихъ мыслей.

Теперь перейдемъ къ возраженіямъ по существу. Позвольте прежде всего констатировать, что первое положеніе вашаго доклада — новая экономическая политика лучше чѣмъ коммунистическій этатизмъ — не встрѣчаетъ ни малѣйшихъ возраженій. Здѣсь «мы» согласны не только съ вами но и съ «они». Согласіе относительно этаго пункта между «мы» и «они» одинаково и въ Лондонѣ и въ Москвѣ. Далѣе, мы всѣ не только согласны, но рады сѣсть съ вами — не коммунистомъ «*за одинъ столъ* и обсудить, не можетъ ли новая экономическая политика быть хотя началомъ, нѣкоторымъ мостикомъ, къ общей работѣ и къ лучшему будущему».

Къ этому второму пункту нашаго согласія я сдѣлаю добавленіе уже не какъ предсѣдатель дѣлающій резюме, а въ порядкѣ личнаго моего мнѣнія. Личнаго потому, что идея въ этомъ «добавленіи» лежащая, никогда не дебатировалась ни въ Русской экономическомъ обществѣ, ни въ другихъ какихъ либо организаціяхъ россійской политической эмиграціи и я просто не имѣю формулированнаго общественнаго мнѣнія по существу этаго добавленія.

Мое личное добавленіе: я сѣлъ бы, для обсужденія поставленнаго выше

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вами вопроса, «за одинъ столъ» не только съ вами, но и съ коммунистомъ при двухъ ,однако, непремѣнныхъ условіяхъ: 1) еслибы этотъ коммунистъ ставилъ честно интересы Россіи и родины выше шкурнаго интереса компартіи или своего личнаго и 2) если бы онъ наперед согласился признать суверенным и высшимъ критеріемъ волю народа для разрѣшенія нашего съ нимъ разногласія относительно того, чѣмъ замѣнить обанкротившійся совершенно несомнѣнно не только для меня, но и для него самого, коммунистическій режимъ. Говоря совершенно опредѣленно: если бы этотъ коммунистъ согласился бы наперед на установленіе въ Россіи представительнаго образа правленія со всеобщимъ, равнымъ и тайнымъ голосованіемъ.

Я не очень увѣренъ, стоитъ ли, оставаясь на почвѣ практическаго обсужденія вопроса, дѣлать это мое «личное добавленіе». Вѣдъ идейный и честный коммунистъ ставъ теперь чрезвычайно рѣдкимъ явленіемъ въ компартіи. Протекшіе годы пребыванія компартіи у государственной власти и возможность «поживиться на пребываніи у власти» развратили очень многихъ идейныхъ коммунистовъ до уровня весьма низкаго нравственнаго паденія. Во всякомъ случаѣ рѣшающее вліяніе на политику компартіи принадлежитъ не тѣмъ очень немногимъ коммунистомъ, которые сохранили еще «идейность и честность старыхъ временъ». Но для того, чтобы остаться до конца объективнымъ я это свое «личное добавленіе» пожалуй всетаки оставлю.

Возвращаюсь теперь къ резюме. За этими двумя согласіями идутъ уже разногласія съ вами. Главное наше разногласіе въ слѣдующемъ: вы думаете, что, оставаясь на правовой и экономической базѣ НЭП'а, Россія можетъ выбраться изъ теперешняго хозяйственнаго разрушенія. Мы утверждаемъ категорически, что это ваше мнѣніе ошибочно. НЭП — это только первый и очень робкій шагъ. За нимъ надо сдѣлать *рѣшительно и быстро* дальнѣйшіе шаги къ 1) правовому строю и 2) частной собственности. Главное здѣсь, ударность—въ *рѣшительности и быстротѣ*. Воспроизводство и при НЭП'ѣ имѣетъ отрицательный знакъ; т. е. воспроизводственная база съ каждымъ новымъ цикломъ производства, беря широко, всего національнаго хозяйства *уменьшается*. Если оставить такъ дѣло, — то дальнѣйшее пониженіе національнаго дохода будетъ повышать истощеніе, и вымираніе населенія. Надо слѣдовательно такъ сдѣлать, чтобы воспроизводственная база быстро *увеличивалась*.

Этотъ вопросъ мы рѣшаемъ на основаніи исторіи экономическаго развитія другихъ странъ и говоримъ: собственность. Вы говорите, что въ средніе вѣка люди жили и безъ собственности. Совершенно вѣрно. Но въ средніе же вѣка накопленіе капитала было чрезвычайно медленнымъ. Импульсивный ростъ національнаго дохода — есть принадлежность новѣйшей исторіи и капиталистическаго хозяйства. Въ уровень съ величиной національнаго дохода было въ среднее вѣка и тогдашнее количество населенія. Если русскій народъ будетъ ждать, чтобы коммунистическое правительство продѣлало эволюцію отъ хозяйственныхъ отношеній феодальныхъ временъ къ современному индивидуализированному капиталистическому хозяйству и его основѣ собственности—то онъ будетъ вымирать, ибо онъ долженъ будетъ привести въ пропорцію величину населенія съ количествомъ создаваемыхъ матеріальныхъ цѣнностей: Этотъ жестокій процессъ приведенія количества населенія въ пропорцію съ величиной національнаго дохода имѣлъ мѣсто въ эпоху коммунистическаго этатизма. Количество населенія Россіи въ 17 году отвѣчало національному доходу Россіи въ 17 г. Доходъ съ того времени сталъ рѣзко падать. Начался процессъ деклас-

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сированія, деградаціи, физическаго истощенія и вымиранія. Онъ НЭП'омъ и вашими «соціально-хозяйственными образованіями» не остановленъ. Городское населеніе: интеллигенція и рабочій классъ, — за исключеніемъ, конечно, торжествующаго коммуниста, — вымираетъ.

Мы считаемъ своимъ патріотическимъ передъ всею некоммунистической Россіей долгомъ рѣзко и громко говорить: берегитесь, вы подходите къ могилѣ.

Вы говорите: вотъ при НЭП'ѣ стало легче, подождемъ. Облегченіе въ организмѣ можетъ быть отъ притока силъ или отъ возбужденія ихъ. НЭП — только второе. Это наркотика, скажемъ, кокаинъ. Облегченіе за счетъ дальнѣйшаго истощенія. На этомъ мы покончимъ съ собственностью.

Теперь перейдемъ къ *правовому строю*. Вы видѣли, что возражавшій вамъ Г. И. Бенигсенъ отдавалъ этому моменту болѣе важное и во всякомъ случаѣ въ порядкѣ послѣдовательности во времени *первое мѣсто*. И это правильно.

Вы говорите, что «большевики будутъ поступать какъ имъ велитъ *ихъ собственный интересъ*», Вы дальше выражаете твердую увѣренность, что «совѣтское правительство заинтересовано въ бережномъ отношеніи къ *своему кредиту*». Съ этими вашими положеніями мы всѣ согласны. Но позвольте обратить ваше вниманіе, что здѣсь дѣло идетъ объ «*интересѣ и кредитѣ*» совѣтскаго правительства, значитъ Компартіи, значитъ диктаторствующаго сословія, а не объ интересѣ и кредитѣ Россіи. Вы очень потому ошибаетесь, когда добавляете «и всему, способствующему возстановленію Россіи» и думаете, что коммунистическому правительству *одинаково* дороги интересъ Компартіи и интересъ всей остальной Россіи.

На самомъ дѣлѣ интересъ компартіи ставится имъ выше интереса всей остальной Россіи. Россійское государственное достояніе разсматривается коммунистическимъ правительствомъ прежде всего какъ *партійный фондъ*. Именно поэтому совѣтское правительство собираетъ тамъ, гдѣ не сѣетъ, даетъ автомобили, дворцы и сытую жизнь комиссарамъ и отнимаетъ всякій наличный пудъ зерна у крестьянина.

Это обычное свойство всякаго *сословнаго* и *деспотическаго* правительства, не имѣющаго *сдержки* въ правовамъ строѣ, въ бюджетномъ правѣ и всѣхъ прочихъ «буржуазныхъ предразсудкахъ» представительнаго и парламентарнаго режима. Вы меня извините, что я напоминаю о такихъ старыхъ и извѣстныхъ вещахъ. Что дѣлать, приходится. Онѣ, конечно, далеки отъ совершенства, но всетаки много лучше вашихъ «соціально-хозяйственныхъ образованій» и безконечно лучше всякихъ «коммунистическихъ этатизмовъ», «государственныхъ капитализмовъ» и «диктатуръ компартіи».

При представительномъ строѣ и вопросъ о собственности быстро потерялъ бы свою остроту. Замѣтьте, возражавшіе вамъ и настаивавшіе на возстановленіи института частной собственности, исходили не изъ нарушеннаго интереса бывшаго собственника, а изъ необходимости цѣлевой собственности, т. е. для успѣха возстановленія всего національнаго Россійскаго государства.

Вы видите, что въ вопросѣ о правовомъ и представительномъ строѣ «мы» абсолютно непримиримы съ «они». Ни за какую НЭП'овскую похлебку этой своей позиціи «мы внутри Россіи» и «мы заграницей» не уступимъ коммунистическому режиму.

Наконецъ наше послѣднее съ вами разногласіе. Вы утверждаете, что смыслъ выслушанныхъ вами возраженій: — «революція должна оборваться»

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и что этотъ лозунгъ есть результатъ того, что эмиграція «ничего не забыла и ничему не научилась».

Позвольте прежде всего разсѣять одну очень упрощенную иллюзію, которой и вы, какъ мнѣ кажется, тоже поддаетесь. Россійская эмиграція — не Кобленцъ и не классъ обиженный въ своемъ классовомъ интересѣ. Послѣ Февральской революціи *никто изъ Россіи въ эмиграцію не уходилъ*. Послѣ октябрьской коммунистической ушли представители *всѣхъ классовъ и всѣхъ профессій*.

Въ подлинномъ смыслѣ слова теперешняя россійская эмиграція есть эмиграція крестьянско-рабоче-буржуазно-интеллигентская.

Стоитъ задуматься надъ тѣмъ, въ чемъ причина? Въ очень разномъ характерѣ революцій — февральской и октябрьской коммунистической; какъ разъ въ вопросѣ о томъ, когда оборвалась революція.

Какими бы эксцессами и ошибками февральская революція и послѣфевральскій режимъ ни сопровождались, всетаки общая тенденція была къ освобожденію личности — и политическому и хозяйственному. Многимъ было трудно найти себя въ новомъ режимѣ, но громаднѣйшее большинство народа искало и не теряло надежды найти соціальный миръ.

Отъ февральской революціи потому никто въ эмиграцію не бѣжалъ. Послѣ октябрьской коммунистической революціи общая тенденція была къ закрѣпощенію личности — и политическому и хозяйственному. Люди потеряли надежду найти соціальный миръ при коммунлстическомъ режимѣ. Отсюда гражданская война оружіемъ и перманентная гражданская война экономическая.

Потому именно отъ октябрьской революціи ушли въ эмиграцію представители положительно всѣхъ классовъ.

Что такое въ исторіи культурнаго человѣчества революція? — Это освобожденіе личности. Какъ называется переворотъ когда личность закрѣпощается? — Контрреволюція. Это контрреволюцію сдѣлала въ октябрѣ коммунистическая партія и закрѣпостила личность такъ, что при коммунистическомъ самодержавіи она чувствуетъ себя на много и много тяжелѣе, чѣмъ въ самые мрачные дни царскаго самодержавія.

Вы видите, что всѣ несогласія говорившихъ, диктовались нашимъ скромнымъ желаніемъ чтобы «революція не обрывалась» а дала въ концѣ концовъ лучшій соціальный строй,чѣмъ это было до февраля 1917 г. Это желаніе россійской политической эмиграціи — очень скромное желаніе, но очень твердое желаніе.

Если вамъ угодно считать его революціей противъ коммунистическаго режима. Считайте. «Мы» въ Лондонѣ говоримъ о ней громко. «Мы» въ Россіи думаемъ о немъ тихо. Въ обоихъ случаяхъ, однако, — одинаково упорно и одинаково единодушнс.

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THE COMMUNIST INDUSTRY IN FIGURES FOR 1922
КОММУНИСТИЧЕСКАЯ ПРОМЫШЛЕННОСТЬ ЗА 1922 г.
ВЪ ЦИФРАХЪ.

I. RAILWAY TRANSPORT IN 1922. ЖЕЛѢЗНОДОРОЖНЫЙ ТРАНСПОРТЪ ВЪ 1922 Г.
(«E. J.» 9.11.22- 10.11.22; 29.12.22; 6.1.23; 14.1.23; 21.1.23; 24.1.23; 28.1.23; 2.2.23; 6.2.23) Econom. Review, Moscow 23. № 1,; Обзоръ состоянія и работы транспорта въ 1921 г.; Матерьялы къ IX Съѣзду; Народное хозяйство за 21 г.

A. Engines. *Паровозный паркъ.*

Months and years Мѣсяцы и годы	Total number (includ. intended for scrap.) Валовое количес. съ ожид. искл. изъ инвен. шт	«Sick» locomotives Больные паровозы		«Sound» locomotives Здоровые паровозы			Number repaired Выпускъ изъ ремонта въ единиц средняго ремонта штукъ
		Number Число	Percent. %	Total number Общее наличіе	Out of wich idle owing to fuel short. Въ томъ числѣ охлажд.	Percent. %	
January 22	18.972	12.399	65.3	6.573	1.061	16,7	467
February	18.900	12.700	67,2	6.200	681	11,4	510
March	19.109	12.803	67,0	6.306	—	—	591
April	19.154	12.584	65,7	6.570	—	—	576
May	19.143	12.462	65,1	6.681	—	—	755
June	19.052	12.098	63,5	6.954	—	—	829
July	19.216	12.049	62,7	7.167	—	—	866
August	19.192	11.764	61.3	7.432	1.968	—	917
September	—	—	—	7.773	2.085	26,6	—
October	—	—	—	7.998	2.095	—	—
November	19.371	11.245	58	8.037	2.114	—	—
December	19.200	11.156	58	8.044	2.157	26,8	—
1921	18.796	11.654	62	7.142	—	—	8.666
1920	17.892	10.556	59	7.336	—	—	9.307
1913	20.320	3.454	17	16.866	—	—	—

B. Wagons. *Вагонный паркъ.*

Months and years Мѣсяцы и годы	Total number (includ. intend. for scrap Вал. кол вмѣстѣ съ ожид. искл.изъ инвент.	«Sick» wagons Больн. вагоны		«Sound» wagons Здоров. вагоны			Number repaired Выпуск изъ ремонт. въ единиц. средн. ремонта
		Number Количество	Percent. %	Grand total Общее количество	In which number Въ томъ числѣ		
					Total wag. fit for serv. Весь рабочаго паркъ	Out of which Изъ раб. парка	
						Loaded Груженыхъ	Idle Порожнихъ	
January 22	415.987	122.100	29,4	293.887	—	—	—	6.721
February	421.140	122.000	28,9	299.140	—	—	—	7.372
March	417.213	124.400	29,8	292.813	—	—	—	8.564
April	418.404	126.100	30,2	292.304	—	—	—	8.595
May	420.486	140.800	33,5	279.686	—	—	—	10.449
June	418.837	144.200	34,5	274.637	—	—	—	10.788
July	419.846	144.500	34,7	275.346	—	—	—	10.303
August	415.100	144.300	34,7	266.450	—	—	69.864	11.108
September	388.875	122.494	—	260.906	—	—	50.600	—
October	—	—	—	266.574	—	—	28.845	—
November	394.000	121.000	30,7	266.848	—	—	22.455	—
December	—	—	—	—	193.191	139.674	53.517	—
1921	443.868	120.800	27,2	323.068	—	—	—	122.794
1920	439.471	109.300	23,9	330.171	—	—	—	100.405
1913	502.101	27.616	5,5	474.485	—	—	—	—

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C. Work of railways.

Months and years Мѣсяцы и годы	Work of rolling stock.								
	Trains. Поѣзда					Locomotives.			
	Общее количество въ тысяч. поѣздоверсть. Total in 1.000 train-versts	Тоже на 1 версту сѣти въ сутки. Total per verst of net per day	Средній составъ поѣздовъ въ обоихъ направл. въ осяхъ. Average number of axles per train.	Нагрузка на ось груж. вагона пуд. Average load per axle.	Коммерческая скорость версты. Commercial speed in versts	Общее количество въ тысячахъ паровозоверсть. Total in 1.000 engine-versts	То же на 1 версту сѣти въ сутки. Total per verst of net per day	Средній суточный пробѣгъ 1 рабочаго паровоза въ поѣздахъ товар. и воинскихъ. Average daily run per engine in goods and troops trains	% порожняго пробѣга въ оба конца. Percentage of run to and from without load
January 22	8.261	4,2	77	—	11,5	11.877	6,0	68,6	25,0
February	7.397	4,1	78	243	11,1	10.670	5,9	66,1	25,5
March	8.885	4,5	74	—	11,3	12.707	6,5	69,1	29,2
April	9.393	4,9	79	—	12,0	13.368	7,0	73,5	34,2
May	10.406	5,3	80	—	12,4	14.608	7,4	78,5	39,5
June	10.404	5,4	83	—	13,0	14.344	7,5	82,0	37,5
July	10.114	5,1	87	—	13,4	13.912	7,0	77,8	38,8
August	9.713	4,9	90	—	13,4	13.304	6,7	73,4	36,5
September (2)	9.950 [1]	5,2	—	—	—	13.600 [1]	7,1	89,5 [1]	—
October (2)	10.919	5,5	—	—	—	14.835	7,5	90	—
November	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
December	—	—	—	—	—	14.803	7.5	—	—
1921	108.900	4,8	73	254	12,4	174.975	7,7	78,9	27,0
1920	11.1536	5,8	76	223	12,5	180.938	9,3	55,8	34,4
1913	419.649	18,0	78	313	—	572.376	24,6	111,6	—

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Работа желѣзныхъ дорогъ.

Работа подвижного состава						Traffic Перевозки		Трудъ. Labour		
Паровозы		Wagons Вагоны								
% непроизводит. линейнаго пробѣга. — Percentage of unproductive runs	% станціоннаго пробѣга Percentage of runs in station work	Общее количество въ милліонахъ осеверстъ тов. ваг. Total in million axle-versts for goods trucks	То же на 1 версту сѣти сутки. Total per verst of net per day	Средній пробѣгъ 1 рабочаго вагона въ поѣздахъ товарн. и воинскихъ. Average run per truck in goods and troops trains	Оборотъ рабочаго товарнаго вагона въ сутках. Daily turnover of working trucks	Средняя суточная погрузка по всей сѣти въ вагон. (съ наличіемъ груз.) Average daily loading on the whole net	Пріемъ вагоновъ съ другой дороги. Number of wagons taken over from other lines	Общее количество рабочихъ и служащихъ на 1 число мѣсяца. Number of workmen and employees on the 1st of each month	То же на 1 версту сѣти. Same per verst of net	Длина эксплоатац. сѣти въ верстахъ. Total length of lines under regular traffic in versts
7,4	23,0	380	191,9	27,1	28,1	8.361	6.970	934.567	14,6	63.823
7,3	23,4	334	192,6	26,2	30,0	8.141	7.289	872.555	13,8	63.326
7,7	22,4	409	208,8	28,1	25,0	9.837	9.263	846.305	13,4	63.326
7,6	22,1	467	245,5	33,0	27,4	9.042	9.074	842.472	13,3	63.456
7,2	21,6	515	261,9	38,4	27,2	10.078	10.062	824.284	13,0	63.424
6,9	20,6	524	273,4	42,7	20,3	10.663	9.993	794.346	12,5	63.921
6,9	20,6	482	243,2	42,5	21,5	9.013	8.490	743.939	11,6	63.970
—	20,8	437	200,0	46,2	21,3	8.429	6.648	724.902	11,4	63.764
—	—	460[1])	240	47 [1])	—	10.515	—	—	—	—
—	—	524	265,	44	—	12.032	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	11.656	—	—	—	—
8,7	20	—	—	—	16,7	12.316	—	—	—	—
6,3	30,2	5.939	261,1	27,3	23	9.780	8.249	934.567	14,6	62.340
8,4	28	6.327	324,6	32,6	24,0	10.738	11.615	1.229.051	20,7	53.261
6,5	18	19.589	841,9	70,2	6	—	—	815.502	12,8	63.749

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D. Locomotive Building Works. *Паровозостроительные заводы.*

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	Jun	July	Aug	Sept	Oct.	Nov	Dec.	Total 1922	Total 1921
Locom new Паровоз. нов.	9	12	14	8	8	12	4	7	8	4	4	4	94	78
Locom. thorough rep. Паров. кап. рем.	7	6	5	7	4	6	2	3	8	5	5	6	64	104
Loc. med. rep. Пар. сред.рем	3	5	2	5	5	8	2	4	1	4	4	4	47	113
Loc. curr. rep. Пар. возст. р.	7	16	16	—	—	—	10	—	2	2	2	2	51	47
Wagons new Вагоны новые	65	102	98	50	40	53	—	12	22	48	22	30	551	819
Wagons repair Вагоны гемон	857	1.009	1.216	1.112	1.298	1.373	923	927	1.804	1.800	1.800	1.800	15.919	13.565
Snow clearers Снѣгоочистит	19	10	12	1	1	4	—	9	6	11	11	11	95	131

«Torgovo-Prom.» 1.1.23; «E. J.» 9.3.23.

II. MINING INDUSTRY. ГОРНЫЙ ПРОМЫСЕЛЪ.

1) Output of various ores for the second half of 1922. (in thousand poods). *Добыча рудъ* за вторую половину 1922 г. (въ тысяч. пудовъ).

Months - Мѣсяцы	Iron Желѣзная руда	Copper Мѣдная руда	Manganese Марганц. руда	Asbestos Асбестъ	Magnes. Магнезитъ	Other ores. Проч. руды и ископаем.
For the first 6 m. За 1-ое полугодіе	5.595	338	1.532	211	268	229
July	972	92	228	71	—	4,5
August	956	117	365	37	—	124
September	978	294	438	20	—	196
October	889	358	402	12	24	87
November	1.117	274	433	9	105	123
December	1.388	228	431	16	67	—
For the second 6 m. За 2-ое полугодіе	6.300	1.363	2.297	165	196	534
For the second 6 m. of 1921. За 2-ое полугодіе 1921 г.	2.275	0	463	78	276	253
Total for 1922. Всего за 1922	11.895	1.701	3.829	376	464	763
Total for 1921 Всего за 1921 г.	8.470	285	782	159	1.005	610
January 1923	1.336	297	401	17	63	—
February						

«E. J.» 11.11.22; 13.1.23; 15.2.23; 27.3.23.

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2) Gold and Platinum. *Золото и платина.*
Output in poods and lbs. Добыча въ пудахъ и фунтахъ.

	For the first 6m. 1922 За 1 пг.	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	For the sec. 6 m. За 2 пг.	Total for 1922	To- for 1921	1923 January
Gold: золото	157-8	24-36	21-20	22-24	27-24	27-35	33-9	157-28	314-36	84	34-18
Platin. Платин..	26-21	8-30	7-1	9-12	5-30	3-8	3-13	37-14	63-35	—	1-37

«E. J.» 4.11.22; 15.2.23; 27.3.23.

3) Salt. *Соль.* Total output in thousand poods. Производство въ тыс. пудовъ.

For the first 6 months За 1 полуг.	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	For the sec. 6 mon. 1921 За 2 п.22За	Total for 1921 За 1921 г.
11.478	5.197	9.192	8.640	5.240	2.655	—	36.201	48.520

«E. J.» 11.11.22; 13.1.23.

4) Coal. *Уголь.* Total output for the whole of Russia in thous. poods. Валовая добыча по всѣмъ районамъ (въ тысяч. пудовъ).

Months	Donetz	Moscow	Urals	Kusnetzk	Cheremkha	Total
For the first 6 mon. За 1-ое полугодіе	218.373	20.900	37.616	31.640	13.835	322.364
July	22.491	802	3.282	3.523	1.249	31.347
August	20.049	968	2.313	1.952	756	26.038
September	21.185	2.115	3.211	2.646	1.133	30.290
October	26.791	2.759	4.148	3.819	1.440	38.957
November	33.708	3.858	5.575	3.979	1.796	48.916
December	41.345	5.424	6.474	4.869	2.327	60.439
For the second 6 m. За 2-ое полугодіе	165.569	15.926	25.003	20.788	8.701	235.987
For the second 6 m. 1921; за 2 пол.1921	196.500	21.100	21.700	22.700	13.700	276.700
Total for 1922. За 1922 годъ.....	383.942	36.826	62.619	52.428	22.536	558.351
Total for 1921 За 1921 годъ.....	352.271	42.548	60.778	47.229	28.189	531.015
January 1923.....	32.704	4.859	5.817	5.970		49.350
February						

«Russkaia Promyshl.» 1922; «Torgovlia i Promyshl.» 1.1.23; «E. J.» 14.2.23; 27.3.23; 23.12.22

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A. European Russia. *Европейская Россія.*

Donetz Basin. *Донецкій бассейнъ.* (in thous. poods; въ тысяч. пудовъ)

Months	Output. Добыча		Total Всего	Consumpt. in coalfields Расходы на собст. нуж.	Export Вывозъ
	Coal Уголь	Anthracite Антрацитъ			
For the first 6 m. За 1-ое полг.	(149.000)	(69.000)	218.373	65.801	111.678
July	17.867	4.624	22.491	8.328	22.758
August	16.223	3.826	20.049	8.346	20.096
September	17.065	4.120	21.185	8.375	17.486
October	(20.700)	(6.000)	26.791	10.100	21.200
November	(24.300)	(9.000)	33.708	10.500	24.800
December	(29.500)	(11.600)	41.345	11.900	28.700
For the second 6 m. За 2 полуг.	(125.600)	(39.200)	165.569	57.749	135.040
For the second 6 months 1921 За 2-ое полугодіе 1921 г.			196.500	61.200	96.300
Total for 1922. За 1922 г.	(274.600)	(108.200)	383.942	123.550	252.618
Total for 1921; за 1921 г.	(252.000)	(99.000)	352.271	134.200	183.165
January 1923			32.704		
February					

Figures in brackets only approximate.

Moscow Basin. *Подмосковный бассейнъ* (in thousand poods; въ тысяч. пуд.)

Months	Output Добыча	Consumpt. in coalfields Собств. потр.	Export Вывозъ	Accumulat. stocks Запасы угля
For the first 6 months. За 1-ое полуг.	20.900	(5.500)	15.059	1.6.22 2.084
July	802	486	458	2.955
August	968	418	637	2.841
September	2.115	462	1.551	2.528
October	2.759	1.059	2.412	
November	3.858	1.210	3.502	
December	5.424	1.302	2.835	
For the second 6 mon. За 2-ое полуг.	15.926	4.937	11.395	
For the second 6 months 1921. За 2-ое полугодіе 1921 г.	21.100	5.520	13.000	
Total for 1922. За 1922 г.	36.826	(10.500)	26.454	
Total for 1921. За 1921 г.	42.548		(28.000)	1.1.22 3.800
January 1923	4.859	880	3.023	2.870
February				

«Torgovo-Promyshl. Gazetta» 1.1.23; 4.1.23; «E. J.» 13.1.23; 14.2.23; 15.2.23; 27.3.23.

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B. Urals and Siberia. *Уралъ и Сибирь.*

Months	URALS		SIBERIA		
	Output Добыча	Export Вывозъ	Output. Добыча		
			Kuznetsk	Cheremkh.	Total
For the first 6 months. За 1-ое полугодіе	37.616	(22.000)	31.640	13.835	45.475
July	3.282	3.187	3.523	1.249	4.772
August	2.313	1.816	1.952	756	2.708
September	3.211	2.547	2.646	1.133	3.779
October	4.148		3.819	1.440	5.259
November	5.575	13.133	3.979	1.796	5.775
December	6.474		4.869	2.327	7.196
For the second 6 months 1922 За 2-ое полугодіе 1922г.	25.003	20.683	20.788	8.701	29.489
For the second 6 months 1921 За 2-ое полугодіе 1921г.	21.700	16.410	22.700	13.700	36.400
Total for 1922. За 1922г	62.619	(42.000)	52.428	22.536	74.964
Total for 1921. За 1921 г	60.778	50.654	47.229	28.189	75.418
January 1923	5.817	4.709	5.970		5.970
February					

(Тѣ же газеты и «E. J.» 18.3.23).

5) Oil Industry. *Нефть.* (in thousand poods; въ тысяч. пудовъ).

Months	Output. Добыча					Refined Переработ. на заводахъ
	Baku	Grozny	Emba	Kuban	Total *) Безъ Кубан	
For the first 6 m. 1922; за 1-ое полг.	92.827	45.007	3.960	—	141.794	94.837
July	15.284	7.673	814	—	23.771	19.200
August	15.028	7.167	622	201	22.817	18.911
September	15.002	7.413	709	226	23.124	16.831
October	16.095	7.935	753	222	24.783	19.001
November	16.823	8.277	707	(200)	25.807	18.201
December	17.828	7.751	702	180	26.291	19.188
For the second 6 m. 1922; за 2-ое полг.	96.070	46.216	4.307	—	146.593	101.335
For the second 6 m. 1921; 2-ое пол.22г.	76.586	40.421	3.592	(1.500)	120.599	—
Total for 1922 За 1922 годъ	188.897	91.223	8.267	—	288.387	196.172
Total for 1921 За 1921 г.	157.029	82.294	(4.400)	(2.900)	246.623	—
January 1923	18.147	6.724	671	188	25.542	—
February	16.376	13.371	1.331	—	—	—
March	17.230					

«Russkaia Promyshl.» 1922; «E. J.» 11.11.22; 13.1.23; 27.1.23; 9.2.23; 15.2.23; 27.3.23; 11.4.23; 20.12.22; 14.1.23.

*) Kuban included.

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III. TEXTILE INDUSTRY. ТЕКСТИЛЬНАЯ ПРОМЫШЛЕННОСТЬ.

Output in thousands. Производство въ тысячахъ.

Months	Linen. Льняная		Cotton. Хлопчат. бумажная			Hemp
	Yarn poods poods Пряжи пудовъ	Tissues arsh. arsh. Ткани аршинъ	Yarn poods poods Пряжи пудовъ	Coarse arsh. fabr. arsh. Суровья аршинъ	Finish. prod. arsh. Готов. тов. аршинъ	Yarn poods Пеньковая Пряжи пуд
For the first 6 m. За 1-ое полугодіе.	602	42.869	1.563	241.117	192.464	62
July	37	2.710	186	32.729	31.327	25
August	67	5.380	240	41.390	29.450	25
September	92	7.462	330	59.003	40.000	26
October	130	11.320	383	70.100	58.600	
November	139	11.430	375	65.800	55.600	
December	159	12.520	409	73.900	64.750	
For the second 6 m. За 2-ое полугодіе.	624	50.822	1.923	342.922	279.727	
For the sec. 6 mon. 1921; 2-ое пол.1921	172	13.223	597	85.938	95.500	100
Total for 1922 За 1922 годъ	1.226	93.691	3.486	584.039	472.191	
Total for 1921 За 1921 годъ	495	38.191	1.118	158.200	214.094	261
January 1923	132	11.400	352	65.300	57.890	

Months	Woollen. Шерсть			Шелковая		
	Yarn poods Пряжи пуд.	Coarse fabr. arsh. Суровья арш.	Finished prod. arsh. Готов. тов. арш.	Fabrics arsh. Ткани арш.	Ribbons arsh. Ленты арш.	Articles of silk Штучн. тов
For the first 6 m. За 1-ое полугодіе.	357	13.351	17.068	811	8.034	72,9
July	34,6	1.625	1.673	91	135	4,9
August	49,7	2.207	2.502	129	169	4,6
September	61,7	2.543	2.732	140	303	3,5
October	71,9	2.794	2.722		383	5.7
November	72	2.752	2.640	—	—	—
December	78,3	2.972	2.785	—	—	—
For the second 6 m. За 2-ое полугодіе.	368,2	14.893	15.054	—	—	—
For the second 6 m. 1921. 2-ое полг. 22.	183,7	5.218	6.220	472	(3.000)	(80)
Total for 1922 За 1922 годъ	725,2	28.244	32.122	—	—	—
Total for 1921 За 1921 годъ	371,4	12.484	19.357	945	(6.000)	(160)
January 1923	68,2	2.574	2.377	—	—	—
February						

(«Russkaia Promyshl.» 1922; «E. J.» 11.11.22; 13.1.23; 27.3.23).

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IV. CHEMICAL INDUSTRY. ХИМИЧЕСКАЯ ПРОМЫШЛЕННОСТЬ.

Basic Chemical Industry. *Основная химическая промышленность.* (Output in thous. poods. Въ тысяч. пудовъ).

Months	Sulphuric acid Сѣрн. кис.	Muriatic acid Солян. кис.	Nitric acid Азотн. кис.	Vitriol Купоросъ	Salts Соли	Other prod. Прочіе продукты
For 4m. March-Jun За 4м. Мартъ-Іюнь	402,6	278	3,6	101,6	—	209
July	65,3	49,6	—	19,9	—	36,2
August	114,5	46,4	5,2	18,7	89,3	135,5
September	120,6	46,3	7,8	16,1	93,7	165
October	122,3	81,1	8,5	18,5	303,4	65
November	149,4	88	8	26,6	435,4	124
December		372,4		—	479,5	115,1
For the second 6m. За 2-ое полугодіе		1.285,4		99,8	1.401,3	640,8
For the second 6m. 1921; за 2-ое полуг	490,1	617,6	8,8	—	892	—
Total for 1921 За 1921 годъ	1.027	1.190	26,9	—	2.041	n. inform.
January 1923		375,6		—	484	68,2
February						

The figures are not exact owing to change of classification. Цифры не точны вслѣдствіе перемѣны классификаціи.

(«E. J.» 11.11.22; 13.1.23; 15.2.23; 27.3.23).

V. PAPER INDUSTRY. БУМАЖНАЯ ПРОМЫШЛЕННОСТЬ.

In thousands poods. Въ тысячахъ пудовъ.

	For the 6m За 1 п.	July	August	Sept.	Octob.	Novem	Dec.	For sec. 6 mont. За 2 п.	Total За 1922	1923 Jan.
Cellulose; целлюлоза	371,6	38,9	39,8	74,3	95,4	80,8	91,7	420,9	792,5	84,4
Wood-pulp. Древ. масла	236,3	16,1	22	28,8	24,7*)	28,5*)	55,6	150,6	386,9	47,1
Paper; бумага	818,2	98*)	124,3*)	156,4*)	261,8	229,3	274,2	1.144	1.962,2	232,0
Картонъ					11,1	11,6	26,1			24,0

*) Figures show the production only of Centrobumtrest. Данныя о производствѣ только Центробумтреста.

(«E. J.» 11.11.22; 15.2.23; 13.1.23; 28.11.22; 31.1.23; 27.3.23).

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VI. RUBBER INDUSTRY. РЕЗИНОВАЯ ПРОМЫШЛЕННОСТЬ.

	For 6m. 1-е пол.	July	Aug.	Sept.	Octob.	Nov.	Decem	Sec. 6m 2 полг.	For 922 За 1922	1923 Jan.
Goloshes th. p. Калоши, тыс.п.	1.855,4	526,1	652	748,8	837,3	998,1	1.267,8	5.030,1	6.885,5	784.6
Tyres, thous. art Шины, тыс. шт.	238,1	38,2	29	39,6	50	62,7	96,8	316,3	554,4	58.6
Belts and hoses poods. Ремни и рукава, пуд....					1.052	3.868	1.116			2.726
Total product. in mill. gold roubl. Все производст. въ мил. зол. руб		3,24	3,4	4,2	4,96	6,98	8,29	31,07		5.0

(«E. J.» 11.11.22; 13.1.23; 15.2.23; 27.3.23).

VII. LEATHER INDUSTRY. КОЖЕВЕННАЯ ПРОМЫШЛЕННОСТЬ.

In thousands. Въ тысячахъ.

	For March- Jun	July	Aug. Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	For sec.6m. За 2 полуг.
Hides. Кожъ крупныхъ	717,4	214	462	293	285	295,7	1 549.7
Skins. Кожъ мелкихъ	968,2	192	367	217	215	251,6	1 252.6
Foot-wear milit. Обуви военной....	296,3	79	181	267	265	n. inf	
Foot-wear civil. Обуви гражд.....	267,8	77	134				

(«E. J.» 24.1.23; 15.2.23; 27.3.23).

VIII. GLASS AND CHINA INDUSTRY. СТЕКОЛЬНАЯ ПРОМЫШЛЕННОСТЬ.

In thousands. Въ тысячахъ.

	Glass ware art. Разн. сорта пос. шт.	Techn. glass poods пудовъ технич. стекла	Bohem. glass, cases ящ. Бемск. стек.	Plain glass cases ящ. Полубѣл- ст.	Total poods Всего пуд.
October	3.041,3	8,4	10,3	5,6	163,5
November	4.745,4	6,5	14,1	6,8	202,2
December.....	6.212,0	22,7	14,2	7,7	242,8
January	6.100	15,4	11,1	9,2	244.7

(«E. J.» 15.2.23; 27.3.23).

IX. TOBACCO INDUSTRY. ТАБАЧНАЯ ПРОМЫШЛЕННОСТЬ.

	March- June	July	August	Sept.	Octob.	Nov.	Decem
Tobacco in thous. lbs. Табакъ въ тысяч. фунтовъ	1.488,5	74,6	37,2	48,4	185	139,4	159.2
Cigarettes in millions. Папиросъ въ милліонахъ шт.	1.893,1	394,5	640	777,6	1.100	998,8	1.195.1
Makhorka in thous. poods. Махорка въ тысяч. пудовъ.....	154,8	76,7	43,7	63,6	72,4	63,5	84.1

(«Russkaia Prom.» 1922; «E. J.» 15.2.23).

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X. METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY. МЕТАЛЛУРГИЧЕСКАЯ ПРОМЫШЛЕННОСТЬ.

Output in thousands poods. Производство въ тысячахъ пудовъ.

Months	Pig Iron Чугунъ				Marten. Мартен. произв.				Rolling. Прокатка			
	South Югъ	Urals Уралъ	Centre Центр	Total Всего	South Югъ	Urals Уралъ	Centre Центр	Total Всего	South Югъ	Urals Уралъ	Centre Центр	Total Всего
January 1922	347	498	86	931	724	732	309	1.765	697	640	321	1.658
February	252	482	141	875	618	800	215	1.633	476	477	318	1.271
March	290	539	151	980	680	605	332	1.617	323	589	?	?
April	260	416	104	780	525	697	276	1.498	527	532	127	1.186
May	425	208	165	798	720	655	292	1.667	579	580(?)	155	1.314
June	633	272	123	1.028	668	605	485	1.758	618	430	341	1.389
For the 6 months. За 2-ое полугодіе	2.207	2.415	779*	5.401*)	3.935	4.094	2.860*	10.889*)	3.220	3.248(?)	1.992*)	8.460*)
July	663	129	66	858	755	279	301	1.334	449	176	221	846
August	533	89	72	694	709	154	337	1.200	254	178	264	696
September	501	295	128	924	467	299	517	1.283	259	344	349	952
October	466	426	95	987	474	778	585	1.837	301	466	416	1.183
November	514	557	135	1.206	566	1.078	678	2.322	498	516	456	1.470
December	497	645	182	1.321	722	1.270	707	2.699	703	836	476	2.015
For the second 6 m. За 2-ое полугодіе	3.174	2.141	678	5.993	3.693	3.868	3.125	10.686	2.464	2.516	2.182	7.162
For the sec. 6 m.1921 За 2-ое полуг. 1921	1.353	1.416	455	3.224	2.219	1.275	—	3.494	4.275	2.172	637	7.084
For 1922. За 1922	5.381	4.556	1.457	11.394	7.628	7.962	5.985	21.575	5.684	5.764	4.174	15.622
For 1921. За 1921г.	1.769	4.285	997	7.051	3.241	5.700	102	9.046	5.839	5.624	1.156	12.619
January 1923	563	854	306	1.723	537	1.061	651	2.249	714	567	446	1.727
February												

*) Totals corrected according to latest information. Итоги исправлены согласно послѣднимъ даннымъ.

(«E. J.» 13.5.22; 27.6.22; 25.7.22; 5.9.22; 12.10.22; 26.1.23; 13.1.23; 24.2.23; 27.3.23)

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FOREIGN TRADE. ВНѢШНЯЯ ТОРГОВЛЯ.

Import. In thousand roubles in prices of 1913. Ввозъ. Въ тысяч. рублей по цѣнамъ 1913 г.

Groups	For the first 6m. За 1-ое полуг.	% %	For the sec. 6 m. За 2-ое полуг.	1923 January th. po. тыс. п.	1923 January th. rbs тыс. р.	1923 February th. pds тыс. п.	1923 February th. rbs тыс. р.
. Foodstuffs and animals. Жизн. припасы и животн.	59.706	21,5	33.600	153	745	154	600
II. Animal products. Животные продукты	7.150	2,6	no infor.	60	854	34	353
III. Timber and seeds. Лѣсной товаръ и сѣмена	2.936	1,1	no infor.	345	63	1.031	124
IV. Pottery. Керам. мат. и издѣл.	502	0,2	no infor.	8	32	2	15
V. Fuel, tar and prod. Топливо, смолы и проч.	2.673	0,9	no infor.	1.512	369	349	92
VI. Chemical prod. Химич. прод.	5.546	1,9	no infor.	198	1.203	279	1.731
VII. Metals and metal goods. Металлы и издѣлія	40.169	14,5	43.100	175	2.912	169	2.124
VIII. Paper and print. mater. Писчебум. тов. и печатн.	7.060	2,5	no infor.	36	161	83	219
IX. Spinning mat. and products. Прядильн. матер. и издѣлія	8.311	2,9	6.000	16	280	31	555
X. Articles of clothing. Предметы одѣянія	18.736	6,7	no infor.	3	300	3	276
Total	152.789	54,8	121.000	2.505	6.919	2.134	6.090
Import of «Pomgol» Ввозъ «Помгола»	125.530	45.2	no infor.	442	7.410	370	4.248
Grand total	278.319	100	no infor.	2.947	14.329	2.504	10.338

Monthly Imports. Ввозъ по мѣсяцамъ.

Months	Total imports exlud. «Pomg» Весь ввозъ безъ «Помгол» thous. poods. тысяч. пудовъ	Total imports exlud. «Pomg» Весь ввозъ безъ «Помгол» thous. roubles тысяч. рублей	Imports of «Pomgol» Ввозъ «Помгола» thous. poods тысяч. пудовъ	Imports of «Pomgol» Ввозъ «Помгола» thous. roubles тысяч. рублей
January	3.930	11.034	1.527	11.780
February	4.200	11.954	4.365	10.830
March	9.842	16.462	6.695	10.902
April	15.490	39.410	5.793	23.409
May	18.222	40.595	8.433	44.206
June	14.814	34.445	4.820	24.014
For the first 6 mon. За 1 полуг.	66.484	152.788	31.633	125.145
July	12.397	24.351		
August	14.686	22.439		
September	10.444	24.082	1.006	9.233
October	12.393	24.601	1.227	8.190
November	6.882	14.381	672	6.338
December	3.377	11.595		
For the sec. 6 mon. За 2 полугод.	60.179	121.449		
For the second 6 months 1921 За 2-ое полугодіе 1921 г.	41.008	101.100	2.928	
For 1922. За 1922 годъ	126.663	274.237		
For 1921. За 1921 годъ	52.174	210.600	3.132	
January 1923	2.505	6.919	442	7.410
February	2.134	6.090	370	4.248

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Export. Вывозъ. The total export during 1922, in mill. roubles. Весь вывозъ за 1922, въ милл. рублей.

Groups	1922 millions roubles	1923			
		January		February	
		tthous. p.	thous. roub	thous. pood	thous. roub
I. Food stuffs. Жизнен. припас.	4,2	175	317	2.330	2.382
II. Raw materials. Сырье	74,1	3.200	4.126	2.297	3.637
III. Animals. Животныя	0,2	—	—	—	—
IV. Manufact. goods. Гот. изд.	3,1	18	90	8	75
Total	81,6	3.393	4.533	4.635	6.094

Monthly Exports. Вывозъ по мѣсяцамъ.

Months	Thous. poods Тысяч. пуд.	Thous. roubl. Тысяч. руб.
January	1.037	4.447
February	205	1.675
March	461	2.708
April	1.534	4.506
May	7.337	7.407
June	4.189	4.105
For the 6 mon. За 1-ое полугодіе	14.763	24.848
July	4.827	7.992
August	9.152	13.653
September	8.249	7.273
October	10.295	12.107
November	4.650	9.190
December	4.418	6.636
For the sec. 6 mon. За 2-ое полуг.	41.591	56.851
For tte sec. 6 m months 1921. За 2-ое полугодіе 1921 года	10.360	17.000
Total for 1922. За 1922 годъ	56.354	81.699
Total for 1921. За 1921 годъ	12.963	20.100
January 1923	3.393	4.533
February	4.635	6.094

Export according to countries of destination. Вывозъ по странамъ назначенія.

Countries of destination Страны назначенія	In thousand poods Въ тысяч. пудовъ	In thousand roubles Въ тысячахъ рублей		
	For the first 6months За 1-ое пол.	First 6 mon За 1-ое полугодіе	Sec. 6 mon. За 2-ое полугодіе	Total for 1922 За 1922 г.
Great Britain	2.257	5.541	(19.559)	25.100
Germany	279	1.104	(13.596)	14.700
Holland	149	65	other count	проч. стр.
Latvia	3.438	5.704	(4.796)	10.500
Persia	135	837	(363)	1.200
Poland	142	985	(1.815)	2.800
Turkey	1.225	4.041	(6.859)	10.900
Finland	5.108	2.887	(613)	3.500
Esthonia	1.775	3.530	(4.170)	7.700
Other countries	254	156	(4.979)	5.200
Total	14.763	24.850	(56.750)	81.600

(«E. J.» 9.11.22; 10.11.22; 25.2.23; 21.2.23; 11.3.23; 11.4.23; 9.12.22).

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Export o: Naphtha during the calendar year 1922, in 1.000 poods: kerosene — 4.815; bensine — 2.873; oils — 3.091; oil fuel — 588; various products of naphtha — 88; total — 11.455. The export in 1922 amounts to 20 p. cent. of that of 1913 (56 mil. poods). («E. J.» 7.3.23). According to countries of destination, the exports were distributed as follows (in 1.000 poods): Gr. Britain — 6.379; Germany — 2.730; Persia — 915; France — 510; Turkey — 463; Hungary — 248; Latvia — 113; Belgium — 93; Sweden — 2; Finland — 0.6.

Timber trade. During the navigation of 1922, about 105.000 standards of various timber were exported through the White Sea ports, including 90.000 standards shipped by the «Sieverolies» trust. Of the timber exported by the «Sieverolies» about 1/3 (25.000 standards) was newly sawed. The freights cost 62 million roubles per standard. The sale price c. i. f. U. K. was £25-12-0 per standard for new and £20 for old sawing. Sawed timber formed 90 p. cent. and round timber — 10 p. cent. of the quantity exported. The distribution of shipments among various ports was as follows: 1) Archangel — 48.150 standards, 99.160 trees and 110.000 sleepers; 2) Mezen — 16.350 standards; 3) Oniega — 11.027 standards; 4) Soroki — 6.319 standards; 5) Kovda — 4.872 standards; 6) Petchora — 4.833 standards; 7) Keret — 1.989 standards.

According to countries of destination: 1) Gr. Britain — 66.947 stand. and 104.114 sleepers; 2) Holland — 17.510 stand, 96.160 round trees and 6.105 sleepers; 3) France — 6.252 standards; 4) Belgium — 1.655 stand.; 5) Norway — 1.176 stand. and 3.000 trees. («E. J.» 9.3.23).

Экспортъ нефти. За 1922 календар. годъ въ тысяч. пудовъ: керосинъ — 4.815, бензинъ — 2.873, маселъ — 3.091, нефтетоплива — 588, разн. нефт. прод. — 88, всего — 11.455. Экспортъ 22 г. составляетъ 20% отъ 13 г. (56 милл. пуд.). («Эк. Ж.» 7.3.23). По странамъ назначенія (въ тысяч. пудовъ): Англія — 6.379, Германія — 2.730, Персія — 915, Франція — 510, Турція — 463, Венгрія — 248, Латвія — 113, Бельгія — 93, Швеція — 2, Финляндія — 0,6.

Лѣсная торговля. Въ навигацію 22 г. черезъ Бѣломорскіе порты вывезено около 105 тыс. стандарт. всякаго лѣса. (въ томъ числѣ Сѣверолѣсъ — 90 тысяч. стандарт.). Изъ этого количества свѣжей распиловки Сѣверолѣсъ вывезъ около 1/3 (25 тыс. станд.). Фрахтъ обходился 62 милл. со стандарта. Продажная цѣна сиф. Н. К. £25.12.0 за станд. свѣжаго распила и £20 стараго. Пиленаго отправлено 90% и круглаго 10%.

По отдѣльнымъ портамъ отправка изъ: 1) Архангельска — 48.150 станд., 99.160 шт. бревенъ и 110.000 шпалъ; 2) Мезени — 16.350 станд.; 3) Онѣги — 11.027 станд.; 4) Сорокъ — 6.319 станд.; 5) Ковды — 4.872 станд.; 6) Печоры — 4.833 станд. и 7) Керети — 1.989 станд. По странамъ назначенія въ: 1) Англію — 66.947 станд. и 104.114 шпалъ; 2) Голландію — 17.510 станд, 96.160 шт. бревенъ и 6.105 шпалъ; 3) Францію — 6.252 станд.; 4) Бельгію — 1.655 станд.; 5) Норвегію — 1.176 станд. и 3.000 бревенъ («Эк. Ж.» 9.3.23).

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